

**PUBLIC LAND GRABBING AND LOCAL RESISTANCE IN  
AJODA NEW TOWN, IBADAN, NIGERIA**

**HENRY UCHE OBUENE  
ND (EDE), B.Sc., M.Sc. (IBADAN),  
MATRIC NO.: 106603**

**A Thesis in the Department of Sociology  
Submitted to the Faculty of The Social Sciences  
In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of**

**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

**of the**

**UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN**

**IBADAN, NIGERIA**

## ABSTRACT

Land grabbing entails acquisition of more than 200 hectares from an indigenous population irrespective of payment or compensation. It is a global phenomenon usually executed by commercial enterprises. In Nigeria, Public Land Grabbing (PLG) is perpetrated by the state using the provision of 1978 Land Use Act. One of such cases is Ajoda New Town (ANT). Land grabbing for ANT has generated local resistance. Research on public land grabbing mostly focuses on livelihood challenges of dispossessed landowners with little attention paid to local resistance. This study therefore examined PLG's colonial foundations, the processes of PLG for ANT, the subsequent local resistance and relations between the indigenous land owners (*omo-onile*) and land allottee-residents in ANT, Ibadan.

Accumulation by Dispossession Theory guided the study, while the exploratory design was adopted. Historical data were sourced from the National Archives, Ibadan, while respondents were purposively selected. Key informant interviews conducted with traditional chiefs (3), family heads of indigenous land owners (4), allottee-residents (2), government officials (3), youth representative (1), chairman of landlords' association (1), residents (2) and indigenous landlords (2). In-depth interview sessions were held with allottee-residents (10), indigenous landowners (10) and Counsellor (1). Two focus group discussion sessions were held with indigenous land owners, while three case studies were held with indigenous land owner (1), allottee-resident (1) and illegal occupier (1). Secondary data were sourced from newspapers and judicial compilations. Data were content analysed.

The colonial authorities formalised PLG through the instrumentality of Native Authority systems, ordinances, gazettes and deeds of conveyance. The processes of PLG for ANT commenced in 1976, when the military government set up a committee on the decongestion of Ibadan. The committee recommended the acquisition of 1200 hectares at Egbeda for the establishment of ANT as a residential and industrial estate. Then, the dislodged indigenous owners were compensated on land and crops. Later, the government enacted the Land Use Decree of 1978 and further acquired 3800 hectares for ANT, but compensated only on crops. The indigenous owners viewed non-compensation on land as exploitation and 'theft' of patrimonial possession. They subsequently deployed violent protest (road blocks, ambush of civil servants and allottees, removal of beacons and attacks on and destruction of building sites). Economic protest included sand mining, land resale, collection of tolls from on-site government officials and allottees for weed clearing (*owó iwogbó*) and collection of charges for construction (*owóomo-onilè*). Indigenous landowners also instituted civil protests through multiple court cases and protest letters. The symbolic protests were placement of charms (*igà*) and rendering of curses (*èpè*) on allocated land and allottees to ensure non-accomplishment (*eti*) of building projects. Allottee-residents repurchased their land from the indigenous landowners and deliberately maintained peaceful relations and co-existence with them for fear of attacks.

Public land grabbing for Ajoda New Town provoked resistance from the indigenous population because of the application of the 1978 Land Use Decree which alienated and denied them land compensation. Amicable dialogues on the compensation processes are recommended.

**Keywords:** Public land grabbing, Patrimonial possession, Local resistance in Ajoda New Town, Oyo state, Nigeria,

**Word count:** 489

## CERTIFICATION

We hereby certify that this thesis was carried out by Obuene Henry Uche with Matric No. 106603 of the Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria under our supervisions.

.....

.....

*Supervisor*

**DR. A. O. OMOBOWALE**

*B. Sc., M. Sc., P.hD (Ibadan)*  
Department of Sociology,  
University of Ibadan,  
Ibadan, Nigeria

.....

.....

*Co-Supervisor*

**DR. O. AKANLE**

*B. Sc., M. Sc., P.hD (Ibadan)*  
Department of Sociology,  
University of Ibadan,  
Ibadan, Nigeria

## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this thesis to my late father, Mr Samuel Anwili Obuene. How would it have gladdened you seeing me achieving this feat of my academic career? But, to God be the glory. You are greatly missed and continue to rest in the bosom of the Lord.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To every purpose under the heaven and the earth, there is time and season (Ecc.1:3). I thank God for endowing me with the enabling Grace that sustained me all through this programme. I thank him for grace, mercy, provisions, protection and at long last, giving me rest round about. The experience was indeed a memorable one in the course of the programme. As quoted that many are the afflictions of the righteous, but the Lord delivers him out of them all (Ps 34:19). Also, in the light of this, I was not consumed during the programme because of his mercy (Lam 3: 22). So, I really thank God for his mercies and grace all round.

I use this medium to appreciate my departmental fathers: Professors Emeka E. Maduka Okafor and Akinpelu O. Olutayo for their uncommon love, interests and advice they provided me at every point of the programme. They were instruments used by the Almighty God to rescue me in the face of the challenges. The Almighty God will reward you abundantly. I also extend my unalloyed gratitude to my amiable supervisors, Drs. Ayokunle O. Omobowale and Olayinka Akanle who in the midst of the storm paddled the canoe with my departmental fathers to sail me through in the course of the programme. I say big thank you sirs. Your blessings will know no bound in this world in Jesus name. Amen. In addition, I salute every of my teachers that I may not be able to mention both in the department and outside department. Thank you all.

To my mother and siblings, I appreciate you all for your encouragement and blessings in different dimensions. I thank you for the love shown to me at the very early stage of my life, which still keeps me going despite all odds. I thank you for the good faith and confidence you have in me till date. May the Lord in his infinite mercy perfect everything that concerns us all in Jesus name. Amen.

I sincerely appreciate my wife and children for their undiluted love, endurance, sacrifices in various ways and their painstaking time with me even when I was supposed to be at home; I still found myself working to make this programme a reality. We shall all reap the fruits of the reward in Jesus name.

To my colleagues in the department, I appreciate our togetherness and inspirations drawn from you in many angles at different point in time. I tell you, we need one another. Thank you. Also, I thank every of my research assistants (especially to Mr Sola Faleye) for their painstaking efforts in making this research a success. To all the participants of this research, I say a big thank you to all. Indeed, this work would not have been a complete project without you. Once again, I appreciate you all. Ese pupo! I express my profound gratitude to Favour CICSManager and staff, UCH, Ibadan, I deeply appreciate you. You were never tired of my presence whenever I needed to show up. I thank you all.

Finally, I return all the glory to God because he made it happen at his best time. I am like the green olive tree that is still growing in the world and vineyard of God, and I trust in the mercy of God forever and ever. I will extoll thee forever because thou has done it; and I will continually wait on your name, for it is good before thy saints (Ps 52: 8-9). Once again, to the most high, I say thank you.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Pages
Title page.....	i
Abstract.....	ii
Certification.....	iii
Dedication .....	iv
Acknowledgements.....	v
Table of Contents.....	.vii
List of Figures .....	x
<b>CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION</b>	
1.0 Backgroundto the study.....	1
1.1 Statement of the problem.....	6
1.2 Research questions.....	7
1.3 Objectives of the study.....	8
1.4 Justification of the study.....	8
1.5 Operationalization of concepts.....	9
<b>CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK</b>	
2.0 Introduction.....	11
2.1 Land grabbing: A conceptual discourse.....	11
2.2 Elitist acquisition through land grabbing.....	15
2.3 Land grabbing and resistance.....	18
2.4 Land grabbing in Africa.....	22
2.5 Public land acquisitions and development.....	25
2.6 Relationship between states, locals and residents.....	27
2.7 A Summary of Land Use Act of 1978.....	29
2.8 Theoretical framework.....	30
2.8.1 Accumulation by Dispossession theory.....	30

### **CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

3.0	Introduction.....	34
3.1	Research design.....	34
3.2	Area of study.....	34
	Map of the study area.....	36
3.3	Study population.....	37
3.4	Sampling technique.....	37
3.5	Methods of data collection.....	37
3.5.1	Primary sources.....	37
3.5.2	Secondary sources.....	38
3.5.3	Archival source.....	38
3.5.4	Observation.....	38
3.5.5	Key informant interview (KII).....	38
3.5.6	In-depth interview (IDI).....	39
3.5.7	Focus group discussion (FGD).....	39
3.5.8	Case study (CS).....	40
3.5	Methodology matrix (A).....	41
3.5	Methodology matrix (B).....	42
3.6	Methods of data analyses.....	43
3.7	Ethical consideration.....	43

### **CHAPTER FOUR: RESULT AND DISCUSSION**

4.0	A Histo-Sociological narratives of land grabbing in Ibadan.....	44
4.1.1	The emergence of pre-colonial Ibadan, its war machinery and land grabbing.....	45
4.1.2	Colonialism and land tenure in Ibadan under the native authority.....	49
4.1.3	Land grabbing under colonial authority.....	55
4.2	The process of land grabbing at Ajoda.....	62
4.2.0	Introduction.....	62
4.2.1	Urban congestion and public policy.....	62
	Map of Ibadan region showing Ajoda new town.....	65
4.2.2	Ajoda land acquisition.....	67



4.2.3	Compensation to and resettlement plan for indigenous landowners.....	70
4.3.0	Resistance against land grabbing.....	78
4.3.1	Resistance socialisation and the actual resistance.....	79
4.3.2	Effectiveness of resistance.....	100
4.4.1	Relationship between government and landowners.....	109
4.5.1	Relationship between indigenous landowners and residents.....	117
4.5.2	Case study approaches.....	125
	Case study Box 1.....	125
	Case study Box 2.....	126
	Case study Box 3.....	127
4.5.3	Demolition report of houses at Ajoda.....	128
<b>CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION</b>		
5.0	Introduction.....	133
5.1	Summary.....	133
5.2	Conclusion.....	138
5.3	Recommendation.....	141
5.4	Contributions to knowledge.....	142
	References.....	143
	Appendices .....	160

## LIST OF FIGURES

Plate showing Map of Ajoda New-Town.....	36
Plate showing Map of Ibadan Region indicating ANT.....	65
Plate showing the effect of Sand mining in ANT .....	91
Plate showing vehicle transporting sand Ajoda New-Town.....	92
Plate showing the effect of sand mining in ANT.....	93
Plate showing the sign-post of ANT secretariat.....	105
Plate showing the aesthetics of ANTsecretariat.....	106
Plate showing the entrance to ANT secretariat.....	107
Plate showing sign post of one of the institutes occupying the secretariat before.....	108
Plate showing the Pace setter estate at Ajoda New-Town.....	124
Plate showing one of the demolished buildings at Fashade in Ajoda New-Town.....	130
Plate showing one of the demolished buildings at Ajule in Ajoda New-Town.....	131
Plate showing one of the demolished buildings at Ajule in Ajoda New-Town.....	132
Plate showing a key informant interview with a participant .....	164
Plate showing a key informant interview with a participant .....	165
Plate showing a key informant interview with a family head .....	166
Plate showing an in-depth interview with a participant.....	167
Plate showing a female FGD interview session with the indigenous landowners.....	168
Plate showing a male FGD interview session with the indigenous landowners.....	169
Plate showing an in-depth interview with an allottee-resident .....	170

Plate showing an in-depth interview with a participant .....	171
Plate showing a key informant interview with a participant .....	172
Plate showing Egbeda Local Government secretariat .....	173
Plate showing a case-study interview with an indigenous participant .....	174
Plate showing a key informant interview with a traditional chief .....	175
Plate showing the under developed state of ANT.....	176
Plate showing a controversial land at ANT.....	177
Plate showing a dispersed type of development at ANT.....	178
Plate showing an in-depth interview with a participant.....	179
Plate showing a key informant interview with a participant .....	180
Plate showing a land resold by the indigenous landowners.....	181
Plate showing an undeveloped state of ANT.....	182
Plate showing an in-depth interview with an allottee that never came back.....	183
Plate showing an in-depth interview with an allottee-resident .....	184
Plate showing an in-depth interview with an allottee-resident .....	185
Plate showing a key informant interview with a participant .....	186
Plate showing a case study interview with a resident.....	187
Plate showing a key informant interview with a participant.....	188

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.0 Background to the study**

Land grabbing has become a global concern (Cotula, Vermeulen, Leonard and Keeley, 2009; Borras and Franco, 2010; Cotula and Lorenzo, 2012). It has become a long standing phenomenon dating back to pre-colonial period (Bukar, 2014). To a large extent, land-grabbing usually involves substantial areas of land taken away from people by either the government or orchestrated by both the government and large conglomerates (Klopp, 2000; Ocheje, 2007; Nuhu, 2008; Scoones, 2009; Borras, 2012; Odoemene, 2014). Land grabbing involves acquisitions of land despite local resistance. In terms of measurability, land grabbing refers to acquisitions of 200 hectares and above by the privileged individuals, groups, corporations and governments (Klopp 2000, Scoones, 2009; Oxfam report, 2012). However, Odoemene, (2014) posits that not every deal for a land investment is a ‘land grab’<sup>1</sup>. He argues that the local context and the processes undertaken are important in order to ascertain how land was acquired<sup>2</sup>. Land grab is thus, when force is used to take ownership of land, even in the name of legal authority, at the expense of local consent and consequent survival of the dispossessed (see also Attah, 2013 and Ridell, 2013). In *Ajoda*, 5000 ha of land were acquired by the Oyo state government for the purpose of developing a new-town (Technical Reports on *Ajoda* New Town, Volume 3, pg. 2, April, 1978). This study therefore, aligns with these definitions of land grabbing as stated above. Land grabbing frequently triggers conflict, occurs in a similar pattern of displacing the poor, peasants and indigenous peoples of the land and means of survival (Franco, Levidow, Fig, Goldfarb, Hönicke and Mendonça, 2010; Odoemene, 2014). Public land acquisitions imply situations whereby vast areas of large lands are acquired

---

<sup>1</sup> For a more detailed discussion on land grabbing, see Borras et al. 2011, Attah, 2013

<sup>2</sup> To him, the context will include issues like Free, Prior, Informed Consent (FPIC)

from the locals by government(s) for the purpose of public development or appropriating such lands to “powerful” individuals for the purpose of harnessing wealth; all in the name of public development (Ocheje, 2007; Nuhu, 2008; Odoemene, 2012; Attah, 2013).

Public land acquisitions could come with or without compensation (Beckman, 1988; Klopp, 2000; Nyambara, 2001; Southall, 2005; Franco, 2008; Odoemene, 2012 and Attah, 2013). In Nigeria, public land acquisitions is backed by law through the instrumentality of Land Use Act of 1978 which puts control over all lands on the president and/or the governor as the case may be (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990; Nuhu, 2008). Through this Act, indigenous land is continually appropriated and allocated to privileged individuals and groups in the society (Beckman, 1998; Mendie, Atser and Ofem, 2010; Attah, 2013). Also, it is important to note that land grabbing in the pre and post Land Use Act of 1978 has not come without some resistance and protests by indigenous owners (Ocheje, 2007; Ako, 2009; Nwabueze, 2009). There are a few government housing estates in Oyo state, but *Ajoda* has remained largely contentious. The historical narratives of the *Ajoda* new-town emanated from the establishment of infrastructure development in Ibadan. For example, the notion of *Ajoda* new-town was conceived when Ibadan was experiencing a tremendous population growth and confronted with diverse developmental challenges like housing, unemployment, traffic, congestion in schools, hospital and other social facilities. *Ajoda* new-town site was then initiated by the Oyo state Ministry of Land and Housing with the aim of extending development and decongesting Ibadan metropolis (*Ajoda New-Town Master Plan, 1978, Adediran, 1984; Onibokun, 1988*). Yet, actualising these proposals by the Oyo State Government has provoked resistance by the indigenous land owners. This research, therefore, studies local resistance to public land grabbing in Oyo state, Nigeria.

Land grabbing cut across different regions of the world. In Latin America, the major players in land grabbing are often the government(s), private firms and individuals who speculate for vast tract of arable land for agriculture, agro-fuel and private investment often transacted across countries from mostly poor and peasantry (Borras, Franco, Gomez, Kay and Spoor, 2012; Daniel, 2012). Land grabbing manifests at a fast pace and in some cases, it results in dispossession with little or no compensation to victims (Borras, Gomez,

Kay and Wilkinson, 2012). For example, land grabbing in Colombia is seen as conflict-related dynamics, where violent processes of marginalisation and expropriation of the locals are often connected. For example, in the case of Tayrona National Natural Park in Colombia, an ecotourism centre, there were local violent resistances following the acquisition of land for the park (Ojeda, 2012). Furthermore, Wilkinson, Reydon and Sabbato (2012) highlighted that land grabbing in Brazil was orchestrated by the government in connection with foreign investors who acquire lands for the purpose of agricultural and forestry commodities. Studies also revealed that many countries are currently experiencing relatively high level of land grabbing in Latin America and the Caribbean. These are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay; others are Panama, Mexico and Nicaragua (Cotula, Vermeulen, Leonard and Keeley, 2009; Borras, Franco, Kay, Spoor, 2011; Hall 2011; Borras, Franco, Gómez, Kay and Spoor, 2011; De Schutter, 2011; Daniel, 2012).

Land grabbing is rarely considered a problem for Europeans or a cause of struggle in Europe especially in contemporary times (Borras, Franco, Kay, Spoor, 2011). However, the various channels by which land grabbing are put to play either by the government, powerful and influential individuals and private conglomerates are mainly found in former socialist European states (Poyry and Maury, 2010). In post-soviet Eurasia, land grabbing is largely carried out by the elites, government(s) and investors (Visser and Spoor, 2011; Mamonava, 2012; Visser, Mamonava and Spoor, 2012). For example, due to large fertile land reserves in Russia, government took the advantage of the 2002 land code decree to go into land investment and also made land attractive to investors for the purpose of carrying out private investments (Visser, Mamonova, Spoor, 2012). This act provoked a protest by the rural social movements against the government (Visser, Mamonova, Spoor, 2012). However, a limited success was achieved as a result. Consequently, the locals or the original land owners easily lost prime lands and were evicted from their ancestral lands (Borras, Franco, Gomez, Kay and Spoor, 2012). Another factor that gave rise to land grabbing in Eastern Europe is the rise in population growth rate. As usual, the powerful few are in control of large corporate holdings on large tracts of land. Thus, they undermine the capacity of many farming households to independently fend for their livelihoods (Bouniol, 2013).

In Asia, land grabbing has sparked off many conflicts such as revolutions and revolts in the past centuries (Manahan, 2011). The mode of land grabbing in the continent has been by stylistic methods whereby the state's role as independent governing body has been transformed into a capitalist body; in the process, national laws were manipulated for selfish gains (Guha, 2004; Barnerjee, 2006; Amr, 2006; Basu, 2007; Bhaduri, 2007; Levien, 2011). Hence, there is a common interest of profit making between government and private individuals and companies regarding land grabbing. Most times, land grabbing is, therefore, done in the name of development (Guha, 2004; Basu, 2007; Ocheje, 2007; Cotula and Lorenzo, 2012). Thus, land grabbing in this region is not in any way different from what is obtainable in any other parts of the world. The pattern has been in form of ejection of many poor residents/ farmers including peasants, indigenous people, landless agricultural workers, rural women and pastoralists from their lands and shared territories (Randall, 2009; Borrás, Franco, Gomez, Kay and; Lopata, 2013). As such, most of the land grabbing orchestrated has led to the peasants' struggling with the government. For example, in India's West Bengal, the government acquired 1,000 acres of prime agricultural land in Singur of Hooghly district for setting up a motor car plant by Tata motors. This resulted to local resistance against the move by the government in the district (Guha, 2004; Barnerjee, 2006; Bhaduri, 2007; Guha, 2007; Kumar-Bose, 2007; Gonslaves, 2010).

In Africa, the colonial dispensation witnessed huge forms of land grabbing (Uchendu, 1979; Gyasi, 1994; Moyo, 2000; Klopp, 2000; Ayoub, 2006; Ocheje, 2007; Mendie, Atser and Ofem, 2010; Bukar, 2014; Arowosegbe, 2016). In Africa, land grabbing is perpetrated by foreign investors often through the government. This is against the backdrop and believes that Africa possesses arable lands which lie fallow and under-utilised (Cotula, Lorenzo, Vermeulen, and Keeley, 2009). For these reasons, international land investors consider land in Africa very cheap to obtain, irrespective of the consequences of such massive land acquisitions on the original land owners/locals; all in the anticipation of bridging the gaps of food insecurity, agro-biofuel and speculations for investments (Cotula, et al., 2009; Borrás et al., 2011; Klopp, 2000; Pantuliano, 2007). As practised in advanced countries, land grabbing in Africa still follows similar pattern of forceful acquisitions and the real key players range from government(s), trans-

government, corporate bodies and private individuals who acquire massive land in order to achieve their selfish desired goals (Attah, 2013; Odoemene, 2014). For example, Moreda and Spoor (2015) highlighted that land grabbing is a political game perpetrated by the federal, regional state elites' and corporate elites in Ethiopia. Here, elites manipulate the rules and practices of land tenure to design land communities in order to suit and favour them for building up power or wealth which is frequently associated with conflict. In Kenya, land grabbing mostly takes the form of privatizing public lands by the government, which also stimulated popular resistance against massive land acquisitions and often considered as 'corruption' (Klopp, 2000; McLennon, 2011 and Muchangi, 2011).

In Nigeria, one of the recent and government land grabbing transpired between Zimbabwean White Commercial Farmers Unions of South Africa and indigenes of Kwara State where lands were given out freely and without the consent of the locals by Kwara state government (Attah, 2013). Another land grabbing experience was between a United States firm called Dominion Farmers and Taraba state government (Odoemene, 2012 and Attah, 2013). The land transaction was also meant for rice production but at the expense of the locals. This amounts to their being dispossessed of their ancestral land. Therefore, this generated a severe resistance against the state government. Also, another incident of land grabbing was between Ollam International, an Asian agro-business and Nassarawa state government. The land was acquired massively for the production of rice. This resulted to depriving and evicting of locals from their ancestral terrain (Odoemene, 2012 and Attah, 2013). The Bakolori Irrigation Project in Sokoto state mainly constructed for water supply into Bakolori project resulted in loss of massive farm lands belonging to several farmers located in the flooded Bakolori reservoir without the consent of the local farmers concerned. This, at the same time, led to expropriation of about 13,000 families on their ancestral land which induced severe local resistance while about 386 people were feared dead (Odeyemi, 1982). This prompted the state government to compensate victims who were dispossessed of their lands (Beckman, 1988; Adams, 1988; Sumit 1990; Yahaya, 2002). Based on this back drop, these land grabbing occurrences have not been without resistance in *Ajoda*. The focus of this study, therefore, is to examine local resistance in *Ajoda* in Oyo state.



## 1.2 Statement of the Problem

Land grabbing activities can be traced to the pre-colonial era (Bukar, 2014). However, the indigenous state actors replicated the legacy as gained from the colonial masters even after their independence to perpetrate land grabbing at the expense of locals (Uchendu, 1979; Gyasi, 1994; Mendie, Atser and Ofem, 2010; Bukar, 2014; Arowosegbe, 2016). In post-independence era, the nature of government-local relations has witnessed significant change, with indigenous administrators taking control over the positions formerly held by the whites. Thus, most of these transitions witnessed a thin communal relation between the administrators and the governed (Tshuma, 1995; Olutayo, 1999; Nyambara, 2001; Momba, 2007 and Raikes, 2008). Over time, the power of the locals has been greatly reduced due to the emergent legislation which supports the deprivation of the locals (Beckman, 1988; Ajayi, 2001; Ocheje, 2007; Nuhu, 2008; Ako, 2009; Nwabueze, 2009). Also, land grabbing activities are creating more poverty and increase rate of job loss (Acharya, 2003; Cotula, et al, 2009; Borrás et al, 2011; Aabo and Kring, 2012). This is simply made possible by the dispossession and alienation of land from the locals; only for the few in power to benefit from the land grabbing activities while suppressing the resistance of the locals through the state instrument (Grajales, 2013; Attah, 2013 and Odoemene, 2015). For example, late Chief Obafemi Awolowo identified that when the white men left, they left the bourgeoisie who continued to use the capitalist ideas to suppress the resistance of the locals through government policy (Udoko, 1993; Momoh, 1996). Hence, the study attempts to investigate the historical frames and contemporary public land grabbing for estate development in Ajoda, Ibadan.

There is extensive literature on land grabbing which has increasingly gained the attention of scholars (see Barnerjee, 2006; Amr, 2006; Ocheje, 2007; Borrás and Franco, 2010; De Schutter, 2011; Bukar, 2014). Existing literature have largely focused on the trend of land grabbing particularly in the use of land for biofuel, agriculture, irrigation construction (Hall 2011; Borrás, Franco, Gómez, Kay and Spoor, 2011; De Schutter, 2011; Attah, 2013; Odoemene, 2014; Bukar, 2014). For instance, scholars like Ocheje (2007), Cotula, Vermeulen, Leonard and Keeley, 2009, De Schutter, 2009, Runk (2012), Borrás, Franco, Gomez, Kay and Spoor, 2012, Attah (2013), Oyalowo and Kadiri (2013), Odoemene (2013, 2014 and 2015) discuss the human right aspect of land grabbing where

the expression on code of conduct and conditions such as free, prior and informed consent of the locals are expatiated. Likewise, Archaya, 2003; Whitehead and Tsikata (2003); Behrman, Meinzen-Dick and Quisumbing (2012); Borras and Franco, (2013) and Verma, (2014) discuss the gender aspect of land grabbing with regards to expropriation of women attached to their ancestral land. Also, Wolford, Borras, Hall, Scoones and White (2013) discuss land grabbing in the light of political ecology and cultural politics elucidating that states are never in agreement with the indigenes in the processes of land grabbing. Presently, the trajectory of land grabbing by the government(s) and agencies, private individuals and companies or conglomerates has opened up a new vista of prevalent reaction among the locals (Attah, 2013). Resistance to land grabbing is significant because it creates stability of political economy in the experienced community (Klopp, 2002; Wolford, 2004; Basu, 2007; Palmer, 2011; White, Borras, Hall, Scoones and Wolford, 2012). To this end, pockets of resistance have been witnessed in *Ajoda* new-town which has not been well documented and this has implications for policy making, social empowerment and legislation. Also, this study seeks to proffer answers to forms of resistance that has been generated and the implication(s) of the resistance in *Ajoda* new-town. Hence, it tries to identify the nexus between land grabbing, resistance and socio-relations in *Ajoda* new-town.

Preliminary investigation by this researcher revealed that despite the long standing land grabbing activities in *Ajoda* new-town, which was close to forty years (that is, 1978), the resistance by the locals has not been investigated empirically. Also, land grabbing activities have negatively affected the localities and the victims of land grabbing as the cases are both in the court of law. Further actions on the acquired lands in question are subject of litigation. All these actions have really attracted the attention of the public and as a result, have deep sociological significance. Thus, the study is designed to understand the intricacies of the local resistance in relation to public land grabbing in *Ajoda* community in Ibadan. The following research questions are therefore generated:

### **1.3 Research Questions**

1. What is the land grabbing experience of the indigenous population?
2. How do locals resist land grabbing?

#### **1.4 Objectives of the study**

The general objective of the study is to examine local resistance to land grabbing in selected government estates in Ibadan. However, the specific objectives are to:

1. Investigate the pre-colonial and colonial historical precedents of land grabbing in Ibadan
2. Examine the processes of land grabbing for *Ajoda* new town by the government of Oyo state
3. Probe the resistance of the indigenous owners against land grabbing
4. Examine relations between government and indigenous land owners in the event of land grabbing
5. Examine the relationship between indigenous land owners and residents

#### **1.5 Justification of the study**

The study attempted to focus on the locals' resistance which has received marginal scholarly investigation. Thus, it revealed how the locals in the community resisted land grabbing in *Ajoda* new-town. Furthermore, the justification of the study is evident as it explicates the cause and effect syndrome of land grabbing and its attendant resistance by the locals to the public. This is in the light of the fact that nothing just happens by chance in sociology but deeply rooted in socio-political and cultural milieu. One of the essentials of the study was tailored towards negotiation for peace, security and development. The dispossession of the locals' lands in their community could result in the breakdown of their cultural ties and crave a new lifestyles imposed on them. This, however, could initiate conflict among the locals in their communities leading to resisting any governmental initiatives as the case may be.

Human interaction of any community is very essential as this could factor many achievements especially in the area of community development. Hence, the study was designed in such a way that it exposes the form of relationship co-existing among the locals and residents of the *Ajoda* new town in Ibadan. This was done in an anticipation of evaluating the factors that necessitated the release of the grabbed land in *Ajoda* new town by the locals to Oyo state government. Moreover, the study will add to the body of

literature on how and why land grabbing occurs in the parochial trajectory of most communities especially in *Ajoda* new-town in Oyo state, Nigeria.

The study also addressed the potency of resistance by the locals signifying that no action is deemed irrelevant and the various means by which resistance was carried out. This in a way has attracted scholarly discourse in the light of land grabbing particularly in south-west, Nigeria. Lastly, land grabbing as a practice has exacerbated largely in the contemporary times. Also, the dynamics of land grabbing have mostly been seen in sharp practices especially among the '*Omo-oniles*'. However, the government mode of land grabbing for a new town in *Ajoda* seems to have remained largely silent. Thus, this alludes to the fact of having a deeper understanding of the old and historical form of land grabbing which this study unveiled.

## 1.6 Operationalization of Concepts

**Public land grabbing:** this simply states the acquisitions of lands by the government away from the indigenous owners irrespective of the consequences it might have on the former. They take similar form in operation and are usually carried out by the government, private individuals, and corporations mostly in the name of development.

**Indigenous owners:** these are the set of people that lay aboriginal claims to the grabbed land. They see the land belonging to them based on their settlement on the land, which started from the old generations of their fore-fathers.

**Residents:** these are the category of people that purchased a plot or more from the indigenous owners/government or by transfer from anybody and are already living in the community.

**Elitist acquisitions:** this refers to land acquisitions by the privileged individuals or groups in the society. They have influence on land acquisitions consequent on the connections, positions, wealth and status being achieved by them (Rose, 2002 and Harvey, 2008).

**Land grabbing resistance:** this is a form of any activity undertaken by the indigenous land owners to show their objections against the grabbed land by the government.

Resistance, according to scholars may take forms like protest which may be violent/non-violent, court or remaining passive/silent or leaving it for God to judge.

**Allottees:** these are the category of individuals who had been allocated land by the government but never went into the community to develop the landed property as a result of the resistance that emanated by the indigenous land owners against the state government land grabbing.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

#### 2.0 Introduction

This section reviews relevant literature around the subject matter of the study. Literature was reviewed on, the conceptual discourse of land grabbing, elitist acquisitions through land grabbing, land grabbing and resistance, and land grabbing in Africa.

#### 2.1 Land Grabbing: A Conceptual Discourse

In an era of food crisis, climate change and energy revolutions, there have been contestations on land related issues (Borras and Franco, 2010). Apparently, land grabbing is not a new phenomenon but the contemporary discourse has a tremendous link with the purpose of biofuel, agricultural use and construction of dams for the use of irrigation, forestry and tourism (Klopp, 2000; Attah, 2013; Bukar, 2014 and Odoemene, 2014). It is commonly operationalised by the government(s) and investors. Land grabbing may be trans-national and domestic deals, which underscores the commercial nature of the transactions regardless of scale and output (Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2010). For instance, Zoomers (2010) recognises land grabbing as large-scale, cross-border land deals or transactions that are carried out by transnational corporations or initiated by foreign governments. Often times, such transactions may involve leasing (between 30 and 99 years), concession or outright purchase of large areas of land in other (mainly developing) countries for various purposes.

In another dimension, scholars like Odoemene (2014), Hennings (2015), Hall (2013), categorically states that it is not all land transactions that should be seen as 'land grab'. But Odoemene (2014) further stresses that land grab depends largely on the local context, and whether the processes undertaken reflect the free, prior and informed consent of local landowners. Also, he adds that 'land grab' is seen as forced acquisition of land

without valid consent and reasonable commitment to the future survival of the dispossessed. Furthermore, he highlighted that most recent land grabbing are land grabs. This is because the processes undertaken by most of the investors in connivance with government officials to include local elites often exclude and/or marginalise the land-holding locals. These locals usually have multi-generational attachments, that is, socio-economic, political, spiritual and cultural to the lands in question. This is further attested to in the statement of Riddell (2013) that land-grabbing is also often associated with lack of consideration for social implications, displacement and dispossession of local populations.

In sub-Saharan Africa, quite a number of land grabbing was carried out as a result of weak institutions and feeble land constitution (Adams, 2003; De Silva, 2012). Also, investors have seen the region especially in Southeast Asian countries where unprecedented history of war was largely recorded as an avenue for building up their wealth through the purchase of lands for agriculture, mining, reservation purposes (Land Matrix, 2015). Furthermore, countries like Cambodia, Laos, and Papua New Guinea were faced with the issue of land grabbing despite the total recovery from violent conflicts (Land Matrix, 2015). In the process of these acquisitions, locals were faced with dispossession of their ancestral land, unfulfilled promises of compensation, loss of means of livelihood and social structures (Hall, 2011; Fairhead et al, 2012; Cotula, 2013; Richards, 2013). In India, the government implemented actions like streamlined bureaucratic procedures, blanket tax and tariff concessions to include the constitution of the state in order to attract investors in gaining cheap land for their investment (Gonslaves, 2010). To actualising this, locals were evicted from their land for corporations like Mahindra to acquire such lands at a relatively low price while concentrating in that region for business purposes. Mahindra later resell this land by square metre on a long term deal to producing companies at exorbitant prices. Although, this attempt of evictions by the government led to a protest by the locals claiming that government implemented the use of *'eminent domain'* to grab their landed property to private investors (Levien, 2011).

Land grabbing practices are often justified by government which declare a vast area of land as “idle”, “marginal” or “wastelands” irrespective of the tenure that appear on the land (Ocheje, 2007; Baka, 2013; GRAIN, 2014). Government usually comes up with

various economic and legal incentives while the investors are dishing out promises like employment opportunities, infrastructure development, technological transfer and contribution to local food security (Anseeuw et al, 2012; Bloomer, 2012). Corroboratively, Oseni (2013) opines that about 75% communities in West Africa depend largely on farming for survival and massive land grabbing prevents them from bases of their existence, cultures and livelihoods. Also, the compensation for the leased or sold land is often very poor. Bukar (2014) explains that land grabbing entails the acquisitions of choicest and the most fertile lands of the community. Furthermore, land grabbing has its origin from colonialism which has been a framework for leaders to function with. Moreover, land grabbing carries a form of terms that are not determined by the people and to their best interest. Hence, leaders use their power to acquire lands on which peasants grow their crops, hunt and pasture their animals. To this extent, land deals are characterised by shabbiness, carelessness, ill preparedness and corruption on the part of the government (Cotula et al., 2009; Bukar, 2014; Land Matrix, 2015).

Land grabbing as a concept has been interrogated from the perspective of socio-economic and political dynamics (Borras and Mc Michael, 2010; Borras, Kay and Gomez, 2012; Borras and Franco, 2013). For instance, in Zimbabwe, lands were grabbed by the state and its officials while also unilaterally re-distributing the lands to farmers (Moyo, 2000). Also, Hughes (2008) shows that large acquisitions of land are easily grabbed politically thereby making the process of official titles to land very expensive and elusive with the execution of the judiciary. Hence, public lands are acquired by the privileged individuals and state officials at the expense of the poor. For example, Boeung Kak Lake was sold for redevelopment to Cambodian People's Party (CPP) senator at a cheap rate of US\$79 million, or \$0.6 per square metre which was later resold for about \$700-\$1000 per square metre because of the thriving of estate business in the region. However, in carrying out this form of redevelopment exercise, about 4,250 locals were displaced and evicted at the same time. In North Sudan and Ghana, lands were compulsorily grabbed from the locals by the government under the deception of public interest and for title registration which were used to amass wealth and power to themselves (ELHadary and Obeng-Odom, 2012). Land grabbing as exercised by powerful actors among our political leaders or officials are maintained in the patrimonial control of land by developing tactful measures



in the guise of land use decree to acquire land on a large scale. Also, they use their power often to boost corruption in massive land acquisitions and violence in dispossessing the locals in the process (Klopp, 2000; Borras and Franco, 2010; Oxfam report, 2012; Oyalowo and Kadiri, 2013; Moreda and Spoor, 2015). The strategies used by elites to grab land are frequently based on the kind of land to be grabbed (Peters, 2004; Borras and Franco, 2010; Hall, 2011; Franco, 2012; Borras, Franco and Wang, 2013). One of the several ways of grabbing lands is abuses of official power wherein land use decree is manoeuvred and manipulated to suit their desired requirements. Through this created medium, substantial tracts of public land have been allocated to elites and members of politically influential families, entities, and/or ethnic groups. Often this land is then fraudulently sold to third parties (Beckman, 1998; Klopp, 2000; Ocheje, 2007; Mendie, Atser and Ofem, 2010; Attah, 2013).

Scholars have discussed extensively on some of the fundamental attributes in the light of land grabbing (Cotula, Vermeulen, Leonard and Keeley, 2009; Borras and Franco, 2010; Oxfam report, 2012). Categorically, substantive elements of land such as the concept in it that is, land grabbing, size or scale of land grabbed, whether the land is idle or not; have indeed generated intelligent debate in the discourse of land grabbing. In this foregoing, Borras and Franco (2010) and Reuters (2008) emphasize that land grabbed in Africa remain so imprecise because of the interest for huge investment in Africa by African leaders, hence the scale of land grabbing in Africa becomes challenging at the same time. For example, an investment by a German company in Ethiopia was reported to be 13,000 hectares while it was recorded for 3,800 hectares only in Ethiopian investment promotion.

Also, there are variations to land size in the issue of land grabbing as no definite size is being spelt out for the discourse. However, Oxfam report (2012) categorised land size of 200 hectares to be land grabbing. Scholars align with anything from 5000 hectares to be considered as land grabbing while some even opine to be 2,500 hectares as the case may be (Eldaman, 2013; Land Matrix, 2015). In respect to the definition of land grabbing especially towards a land being idle, marginal or waste as could be identified, it was argued that there is no land without a source which could either be from small scale farmers' land, communal land or conservation land thereby providing them with their

basic needs such as food, medicinal herbs, construction materials, even fuel (Celestino, 2009). So, it is either the locals are displaced and denied of their land territories and natural reserves.

Land grabbing can be viewed as a global threat practiced mostly in the rural areas in an attempt to satisfy the unmet needs of the political leaders and government from outside. Africa is practically focused in augmenting the increasing food shortage problem for the world (Daniel, 1999). According to Basu (2007), capitalist development led by global capital is driving government to dispossess and displace locals from their farm land, even using force to break up local resistance. In this vein, land acquisition has become a prime objective especially the state government to brace-up capital.

Literature has shown that in land grabbing, class and capital are ultimately intertwined. Historically, land grabbing has been influenced largely by actors who have power and influence to suppress the poor (Guha, 2004; Hughes, 2007; Basu, 2007; Nuhu, 2008; Mendie, Atser and Ofem, 2010, Borrás and Franco, 2010; Ocheje, 2007; Cotula and Lorenzo, 2012; Attah, 2013; Odoemene, 2014). This is shown in the sharp practices of the ruling class in acquiring massive lands from the people in the lower class especially the peasants; due to the inevitability of them in utilising lands for their survival. Indeed, land is a crucial element in developmental construct, however, the processes of the acquisition is mandatory in order not to circumvent the rights of the indigenes or locals. It has been variously reported that force is being applied in the acquisition of landed property thereby dispossessing the locals and putting them in a tight and unmatched condition. The instrumentality of the land use decree by the individuals in control demonstrated the fact that their capital is one of the sickles in appropriating massive land from below actors. To this end, capital as a device is congruent to class and is applied in executing land grabbing by government(s), conglomerates and individuals as the case may be.

## **2.2 Elitist acquisition through land grabbing**

Land is critical to elites' political power and economic status (Mann, 1984; Uchendu, 1984; Crawford and Lijphart, 1995; Beckman, 1998; Swyngedouw, 2000; Rose, 2002). There are two dichotomies in elaborating the category of elites especially in African (Rose, 2002). These are National/local, urban or traditional/modern with demographical indicators associated with the elites, such as wealth, education, hereditary

status, and political office. Rose (2002) further clarifies that national elites got into the position often by achieved status and paid employment either in the government or private sector. They may be urban residents and at the same time contribute to rural communities. For example, they may render their social responsibilities towards the locals in the area of farm input like seed and fertilizer. Local elites as categorised tend to get to high position via ascription, hereditary positions of authority and being educated in the contemporary days to derive income from the sale of farm produce, manage small businesses and earn wages (Marcus, 1978; London, 1979; Wotters, 1989; Rose, 2002; Yamkoski and Dubrow, 2008; Lindsay, 2008 and Besnier, 2009).

Elites in whatever category manipulate and acquire massive lands for their private use (Segal, 1968; Payer, 1979; Mc Cleskey, 1990; Rose, 2002; Lachmann, 2003; Lin and Ho, 2005; Qiu, 2005; Bell and Parchonovosky, 2006; Reddy and Reddy, 2007 and Sun, 2015). This, they achieve through the manipulation of rules and practices of land tenure in acquiring massive land to their favour with the end goal of maintaining or acquiring personal power or wealth. Studies have shown that elite's acquisitions of lands are frequently associated with igniting of conflict and response to conflict as the case may be (Homer-Dickson, 1991, 1994; Percival, 1995; Percival and Homer-Dickson, 1995; Palmer and Barber, 2001; Rose, 2002; Simmons, 2004; Beyene, 2009 and Socpa, 2010)). However, some scholars are of the opinion that elites land acquisitions stimulate group resistance and they may even instigate some locals to violence so that they retain the power and position occupied by them (Zoomers and Kleinpenning, 1990; Purnell, 1999; Kay, 2001; Yambara, 2001; Rose, 2002; Vinthagen, 2006; Cai, 2008; Steedman, 2009; Visoka, 2011). Webner(1993) states that in the light of elites struggles for position especially in Africa settings, state elites define the legal and political nature of land in customary tenure and maintain personal land holdings in the communities. More often than not, elites in both state and local usually have the where-withal to acquire massive lands (Zubek and Gentleman, 1994; Lachmann, 1990; Bealey, 1996; Rose, 2002; Lachmann, 2003; Clarke and Chess, 2008; Cock, 2010; Manatsha, 2010 and Richards, 2010).

Elite's acquisitions of land are often linked to the land tenure system (Uchendu, 1979; Dike, 1983; Rose, 2002; Crewett and Korf, 2008; Kishindo, 2010 and Yaro, 2010).

The land tenure system can be seen as customary land tenure system (communal) and the modern (individual or private) land tenure system. Based on this fact, scholars like Uchendu, 1976; Dike, 1983; Beckman, 1998; Fisiy and Goheen, 1998; Rose, 2002; Duffy, 2008; Yaro, 2010 and Sackeyfio, 2012 opine that elites acquire lands through some more traditional means which could be by conquest, peaceful appropriation, inheritance, or as a gift from another leader or community while the modern form of elites' acquisitions may be through the repurchase programmes and/or land tenure conversions (example free hold land which is acquired from colonial settlers) or through land exchanges associated with a development programme. Such lands are acquired by deceit for farming in feeding a nation thereby converting to personal/private farm or for other purposes as may be claimed. Furthermore, the practices of elites' self-interest cut across every region and the households are usually carried along in such unclear ways of land acquisitions (Beckman, 1998; Rose, 2002; Guha, 2004; Basu, 2007; Cotula and Lorenzo, 2012). For example, elite members of the community determine the distribution of land rights, and grant some members more favourable land rights than others. The elites acquire land through purchase and obtain a deed and the lands are controlled on the individual basis and therefore determine the uses. Based on this, they use lands acquired for collateral to obtain credit for investments. This kind of system as described by Rose (2002) allows the rich to essentially benefit from land grabbing.

Literature has shown that the elites that are favoured with the kind of land tenure system always try to maintain the status quo while those who are not in the group move for transitional land tenure system. However, those who accept land administration responsibilities are mostly accused of land grabbing (Uchendu, 1979; Gyasi, 1994; Moyo, 2000; Klopp, 2000; Ayoub, 2006; Ocheje, 2007; Mendie, Atser and Ofem, 2010; Rose, 2002; Duffy, 2008; Sackeyfio, 2012). They acquire favourable land for personal use; they may grant land to family members or friends; or to strangers for profit. Another obvious greedy methodology exhibited by elites in grabbing land is seeking to privatize arable lands through loaning arrangements (Basu, 2007; Cotula and Lorenzo, 2012; Borrás, Franco, Gomez, Kay and Spoor, 2012; Buka, 2014). Invariably, they protect themselves via the concept of '*expanded reproduction*', which is, having a generational continuity of wealth flow accrued to them (Rose, 2002 and Harvey, 2008).

### **2.3 Land grabbing and resistance**

There has been several land grabbing experiences that provoke resistance globally (Hall, 2015). Instances of land grabbing cases abound in African settings especially in Nigeria. Consequently, resistance against land grabbing is largely arising among locals. Scholars have emphasized that in some communities, peasants are extremely inactive to respond to issues on land grabbing. Similarly, others display passive disposition even in the midst of dispossession, oppression and eviction from their land (Haynes, 1992; Walker, 1999; Collier and Quaratiello, 2005; Bayat, 2013; Marti and Fernandez, 2013). Studies have shown that large scale of land acquisitions expel local people' or 'local communities' from their lands and are for these reasons they engage in 'resistance'. Also, it has been proved that transactions that have to do with land acquisitions are very sensitive, complex and sacrosanct (White et al. 2012; Wolford et al. 2013; Edelman, Oya, and Borras 2013). This is because issues that have to connect with land challenge the communality of people and are differentiated by class, gender, ethnicity and historical attachments. Hence, resistance is deemed inevitable.

While resistance as a term has been viewed by various schools of thought; different interpretation and meaning have been giving to the operationalisation of the concept. For instance, classical collective action sees resistance as exception and inaction as a norm. The position is premised on neoclassical economics and rational choice theory which emphasize that individuals strategically weigh potential benefits and risks of particular course of action and then proceed in their own self-interest. Since risks of collective resistance are likely to be high, this can be experienced in the area of loss of time, arrests, physical assaults and assassinations. Here, a keen observer and the individual may likely sit on the fence hoping to benefit from the gains of others' risk-taking and sacrifices. Marxists like Olson shared from his point of view that there is a link from shared grievances to collective action. Recognising that some forms of resistance are individual, they tend to assume that common oppression gives rise to class politics and common political projects (Barker 2014). Also, Marxist ideologies believe that numerous lamentations about 'false consciousness', 'hegemony' or failure to recognise the collective's 'true' that is, the divisive interest of proletariat and bourgeois. Lastly, heterodox social movement scholars have taken issue with both the figure of the rational,

calculating *Homo economicus* in collective action theories and the Marxist presumption of oppression inevitably producing proletarian consciousness and collective struggle.

Further insights to resistance is seen in the works of scholars like Polanyi (1944; 2001), Foucault (1994), Gramsci (2008; 1971) and Scott (1976; 1986; 1990). These scholars individually demonstrate the various reasons why and how resistances are provoked. According to Polanyi (2001), resistance to land grabbing can be situated with what is obtainable with the industrial capitalism in Europe. He therefore interrogated resistance to capitalism and the effect of unregulated free markets on factors of production. In his result, Polanyi submits that resistance emerges from both the State and civil society, consequent on capitalist exploitation of both labour and nature with the aim of generating surplus. It is the attempt to protect the social value of the people from capitalist expansion that has compelled the society and sometimes the state to regulate, protect and resist market exploitation of land and labour. However, the state government is at the fore-front of promoting capitalist expansion through land grabbing which hitherto provokes resistance by the locals. Foucault (1972) shows that power relations are the denominators for resistance. Therefore, various forms of resistance are fashioned by specific groups of power and the interacting entities of the society. He further observes that power is not in isolation, but always a relation between domination and subordination or between the State and the society or the ruler and the ruled. Power relations sometimes include the possibility of resistance, which is formed “right at the point where relations of power are exercised” in a way that a group is exploited or disadvantaged. Forces of domination and resistance are mutually exclusive considering the fact that they redesign each other. The manner which the forces are manipulated makes resistance bring to light the power relations (Foucault 1994).

Gramsci (2008) identifies resistance as being undertaken by subaltern groups who act based on particular experiences with specific material and political conditions. He further clarifies that the hegemony or supremacy of the State and the elite classes whose interests are served by state institutions, policies and hegemonic ideologies are the basis of class-based resistance. He further argues that subaltern resistance is not usually based on a clear ideology or “class consciousness”, but “spontaneous” in response to specific material circumstances arising from class domination. Thus, resistance cannot only be understood

in the scope of adherence to an ideology, but also by spontaneous eclectic consciousness that later become unified under one collective resistance. Scott (1976; 1986; 1990) explains the covert on “everyday forms of resistance”. In demonstrating this, he describes resistance as a response to power relations, often provoked in defense of subsistence and material interests of the subaltern. Actions such as clandestine sabotage – theft, false alarm, foot-dragging, destruction and the likes are employed to undermine the authority and productive enterprises of perceived exploiters. This method is adopted by subalterns when the risk of outright resistance is considered too great, and chances of success are slim.

Drawing from the above understanding, resistance follows the axiom of class structure showing a higher individual or group oppressing the other group. Schneder (2011) and Adnan (2013) argue that some scholars termed peasants as the victimized whose means of livelihood are threatened and these sets of locals are deemed to oppose any form of land grabbing in their communities. In this light, Cavanagh and Benjaminsen (2015) ascribe locals to be powerful and transformative agents because of the manner they resist being unjustified and marginalised. In contrast, Mamonovia, (2015), explicates how locals take to faith or have a mild form of resistance in the issue of land grabbing as studied among Ukrainian peasants.

According to Borrás and Franco (2013), contemporary large-scale land deals widely involve the expulsion of people who, in turn, struggle to resist dispossession. They further submit that large-scale land deals do not always result in people losing their land, and many of those who are evicted do not necessarily respond with the kind of resistance often expected of them. Going by this, much evidence shows that the nature of and responses to big land deals can vary across and within ‘local communities’ (Borrás and Franco, 2013). Diana’s (2012), study on land grabbing in Colombia, reveals that land grabbing provokes resistance in different dimensions and that it leads to the exclusion and expropriation. Using the case of ecotourism in Tayrona National Natural Park, it was concluded that the acquisitions and appropriation of massive land in achieving a huge project of this kind leads to privatisation and dispossession of indigenes which thereafter ignites resistance in form of violent protest by the original land owners against such investment which may or may not be productive to the society.

Scholars have shown that peasant resistance has been displayed in both the colonial and post-colonial regimes (Seed, Hulme, Pastor, Sullivan, Rafael and Lletto, 1991; Ortner, 1995; Momoh, 1996; Kennedy, 1996; Beckman, 1998). Even, in the post-colonial era, peasant resistance has been noted to become more intensified (Momoh, 1996). Using the case of Bakolori irrigation that happened in Talata Mafara in the then Sokoto state, where peasants' lands were acquired for the purpose of dam and for the use of irrigation for advanced and mechanised farming. This conception of ideas led to the displacement and eviction of peasants from their farm lands. The peasants were immediately stripped off their means of survival as they were mainly peasant farmers whose family members depend on their farm produce. This made them result to resisting government decision through protests and public demonstrations. The state later used law enforcement agents to combat the peasants resisting against the authority and degenerated to a massacre. This in a sense shows ultimately the resistance of locals against land use act. For example, Visser, Mamonova and Spoor(2012), illuminate that elites in Russia are blessed with different business ideas on land use. They were favoured with the 2002 land code/decreed which makes land grabbing possible for them. This eventually led to the coming together of the peasants; they organised forms of resistance by protesting against the ruling class. Also, Odoemene (2015) buttresses on the resistances that were provoked by land grabbing in three different communities of Nigeria. The communities were Mutum Biyu in Gassol Local Government area of Taraba (Dominion Farmers), Ekong-Amaku in Cross River state (Wilmar International Farm) and in Kwara state against the Zimbabwean farmers. These resistances in these three localities generated a kind of indigenes mobilisation and protest which were spearheaded by nominated leaders (Attah, 2013; Odoemene, 2013, 2014 and 2015). The resistances proved to be very organized and peaceful. The resistances involve letter writing to the ruling class, peaceful demonstrations by the peasants. Studies have shown that resistance may be easily transformed from every day to advocacy politics and vice-versa depending on the repressive power involved in land grabbing (Franco, 2010; Hennings, 2015, Hennings, 2016; Hall, Edelman, Borrás, 2015). Peasants may be pushed to the extent of damning any consequences laying aside fear and insecurity (Adnan, 2007). For example, Hall(2007), highlights that violent peasants resistances was



carried out in Brazilian Amazonia over a large-scale commercial farming as a result of land grabbing experiences of that region which resulted to loss of lives and properties.

Land grabbing has underscored diverse ways of adjudging precedencies of stimulating resistances. In Ethiopia, two land grabbing activists and citizens living outside the country canvassed against the government grabbing of land from the locals and dispossessing them at the same time. However, the activists who were already naturalised to Britain and Norway were extradited and tried by Ethiopian government on terrorism charges. Their torture, oppression and silencing were contextualised by a report released that led to severe resistance against the government and have also made many of the citizens to live under threat (Oakland Institute, 2015).

## **2.4 Land grabbing in Africa**

Land grabbing in Africa can be largely traced to the colonial era (Uchendu, 1979; Gyasi, 1994; Moyo, 2000; Klopp, 2000; Ayoub, 2006; Ocheje, 2007; Onwuzuruigbo, 2009; Mendie, Atser and Ofem, 2010; Bukar, 2014; Wolford and Nehring, 2015; Arowosegbe, 2016). Land grabbing in Africa was widely organised by the developed countries via the government(s) which believe that Africa possesses arable lands (Cotula, Lorenzo, Vermeulen, and Keeley, 2009). Thus, there is the notion that land in Africa is very cheap to obtain irrespective of the consequences of massive land acquisitions on the original land owners/locals for the purpose of food security, agro-biofuel and speculations for investments (Cotula, et al., 2009; Borras et al., 2011; Klopp, 2000; Pantuliano, 2007).

Africa is the target of half of the land grab practice, followed by Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe respectively (McMichael, 2009). In the development of narratives, the idea that subsistence farmers are generally poor and would be attracted by the promises of job when cajoled demonstrates the supposed essence of land grabbing in Africa. Hence, a modern caption of the governments and the investors is the introduction of money to reveal wealth rather than sustainable agricultural development on communal lands (McMichael, 2009). Literature has shown that land grabbing in Africa still follows similar pattern of forceful acquisitions. The real key players ranges from government(s), trans-government, corporate bodies and private individuals who acquire massive land in order to achieve their economic interests (Hughes, 2007; Nuhu, 2008; Mendie, Atser and

Ofem, 2010; Borras and Franco, 2010; Attah, 2013; Odoemene, 2014; Moreda and Spoor, 2015).

In the discourse of land grabbing in Africa, one of the salient issues that generates interrogation is the under-utilisation of the massive acquired land since the notions over the grabbed land are rationalised based on land becoming fallow in Africa (Odoemene, 2014; Wolford and Nehring, 2015; Borras; Cotula). This is practiced in Mozambique where the Brazilians came over to establish a ProSAVANA initiative for farming purpose and a very vast land was acquired for this purpose and with the mind of collaboration for support to Mozambique government. Based on the Brazilians idea on the Mozambique as a country, they believe that they share three similarities with Mozambique in the area of ecology, their common colonial heritage (Wolford and Nehring, 2015). Furthermore, (Wolford and Nehring, 2015) reiterated that the attempt to replicate Brazil's success in agro-industrial commodity production typifies the nationally specific relationship between the state, land, labour and capital. This led to the commodification of land and labour in Mozambique.

Sparks (2012) emphasizes the frequent land grab in sub-Saharan Africa, thus, it was pointed out that the size of a land deal matters. Thus, an estimated 50 million of hectares of land, which is almost equal the size of Spain has been grabbed so far in the region. Moreover, the study dwelled on the acquisitions of the Africa's farmland and since agriculture is as vital to the continent as a means of reducing poverty. However, there are lots of dangers on the locals' needs which generate tensions especially among the peasants. Also, it was concluded that host countries generally have poor capacity for meaningful negotiation and cannot handle intense land deal competition/ negotiation. Equally, a land deal can result to the suffering of the indigenes especially if they are from the low class. If financially successful for investors, most of the deals do not generate social benefits. It could either increase pollution, land alienation, commodification of labour and lower wages and if otherwise, these governments may not be able to facilitate compliance especially in the area of infrastructures. Ocheje (2007) argues that the forced eviction of the locals engenders human development capacity. He highlighted the gimmicks behind the public interest as often claimed by the government and the magnitude at which these evictions are done. For example, since the year 2000, over two

million people have been forcibly evicted in Nigeria through the instrumentality of land use decree which automatically turn original land owners to squatters. This was evident in Lagos, Port-Harcourt and Abuja. Properties like houses were demolished and there was no arrangement for any resettlement.

In Kenya, over 800, 000 people have been evicted between May and June 2005. Over, 50,000 families were removed, some of whom claim to have their certificate of occupancy. Similarly, in Angola, between 2003 and 2005, over 500 houses were destroyed while 200 families were ejected and the victims were left without compensation and no resettlement aid by the government. Also, in Addis Ababa, 10,000 people were forcibly evicted in the year 2002. Over 5.5 million people were evicted or displaced from their farms in post-apartheid South Africa. The evictions manifest by displacing large number of people without compensation and official lawlessness is found to be on the increase.

Hall (2011) is of the opinion that investigation on land grabbing should interrogate the legality, structure and outcomes of commercial land deals in favour of local elites, government as partners, intermediaries and beneficiaries in Southern Africa. Also, attention should be shifted to land size, duration and source of investments, the commodities and business models through which they are implemented, the tenure arrangement and resources accessed, the terms of leases and compensation, the degree of displacement, labour regime and employment creation and changes in farm settlements. Makki and Gelsler (2011) stress further that land grabbing has taken over the majority of the agricultural farm land in Ethiopia where the state uses its powers to acquire a vast of land and terms it as '*unused*' in the name of state project and development of the people thereby dispossessing the locals from their long age land. Deng (2011) explores the concept of land grabbing in the context of communal land and the processes of company-community engagement and the extent to which rural communities are being involved in the investment project in Central Equatorial and Western Equatorial both in South Sudan. Therefore, he places the conclusion on the interplay between cultural sovereignty and conflict and war reconstruction in the Southern Sudan.

Klopp (2000) avers that the dimension of land grabbing in Kenya is bequeathing public land to privileged individuals. Also, government officials are already frightened of

'life after' when they leave public office. This propels them to accelerate on the accumulation of public land during land allocations and the privatisation of public infrastructures like schools, parking lots, markets, forests, cemeteries and the like. Literature has shown that private companies are behind most of the land deals in Africa. Meanwhile, land is also being acquired by national governments often via state-owned companies and by private investment companies in the pretence for food and agro-fuels production (Cotula, Lorenzo, Vermeulen, and Keeley, 2009). In Tanzania, land grabbing and resistance were documented as related to investments in industries such as agriculture, biofuels, tourism, hunting and forestry. However, it was stated that the dimension of its occurrence in the state should be traced to different era of government that have come to power (Nelson, Sulle and Lekaita, 2012). Land grabbing takes a number of forms contingent on the local situation and law (Attah, 2013). For example, in Nigeria, the land law allows the state governments to be custodians of land on behalf of the communities, as quoted in land decrees that "*the country's land is vested in the government which holds it in trust for the people*" (Land Use Act, 1978; Odoemene, 2013; Attah, 2013). However, the people are rarely consulted whenever massive lands are acquired for any purported transactions. The government has always be in charge of land grabbing, issues of development and job opportunities that are never provided (Odoemene, 2013; Attah, 2013).

## **2.5 Public land acquisitions and development**

Land is useful for so many things in both the urban and rural areas of every society. Land is very vital to the socio-economic advancement of any country and society (FMH&UD, 2006). Jiboye (2005) made a construct to the strict principles of land control and its usage. He, therefore, emphasizes the positive results of the land use policy in the area of development in cities like Lagos, Kaduna, Port-Harcourt, Onitsha, Enugu, Abia and a host of others. Land development demonstrates how urban land is utilized in the form of building and site for various kinds of activities (Healey and Barrett, 1990). Healey and Barrett (1990) postulated that the critical study of land development should involve research on the land tenure and ownership, the organisation of the construction industry and the type of investment that should be introduced on the land. However, the social and

political structure of the state influenced the use and development of land in determining the kind of urban development that ensues thereafter. In the work of Bengston, Fletcher and Nelson (2004), the introduction of stringent public policy is necessary for urban development amidst land acquisitions practiced at federal, state and local levels. Furthermore, the basic land policy that culminates into development for all and sundry is encompassed at all levels of government and are as thus, public acquisitions of land, its regulation dynamics and reward based approach.

The colonial's drive to utilizing land for development set out precedence for land acquisitions. Labi, Antwi and Olomolaiye (2004) show that in ensuring development by the state, it is habitually achieved through the colonial's styles of compulsory acquisitions of land from the locals which aimed at utilizing land for public social amenities, regularising economic and social influences in private market operations and justifying social distribution of land to all. However, they concluded that compulsory land acquisitions had had inverse socio-economic effects on locals resulting to land dispossession, poverty and ill-relationship between the state and commoners. Place (2009) contributed to land acquisitions and development in Africa that land has both functionality and lapses depending on the style of land tenure system and agricultural enhancement introduced for poverty reduction and land policy practice. It was found that there were meeting and divergence points in the economic predispositions. However, land tenure practice and its consequences on productivity are of diverse situations in the policy submissions. In addition, policy structures and compositions must recognise local context within the practice of land tenure in order to actualise a healthy development.

Studies have shown that farmers ought to be compensated whenever they are dispossessed on their farm land for the purpose of industrialization development (Ghatak and Mookherjee, 2014). Despite the existing customary way of leasing farmland whether by private or local government with a bond between the users and landowners before the acquisitions is carried out, landowners are found to suffer in silence (Ghatak and Mookherjee, 2014). However, landlords are motivated by the compensation rules which positively guide their willingness to release their land for industrial developers for the sake

of agricultural development. Therefore, landowners are to be dutifully compensated after the land acquisitions.

## **2.6 Relationship between State, Locals and Residents**

The relations that exist between government and locals of a community are based on the class structure found among the locals' population (Barkan and Holmquist, 1989; Hall and Lamont, 2013). Scholars underscored the benefits accrued to the cooperation of the state and locals by showing that lesser cooperation become the ruling force when a rigid class structure is operationalized while the locals in the upper class (Compradors) have the tendency to form an ally with the ruling class in order to extort the poor peasants (Beckman, 1998; Omobowale, 2006). However, scholars have also shown that attitude guides the dispositions of the human behaviour (see Ajzen, 1987; Jerolmack and Khan, 2014). In this wise, Mason and Cheyne (2000) claim that attitude of residents or locals in a given community are sometimes in tandem to the infrastructural development that is introduced in a given community. They believe it gives room for job creation and advance the community for scenery sites or tourism. This shapes the residents interaction with the indigenous landowners and the state. However, literature has also confirmed that where and when resources like mines are tapped in the community, whereby locals in the community bear the social and environmental consequence with much gain to the government and the international business partners can lead to the unhealthy/acrimonious form of relationship between the government, locals and by extension to the residents if the social contracts are jeopardized (O'Fairchellaigh, 2013). Also, Hilson (2002) in his study of land use conflicts in mining communities opines that good communication engenders healthy coexistence among landowners, government and business partners. This was justified in the sense that the thorough communication links between them is deemed necessary because the land in which miners are operating on are used by the landowners as a means of sustenance through massive cultivation of the land. In addition, the study reveals that landowners frown at environmental threats and hazards as a result of the mining occupation which leads to conflicts of the landowners and the government in the region.

However, literature has also shown that where the negotiations on land were fulfilled to satisfaction between the authority and the locals, there is bound to be a peaceful relationship. For example, the Lekki free trade zone in Lagos was a laudable project that was initiated during Tinubu administration but did not manifest until Fashola administration. It was gathered that there were series of stakeholders' fora, town hall meetings between the government representatives and the so called *Omo-onile*. In those meetings, there were series of negotiations between the government and the stakeholders in the area of promises made to the original land owners regarding dispossessing them of their land. After the agreement, the government started building for them, tarred road, put every activities in place before they now moved the original land owners to the new location. That was why there was no crisis in that place. Assuming the Lagos State government neglected them, there would have been a lot of crisis and they will not take it lightly with the government. The reason could be because Lagos State is richer than other states in Nigeria. That was why it was so easy for them to achieve such arrangement on the project (Akanle, 2017).

In addition, a report on public land acquisitions in Nigeria during the Military era in Lagos found that a new designated village was handed to the fourteen families displaced in Oguntedo community in Lagos for the housing project called Satellite Town. It was said that they were neatly resettled and necessary compensation was paid on the farmlands used for the housing project. Fourteen permanent houses of two-bedroom houses with a comfortable verandah, sitting room and kitchen each cost of #5,500 was built for them in place of the bamboo houses that was demolished by the government (New Nigerian, Friday, September, 1<sup>st</sup>, 1978, pg. 32). Based on the information, it can be seen that compensation was made on the **farmlands** and new houses were built for them. This action from this view averted the resistance that could have resulted from the community members against the government intentions.

Also, it was affirmed that when the Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG) wanted to acquire their latest auditorium from particular villages for extension, they had series of meetings for about a year before the acquisitions took place. This allowed enough room for acquaintances and all the promises given to them were fulfilled (Fieldwork, 2017). A derivative of these literature signify that landowners always welcome new social

infrastructural development in the community with a clear social contracts inclusive, which are obviously executed to the letter. This promotes a good and cordial relationship between landowners, government and business partners who wants to utilise the community land for profit. However, where the indigenou landowners have a contrary opinion and the social contracts are not executed as promised may culminates in acrimonious relationship especially with the residents.

## **2.7 A Summary of Land Use Act of 1978**

Land has ever remained valuable in human life from the agrarian period to the industrial revolution era (Uchendu, 1979; Nnoli, 2013). It serves as a revenue to owners and pivotal to every other property. With its importance nature, every man desires to own land as a means of wealth and development. In order to make land available for development, administration in the colonial and post- colonial era enacted laws that govern the use of land in Nigeria (Yakub, 2002; Ocheje, 2007; Ako, 2009). Three main sources of land law were in operation before the enactment of Land Use Decree in 1978. These are customary law which differs from custom to custom; English revised law and local legislation. Despite all these laws, there were problems in the administration of land both in the Southern and Northern Nigeria. For example, land speculations and racketeering became the order of the day. Even, outrageous compensations were demanded by landowners (New Nigerian, 29<sup>th</sup> March, 1978). All these factors hindered development, and in an attempt to break even by the government of the day, a panel was constituted on land matters which provided a report that eventually metamorphosed to Land Use Decree of 1978.

The Land Use Decree was promulgated on 29<sup>th</sup> of Mach, 1978 by Obasanjo administration. The Decree vests all lands in the confines of each state solely under the control of governors. This was introduced because of the variations in customary law of the people and the fraudulent sales of land in the especially in southern part of Nigeria. The decree had distinctions in the urban and rural land. The urban lands were to be administered by the governor while the rural lands are handled by the local government (Yakub, 2002; Ocheje, 2007; Ako, 2009). The appointment of Land Use and Allocation Committees by the governor were saddled with the responsibility to advise a sitting



Governor on administration of land in the urban while Land Allocation Advisory Committees were to do same as regards rural lands. Also, the rights of occupancy as envisaged by the act to replace all the socio-cultural inheritance and holdings of lands would guide the holdings of lands whether statutory rights of occupancy which deals with urban lands controlled by a governor and the customary rights of occupancy associated with the right of a person or community lawfully holding lands as granted by the local government. The law empowered local government to grant customary rights of occupancy to any person or organization for the use of agriculture, residential and other purposes. This was with the proviso that the purpose for which lands are granted should not go beyond 500 or 5000 hectares. Like the state, the law also granted local government the right to enter upon, use and occupy for public purposes any land of their interest within the jurisdiction and revoke any customary right of occupancy on any such land. The governor approves for state lands while local government approves the holdings of customary right of occupancy.

The four main objectives as derived from the Land Use Acts can be categorised as following:

Effectual structural change in the style of land holdings

Quick interventions in the area of economic and social transformation

Striking of balance in the economic inequality as caused by land speculators and holders and

Making lands available without stress to both governments and private developers.

## **2.8 Theoretical framework**

### **2.8.1 Accumulation by Dispossession theory**

This study was guided by David Harvey's theory of accumulation by dispossession. The theory is Neo-Marxian and is anchored on Marx's concept of "primitive accumulation" (Harvey, 2003). It explains mainly the primitive accumulation of land by land grabbers and how this accumulation further impoverishes the poor via land dispossession. Harvey avers that primitive accumulation is one of the "predatory practices" which have played a major role in the processes of capital accumulation, even in the contemporary world. Harvey claims that the word "primitive" leads to a misunderstanding

in the history of capitalism; that the original, "primitive" phase of capitalism is somehow a transitory phase that need not be repeated once commenced. Instead, Harvey maintains that unlike primitive accumulation, "accumulation by dispossession" is a continuing process within the process of capital accumulation on a world scale.

In this theory, expression on the idea of colonial, neo-colonial and imperial processes of appropriation of assets, including natural resources, monetization of exchange and taxation, particularly of land;" slave trade and usury, the national debt and ultimately the credit system (Harvey, 2003:145). Furthermore, it typifies the commodification and privatisation of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations. This emphasises on the corporatisation and privatisation of public assets and other public utilities which have been another dimension whereby the people in the lower class are enclosed/ or dispossessed. Also, these processes of dispossession provoke a widespread local resistance which is currently applied against any form of globalisation (Harvey, 2003).

Conversion of various forms of property rights (common, collective, state, etcetera.) into exclusive private property right is expatiated by this theory. This underscores one of the conceptual issues of land grabbing in the turning of the public land to government exclusively, companies/conglomerates thereby dispossessing the locals who constitute people in the lower class (Sparks, 2012; Attah, 2013; Odoemene, 2014). It also demonstrates the suppression of rights of the commons, the commodification of labour power and the suppression of alternative (and indigenous) forms of production and consumption. As indicated by Ocheje (2007) that the rights of the commons are trampled upon because of the way the constitution spells the dictates of land owning which prioritises the interest of the capitalist investors and the political elites. Land grabbing is thus an appropriation of peasants land possessions for the accumulation of the elites' economic interest (Ocheje, 2007; Nuhu, 2008; Odoemene, 2012; Attah, 2013).

The theory brings awareness to the issue of social inequality demonstrated by the capitalist's ambition of acquisitions and the struggles of industrialised working classes against plant closures, peasant resistance to land enclosures and the urban dwellers poor opposition to the privatisation of government services. Land acquisitions and resistances are interconnected (Harvey, 2005). This explains the rationale behind the socio-economic

activities that revolves around land. Dispossession according to the theory takes various forms around the globe: in advanced industrial regions, workers lost pension, welfare, national health care and jobs. Communal lands in indigenous and peasant communities are lost and communication and other public utilities were privatized. All these according to the theory can be traced to the shift dominance in finance capital that accompanied the rise of neo-liberalism. Harvey (2005) termed the protection of a class interest and right as '*expanded reproduction*'.

Politics of civilization mainly results to disempowering individuals especially in the lower class. Accumulation by Dispossession theory clarifies this act. This gives opportunities for a resistance which can at the same time be radical. In this vein, the collection of class brings the consciousness of resistance in the society. Class resistance is a struggle over the appropriation of work, property, production and taxes. According to the theory, resistance is made possible by the peasants because they are aware that the lands are acquired in deceit (that is the government acquisitions of the land and therefore sells to private individuals). Also, the peasants are aware that resisting can provoke a change that will culminate in the reversal of the acquisitions of their land. They are also aware that not resisting can lead to famine or other fearful odds. This is especially executed through the strategy of under-reporting of the land size. Also, the theory elucidates that peasants are resisting the government's use of '*eminent domain*' to acquire and transfer their land to private companies for development.

Capitalists use accumulation by dispossession as a tool for property acquisitions on the oppressed class who may or may not resist and resistance could either be violent or non-violent (Attah, 2013; Odoemene, 2014; Mamonova, 2015; Alonso-Fradejas, 2015). This theory demonstrates how the peasants resist the practice of accumulation by dispossession. Some forms of resistance are individual; they tend to assume that common oppression gives rise to class politics and common political projects (Barker, 2014). Scholars have shown that most of those who suffer from 'unjust land deals' do not openly resist (Visser et al. 2012; Mamonova, 2015; Moreda, 2015). They leave it for the 'Almighty' (God) to settle while some other forms may be individually, unorganised and brutally featured (O'Brien and Li 2006; Kerkvliet, 2014).

In the light of the foregoing, public lands are succinctly turned into commodities and consequently privatised by the government thereby selling for individuals, which also extends to utilising lands for their personal wealth. Accumulation by dispossession theory also illuminates largely in *Ajoda* new-town where vast of land was acquired and appropriated by Ministry of land and housing via the power of “land use decree”. Hence, this penetration by the government thereby dispossesses many indigenous farmers of their livelihood for a low and medium-cost housing scheme and industry. However, they defaulted in this promise, and rather, sold some parts of the lands to private individuals at profitable huge sums of money. This, however, provokes resistance by the locals against the government’s acquisitions of land for the purpose of a new town. Therefore, the long-time trajectories of the similar occurrences of the public land acquisitions’ provoking resistances in Oyo state generally undermine the conditions for development. The commodification of the peasants’ class labour by the capitalist is being experienced by the indigenous people as a coping strategy for survival owing to deceptive land accumulation.

Accumulation by dispossession can occur in a variety of ways contingent on the modes of operation. Yet, it is always present in no matter what historical period and time of its occurrence. Therefore, such accumulation by dispossession rather than leading to development can hinder development while promoting underdevelopment in indigenous communities (see Olutayo, 1991). Scholars have engaged this Accumulation by dispossession theory from different perspectives (Arighi, Aschoff and Scully, 2010; Barnejee-Guha, 2010; Ekman, 2012). However, this study aligns with the idea of Arighi et al, (2010) who probed into the consequences of accumulation by dispossession in Southern Africa manifested in forms like homelessness, poverty, hunger, death and so forth.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.0 Introduction**

This section of the study focuses on the detailed analysis of the research design and methodology to be adopted in carrying out this study. It covers the design, the instruments of data collection, sampling procedure and data analysis.

#### **3.1 Research Design**

The research design for this study is historical and exploratory. Historical research design was used because there are historical antecedents to land grabbing in Ibadan while exploratory design was introduced because the subject matter has not been studied in *Ajoda* new-town and there is need to have an in-depth knowledge of the subject matter.

#### **3.2 Area of Study**

The study was conducted at *Ajoda* new-town area of Egbeda Local Government in Ibadan. The area of study was purposively selected because of the resistance that was provoked in the communities. This was further justified of being a litigated issue and is in the court of law for about 40 years now due to the large expanse of land that was transacted between the community and the Ministry of lands and housing, Oyo state. Also, due to the fact that there are many housing estates established by the Ministry, of which this *Ajoda* new-town has remained controversial. *Ajoda* is located north-east of Ibadan. It lies on the geographical location of longitude  $4^{\circ} 2^{\prime}$  of the Greenwich Meridian and latitude  $7^{\circ} 23^{\prime}$  north of the equator. To the west, *Ajoda* New Town is bounded by the Omi River and in the north by the new Iwo road. The physical boundary on the eastern side is approximately 2km beyond the east of the dual carriage way; the southern boundary is formed by the new Ibadan-Ife-Road. From Ibadan, *Ajoda* New Town can be reached on

the Ibadan-Ife Road or the Ibadan-Iwo Road, which is at present being enlarged to deal with increased traffic. On both roads, the travel distance to the designated area is approximately 15 kilometres from the edge of Ibadan formed by its Eastern By-Pass.




Figure 1: Map of Ajoda New-Town showing Ajoda and the neighbouring towns

### **3.3 Study Population**

The study population comprised adult's indigenous landowners and were fully residents in Ajoda new-town and allottee-residents of *Ajoda* new-town community (see the periods of stay in the community in the primary sources of data collection below). Selection of respondents from this age category was due to the fact that they are already adults and are abreast of the land grabbing activities in relations to the consequent resistance demonstrated in the communities. The study population included both male and female, in order to elicit information from both genders.

### **3.4 Sampling Technique**

The sampling techniques used for this study were primarily purposive and snowballing in selecting and locating participants. Ajoda community is made up of many villages championing the same course of resisting public land grabbing. They usually had their meetings fortnightly in Ajule, which is later extended to Gbenku axis after two weeks, yet discussing about the way forward of their acquired inherited land by the Ministry of Land and Housing, Oyo state.

### **3.5 Methods of Data Collection**

Qualitative research method of data collection was adopted to generate data for the study. This included both the primary and secondary sources of data.

#### **3.5.1 Primary sources**

The primary sources included Archival source; Observation, Key Informant Interview (KII), In-depth Interview (IDI), Focus Group Discussion (FGD) and Case studies were used in collecting data in order to capture the social reality on the subject matter.



### **3.5.2 Secondary sources**

The secondary sources included the minutes of the landlords' meeting of *Ajoda* community, newspapers, and court proceedings on *Ajoda* community and government's report on *Ajoda*.

### **3.5.3 Archival Source**

Archival data was collected to shed more light on the historical and old form of land grabbing in Ibadan. This was largely from the National Archives in Ibadan for materials such as colonial reports CSO 2609631, Oyo Prof. Vol.1, Oyo Prof. 221, Oyo Prof. 4063001, IbaProf <sup>3</sup>/<sub>4</sub>, memorandum, and gazettes.

### **3.5.4 Observation**

This study observed the physical features of under-development of the *Ajoda* new town. Also, observation on some (traditional material symbols, proverbs, songs) alluding to land ownership in the environment as a result of the resistance that took place in *Ajoda* new-town. The researcher adopted a non-participant observation method in achieving this and lasted for a period of three (3) months.

### **3.5.5 Key Informant Interview (KII)**

Key informant interview was purposively conducted among community leaders (*Baales* and co-chiefs), a youth president, allottees, government officials and chairman of landlords who are not only familiar with the topic under discussion, but might have privilege information due to their status in the community. The total numbers of eighteen (18) KIIs were conducted for the study. Three (3) of the community leaders in the community, that is, the *Baale* (1) and two (2) chiefs were purposively selected and located through snowball for interviewed. Four (4) *Omo-onile* that is, family heads of children of the landowners that lay claims to the land were purposively selected and located through snowball were interviewed in the community. Also, key informant interview was conducted among two (2) allottee-resident landlords who were purposively selected and located through snowball and that have lived in the community for at least 10 years and

above and two (2) indigenous landlords were interviewed in the community. Equally, one (1) key informant was conducted with the chairman of the landlords association of the community who was purposively selected and located via snowball. One (1) youth president in the community was interviewed, purposively selected and located through snowball. Also, two (2) allottees (these are the respondents that purchased land through Housing Cooperation but never came back to develop their sites due to the crisis) were interviewed, purposively selected and located via snowball. Finally, 3 state government officials who are in the cadres of Directors (1) and Assistant Directors (2) were interviewed, purposively selected and located through snowball.

### **3.5.6 In-Depth Interview (IDI)**

In-depth interview was purposively conducted among the indigenes of *Ajoda* new-town. This was carried out on ten (10) indigenous landlords in the community, purposively selected and located through snowball; 1 Counsellor representing the community in governance, ten (10) allottee-residents' landlords who have stayed in the communities for a period of 5 years and above. Thus, a total of twenty-one (21) interviews were conducted using an interview guide. In-depth interview provided data on the rationality of the subject matter of the study.

### **3.4.7 Focus Group Discussion (FGD)**

A total number of two (2) focus group discussions were conducted for this study. The focus group sessions were homogenous. Due to the patriarchal nature of the Nigerian society, most members that constituted the focus group discussions were males. However, there was a session for female members and age group to grant their views on the subject matter. Although, locating indigenous female members to discuss about the subject matter was a bit complicated but this was made possible with the assistance of a female gatekeeper. The FGD was conducted among the older and younger generations often known as *Omo-onile*, that is, children of the land owners in the scenarios of the resistance to land grabbing as experienced in *Ajoda* community. The FGD session was held for the old generation (46 years and above) comprising one male and one female group in *Ajoda*. This was done among this category of people owing to their direct involvement in the

exercise of the resistance that took place in relation to the land grabbing. Each FGD comprised between 6 and 10 discussants. Discussants on each category provided data on their critical, different views and perceptions on the land grabbing activities.

#### **3.4.8 Case study**

This was purposively identified and constituted of 3 respondents, that is, indigenous landlord (1), allottee-resident landlord (1) and (1) illegal occupier of the community. The periods of stay would have spanned through a period of 30 years and above. It was assumed that these people would have first-hand information regarding the resistance that transpired as a result of the land grabbing activities that took place in the communities.

#### **3.5 Methodology Matrices**

The matrices below show the guideline and the procedures that will be used for the method of data collection and for the objectives of the study.

### Matrix A

<b>ACTORS</b>	<b>KII</b>	<b>IDI</b>	<b>FGD</b>	<b>Case study</b>
Traditional rulers/ chiefs	3			
Omo-onile (family heads of children of the land-owners)	4			
Allottee-Resident landlords	2	10		1
Indigenous landlords	2	10	2	1
Chairman (Landlord's association)	1			
A Youth Representative	1			
A Counselor		1		
Director (Government official)	1			
Assistant Directors(Government officials)	2			
Allottees	2			
Illegal occupier				1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>

**Matrix B**

<b>Research Objectives</b>	<b>Data Collection Instruments</b>					<b>FGD</b>	<b>Case-study</b>
	<b>Archives</b>	<b>Observation</b>	<b>KII</b>	<b>IDI</b>			
<b>Objective 1</b>	✓						
<b>Objective 2</b>			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<b>Objective 3</b>			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<b>Objective 4</b>			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<b>Objective 5</b>		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

### **3.6 Methods of Data Analyses**

Data was analysed using content and descriptive techniques. While the main focus of the study was to generate primary data through the various research methods as stated above, then the presentation of findings took both tabular and words summary forms. These were done by focusing on the core themes or objectives of the study. Research findings were coded into themes and arranged for easy identification and collation into systemic ideas emanating from the field. Verbatim quotations from respondents' interview were also included in the data presentation. Interpretation of findings was done by examining the major findings and how they support or contradict past works as identified in the literature.

### **3.7 Ethical Consideration**

The basic ethical principles for research involving human subjects as highlighted by Babbie (1992), which includes voluntary participation, anonymity, and confidentiality was strictly adhered to by this study. The consent of the interviewees was sought before the commencement of any of the interviews. Any information given was treated with confidentiality and be used in a way that no individual who responded in the study would be linked with any information. Also, any respondent who felt his/her interest was at risk and wanted to withdraw from participation at any point during the course of interview was given the opportunity to do so.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

#### **4.0 A Histo-Sociological Narratives of Land grabbing in Ibadan**

The issues of socio-cultural practices over land matters in ancient city of Ibadan, as a subset in the entire Yorubaland cannot be over-emphasized. Essentially, having described Ibadan as an ancient city signifies the rationale of interrogating the contemporary socio-cultural practices especially in conflicts on land matters and the motive of digging deep into the fabrics of the old times. This helps to provide a better perspective in respect to the historical connections to the background of a particular social phenomenon. Thus, it is imperative to have a critical historical understanding of the socio-cultural behavioural practices as relating to land grabbing in Ibadan.

Buthe (2002) highlights that the combination of the historical variables and analysis add value to a particular social phenomenon. Also, Scott (1986) emphasizes that researchers codifying the interpretations of words may not bring out the essential words, however, history makes out the understanding of the ideas. Juxtaposing these two narratives succinctly provides the idea that historical analysis is important to research investigations. Historical analysis gives room for thorough searching of documented records in order to make an inferential position about a particular subject matter. As societies are dynamic in nature, overtime the socio-interrelatedness of the actors remains changing consequent on some variables in particular to a social phenomenon. One of the social phenomena is land grabbing which has been a long standing issue from time

immemorial. Therefore, the next section interrogates the pre and colonial historical antecedents of land-grabbing in Ibadan.

#### **4.1.1 The emergence of pre-colonial Ibadan, its war machinery and land grabbing**

The growth of Ibadan from a forest comprising various hills inhabited by social deviants from the neighbouring towns makes it unique among other Yoruba settlements (Salami and Olawale, 2013). Ibadan had her roots in war. What later became Ibadan was a war camp in the 18<sup>th</sup> century to the last decade of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Johnson, 1921; Awe, 1964; Ajayi and Akintoye, 1971; Falola, 1984; Adediran, 2000; Adelugba, Raji, Omowunmi, Olayebi, 2001; Watson, 2003; Salami and Olawale, 2013). Its founders were experienced soldiers from different Yoruba kingdoms like Oyo, Ife and Ijebu (Watson, 2003; Salami and Olawale, 2013). Of all the warriors, Lagelu was the first to settle in Ibadan (Awe, 1964; Ajayi and Akintoye, 1971; Adediran, 2000; Adelugba, Raji, Omowunmi, Olayebi, 2001; Watson, 2003; Fadipe, 2012; IbaProf <sup>3</sup>/<sub>4</sub>).

Watson (2005) noted that Lagelu came to Ibadan in the company of his brother, Labosinde. It was also gathered that those who have their attachments with the brother assert the rights to the title of Oluwo, a chief saddled with the responsibility of installing the Olubadan, Ibadan's traditional ruler. Also, Lagelu's settlement was regarded as Eba-Odan, interpreted as 'near the savannah', or 'a location at the edge of the forest belt'. Thus, the Ibadan nomenclature originated from this geographical description (Awe, 1964; Falola, 1984; Adediran, 2000; IbaProf <sup>3</sup>/<sub>4</sub>). Watson (2005) and Omobowale (2006) indicated that Ibadan was further disintegrated by other towns in the region consequent on the revelations of the *egungun* at the market place. The *egungun* was generally believed by the people, as ordered by the then Alaafin, to be spirits of the ancestors. In the process, Lagelu and his family sought refuge in a nearby forest and survived by pillaging the neighbouring villages. As one of the raids was going on, Lagelu and some other refugees shifted their location to the hills in respect of the on-going war and lived on snails and wild mangoes gathered on the hill. This explains the common appellation of Ibadan people as shown below:



*Ibadan, omoajorosun*Ibadan, child of one who ate wild mangoes for supper

*Omoajegbinyo* Child of one who exhaustively take snails for a main meal

*Omoafiikarahunfori mu* Child of one who drank from snail shell

**Source:** Watson, 2005

The descent of Lagelu and his people from the hill to a place known as ‘*Ori Yangi*’ initiated the ‘second Ibadan’ (Adelugba, Raji, Omowunmi, Olayebi, 2001; Watson, 2005; Omobowale, 2006). This area is now referred to as *Oja ‘ba (Iba Oluyole market)* (Akinyele, 1981). Therefore, the hill where Lagelu and the followers descended from was used as a location to accommodate a deity (*orisa*) called *Oke ‘badan*. Lagelu was buried in *Oke ‘badan* hill and it is believed that his spirit has since remained there. From the foregoing, the expansion of Ibadan during the pre-colonial era is predicated on the sojourn of Lagelu. Also, Ibadan expanded into a city in the pre-colonial era through series of wars and conquests. Hence, there is a need to investigate land grabbing as an imperialism strategy in the pre-colonial Ibadan. Land grabbing is a strategic issue in the pre-colonial times (Bukar, 2013). As a result, cultural practices of land ownership were central to understanding development as it occurred during the period (Abdulahi and Antwi, 2005).

In the history of Ibadan imperialism, the fall of old Oyo Empire by the Ibadan indigenous military soldiers opened up a vista for land grabbing by conquest. It led to how Ibadan warriors spread to other parts of Yorubaland through the wars they had with other neighbouring villages (Adediran, 2000; Watson, 2005). Also, land grabbing in the pre-colonial days took place primarily through invading existing settlements (Watson, 2005). For example, in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, a land was assumed fertile and sustainable if a community was established on it (Falola, 1984; Adelugba, Raji, Omowunmi, Olayebi, 2001; Abdulahi and Antwi, 2005; Salami and Olawale, 2013). Based on that assumption, warriors could overrun settlements and dispossess the people of their land. The practice was based on the notion that marauders do not have the time to experiment on land to know whether it would yield or not to achieve their mission of accumulating land for their

expansion. The Ibadan warriors gradually crept into the communities by initially sending their slaves for pillaging and therefore degenerates to fight that could lead to war.

Furthermore, land grabbing was facilitated by warriors' desire to acquire slaves in the pre-colonial Ibadan (Falola, 1984; Watson, 1999; Ejiogu, 2006; Salami and Olawale, 2013). When Ibadan warriors were keenly fighting various wars in different locations of Yorubaland, concerns shifted from land fertility to acquisition of slaves who would be beneficial for security and in accumulating land after the demolition of any town (Salami and Olawale, 2013). For example, the five (5) different wars which were fought by Ibadan soldiers at Offa, Kiriji, Ife, Egbas, as well as the Ijebu were seen evident in respect of the explanation (Johnson, 1921; Ajayi and Akintoye, 1971; Falola, 1984; Adediran, 2000; IbaProf, ¾). In addition, whenever any town was conquered, its people were taken as slaves to increase workforce (Watson, 2005; Salami and Olawale, 2013). This is because land accumulation increases warlords' need for slaves and other subservient individuals to cultivate the land (Salami, 2012). Many of the weak villages that surrounded the strong marauders were destroyed and later inhabited by slaves and the marauders. Hence, land grabbing also created a form of relationship where the natives that owned a land became integrated into the household of the marauders (Watson, 2005). They intermarried and the natives were apportioned plots of land which they could use as source of wealth while they remained subservient to the warlords.

In the pre-colonial Ibadan history, warlords did grab land whenever they found some attractions such as farm produce and systematically alienate landowners over time (Salami, 2012). Another strategy used by Ibadan warriors to grab land in the pre-colonial era was by inhabitant natives paying for their servitude through the service of young men who would work on the warriors' farms. However, the practice was not rampant because the natives were always afraid that such young men servants may run away. Nevertheless, the warriors believed that if they lived in an enclave with slaves working on the land, the slaves would protect their interests over the land. This easier means of land acquisition is one of the main reasons warriors preferred to stay around the natives (Watson, 2005; Salami, 2012).

Another factor that facilitated land grabbing in the pre-colonial days is the reputation or fame of warriors (Falola, 1984). In measuring the wealth of a famous leader then, two things were largely considered. It is either the reputation or political power of the warlord or large number of slaves who can fight and grab other people's property through diplomacy or force. For example, Aperin was a fearless warrior sent to the south of Ibadan lay forestland which was an unsettled boundary with the Ijebus at that period. His assigned duty was to protect Ibadan from being attacked by the Ijebus while Ibadan soldiers were in the north. Aperin used the advantage given to him to accumulate land for himself, his sons, and some other people. Indeed, Aperin used his vigour to shield the wide expanse of land that would have been taken away by the Ijebus. Thereafter, Aperin and his sons started granting the protected land to people that showed interest in the land while they remained the overlords of the land. In that respect, the grantees had a responsibility to bring presents to them in order to enjoy their supports whenever a dispute ensued. What Aperin did annoyed Ibadan chiefs who accused him of stealing, regardless of the fact that the native customs allowed the natives to take land as huge as they wanted. While the Ibadan chiefs claimed that the land in question was officially acquired for the welfare of the natives, Aperin, in his personal defence, submitted at the native court that he and his sons protected the land from the Ijebus. In alignment with the submissions of the Ibadan chiefs, the contested land was placed entrusted to the Baale for the welfare of Ibadan natives (Price, 1933).

The historical antecedent of land grabbing in Ibadan pre-colonial era was also established from the native creation of household/compounds known as '*ile*'. The argument in this dimension crystallizes from the time the warriors settled in chosen areas seen as a safety valve to all and sundry in the areas (Watson, 1999 and 2005). In the process, the belief was that their followers and slaves should spread around to all the villages in the neighbourhood. This is illustrated by a popular saying in Ibadan that '*Ibadanti o baloko, omo ale ibadanni*'. That is, any native of Ibadan without a village is a bastard. At the settlement of these marauding warriors, many of the land of the natives were accumulated thereby displacing the original settlers. The practice is still upheld in the current Ibadan chieftaincy. The Ibadan council still maintains that instructions and dictates of the *Olubadan* determine land ownership at the periphery. Ideally, those

dominated communities have a right to determine whether they should have a king or not. Many of those areas are even larger than Lagos and the *Olubadan* insisted that they should be under the headship of *Baale*. Ibadan came to dominate them through the war and the marauding nature of Ibadan warriors. Many of those small villages/hamlets captured were collapsed under Ibadan dominance. For example, it was highlighted by one of the notable chiefs in Ibadan that places like *Omi-adio*, *Akufo*, *Iddo*, and *Bakatari* were taken over by Ibadan and along the line became absorbed by expanding city. Many of those natives have retained their identity over the years while seeking a return to the status quo, where they would have kingdoms of their own. They were indirectly challenging the Ibadan native authority on the ground that their settlements preceded Ibadan overlords who later grabbed their land and identity.

Finally, land grabbing was achieved by Ibadan natives through diplomacy. Ibadan people in the pre-colonial days were very smart goal getters (Falola, 1984). Ibadan style of political relationship to other Yoruba regions demonstrated that Ibadan people were diplomatic and subtle in enlarging the spread of Ibadan. Therefore, Ibadan army usually used their military prowess in supporting and fighting other settlements. This is not for any other reasons than to expand their coast and gain more alliances. For example, the Ife kingdom was largely absorbed into Ibadan territory by adjudicating between Ife and Modakeke through the aid of diplomacy in 1850 (Falola, 1984 and Adediran, 2000).

#### **4.1.2 Colonialism and Land Tenure in Ibadan under the Native Authority**

The arrival of the British colonialists ushered in a new era in Yoruba history. With it, came the 1861 treaty introduced by the British colonialists, to reconcile and restore peace, disrupted by different indigenous Yoruba wars (Omobowale, 2006; IbaProf <sup>3</sup>/<sub>4</sub>). The treaty involved the endorsement of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) binding the conflicting parties towards peaceful coexistence (Awe, 1964; Falola, 1984; Omobowale, 2006; Yakub, 2007; Udoekanem, Adoga and Onwumere, 2014; IbaProf <sup>3</sup>/<sub>4</sub>). This treaty was signed by the British colonialists as at that period of the colonial era which involved the traditional chiefs in Nigeria (Udoekanem, Adoga and Onwumere, 2014; IbaProf <sup>3</sup>/<sub>4</sub>). One of the implications of this agreement was that land as a major factor of production

was unavoidably needed by the colonial government to achieve their economic, social and political goals (Udoekanem, Adoga and Onwumere, 2014). In the British colonial masters' bid to administer the region successfully, especially in the area of land holdings, they had to go through the socio-cultural practices of Yorubaland, with respect to land tenures, in order to practically understand the '*modus operandi*' of the indigenous land tenure system (Price, 1933; Oyo Prof 221, Vol. 1, pg. 1). It was discovered that land tenure practices, in the pre-colonial Yorubaland, were complicated and as a result generated debates among the colonialists (Price, 1933; Oyo Prof.Vol.1. pg.3).

A new land tenure, however, was introduced by the British colonialists that introduced land regulations to control land ownership, land use and development. Amongst the legislations introduced, were the 1861 treaty of land cession, the 1900 legislation that describes the Land Proclamation Ordinance, that of 1916 Land and Native Rights Act and Niger Land Transfer Act, the 1917 legislation on the Public Land Acquisition and the Native Land Acquisition. Consequently, the introduction of these ordinances nullified the communal land ownership that was operational in pre-colonial Nigeria. Through this legislation, all native lands were brought under the absolute control of the Governor, via the 1916 ordinance as mentioned in sections 3 and 4 of the ordinance (see CSO 2609631/S2; No.1-3; Pg. 19). This ordinance empowered the Governor to refuse or grant the rights of occupancy to the indigenes and non-indigenes introduce rents on land subject to his own approval and revoke land not used according to the terms and agreement. Consequently, coupled with the socio-economic ambition of the colonialists, parts of native lands were acquired and made Crown lands, as counter signed by the Surveyor-General (Oyo Prof 4063001 I, pg. 37). For example, the 1900 Land Proclamation Ordinance that was enacted by Lord Lugard ignored the principles of native law and customs, which were hitherto used as instruments for land acquisition (Yakub, 2002; Udoekanem, Adoga and Onwumere, 2014). It further made provision for titles to land that could only be acquired through the High Commissioner.

One of the platforms through which the British colonialists administered land in Yorubaland was through the indirect rule. The colonial administration, on 22<sup>nd</sup> November, 1939, brought the awareness on the adoption of land holdings and execution of deeds of

lands to the Yoruba tradition on land tenure, via the native authority. The Native Authority was originally disempowered to hold and claim land *ab initio*. However, the deed was amended to empower the Native Authority to acquire, hold and let land for specific purposes in the colony (Oyo Prof 4063001 I. pg.2). The Native Authority henceforth, acted in the capacity of the Head Chief of the land group. This was specifically done in order to foreground the authority of the local chiefs among the native people though the supreme authority and command came from the colonial administration, especially on land acquisitions (Oyo Prof 4063001 I. pg.62). In furtherance of the colonialists' land tenure practices, the native authority was fortified with the registration of incorporation, in order to acquire land for public purpose. It was also mandated that land be held with Certificate of Title as proof of ownership (Oyo Prof 4063001 I. pgs.15 and 46). The colonialists also ordered that some clarifications on land be made by the native authority, and that all land held or used by the native authority be publicly declared. For example, on the 10<sup>th</sup> of May, 1944, the colonial government used the Incorporation of Native Authority on behalf of the native authority to acquire the piece of land used for the Reservoir, Water Works and Electric Light Power Station in Ibadan. Furthermore, the native authority was given the responsibility, by the British colonialists, to take over the acquired area for easy implementation (Oyo Prof 4063001 I. pg.4).

The native law and customs was thereafter revised by the British colonial leaders for their own administrative convenience. The sale of land in the pre-colonial period was seen as forbidden, as there were vast tract of land. However, land could be offered as a gift or used by an interested non-indigene of a particular community, based on the terms and agreement between such user and the host community (Price, 1933). The terms and agreement usually involved giving the community head some of the farm produce often known as *Ishakole*, which reinforced the fact that the land did not belong to the stranger permanently. Contrary to this practice, however, the colonial government introduced the sales of land as being practiced in the British motherland. While investigating the communal land tenure system, the colonialists opined that they lacked trust and confidence in some aspects of the Yoruba law and customs related to land tenure (Oyo Prof 221, Vol.1, pgs. 69 and 78). This was claimed as one of the reasons why the colonial masters incorporated the sales of land into the local administration, as practised in the

English law. For example, the socio-cultural practice of land given as a gift among the Yorubas, meant to a large extent to the British colonialists that the land may have been used as a medium of 'sales' rather than the purported gift as claimed by the natives (Oyo Prof 221, Vol.1, pg. 78). The British colonialists therefore, came up with the introduction of title bills to control the ownership of lands, which was categorically stated in the amendment as shown thus:

No sale of the family land shall be valid except in accordance with the terms of the new Registration of Titles Bill, which provides that the family that owns the land may justify the rationale behind the sales of the land or other wisely. Also, that the land so sold may not be registered until the family has been given full opportunity to show reasons against the sale. Moreover, there is no farming land whatsoever that shall be attachable for debt (CSO 26/09631/S.1).

It was, therefore, concluded that subject to the views of the native administration concerned, the natives should be allowed to deal freely amongst themselves on their land matters, farming land or non-farming land, provided that the 'farming land' is not attachable for debt, while pieces of non-farming land attached for debt and sold to an alien should also be subject for lease. Finally, they may mortgage the crops but not the land; and indigenes should not be allowed to mortgage farming land to aliens. This, no doubt, demonstrates the genesis of the historical connection on the issue of non-payment on land but on crops which still permeates the current dictates of the Land Use Act of 1978 in Nigeria. Also, in the amendment of the native law and customs, the British imperialists came up with the idea of using the instrumentality of lease to ensure that land perpetually remained the property of the government rather than individuals. This is as shown below:

Under the native land law, native should not be allowed to mortgage farming land to aliens. Also, farming land should not be attachable for debt and a tenant should not be allowed to mortgage if it has a proper **lease**. However, the colonialist amended that non-farming land attachable for debt and sold to an alien should be the subject of a **lease** with the approval of the Governor (Oyo Prof 221, Vol.1, pg. 82).

Sales of land, as alleged against the Yoruba natives by the colonialists was demonstrated when indigenes in the pre and colonial era were found to have used their influence, positions and wealth to control and manipulate land to their favour. In the

course of the archival research, it was discovered that land ownership was maneuvered and exchanged as a result of obligated attachment attested to the lands, all in the name of land control and occupancy (Price, 1933). For example, the Sanni of Ibadan obtained a vast land from the Awujale of Ijebu-Ode supposedly before the guild of Aperin. The land in question was later acquired by Ibadan to the credit of Aperin's tenacity in safe guiding of the territory against the Ijebus. Eventually, the Sanni and Aperin families mistakenly allocated same plots of (forest) land to different people. Such situations usually degenerated to a constant pandemonium at that period. In this regard, Aperin was allowed to take one pound on each individual, as ordered by the Baale and the Chief in Council. With this development, Aperin made good money through this collection of one pound from each person over the land crisis. He even collected the same amount of money from any chief, who desired to acquire land from him.

On accounting for the aggregate of land sales, through which he enriched himself, Aperin, ignited the Bale's fury, even more than the initial time. This was the era when cocoa farming was at its peak and attracted a lot of farmers to the plantation. The desire and rush for this goal led to series of disturbances and conflict over land. In mediating this case, a delineation of boundaries on this vast forest land was created for both Aperin and Sanni, which at least brought calmness at the time. They were both told to always acknowledge the Baale as their head chief by donating to him in kind at certain intervals. However, it was adjudged by Justice Nile Cole that Aperin's family owned the land because they were the first to occupy and take possession of the place. Also, it was discovered that neither of the two sides admitted to selling the forest land, but instead both agreed to have accepted fees for the services of making the delineation and annual payments in cash and in farm produce to show appreciation on the grantee's part (Price, 1933).

Another case as documented by Price (1933) was that involving Dalley and some Ibadan chiefs. Dalley happened to be a native of Abeokuta, who was granted land by Baale Fajinmi of Ibadan with the approval of the native council, when he migrated to Ibadan about 1890. For as long as eight years after the agreement, there was no dispute, but when cocoa became economically viable in the market, land ownership was greatly



affected land. Soon, Dalley was challenged by the chiefs who had become jealous of his large expanse of land. After an extended mediation, Dalley was able to retain the agreed delineated portion of land, while some went to family members and the rest was subjected under the Baale and the chiefs in council (see also Omobowale, 2006). Also, Dalley was permitted by the residents and the Council to obtain a retreat at five shillings per annum per plot, (approximately two acres) from those he already allocated land to from the remaining forest land. Consequently, various disagreements erupted between him and his tenants, who encroached on other people's portions and took new portions of land without permission, displacing other farmers and claiming their crops.

Ewebiyi's case was also reported as one of the cases by Price (1933). Ewebiyi was purported to have laid claims to a tract of land which had been in dispute for about 20 years (1905-1925). Majority of the Ewebiyi's tenant declined being loyal to him as their overlord. They refused to pay him in kind (*Ishakole*), annually, because he was accused of siphoning money from them deceitfully. This affirms that deceit and resistance over land has been an issue from ancient times. However, various levels of dynamism keep unveiling as the society changes overtime. In settling this case for the tenants, delineation was created for them in 1917, whereby they all agreed to pay tributes to Ewebiyi with the full assurance of a witness in the process of the payment. This tribute amounted to 5 shillings on each individual. Thereafter, Ewebiyi was also accused of evicting his tenants from their cocoa plantations. This resulted to various disputes which later degenerated to a denial of Ewebiyi of land owner tribute in form of *Ishakole* in 1918. When the land was inspected by officers in a bid to ascertain the cause of the misunderstanding, it was concluded that series of trespasses and unruly conduct of all the actors involved had led to the crisis.

Finally, during the reign of the British imperialists, it was seen that there was a massive expansion of the urban settings creating a class division in the territory (Omotoso, 2017). This dissected the territory into smaller planned units of the British colonialists and the unstructured larger society. For example, the Jericho quarters in Ibadan was acquired in the 1940's for the purpose of the British colonialists as a Government Residential Area (GRA) replicating the features of the Western world. This was made possible with the

ordinance of 1917 (Falola, 1984; Udoekem, Adoga and Onwumere, 2014). Omotoso (2017) highlighted that the Europeans resided where there was proximity to social services like medical attention, security, adequate water supply, good roads and the like. He further posited that the British rule or colonialism opened up a vista for class consciousness resulting to the idea of modernization among the few elites. Consequent on this, racial apartheid and ethnic cynicism among the natives were found as implications of the dichotomy. The few native elites who were privileged to work and associate with the British colonialists were able to internalise the lifestyle of the British imperialists; trend with the British culture and assumed themselves as the '*olaju*'(civilized) and of the less privileged as '*ara oko*' (under civilized) (Falola, 1984).

#### **4.1.3 Land Grabbing under Colonial Authority**

Land grabbing under the colonial government was made possible, no doubt, with the aid of the native authority. In the course of an archival research, it was discovered that the colonial government was also diplomatic and subtle, interacting with the native authority, over the declaration of land to ensure the control and management. This is to ensure that no land is hidden or undeclared by the natives as stated:

It was of importance that all the lands in the custody of the Native Authority whether it is being held or used should not be declared as a matter of necessity because there may be lands at present held by the Ibadan Native Authority and be declared at the time of application such as the Hospital area and the area acquired for development on the Ijebu bye-pass. Also, the Honour could be aware of other lands which could be usefully declared and authority from the Excellency should be sought before the release (Oyo Prof 4063001 I. pg.6).

Furthermore, land grabbing under the colonial authority was also achievable, via the power conferred on the Native Authority which enabled them to confront and persuade families that own plots of land to allow the land be used by the colonial government and to agree and convey the full title without any reservation. It was also emphasized that there should be a complete acquisition of land when the compensation has been paid (Oyo Prof 4063001 I. pgs. 11, 56-57, 63, 68). In addition, it was shown that the colonial government recognised the fact that Ibadan indigenes quickly awakened in their consciousness of their

land rights and used the legislation on native authority to acquire land compulsorily for public use, and to forestall any conflict that could erupt as a result (Oyo Prof 4063001 I. pg. 69). For example, on the 18<sup>th</sup> May, 1944, some pieces of family land were declared for public purposes in Ibadan (Oyo Prof 4063001 I. pgs. 7-9). It was later discovered that compensation had been paid for some of the acquired lands, while some others were given freely on moral grounds by some families to the government for public purpose. On Ijebu bye-pass road area, it was, however, established that there was no formal agreement between the Native Authority and the concerned family. The land was acquired and developed from Bola Church to the main Ijebu Ode Road, in 1929. As a matter of fact, there were no details concerning the acquisition, and compensation was said to have been paid on the land. Salvation Army Road Area was seen not to have received a formal agreement, but the land was said to have been obtained from the Oganla's family in 1923 by consent. Hence, no compensation was paid on the land to the family which willingly gave to the government. Adeoyo Hospital Area also shows that there was no formal agreement involved in its acquisition. It was acquired for healthcare purposes in 1921 from the owners and compensation of 260 pounds was paid. The area was neither surveyed, pillared nor with an organised documented plan. Also, Police Barracks Area revealed a lack of any formal agreement involving the original owners (Are's family) in 1938 when the land was acquired though compensation was fully paid (Oyo Prof 4063001 I. pg. 11).

In Ogbomoso Water Works Area, there was no formal agreement and no compensation was paid. However, it was emphasized that the documentation of the Prison area in Oshogbo and the Water works area in Oshogbo and Ogbomoso should be forwarded for political considerations from the subordinate Native Authorities with the consent of the Superior Native Authority (Oyo Prof 4063001 I. pg.7). On the 17<sup>th</sup> of July, 1944, the Incorporation of Native Authorities ascertained that there was no full agreement relating to Native Administration's tenure of the land and that there were no details regarding the land but compensation was said to have been paid (Oyo Prof 4063001 I. pg.11). Therefore, the native authority had no formal agreement with the families whose lands were taken over by the native authority but by the mere consent of the owners of the acquired land in favour of the government (Oyo Prof 4063001 I. pg.15). Another notable

piece of land acquired by the colonial government in Ibadan was the land used for the Nigeria Regiments at Eleyele, Ibadan, as evident in the memo dated 23<sup>rd</sup> July, 1937 (Oyo Prof 221, Vol.5, pg. 613). The pillars on the boundary of land used by The Nigerian Regiment were sub-divided into two. These are as seen in (Oyo Prof 221, Vol.5, pg. 614):

**R.W.A.F.F Officers Quarters:** P.B.Z 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946 and 947 and

**R.W.A.F.F Barracks Men's Quarters:** P.B.Z 292, 293, 294, 295, 948, 949, 950, 473, 472, 575, 993, 994, 995, 996 and 997

Also, the government's acquisition of old Agodi and the extensions were included in the acquisition as equally evident on the memo dated 13<sup>th</sup> July, 1945 (Oyo Prof 221, Vol.5, pg. 620).

In the colonial regime, public land grabbing in the name of native authority took a new turn. Gazettes were adopted in publicizing the acquired land to the general public for a specific period of time (about three (3) months) after which any claims by any indigene was rendered impotent as far as the native authority was concerned (Oyo Prof 4063001 I. pg.70). Most of the aboriginal owners of land were uneducated and as a result, lacked access to these forms of publications thereby were dispossessed of their lands (Ocheje, 2007; Ako, 2009; Nwabueze, 2009). Even, if accessed, they could not read and understand what the publications could have meant and the time as indicated on the gazette would have stalled due to ignorance. One of the events that took place in the colonial administration demonstrated the colonialists' urge for land ownership. The colonial government's interest in land was evident in the transfer of the Crown building to Native Authority while they declined the Native Authority the right over the land on which the building was erected (Oyo Prof 4063001 I. pg.33). It was affirmed that many patches of land were acquired for government use with this aid of the Native Authority. This is evidenced in the history of land acquisition in Ibadan sub-divided into sheets 1-9 (see Oyo Prof 4063001 I. pg. 21-24):

**Sheet 1:** Nil

**Sheet 2:** Oyo Road Cemetery, Aleshinloye Market, Sabongeri Market, Portions of Oke-Aremo Fuel Plantation and Portion of Ibadan Recreation Club and Race-course

**Sheet 3:** Portions of Oke-Aremo Fuel Plantation. Access road acquired by Crown and to be handed over to the Ibadan Native Administration

**Sheet 4:** Portions of Ibadan Native Administration Fuel Plantation

**Sheet 5:** New area acquired at Corner Club Road and Oyo Road. The remaining portion of Ibadan Recreation Club and Race-course; Ibadan Native Administration Layout; Salvation Army Road, Ekotedo, Ibadan; Inalende Market, Portions of Oke-Aremo Fuel Plantation, Portions of Land lease to Roman Catholic Mission at Oke-Are; Land leased to Roman Catholic Mission (School) at Abebi; Land taken from Mr. D.O. Olunlade for a plot given to him on the Native Administration Layout; Salvation Army Road; Land leased to the Salvation Army at Ekotedo, Ibadan; Dugbe Market; Land leased to G. Gottschalck and Company, Lebanon street, Ibadan; African Forces Canteen- (Old Treasury and Police Station); Land leased to C.F.A.O, Land leased to Mr. T.J Sarkis; Land leased to U.A.C Petrol Pumping Station, Ogunpa Motor Park, Land leased to Michael Elias (E33/V) assigned now to Paul Courie, Native Administration building, now property of the African Club; Native Administration building now Licensing and Water Rate Office, Land leased to C.F.A.O. and W.B. Maciver, Paterson Zochonis, U.A.C. (Miller Brothers), Land acquired from NuruAyinde Williams, S.C.O.A, Land acquired from Mr. D. Sowemimo at Ogunpa, Ibadan; Roman Catholic Mission Convent, Idikan street, Ibadan; C.M.S. Bookshop No. 1, Amunigun street, Ibadan; Roman Catholic Mission Compound, Church and School, Oke-Padi, Ibadan; Roman Catholic Mission Bookshop, OkePadi, Ibadan; London and Kano New Court Road, Ibadan, U.A.C. Swimming Pool, U.A.C. (Manager's Residence), John Holt, A.J. Tangalakis (Two plots), U.A.C (Kingsway Stores) (two plots), Dumping ground at Ogunpa, being considered for a proposed market, Methodist Manse, Oke-Bola Road, Ibadan; Amunigun market, Playing ground Methodist Mission school Agbeni, Ibadan; Agbeni Market, Ayeye Market; Olorishoko Market; Seventh Day Adventist Mission Oke-Bola (Two plots), Portion of Ijebu Bypass Layout; Elementary Training Centre, Inalende Old Native Administration Pumping Station, Pipeline and Tank.

**Sheet 6:** Ibadan Native Administration Police Barracks Acquisition E; remaining portions of Oke-Aremo Fuel Plantation, remaining portions of Roman Catholic Mission Seminary, Oke Are, Ibadan; Oke-Are Courts; Nurses Quarters, Adeoyo, Adeoyo Hospital; Church of God land (Church Buildings) Beyeruka, Ita Bale Olugbode Market, Mapo Council Hall and Bere Native Courts and Library; Bere Motor Park and Water Fountain Area; Oje Market; land leased to L.L Ricketts at Yemetu, Ibadan; Ojagbo Market, Gbenla Market, Agodi Market, Roman Catholic Mission Church (Motala) Oke Offa; Agugu Market, Ode-Aje Market, and Vaccinator's Shed, Oranyan

**Sheet 7:** Nil

**Sheet 8:** Remaining Portion of Ijebu Bypass Layout, Roman Catholic Mission and Convent, Oke-Ado Market, Ita-Moya Market, United Missionary College, portions of Ojaba Market, Ita-Aregbeomo Market, Idi Arere Market, Ibuko Market, Kudeti Girls School, St. Anne's on the Hill (Kudeti Girls' School Chapel), Scout Camp and Training Depot (Out of Sheet).

**Sheet 9:** Remaining Portion of Mapo Council Hall, Olubadan's School and Oranyan, remaining Portion of Ojaba Market, Labo Motor Park, Idi-Aro Motor Park, Ita-Ege Market, Eleta Market, Adebiopon Market; Wesley College Compound, Elekuro, Ibadan; Oranyan Dispensary; Wesley College Staff Quarters, Elekuro.

**Sheet 9:** Elekuro Market, Scale Market, Elekuro and Arijepe Market (OkeOdinjo).

The inherent tendency for land grabbing of the colonial leaders was understood from their management. Although, it can be argued that some special conditions were required for land acquisition, there is ample evidence that such conditions were negated or blatantly ignored in the general acquisition ordinance of the colonialist (Oyo Prof 1221 Vol. 5). For example, on June 10, 1946, an application for land for the extension of the Public Works Department, Ibadan area workshops, was filed to the Commissioner of Lands, Lagos. The extension was said to be built on Crown land and partly on privately owned land of the Adeniran's family. While building had already commenced on Crown land, the privately owned building was leased to Mr. Abizakem under the lease No. E24, vol. XXII, No. 11, Pg. 11; which at that time nullified the commencement of the building on the private land. The private land or plot was owned by the Adenirans, an Ibadan indigenous family. It was established that they were quite willing to sell the land. They therefore demanded a heavy compensation of £2000 from the colonial government. After much bargaining, however, the family agreed to £800. The colonial government was ready to offer £500 or more as a trading site at that moment. It was also said that the owners had been in the negotiation for the land with a Syrian for a 60 year lease at a rent of £30 per annum, which they claimed was equivalent to what the neighbouring land owners were collecting at the period. With this development, the Town Planning department had to order for the relocation of the Public Works Department (PWD) because of its location in the best commercial area of Ibadan town. Then, the government compulsorily acquired the land under the Public Lands Acquisitions Ordinance and left the amount of compensation to be fixed by the Supreme Court under section 10 Cap 88. Also, the integration of

acquisition by private agreement at a cost of £800 was highlighted. The negotiation of a lease of twenty years with the owners was considered as one of the options, entailing a renewal for twenty years with a clause that the Crown be permitted to lease at three months' notice. The government in its discretion finally offered a sum of £500 to the family (Oyo Prof 1221 Vol. 5)<sup>3</sup>.

Another case was reported in the archives on how lands were acquired by the Native Authority and government (Oyo Prof 1221 Vol. 5, pg. 658). Patches of land belonging to the Oriare's family was one of the lands that were acquired using the authority and power. It was an inherited land known as '*Odokekere*' of the Herbert Macauley who were the original owners of the land that was acquired by the government in 1919 as one of the Crown's land for the construction of RWAFF barracks in Ibadan. Compensation of £633 was paid on the crops and huts met on the part of the land for occupiers using the land for farming, but compensation was never paid to the whole of the land as acquired by the Bale and the Council of Ibadan representing the Native Authority and the government. This was actually contested by the Oriare's family that any reasonable person or persons would not consent the alienation of his family land for 999 years at one shilling. Also, it was in their submissions that the Bale and Council of Ibadan never consulted their family and it was not in accord of the native law and custom for the Bale and Council to alienate private properties. However, the Senior District Officer in-charge of Ibadan then advised the government that it will be appreciated that if Government admits to Mr. Macaulay's claim and enters into negotiations for a settlement, a large number of claims of other parties will also have to be admitted, which may well involve the expenditure of many thousands of pounds. Unless Government is prepared to reopen the whole question in this way; he further stated that he **cannot** recommend that it should and suggested that the line should be taken to the effect that:

By reason of the Certificate of Title No. 77/P.77/Vol. III  
Government's Title to the land in question is indefeasible

Government is satisfied that proper compensation was paid  
when the land was acquired

---

<sup>3</sup> Also, see Appendices Oyo Prof 1221 Vol. 5, pg. 623-635, 640-641

That every opportunity was given to claimants to put forward their claims at the time the Omnibus Lease covering the area concerned was being prepared, but that the petitioner's family failed to take such action at that time (Oyo Prof 1221 Vol. 5, pg. 681)<sup>4</sup>

It was assertive that with these given conditions as shown above, that government has nothing to fear any legal proceedings which might be instituted against the petitioner irrespective of all his petitions.

In summary, during the colonial Nigeria, all the machineries as introduced by the colonial government in governing lands were seen as a direct practice being exercised in the English law. Primarily, it was confirmed that the colonialist needed land for their private growth and development. Hence, they achieved these by exercising power and authority with the aids of these machineries in grabbing lands via the introduction of different policies which nullified the native practices of land tenure in the Yorubaland. As a result, lands became the perpetual property of the government. Affiliates represented in the Native Authority in colonial era were also using influences over original land owners in grabbing and dispossessing them of their ancestral lands. This is as described by Harvey (2005).

---

<sup>4</sup>(For full information, see Oyo Prof 1221 Vol. 5, pgs. 658-692).



## **4.2 The Processes of Land grabbing at Ajoda**

### **4.2.0 Introduction**

This section examines the processes of land grabbing in Ajoda. Behind the issue of land grabbing at Ajoda in Ibadan was the deliberate expansionist drive of natives who were interested in creating a new town or settlement distinct from the old Ibadan metropolis. This drive was to further the urbanisation drive from Ibadan metropolis through the processes of urban decongestion, land acquisition, resettlement/compensation, and the creation of a new town. These processes are discussed in this section.

### **4.2.1 Urban Congestion and Public Policy**

Ibadan is still classified as both urban and rural settlements till today because six local government areas (LGAs) constitute urban settlements and the rural Ibadan comprises five LGAs (Onibokun and Kumuyi, 1996; Adelekan, 2016). The urbanization efforts of the State Government had made Ajoda a popular town amidst other rural areas in Ibadan. Therefore, the settlement as one of those rural enclaves jostling for development attracted government attention. A government official affirms:

In the mid 1970's, the Ibadan metropolitan area and the undeveloped districts witnessed a population explosion, which as a result led to an immense strain on the city's social and physical infrastructure. The government's plan for Ajoda was to become a satellite town that accommodates people displaced in urban Ibadan, a situation that necessitated government's development intervention to provide basic need of its inhabitants. The problems bordered on poor housing, improper sanitation, unemployment, inadequate supply of water and electricity, acute shortage of health and educational facilities, dilapidated roads and a general dearth of infrastructural services **(Government Official/KII, December 2, 2016)**.

The above submission of a government official is corroborated by the State Government's policy report on the development of Ajoda:

The Oyo State Government's Ibadan decongestion program was part of the policy to take up the construction of critical infrastructure within Ajoda area with a view to integrating the area into mainstream metropolitan Ibadan **(Indigenous Land Owner/CS, February 19, 2017)**

This report shows that government was aware of the critical infrastructural deficit in Ibadan town and was working on a plan to remedy this and develop the area. In one of the interview sessions conducted, another interviewee posited:

Yes, the government as of that time wanted to decongest the town. It wanted people to shift from Ibadan city to this area. That was what government told our fathers. Though we registered our displeasure with this move, the government was firm in implementing its decision to acquire Ajoda. The language used then was that government wanted to create a satellite city in order to decongest Ibadan. It is closer to urban renewal when you look at it very well and what government told our people was that it was close to urban renewal generally **(Indigenous Land Owner/IDI, March 3, 2017)**

The congestion problem in Ibadan witnessed in the mid-1970 had cumulative effects on the social infrastructures in the metropolis. This was the rationale behind Oyo State government's urbanization extension project. Ajoda, one of the rural settlements, was then chosen as a site to implement this urban decongestion scheme, in which people would be moved from Ibadan to new-towns. However, this quest for communal land in *Ajoda* did not go down well with the indigenous people, who were afraid of expropriation and displacement that could endanger their indigenous authority over their communal land. The government, notwithstanding, proceeded with the policy that birthed the acquisition of Ajoda settlement.

This policy implementation presupposes 'urban renewal' and it is in line with extant literature positing that urban renewal is usually done to make life meaningful in terms of security, safety and comfortability of residents; and to attract investors thereby enhancing the economic activities of the area. This must be maximally executed and best utilized with strict conformity to the conceived planning design (Egolum and Emoh, 2017). Also, Harvey (2008) avers that urbanization is created from surplus value. This results from the geographical and social concentration of surplus product (land). Hence, it has always been a class-dominated phenomenon, where surpluses are extracted from somewhere and somebody (usually an oppressed peasantry); and to make class-domination a reality, the resultant enclave is controlled by the minority few.

In all these, there is evidence that the people in the first instance never accepted the policy then interpreted as unfavourable. However, the persistent persuasion from government and its continuous networking with community leaders finally led to the government having its way.




Figure 2: Map of Ibadan Region showing Ajoda New Town

The siting of the new-town at Egbeda was as a result of the road networks which lead out of Ibadan some ten to fifteen kilometres from the city. This presence of good road networks motivated government to further its decongestion program: where people would be resident in the low and high income areas acquired from the Housing Corporation. Within that period, the policy and strategy needed for creating a new town was clearly spelt in the amended version of the 3<sup>rd</sup> National Development Plan, which included the financing of new infrastructural services and the encouragement of private enterprises in such communities. Moreover, the development of the new town was in line with the drive for creating urban settlement in different stages and the plans of decongesting the city of Ibadan with a workable 'Master Plan' (Technical Reports on *Ajoda* New Town, 1978).

An interviewee further corroborated:

The intention of the then government was to create a reservoir of accommodation that will cater for both the new industry and the overspill population from Ibadan. Furthermore, it was emphasized that such a new-town project was expected not to only provide a properly equipped and serene environment for people living in the community, but to also assist in relieving the strain in Ibadan (**Government Official/ KII, November 30, 2016**).

Furthermore, another interviewee observed that:

The government wanted a befitting city in order to decongest Ibadan during that time. The place would be beautiful and serve as a foreign attraction for foreigners to come and live in Ibadan. So, the acquired land was up to 5000 ha and it was designed and sectionalized into residential, low-cost and high cost areas, as well as industrial section and commercial area (**Government Official/KII, November 23, 2016**).

Again, government was motivated by the interests of the potential settlers at *Ajoda*, who already registered their enthusiasm for acquiring land through their applications for both residential and industrial lands in that location, while considering the New Town Master Plan. This motivated the then administration to boldly site the new town at *Ajoda*. An interviewee who provided further information said:

When they were talking about *Ajoda* new town then, most of us were younger then. We were young civil servants when we heard

about the *Ajoda* new town and the Master plan was beautifully designed. Therefore, it was the plan of the government to develop the place and decongest Ibadan city of its hustling and bustling in the city then (**Allottee-resident/IDI, March 1, 2017**).

The data above show that the conception and development of Ajoda new town had been a discussion for a long time, where the potential settlers demonstrated their willingness to acquire land. The data also show the Master-plan of the designated new-town as a development plan to accommodate potential settlers; the acquisition would serve as a relief with a capacity for decongestion and escape from dilapidations of social infrastructures in Ibadan metropolis.

#### **4.2.2 Ajoda Land Acquisition**

Land acquisition at Ajoda was in two phases. The first acquisition was done in 1976; prior to the introduction of Land Use Decree of 1978, while the second was done after the implementation of the Land Use Decree. The scheme started in 1976 and government started setting out the area and putting other necessary facilities such as borehole water, electricity and good roads in place. Before the acquisition of the land during the first phase, the Oyo State government sent some delegates to approach the community leaders of the new prospective area, for the developmental extension at *Ajoda to succeed*. This was primarily to intimate them about the government's intention to establish a new town in the community. The representatives of government went to the community on this task and some of the community leaders agreed, while others declined with the fear of being dispossessed of their inherited farm land as earlier discussed. In the process of their discussion, the representatives hinted the indigenous land owners about all the fascinating plans and promises that the state government had already designed for the benefits of the community members. The promises included an elaborate resettlement plan, compensation, job creation and infrastructural facilities amongst other enticing offers. The then Governor also clarified, as part of the promises, that all genuine settlers and property owners in the affected areas already marked as part of the extension plan would be relocated comfortably and compensated adequately in relation to acquired lands, crops and other investments (Governor's Speech, 13<sup>th</sup> July, 1977). Some of the community leaders who heard these were attracted to the prospects and thus, affirmed that

their community was indeed in need of all these aforementioned promises. An interviewee had this to say:

Some of our community leaders who believed they were actually educated adopted the idea of government. They were given the task of enlightening the ‘less knowledgeable’ natives about the intention of government with the promises that there will be water, electricity, roads, school and so on. Our elders at that time said it was worth accepting because those were the facilities they were in dire need of **(Indigenous Land Owner/KII, March 9, 2017)**.

Another interviewee discussed thus:

Really, I am not one of the children of the soil but we heard about the acquisition of lands in this *Ajoda*; that government wanted to acquire them for industrial estate so that the sons of the soil could be working there. Also, government promised that it would provide *Ajoda* with electricity, security and pipe-borne water to the extent that there would be no room for thieves to operate **(Allottee-resident/IDI, March 4, 2017)**.

The indigenous settlers felt that they deserved a better and comfortable environment full of social amenities. Some of the traditional heads welcomed the plans of creating a new town in the community with the expectation of all these promises. Thereafter, the community leaders summoned their followers to a meeting where they briefed them of the government’s intentions, and the promises to reward the community’s compliance. However, majority of the indigenes declined the offer of giving away their land to the state government and as result; there were misunderstandings which led to division among the community leaders and their followers. This in turn made the government to deploy a *divide and rule* strategy in dealing with the community leaders. In addition, good sums of money were given to the leaders that aligned with the plans of government. With this strategy, the aligned community leaders were able to enforce their subjects’ compliance in submitting to the requests of the state government. Not long after this, the military government of the day penetrated the community and acquired the first parcel of land (1,200 ha or 3,000 acres) in 1976, prior to the introduction of Land Use Decree. While making the acquisition official, the Governor’s address to the entire *Ajoda*

community affirmed the acquisition of 3,000 acres of land, made up of several villages and settlements, divided into seven zones for the purpose of the new-town.

On the inauguration day (13<sup>th</sup> July, 1977), some issues were deliberated upon in order to clear the minds of the indigenous land owners. Issues, such as the name to be given to the designated new town, a resettlement scheme, the cooperation of the indigenous land owners and claims to rightful compensation among others, were discussed. However, the Governor in his speech clarified this issue on name thus:

In forming this new town, we do not want to create an impression that the name will be limited to *Egbeda* Township; that if it becomes necessary, a new name would be agreed upon to reflect the multiple nature of the villages acquired for the development of the new town. I must emphasize however, that we do not want to split hairs on the issue of name; what is important is everybody's contribution towards making a success of this laudable scheme **(Governor's Speech, 13<sup>th</sup> July, 1977)**.

This understanding that a name for the new town should reflect the decision that many autonomous villages were lumped to produce the new town was buttressed by another participant that:

For *Ajoda*, that is where the name came from; 'together', *Ajodasiile ni* (we came together to create the town) Initially, the whole place was *Egbeda* or *Egbejoda* (*agreement by communities to create a single new town*). So, when they now sat down and tried to coin out a name for the place, we had about 169 villages and all of us agreed to have this new-town named *adijojoko* (we sat down together) *Ajodasile* (*we mutually agreed to start the town*). From the mutual agreement of both natives and government, that is where they coined out the name *Ajoda*, meaning that we all agreed to have a new town here. Then, the new town was named *Ajoda* **(Government Official/ KII, November 30, 2016)**.

A name remains a very strong social identity in the society (Platteau and Seki, 2007; Rose-Redwood; 2009; Guyot and Seethal, 2012). Since about 169 villages were brought together to form *Ajoda* New-Town, the common name that would be given to the new-town was very essential; as no indigenous family wanted its name in extinction. They had to critically look for a name that best described the place. For this purpose, they then resolved to name it *Ajoda*.



The second phase of the land acquisition in *Ajoda* took place in 1978. The acquisition was 3,800 ha (Technical Reports on *Ajoda* New Town, Volume 3, pg. 2, April, 1978). The explanation on the acquisition is in connection to the dictates of the Land Use Decree of 1978, where government declared all lands as government property. Hence, this empowered the Oyo State Government to acquire new expanse of land, largely greater than the former. The Land Use Decree was introduced because of the hitches encountered by government, a usual reaction from indigenous land owners whenever government was in need of land for public development. The main purpose of the decree was to make land for development available to all including individuals, corporate bodies, institutions and governments, which would produce fast economic and social development at all levels and in all parts of the country (New Nigerian, Thursday, March 30<sup>th</sup>, 1978, pg.17; Ajayi, 1981; Ocheje, 2007; Nuhu, 2008; Nwabueze, 2009; Mendie, Atser and Ofem, 2010). Empowered by the Land Use Decree of 1978, the Oyo State Government affirmed that there would be a reclassification of urban and rural areas. More importantly, the government emphasized that the money paid as compensation to land owners in the country was more than what the government spent on the projects carried out on the acquired land. Therefore, there would be no more family lands and that the new policy was designed in the interest of the nation (New Nigerian, Wednesday, March 29<sup>th</sup>, 1978, pg.3).

#### **4.2.3 Compensation to and Resettlement Plan for Indigenous Land Owners**

Compensation was paid to some of the indigenous land owners of *Ajoda* community following the promises of government in 1976 (see appendices in judicial compilations). Furthermore, the study in the light of the compensational payment discovered some antics played by the then government officials and the indigenous land owners (Judicial Compilations, 2012). For example, a particular individual, who happened to be a non-indigene (from Lagun, as claimed) in the community, organised some set of people with himself representing about ten villages to demand compensation, and they were paid the compensation. In addition, the indigenous land owners accused some civil servants in the Housing Corporation that they connived with those unfaithful set of people to amass wealth.

It is worthy to note that some parcels of land covering up to ten villages meant for Green Belt (a reserved area meant that should not be built but can be used for any temporary activity) in the acquisition was freely released by government to the indigenous land owners consequent on the failure of the promise to establish a new-town by government (see appendices 102, 103, 104 of the judicial compilation). However, the research found out that some villages deliberately rejected the compensation as evident in the letter--reply of the indigenous land owners titled:

*Re: Payment of Land Compensation on Ajoda New Town Acquisition.*

The indigenous land owners in the letter protested that the government should not attempt to pay for the compensation as previously promised by the Corporation. They further concluded that they were not releasing their lands and villages (see appendices 105 and 106 in the judicial compilation). This was also corroborated by an interviewee in this manner:

This issue of compensation caused a lot of problems in *Ajoda* then. Indigenous land owners from Tanmo village collected compensation while villages such as Mosafejo, Awaye and a host of others did not. So, the people were sad after knowing what came out of the compensational arrangement (**Indigenous Land Owner/KII, March 3, 2017**).

Another interviewee responded thus:

Another issue about the compensation was that government only gave compensation to the indigenous land owners in 1976 before the advent of the Land Use Act of 1978. The compensation did not even go round. So, the second acquisition never attracted any compensation because of the Act. This generated another problem (**Allottee-resident/IDI, March 4, 2017**).

The statements above highlight the difficulty that goes along with compensational payment and *Ajoda* community was not an exception. The data show that it was not all the indigenous land owners that collected the monetary compensation from government, a situation that resulted from the divide and rule relationship as earlier explained. The natives that collected compensation followed the dictates of their traditional head known as *Baale*, who was in right standing with the government, while other villages as mentioned in the data declined to collect compensation because they were against the

plans of the government in acquiring their inherited land. Moreover, compensation on land was only paid once for the two acquisitions and before the introduction of the Land Use Act of 1978. Harvey (2005) in the Accumulation by Dispossession theory avers that public land acquisition expresses the idea of colonial, neo-colonial and imperial processes of appropriation of assets particularly of land. The Land Use Act of 1978 was a colonial approach to express dominance over the indigenous land owners. Hence, indigenous lands were appropriated using the instrumentality of the Act. Also, literature confirms that over time, the power of the locals has been greatly reduced due to the emergent legislation which supports the deprivation of the locals (Beckman, 1988; Ajayi, 2001; Ocheje, 2007; Nuhu, 2008; Ako, 2009; Nwabueze, 2009; Ghatak and Mookherjee, 2014).

The questions that are often asked in relation to compensation are thus: who defines the adequacy of the compensation paid on land, crops and other investments as the case may be? Is there a regular format for this kind of agreed payment? What exactly are the parameters to be followed, if at all they exist? Other questions are, were compensations not done under duress? Is the set-back an adequate alternative to the payment on the land or relocation as promised? Is there any historical approach to this compensational payment? Most of the time, the Land Use Act and other State laws on acquisition of public lands make provisions for how much is to be paid for compensation on any land that is to be acquired and this is what guides the payment. There is also the requirement that all the people must be duly informed and notified of the acquisition of their land and the compensation must be paid (Land Use Act, 1978). This expresses the fact that the indigenous land owners involved must be duly notified in connection with the manner by which the compensation must be paid. In essence, it demonstrates the nuances of free, prior and informed consent that government must apply in any acquisition processes vis-à-vis the compensation that accompanies it, as described by Attah (2013) and Odoemene (2013) that FPIC may be used to justify the acceptability and incorporation of any land deals by any individual. Generally, people have lost trust in the government because if the government had been performing well over time, the people would have been supportive. However, there is a belief that the government has lost its sanctity, as regards its approach to compensational payment, and that its actions mirror its unreliability with the people involved in *Ajoda*.

The format or term and conditions that are usually used for the payment of compensation after the regular land acquisition is based on the availability of cash and food crops found on the acquired land as of the time of the acquisition (Technical Reports on *Ajoda New Town*, Volume 3, pg. 2, April, 1978). To buttress this fact, an interviewee said:

I know the term and condition is that if you want to acquire land, if you have trees like cash crops on your land, they will call estate managers to value the cash crops and I think it was ₦15- ₦20 per tree then. They will count the number of trees on your land and there is a way they work out the percentage. After calculating the total number you have on your land, they will now calculate the particular percentage that will be added to the exact money you ought to collect. Those are the things they do for compensation because it is just a small compensation, and it is in cash not in kind (**Government Official/ KII, November 23, 2017**).

Another interviewee also said that:

They considered the crop aspect either cash crops or arable crops like palm tree, cocoa even maize. So, they sub-divided the land according to their claim and they did the claim survey according to each complainant and they (complainants) were compensated according to what they claimed to have (**Allottee-resident/IDI, March 1, 2017**).

The data above explains the general enumeration of food and cash crops on one's farmland, already fixed with particular amount based on the value of the crops on the land. Also, some percentages are worked out in addition to the payment. The payment is usually done in cash and not in any other forms. This is supported by the court injunction on enumeration of both cash and food crops before compensation is paid (pg. 104). The alluded compensational payment as buttressed in the *Ajoda Technical Report* (1978; pg.78) revealed that land compensation would be in accordance to Section 15 of the Law which spelt that compensation for land would be in expectation to the selling rate in the open market. However, it was highlighted that there was a differential between the cost of the land and the agricultural used land by the original land owners whose lands were acquired by the government. This was at the rate of (₦1,600.00 per hectare) and the bush (₦500.00 per hectare) then. This, is, therefore, suggesting that a plot of land was acquired

as stated from the report at the rate of ₦266.66 for the already cultivated land, while the land regarded as bush was acquired at the rate of ₦83.33.

Here is the contribution of an interviewee on this:

...When the indigenous land owners were being paid their compensation then, they believed that government paid them meagre sums. It was not seen as a justifiable decision because by then, nobody was paid ₦10.00 per plot. They were paid about ₦5.00 plus then. What later made the villagers to decline was that those that were paid ₦5.00 per plot then later heard that people were buying land for ₦1,000,000 in the neighbourhood some years later. They too now said abah! This is wickedness. Somebody that the government acquired like 10 acres of land from and was given about ₦700.00 now saw someone that just sold a plot of land for ₦1,000,000. Look at the gap. This became the genesis of the problem after the government acquisition **(Allottee-resident/IDI, May 1, 2017)**.

The summary of those submissions above is that what the government paid to the indigenous land owners was not commensurate to the value of the land they acquired from them. This served as an eye-opener to the indigenous land owners when neighbouring communities were selling their lands in millions some years later. So, they realised that their land was privatised by government and sold to the public for profit. This further explains the resentment of the indigenous land owners to the government's plans and compensational payment. An interviewee in this vein retorted that:

Government acquired our land without any compensation on the land and was now selling the acquired land for about ₦50,000 and above per plot then depending on the area, while dispossessing us of our ancestral land we were using to eke out a living. We are not happy about this development **(Indigenous Land Owner/ IDI, February 2, 2017)**.

Also, discussants in an FGD concurred thus:

Having heard and seen what government was doing with our ancestral land, we had to delegate some of our community members to disguise, go to the Housing Corporation at Bodija and buy plots of land for building purposes. It was in that process that we saw all what the government was doing, selling our freely acquired land per square metre basis to the general public **(Indigenous Land Owner/Male, FGD, March 7, 2017)**.

Corroboratively, this was captured in the Civil Appeal Report,:

..... we wish to confirm to you (that is, the indigenous land owners reporting to the current Governor Lam Adesina in the year 2000) that instead of the then government utilising the acquired land for building Government needs, the Housing Corporation in charge started selling the lands to money bags at a cost of plot for Eighty Thousand Naira (₦80,000), while they are paying Three Thousand Seven Hundred and Fifty Naira (₦3,750), equivalent to for an hectare, which is two and half acres of land (2 ½ acres), equivalent to fifteen plots of land (15 plots). This is quite disheartening (**Appeal letter, 18<sup>th</sup> October, 2000**)

From the data shown above, it can be inferred that indigenous land owners saw land grabbing for *Ajoda* new town development by the government as sheer exploitation and a business venture, as evident in the re-purchase programme of the government, as established by Beckman (1998), Fisiy and Goheen (1998) Rose (2002), Duffy (2008) Yaro (2010), Sackeyfio (2012) and O'Fairchellaigh (2013). Such a plan is likely to lead to increased poverty, unemployment, and even death because indigenous land owners at *Ajoda* were alienated and disposed of their lands. This is supported by the 'Save Our Soul' letter, written to the community members who were top government officials by the *Egbeda* Community Land-Owners Association. An excerpt is quoted, thus:

As the government had promised to give us enough set-back to our villages and set aside enough land for our farming, nothing had been done to all these, instead of these, they continued selling the land to money bags and left us to continue suffering indefinitely. We need your help at this juncture; we are dying on.... (**Appeal letter, 18<sup>th</sup> October, 2000**)

Also, the data above show that rather than government sticking to the promises it made to indigenous land owners, in terms of compensation, resettlement and the likes, It was selling the compulsory acquired land to wealthy individuals who showed interests. This is validated by Acharya (2003) Cotula, *et al.* (2009) Borraset *al.* (2011), Aabo and Kring, (2012), Grajales (2013) Attah (2013) and Odoemene (2015) in their assertion that land grabbing is usually caused by alienation and the dispossession of the lower class. Another salient point to note on the matter is that having accumulated the community's land, the government resold in square metres to the general public, as evident in many studies

(Moyo, 2000; Hughes 2008; Hadary and Obeng-Odom, 2012). By so doing, public lands were acquired by state officials and other privileged individuals at the expense of the poor.

But, in the latter part of the case at Ajoda, set-backs were introduced by the government in lieu of compensational payment and resettlement. The indigenous land owners reiterated that the set-backs had nothing to do with the compensation and resettlement. They further highlighted that it did not in any way measure up to what they had originally. They therefore stressed that they were being confined to a very small area on their ancestral home, thus, disempowering them from carrying out their daily farming activities. Harvey (2005) in the societal structure elucidated that people from the lower class are dispossessed of their land due to the overriding political power vested in the dominating class over them.

The resettlement policy as promised by the government in line with the acquisitions procedures equally failed at Ajoda. The government had already destroyed the food and cash crops found on the indigenous land for this purpose. Compensations were paid on crops in some of the quarters. However, the indigenous land owners still complained that it made no sense at all to them. An interviewee said that:

...but cocoa is no longer there, kola is no longer there. All the cash crops and whatsoever, government has taken over and people are even afraid of planting more of that. So you hardly see *iyere*<sup>5</sup>, you hardly see cocoa there, you hardly see palm trees; there and then, everything was there in abundance. They are all gone (**Indigenous Land Owner/KII, March 9, 2017**).

Another interviewee submitted:

They said they are not sending us away from our villages but they emphasized that there must be set-backs then. Can the set-backs measure to the acquired land? Well, they gave some but with the intervention of the committee set aside and the government operation does not seem to be fair on that. There was a time government wrote to us from Housing that there should be a peaceful coexistence everywhere *Ajoda* (**Indigenous Land Owner, CS, 2017**).

---

<sup>5</sup> This is the locust bean plant

The data above depict the loss of the indigenous land owners' valuable food and cash crops which could not be recovered anymore. Also, the set-backs that were given in lieu of the resettlement scheme were forcefully released to some of the indigenous land owners after much appeal through the set-up committee to the government. Harvey (2005) in the *Accumulation by Dispossession* emphasizes the loss of valuable property by the lower class. This, he expresses, is consequent on the dominance of the political elites. The indigenous land owners saw the set-backs given to them as nothing because it did not add up to them as they were wholly utilizing their land at first.

One of the reasons for the failure of the resettlement program was as a result of name as a social identity as earlier discussed. Discussants in an FGD concurred that:

Government promised three different resettlement centres for the displaced villagers if they succeeded in displacing people. One is Ipako-awaye, Isobale and the third one. In these villages, government wanted to resettle us in one place and the first question they asked themselves was the name the new places would bear. Some people at Abijakata village said should they name the entire villages Abijakata? No! We have our own name and it is Gidigidi. The other village said no because it cannot be Abijakata and be bearing Gidigidi. Another one said, 'I am Irifin and you cannot call me Gidigidi'. You can see the natural deviance that will come in if I allow your name to suppress my family name. So, the government comes round to do similar thing but the locals said okay, give us a name because we don't want to be called with a compound name. You know we can say Lagelu compound, but they said no, that "we want to be our own village. We want to retain our identity not compound name" and the government was put off. Nobody will like that. I am from Egbeda now; they want to resettle me with another village and said now all of you will be bearing Gbalefa and Gbalefa is village. I become Oloriegun, Fashade, Omitowo, Adekanbi, Aba Alfa or Igin. These are the villages around Egbeda there. So, if you want to resettle us, it has to be distinct and it must retain our own original names. Don't bundle us together and call us the same thing. Can you see how government created that problem on their own? That thing failed woefully. The government has no say on that, it could not answer that. The particular aspect of the project failed and it couldn't go further **(Male/FGD, March 7, 2017)**.

The data above depicts the plan on the resettlement policy which almost dissipated into conflicts in term of picking an overriding name for each settlement. The originality in the name of an individual's compound or family name as the case may be becomes essential here. None of the indigenous land owners wanted to accept a second-fiddle position,



which may eventually terminate the original name of a particular group of people. As such, the data later revealed that the state government understood the sensitivity attached to names and how it could destroy a given project, such as the urbanization as proposed at Ajoda community. However, the project failed consequent on the issue of name as a strong social identity in the community as earlier discussed. In addition, the resettlement policy failed as a result of lack of fund to achieve it. An interviewee has this to say:

They had the plan to resettle the indigenous land owners. They set aside lands along *Ogungbade, Ikumapayi* and *Olodo* area axis for this exercise. We use that permanent feature which is *Omi* River as our common boundary. Once you are above that river, you are already inside the estate but before that river, you are outside the area exercised for the relocation. But due to government policy of that time and insufficient money that hindered the government from actualising the project, it was unable to resettle people as planned. Instead, the government left many villages inside the settlement which continued to multiply. It poses another challenge that we experience these days. Had it been that government successfully resettled the people as planned, there wouldn't have been any problem again **(Government Official/KII, March 23, 2016)**.

The data as shown above depict the readiness of the government to relocate the indigenous land owners to different communities as highlighted. However, there were not enough funds to execute the resettlement plans as a part of the promises made to the indigenous land owners.

#### **4.3.0 Resistance against Land Grabbing**

This section examines how indigenous land owners resisted the government's attempt to grab land in Ajoda, Ibadan. In the course of the study, the resistance socialization and the actual resistance against land grabbing as well as their effectiveness were equally examined. As stated earlier, scholars have studied this kind of resistance in other contexts and locations, indicating its causes and dimensions (Pederit, 2000; Toriola, 2013; Shaibu, 2013). However, studying the resistance which occurred in Ajoda, Ibadan, will also add to the body of literature the peculiarity of that resistance.

The dispossession of the indigenous landowners of their ancestral land for the government's newly introduced policy of *Ajoda* New Town in the community attracted

various forms of responses from indigenous land owners. Existing data signifies that the government's accumulation of the *Ajoda* community land disempowered the indigenous landowners from fending for themselves through their agricultural practices, since they were completely peasant farmers. The situation provoked resistance to government actions among indigenous landowners. Moreda (2015) noted that peasants resistance could be unorganized, localized, individualized, and that it may go beyond any imagination. In addition, Scott (1985) emphasized that peasant actions are real and are defined as part of political and economic struggles. The resistance in *Ajoda* was perpetuated by the peasants because they became aware that their lands were deceitfully acquired: the government acquired and sold off the land to private individuals. In *Theory of Accumulation by Dispossession*, Harvey (2008) describes this form of acquisition as commoditization and privatization of assets (land). Harvey (2008) avers that peasants were aware that resistance could provoke a change that would culminate in the reversal of the acquisitions of their land, and that absence of resistance could lead to famine or other negative outcomes. During fieldwork, indigenous landowners stated that the reactions would not have occurred if the process of land acquisition initiated by the government was transparent. Also, how the government abandoned their land for about twenty years affected the development of the community. These factors ignited their responses and demonstrations. While justifying their resistance, indigenous landowners maintained that they too are human beings who wanted a good life. Dispossessioning them of their lands appears to them like denying them access to that good life.

#### **4.3.1 Resistance socialization and the Actual Resistance**

In the course of the study, attempts were made to know the resistance socialisation against land grabbing in the community. The results show that information about the government land grabbing in the community is passed down from the older generation to the younger. This is done to preserve the struggle against the government's land grabbing in the consciousness of the younger community members. In this light, collective consciousness through the social gathering of family members, who share common culture, identity, and values, remains very important. This is especially appreciated when family members are gathered for a celebration such as *Ileya*, Christmas and traditional

festivals. This can also be extended to occasions like wedding, burial, or christening. Even other social functions such as coronation anniversaries of *Baales* and the community endowment fund, which may be for community developmental project such as town halls, are also relevant. They serve as uniting platforms that enable family members to table different issues about individuals and the entire family. Part of this is the discussion about the government land grabbing in the community. The children are also involved in the discussions, being socialised into the issues for continuity purpose. Also, for the sake of proper socialisation, modernisation should not take away one's ethnic heritage. It is good for generations yet unborn to be connected to their roots. This will enhance the preservation of cultural heritage. This point was underscored by one of the interviewees (KII and IDI) in the following words:

.... So, after finishing with Ibadan Ileya festival, I usually take my children home to *Egbeda*. We play, talk about all cases relating to this kind that may be brought to the table. They will be there listening and some will be playing at *Egbeda* for days thereafter **(Indigenous Land Owner/KII, March 9, 2017)**.

Our forefathers inherited the lands and transferred them to our fathers and they too transferred the land to us. If care is not taken, government may collect lands with document from one. It is just that we children of nowadays should not be far away from our villages so that we don't miss a lot of our property **(Indigenous Land Owner/IDI, March 22, 2017)**.

Another respondent stated:

We usually inform our children about how the government came and cheated us on our inherited lands. It can be said that it is just like giving *akara* to a child while collecting a loaf of bread from the child. In fact, the story will never end until this world fades away **(Indigenous Land Owner/Female/IDI, February 26, 2017)**.

The data above show that the indigenous landowners usually utilised the festive period and some other ceremonies to inform their children about the land grabbing that took place in Ajoda community. It also emphasises the need for cultural affiliation. This socialisation technique as seen in this study reflects the idea of class struggle in the context of land grabbing in the community. Another dimension is seen where the enlightened and well-exposed (upper class) community members are used as instruments

to influence the less privileged in the community. This is possible because the upper class community members may be privileged to interact with the people at the helm of affairs. Such members of the elite class would not want to be seen in public participating in act of resistance but their voices are heard symbolically through other people. It is worthy to note, however, that the less privileged take issues to the extreme, and exhibit actions in unrefined ways as submitted by this interviewee:

The enlightened among them influence the illiterate. This informs so many actions being put forward by them. We have not been able to resolve that because once they inform the unenlightened ones, they muddle up things and misbehave until they come out again and interfere  
**(Government Official/KII, December 2, 2017).**

The data above shows the reliability of the people in the lower class on the elites in the society. They listened to the dictates and directives of the privileged among them before a resistance is put forward.

Resistance could be peaceful or violent. Findings reveal that during the fieldwork, the indigenous landowners of Ajoda explained that the indigenous landowners earlier employed peaceful means to express their grievance to the government over acquisition of their land. They did this by writing letters to express their feelings but the government did not respond to their plights positively. For example, 'Appeal letters' were written to both their indigenous Very Important People (VIP) serving under the government in both federal and state levels to appeal to the then military Governor to revoke the detrimental land order. Among these letters were the ones dated as shown below:

Save Our Soul

Re: Our Letter of Protest and Appeal for the Revocation of the Order of Acquisition of the Ajoda New Town Scheme  
**(18<sup>th</sup> October, 2000)**

Letter of Appeal for Release of Ajoda Land **(21<sup>st</sup> March, 1984)**<sup>6</sup>

The successive letters written to the government reveal the extent to which the indigenous landowners wanted the reversal of their land acquired by the government. This is in line

---

<sup>6</sup> Also, see Appendices ....

with extant literature suggesting the ways and manners lower class resist through letter writings to upper class individuals (Ndi, 2007; Mustapha, 2011; Hennings, 2015). However, negative responses by the government to the indigenous landowners' requests through their letters informed other methods of resistance to government activities regarding their land. For instance, another way the indigenous landowners demonstrated their feelings was referring the government to court where they thought justice could be secured in their favour. An interviewee demonstrated that:

We have written letters for some time and the reasons that made us to do that is that, we have written series of letters to the Governor too. We have sent different types of people to him; still there is no change (**Youthrepresentative/KII, February 28, 2017**).

In addition, an interviewee in a KII has this to say:

In my own opinion, there is no other resistance that I know with the original land owners except the court matters. You know a thing like that, the only way to go about it is to let the matter get to the Supreme Court if need be (**Allottee-resident, KII, 2017**).

An interviewee corroborated the position further:

When the government refused to fulfil its promises, the landowners then decided to take a step to go to court to collect back / retrieve their land (**Allottee-resident/CS, February 27, 2017**).

This is what another interviewee also said:

... There is not anything we have put up. The one at hand is the court they have gone to. We can't put up any pillar. The pillar there is for the government (**Indigenous Land Owner/KII, February 27, 2017**).

Participants in FGD agreed that:

We took to fate. All the things that they said they will do, they didn't do it. That is why we had to take each other to court (**Male FGD, March 7, 2017**).

These data indicate that the indigenous landowners took Oyo State Government to court. This corroborates studies that have shown that locals resist by referring their case to court where justice could be sought over their matters especially on land (Attah, 2013,

Odoemena, 2013; Eldema, Hall, Cotula, Borrás, Scoones, White, 2015). Even, mass media arbitration panels like *Agbonrandun*, *So Dabe*, and *Gbangbadekun* were reported by Onwuzuruigbo (2013) as platforms where cases of land are referred for resolution. But, from the last submission, resigning the matter to fate seems unproductive and it can wreak much havoc. This is commonly experienced where an individual or group(s) feel(s) oppressed by another party. It may lead to unpredictable actions which can be very disastrous; as in the case of the public land grabbing in *Ajoda* community. The researcher, at this juncture, intensified efforts to know if the court had made its ruling over the case. The indigenous landowners referred the case to court twenty-three years after government acquisition (that is, in the year 2003, while the acquisitions were in 1976 and 1978/9) (Judicial Compilation, 2012; pg. 247). In the process, the case took about twelve years before the verdict was pronounced and it was adjudged in favour of the government (Judicial Compilation, 2012; pg. 250). Hence, the indigenous landowners felt that it was not rightly adjudged and thus, preceded to the Appeal Court where the case is on-going (Judicial Compilation, 2012; pg. 257). This finding is corroborated by an interviewee thus:

Since we are in court on the other end, we are still working on the court matters. Whatever is in court, there is nothing you can do about it. In fact, last week, we went to site and some of them came. When the trouble started, I was reliably informed that they have gone on appeal. The appeal that is working now, though, I don't see anything in that appeal although, I'm not a judge. In as much as the lower court says that if you are still owing them go and pay them. So, I think that is where we are. The Appeal court will not say that don't release the land; knowing full well that the constitution states that government owns the land. So, it is whatever you find on the land and that is outstanding is what you are going to pay for **(Government Official/KII, December 12, 2016)**.

Another interviewee illuminates further on the matter:

.... So, the indigenous land owners went ahead to court and the judgment was delivered in the year 2012 in the favour of Housing Corporation. Later, they said they would never take the judgment like that which made them to proceed to Appeal Court and the case is still there till now. They reiterated that they were no more giving their lands to

Housing Corporation at the court **(Government Official/KII, November 24, 2016)**.

This interviewee has this to say:

The step government is taking is such that they have powers over us but we are looking unto God and we have some mediators that got themselves involved in the matter. We eventually took the government to court and the judgment was not in our favour. After a short while, we referred the case to court of appeal and you know that we have been going to Court of Appeal till now**(Indigenous Land Owner/IDI, February 19, 2017)**.

The data reveal that the indigenous landowners felt that the government used its power over them and referred the case to the Court of Appeal. This action has also contributed to the undeveloped state of the community. Apparently, all affected activities are suspended whenever a case is still in court until the final judgment is pronounced. However, a clause was released by the court that the government should endeavour to adequately compensate the original landowners amicably where necessary (Judicial Compilations, pgs. 247 and 250).

Another interviewee said that:

The indigenous landowners took Housing Corporation to court and the judgment was in favour of Housing Corporation though, there is one particular prose that we should give those that applied for expansion of their land, we call it ringing exercise little land to expand. But the illiterates as they perceived it still went around and said that the judgment was in their favour without knowing that they went ahead to appeal the judgment **(Government Official/KII, November 28, 2017)**.

This is corroborated by the daily report that:

The land case between the original landowners at *Ajoda* New Town and Oyo State Housing Corporation was finally laid to rest in the ruling on suit No. 1/815/2003. It was declared that the land was acquired by the state government in 1976 in the overriding interest of public and all necessary land acquisition requirements were fulfilled. It was also advised that few rightful owners who initially refused to

collect their compensation to contact the corporation for their entitlements. (**Saturday Tribune, 28<sup>th</sup> April, 2012**)

An interviewee then submitted that:

Some of our people went to court for that and so on and so forth. The government in its own way said that the money was ready and it was the indigenous landowners that refused to take the money. You can imagine. How much land did you take? How much are you now paying them after about 30 years of the acquisitions? (**Indigenous Land Owner/KII, March 9, 2017**)

The data reveal that the court judgment was in favour of the Housing Corporation. However, the judgment stressed that there should be amicable settlements between the government and the indigenous landowners (Judicial Compilations, pg. 250). It is very germane to understand the argument as stated above. This pronouncement gave impetus to the subsequent actions of the indigenous landowners. The indigenous landowners were contesting the agreement by the government from the beginning. At the same time, the Housing Corporation emphasised that few of the original landowners who earlier refused compensation should contact the Corporation.

Hear this again in relation to the clause given in the court case:

We too heard and agreed that government owns the land but since they have acquired it, there was nothing given to us as indigenous landowners. So, when it got to the point of going to court, the judgment was that the government and the indigenous landowners should settle and co-exist peacefully and also that if Housing wants to do anything and if it pleases the indigenous land owners, it should go ahead and if not, it should not? (**Indigenous Land Owner/IDI, February 27, 2017**)

Another interviewee said this:

You literates usually say that government cannot easily be toppled. Government nowadays operates by the saying: if you see my face, you don't see my heart. The step government is taking is such that it has power over us but we are looking unto God and we have some mediators that got themselves involved in the matter. Since then, they have been going to court and the case is in the Court of Appeal now (**Allottee-resident/IDI, May 1, 2017**).



Another interviewee said that:

[What] the judge said was that we should go and settle. The government did not do that and we went back to the court after 10 days. The appeal is still in court and every action will remain stand still until judgment is given **(Indigenous Land Owner/KII, February 19, 2017)**.

An interviewee has this to say also:

They have passed the judgment and they said we should make agreement with each other. Even if you want to collect something from somebody, it's not going to be with a fight. We are asked to relate well with the government that collected the land and the government should give us what we want as our right **(Indigenous Land Owner/CS, February 27, 2017)**.

The data presented so far reveal the displeasure of the indigenous landowners towards the High Court judgment. The data emphasise the clause of amicable settlement between the government and the indigenous landowners contained in the judgment. The clause appears as the basis for the appeal the indigenous landowners instituted at the Court of Appeal.

Anchoring on the fact that resistance could also be violent; the findings reveal that indigenous landowners employed mostly violence and symbolic means in resisting government incursion into their land to execute its dream plan of *Ajoda* New Town. They have been able to transfer their resistance tactics among the descendants of the original owners through a process of resistant socialisation. The submissions by the participants show how the acts of resistance were orchestrated and demonstrated by the indigenous landowners. One of the government officials interviewed related experience of indigenous landowner resistance in the following words:

The indigenous landowners go on attacking us, and, you know we are harmless. Sometimes, the indigenous landowners allow people to use plough, an agricultural machine, to remove our beacons in the day time. They tamper with our survey beacons and destroy the beacons. The destruction makes it very difficult at times to locate the plots of our allottees on-site inspection. While working, you may not see the pillar. Later you will see the beacons packed under a tree. They have used the land and given it to people

who want to farm without even consulting the Housing Corporation at all, without even minding that they are destroying the pillars or not **(Government Official/KII, November 24, 2016)**.

Another interviewee also corroborated the position:

One of the ways the indigenous landowners resisted the government is by attacking our surveyors, using all manners of diabolical means like charms, cutlass and threatening them with gun in some cases. Many people that are notorious in that village, like one boy nicknamed Yassalah, Oluomo, or Oluaye, have been threatening, attacking and doing a lot of things. In fact, they are the illegal sand miners in that place. They deface the topographical surfaces of our land. They illegally sell land to many people without minding the presence of government in that area. That is what we have been experiencing **(Government Official/KII, November 28, 2016)**.

Another interviewee also explained the way the attacks were carried out by indigenous landowners:

When coming down to the land, that is, the physical study of the land or wanting to know where one's land is, they will attack you by laying ambush already for the buyer and the inspector/inspectorate, "*enioriyodileloku*"<sup>7</sup>. They scared away both the officers and the allottees **(Allottee-resident/IDI, May 1, 2017)**.

An interviewee described further that:

... Like matcheting and the like, and anytime we have our clients on the sites, they do send them away that they are not aware of any government acquisition. At times, they do attack our inspectorate any time they are on site. So, we arrest them with police **(Government Official/KII, December 2, 2017)**.

Another interviewee explained the situation thus:

... The indigenous landowners now stood their ground. Whoever comes to the community that government sold land to him/her, the indigenous land owners will chase such a person with cutlasses **(Allottee-resident/IDI, March 3, 2017)**.

---

<sup>7</sup>That is, it is now left for the escapee to find his/her way out of the situation.

The data presented so far reveal that all manners of weapons such as machetes, cutlass, and charms were used by the indigenous landowners in resisting the Oyo State Government officials. The violent resistance was spearheaded by some notorious individuals. They equally made use of machines like plough to remove beacons mounted by the government to identify plots of land that have been allocated. In addition, the indigenous landowners laid ambush for the inspectorate, thereby disrupting their routine activities on the sites. The confrontations between indigenous landowners and government officials, at times, led to the arrest of both parties. The community members engaged in this act to push their agitations to the attention of the government in anticipation of better understanding between the two parties. This practice is consistent with what Harvey (2008), in the theory of accumulation by dispossession, describes as locals protesting against the upper class to attain mutual understanding. This foregoing discussion reveals that resistance demonstrated in Ajoda community was violent. Such violent resistance was also found by Ojeda (2012) in the case of government grabbing of land for Tayrona National Natural Park in Colombia. Land grabbing attracts violent resistance because, as Nnoli (2003) noted, human beings are users of land; they are not like mammals that only occupy land. As a result, human beings tend to be violent towards any land acquisition which may deny them the right to make adequate use of their land and dispossess them of their ancestral attachments on the land

Furthermore, the indigenous landowners were hostile to government inspectorates whenever they wanted to carry out their inspectoral activities on the acquired land in *Ajoda*. For example, the data collected shows that the man nicknamed Yassalah was not a direct native of *Ajoda*. He has become a beneficiary of the crisis to the extent of using the opportunity to enrich himself. He was always at the fore front of the struggle against the government. Also, the indigenous land owners are always at alert for the government officials at any time. This is evident in how the indigenous landowners mounted roadblocks barricading government officials from coming out of the community after discharging their duties. The indigenous landowners were always informing themselves against the tactics of government officials. To get through the roadblocks sometimes, government inspectors would have to give the indigenous landowners money. In such an instance narrated by a participant, government officials went around for their regular

inspectoral duties that day and they were confronted on the site by tall huge men, who threatened their operations on the site. What guaranteed the escape of the government officials from the location that day was the monetary bargain reached with the man. Money thus becomes central in the resistance and in the relationship between indigenous landowners and government officials.

Harvey (2008) maintains also that non-resistance to oppressions by locals could result in scarcity and famine. The indigenous landowners in Ajoda were also aware of these likely consequences of non-resistance. This is shown in one of the letters they wrote to the government:

Initially, the then Military Government made provisions for adequate compensation for the crops but the rates were later reduced, thus dashing our hope on compensation. We are not mechanics, bricklayers, motor-drivers, in fact, we are not traders but peasant farmers whose source of income is mainly from farming in the acquired areas. We have been suffering for the past 8 years. We are hungry. We are not settled and unable to get three square meals a day as it can be seen that we cannot farm on our land again. We have to pay our annual tax and have to cater for our wives and children. It has been stated that a man who goes without food for 24 hours will quarrel, one who is denied food for 48 hours will steal and one who is without food for 72 hours will fight. Thus, the difference between peace and anarchy in most countries is a matter of only a few days without food **(Appeal letter, 1<sup>st</sup> March, 1984).**

The data above indicates that the affected indigenous landowners found it difficult to earn their livelihood as a result of government land grabbing. They stressed that the denial of food and other forms of basic requirements can easily degenerate to a state of anarchy. The experience of the Ajoda indigenous landowners is consistent with Polanyi's (1944) position that resistance can emerge from both the State and civil societies, consequent on capitalist exploitation of both labour and nature with the aim of generating surplus and that could lead to resistance. Resistance, in this way, is aimed at regulating, protecting and resisting market exploitation of land and labour. Also, their experience is consistent with the positions of Schneder (2011) and Adnan (2013), that peasants are the victimized, whose means of livelihood are threatened; and as a result are deemed to oppose any form of land grabbing in their communities.

Another way through which the indigenous landowners resisted government takeover of their land was by engaging in sand mining. Portions of sand on the acquired plots of land were sold off by landowners turned sand miners. It serves as an alternative source of income for the indigenous landowners to meet their needs. Sand mining, however, has a negative impact on government plans. The land from which sand is mined is destroyed, its topography is defaced, and its economic worth is devalued. Observations made by the participants confirmed these effects.



Figure 3: Plate showing the effect of sand mining at Ajoda



Figure 4: Plate showing the vehicles used in transporting sand mined at Ajoda




Figure 5: Plate showing the effect of sand mining at Ajoda



Contrarily, the indigenous landowners engaged in the act maintained that sand mining does not destroy the land, as the land is not sold but the top soil: the land remains fixed where it is. They argued that since their means of sustenance was threatened by government takeover of their land, they had to find another way to survive. Interviewees noted that during sand mining, charms which the original landowners had buried underground were excavated. The allottee-residents considered that an advantage to them. This was reported by an interviewee that:

Presently, the indigenous landowners are selling the top soil of the land, not the land, but the sand, according to them. They are selling it. The villagers are selling it out. But they will tell you they are not selling the land. Indeed, they are selling the sand on it **(Allottee-resident/ IDI, March 2, 2017)**

Another participant asserts thus:

The indigenous landowners are selling the top soil and have removed all the beckons on the land. But, you see, that happened to be an advantage for us in a form. These sand miners exhume most of their rituals in the process. Doing that is one advantage for us here. But the disadvantage there is that the land owners will not be able to locate their land there or plots unless the Housing Corporation staffs now come to proffer solutions to it **(Allottee-resident/ IDI, March 4, 2017)**.

Another interviewee submitted that:

When they have written letters and there were no responses, some of them now reasoned in another way and they buried some charms on their land or that the person's mind will not come there to build the place. Whether he has money or not, his mind will not come over to do anything on that land **(Indigenous Land Owner/KII, February 27, 2017)**.

As evident in the data presented so far, the indigenous landowners became sand miners because government acquired their land. They considered the sand mining a method of protesting government acquisition of their land and of averting famine or other negative consequences of government's land grabbing.

The indigenous landowners also considered justifiable the sale of portions of the land acquired by the government. They maintained that they had to give parcels of land to their

wards whenever they showed interest in building in Ajoda. They emphasized that they had no alternative than their community land. This position was expressed by an interviewee thus:

It's not that we are selling the land. Some of our children can come now and say they want to build houses; we will release to them out of their father's land. Or will they go to another person's land to build? That is what is common here **(Indigenous Land Owner/Female/KII, February 27, 2017)**.

The data revealed that the indigenous landowners were bothered by their exclusion from their ancestral land. The indigenous landowners could not understand the reason for government dispossessing them of their land to create a new town. As a result, they continued to allocate land to their wards whenever they were in need of land to build, despite that the government had acquired their land for the new town project. This action demonstrates their strong attachments to their inherited land and equally shows their resentment against government intention in acquiring the land.

As earlier mentioned, majority of the indigenous landowners denied that they used charms or meta-physical powers on the land to scare away the government officials and allottees. However, other stakeholders confirmed it. Among such stakeholders were those who had been confronted physically with charms by indigenous landowners. The indigenous landowners used charms to scare away any of the government operatives and allottees on their land. To this end, government officials on sites were always warned to be careful in case of any kind of such occurrence:

We usually warn our staff that whenever they see things like that, they should take caution because *mojamosalanbaakinkanjulogun*<sup>8</sup>. You can't say it is just an ordinary voodoo and just go into the site anyhow. It is not done anywhere. Every human being has the potentials of being fetish and you can't determine the efficacy of all these things. Well, you may think they are not functional while they are tremendously functional **(Government Official/KII, December 2, 2016)**.

---

<sup>8</sup> That is, confronting and retreating describes a warrior at war

As indicated in the data above, indigenous landowners used charms to prevent government officials from discharging their duties. Government officials were always warned to be careful and not to underrate any of such charms. Moreover, findings from the fieldwork suggested that the charms could be divided into two: visible and non-visible charms. The visible ones mostly referred to as '*Iga*<sup>9</sup>', are mounted on any plot when there are scores to be settled, especially on monetary terms. It is usually mounted when a buyer or an allottee is about to start building a structure on the land. The indigenous landowners would make sure that they were settled monetarily based on the term(s) of agreement between them and the allottee of the government. That is, after buying from the government, the allottee still buys from the original landowners. An allottee said that:

I met a stiff resistance from the original landowners. I was prevented from occupying the land except I am going to pay a certain amount on the land again. But then I will be a tenant to the government and to the original landowner which I couldn't meet. Then, I neglected the place because they prevented me from occupying it (**Allottee/IDI, March 10, 2017**).

The data above shows one of the strategies deployed by the indigenous landowners in ensuring that allottees pay them too money. The indigenous landowners established the fact that they have to be settled in order to be peaceful with the allottee in constructing their buildings. Also, it is a way of ascertaining the identity of the buyer and ensuring the recognition of the powers of the indigenous landowners over the land. This is because the buyer will be under compulsion to locate the original landowner for recognition and settlements.

The non-visible charms could be the buried or mostly the enchanted type backed up by spiritual forces, and administered orally or by the sprinkling of any applicable substance on the piece of land. When placed, the buyer oftentimes forgets that he has a plot somewhere for however long a period. In other words, it is used to cause abandonment, even after the commencement of a building (Such charm is referred to as '*eti*<sup>10</sup>', in Yoruba

---

<sup>9</sup> A fetish Palm-frond design mounted on a piece of land with crisis to avoid entrance or penetration on the land

<sup>10</sup> Abandonment

land), until it is removed by whatever intervention. In this regard, a participant submitted that:

... We took some steps to start a building project on my land, and we were told that somebody had placed what is called (*iga*) on it. It was the person that helped us to cut the bush that told us. He said we had to see the original landowner and settled him. It was not only that place. It also happened on this place we are. When we wanted to start work on this land, the original landowner sent my neighbour to me that I should see them. I was taken to them and they told me that I would have to re-buy the land. I bargained with them and told them that this was the certain amount that I could pay. After that, I gathered the money and paid them, in addition to bread and hot drinks and that was all **(Allottee-resident/IDI, February 25, 2017)**.

Another interviewee, in an attempt to describe the kind of physical charms placed on land, said that:

It is palm frond that they always mount there, but I didnot go there o. It was somebody that told me. I didnot go there. The one beside me here was the one I saw with my naked eyes o. Until the allottee paid them, that was when he was left alone and they removed it **(Allottee-resident/IDI, March 3, 2017)**.

The data above explains the indigenous landowners' motives in placing charms on land. The placement of those charms (*igà*) implies that the buyer's attention is needed and until the buyer sees and settles them, no meaningful construction can be done on the land. This serves as a way of attracting and repelling strangers on their inherited land. The charms supposedly posed risks to the allottees of denying them access to their respective land which indirectly affects their intention of constructing a building on the land and by creating fear of the aftereffect of the charms into them. In this regard, an interviewee submits that:

I bought a piece of land from the government and specifically here in *Ajoda* because of the incessant trouble by the '*Omo-onile*' all over. Also, I tried to stay far away from my family members in order to hide my head and avoid their disturbances. I pray that one doesnot encounter the *Omo-onile*'s problems; because if one does, they can easily shorten the life span of an individual with trouble today and trouble tomorrow. But, regrettably,

I still found myself in the agony of the *Omo-oniles* telling us to vacate their land in *Ajoda* here because they have not been compensated by the government. They made me what I am today, deformed, by laying charms in front of my house, and I unknowingly crossed it. You can see how I walk now and if not for God on my side, I would have been forgotten by now. I tried avoiding their problem and still got myself into it! (**Allottee-resident/IDI, February 29, 2017**)

The data reveals the nature of trouble that could be caused by the indigenous landowners by placing charms at the entrance of allottees' houses. The efficacy of the charms was confirmed by the respondent who presented the deformity he suffered in the body as evidence. The deformity, although, could be as a result of some hormonal imbalance in the body. However, the application of the meta-physical methods does not affect the government as mentioned by some of the respondents. They said that when the government is ready to perform its operation, nothing stops it, though government has specified no time for the execution. The original landowners therefore take advantage of that to re-sell the land to whoever indicates interest, since the government does not have a specific project time plan especially on the new town agenda. This is one of the ways that these original landowners in *Ajoda* resist government activities. An interviewee described the situation thus:

Ah, well; you know government is different from individual. "*Oniwele mu o, Oni o maa se asasi, committee melo loo lul'oogun<sup>11</sup>*". You know, whether they like it or not, government owns the land. But before the government comes, let us see what we can do before it comes. That is it now. Since the government is not serious about it. They sell land now for ~~N200-N300~~ thousand naira per plot here. You can imagine (**Allottee-resident/IDI, March 1, 2017**).

Also, an interviewee retorted that:

In my case, I went with the mind of putting up a structure to the window level and by the time I got there, I found another person on my land. I later went to Housing to report of the encroachment on my property. The government officials and I went there to re-confirm. We went there the second time and were prevented from entering. Also, some lands that have been allocated to other people like me were already

---

<sup>11</sup> That is, you are caught by the government fee collector and you said you will go fetish, how many set-up committees are you going to enchant?

been sold to other people with buildings on them without the government knowing. But, I know that every day is for the thief and one day is for the owner (**Allottee/IDI, March 8, 2017**).

The data above reveal that sales of land was indeed one of the ways the indigenous landowners of Ajoda resisted the government plans in *Ajoda* community. The data reveal also that the government that owns the land would someday come back unannounced. Hence, they orchestrated land sales as a medium of resisting government activities.

The indigenous landowners have become conditioned to strategize dynamics of resistance against the government. For example, it was highlighted in the course of this research work that the government may be cursed by the indigenous landowners of *Ajoda* community, if it failed to reverse the action and release the land to the original owners. One of the interviewee, an indigenous landowner during an interview argued:

... If that decongestion must take place, the people to be dislodged should be heavily and adequately compensated. So that *won nisepe fun ijoba*<sup>12</sup>. That is the truth. I'm a village man to the core (**Indigenous Land Owner/KII, March 9, 2017**).

From the above data, resigning to fate may cause those who were dispossessed of their land to place curses on those who acquire their land, in this case the government.

Another way the Ajoda indigenous landowners resisted government was to assemble to physically disrupt on-going building activities in the community. They may also come requesting for money at every stage of the development or asking for full payments a times. This is another strategy adopted by the indigenous landowners to earn a living. Literature in line with this posits that resistance is usually organized in groups and the aim of the locals resisting is not to overthrow or suppress a domination structure, but for survival (Scott, 1985; Harvey, 2008; Moreda, 2015). This is evident in the fact that, if they secured the required amount of money from prospective builders, indigenous landowners may render assistance in securing the building under construction till the point of completion. This, in a way, brings peace to the allottees and the contracted builders. They

---

<sup>12</sup>So that the government is not being cursed by the indigenous land owners

saw it as an avenue to make money while the building is still under construction. An interviewee in this regard said this:

The only thing there is that whenever an allottee wants to build his/her house, the *Omo-onile* may come to him for their *Omo-onile's* money. The *Omo-onile* know that if the land owners or users should build the house, there may not be chance to collect money from them again. At least they too will eat now **(Indigenous Land Owner/IDI, February 28, 2017)**.

The data reveal another method the indigenous landowner employed to resist government acquisition of their land. They would go about in groups, making money off any prospective builder who was allotted land by the government. Harvey (2008), in this style of resistance, addressed the force and power intensified in a group in executing a class struggle. With this group formation, there is effectiveness in fighting their course.

Another way the original landowners show their resistance is by applying a delay tactic against an allottee. This is usually used when the allottee is ready to commence his building or comes around for whatever reason. It is usually done by deceptively making the allottee go back to the government for necessary documents, just to register the point that the government actually has no place in the community. An interviewee expressed this thus:

When you say that government has given you the land, then you will go and meet the government and tell them that government has no land here. They have taken our land. Let them show you if we have been compensated. Let them show you our names on their lists where we have been compensated **(Indigenous Land Owner/ IDI, March 8, 2017)**.

The data above shows the regular delay antics used by the indigenous landowners against the allottees. It is a way that reflects the attachment of the indigenous landowner to their land to the government operatives.

#### **4.3.2 Effectiveness of resistance**

It is very crucial to understand whether all the aforementioned forms of resistance put in place by the indigenous landowners have been effective. In doing this, the

researcher endeavoured to investigate it. The opinions of the participants on the effectiveness of the resistance vary. Majority of the participants believed it was very effective, some believed it was not, while others could not take a definite position. An interviewee who considered the resistance effective submitted that:

It is seriously effective now. They will attack you with machete. In fact, there was a day we wanted to go and check one of our allottee's lands at *Ajoda*, do you believe that we have to pay them before we were able to enter the village? We paid them #3,000.00 which they called *Owoiwoko*<sup>13</sup>. They said you have to pay us now because government acquired this land from our fathers since all these years and nothing was done on it till date. We really negotiated from #5,000.00 to #3,000.00 before they allowed us in. After all said and done for us to go back to the office, we now told them that we are coming back for the rest of the work. They told us to bring money when we are coming back again **(Government Official/KII, November 28, 2016)**.

Another interviewee submitted that:

If you look at the extent of the damages, you will think it is effective. But I still blame the government, most especially the political will within their jurisdiction because they are the ones master-minding many things, because this is political settings. Before you know it, they will take the case to the State House of Assembly and the House always protects the interest of their party members. If you want to channel anything, once it gets out to the House of Assembly, you have to play caution in order not to be at the other side. So, that is why they are able to achieve to some extent at least 60% of their claims but I know government is soldier go, soldier come. The government in another time may come and it may not be favourable to them. I don't know where they will find themselves then **(Government Official/KII, November 24, 2016)**.

The data above indicate the effectiveness of resistance put in place by the indigenous landowners. Attacking government officials on the site was one of the methods of resistance. The indigenous landowners imposed a fee called *Owo Iwoko*, that is, toll fee on government officials attempting to access the land. Also, the indigenous land owners hide under government's lack of political will to achieve their resistance. Government officials

---

<sup>13</sup> This means a toll paid before entering the bush/ acquired land that is already covered with thick bush



believed that was possible to do because the democratic structure in operation constrains those in power to listen to the people and protect their interest because they voted them. This is what the military government will never tolerate. Another interviewee submitted that:

During Akala and Arapaja administration, we lodged the complaint that our land had been barstaded by these villagers. You know that in the political era, they want multiple. In fact, they (the villagers) went to the governor's office too and they listened to them. Really, that day was like a drama because before we knew it, the so-called villagers appeared in the same Ankara, chanting slogans and praising the government of the day that they are there to listen to the government, they are the people of the government, and they are there to listen to them because they voted for them. Before we knew it, Arapaja could not make anything meaningful other than appeal to us that they are not taking our land but they mined to be able to find something to eat. The words spoken by Arapaja went a long way because the villagers took it as if they have been given the power to continue with the illegal mining. Before we knew it, we cannot resist them because they always refer us to the statements made by the government each time we approach them **(Government Official/KII, December 2, 2016)**.

The data above further shows how the locals' resistance was enhanced by the then political structure. The action of the government made the resistance by the locals effective because of the mutual attachment between the indigenous landowners and government. Also, utterances made by any public figure go a long way. This is because of the attachments that exist between the leaders and followers, which are based on trust and values. Moreover, it was said that the 'big icons' among the indigenous landowners usually fuel the crisis up to date. A government official submits:

...you will think probably because some of them are illiterates or not enlightened. In Ajoda, what I've come to realize is that top echelon of their communities, that is, the people who are knowledgeable, well-educated, are heading and fuelling these crises. They will tell them what and what to do. We are all in this dilemma though some of them are so reasonable and they are bold enough to come out to say

that this is what they want (**Government Official/KII, December 2, 2016**).

The data above show that the elite among the indigenous landowners usually orchestrated the resistance. This corroborates Beckman's (1988) assertion in his analysis on the exploitation of the peasants/lower class by the elite. The elite class uses their positions to influence the lower class peasants to contest other people in the upper class. The elite in the community would not want their names to be heard because of the role they play in government/politics. The effectiveness of the resistance was further highlighted as submitted below thus:

It is very effective o. I could remember in that time compensation was #30.00. It got to a point that the villagers insisted that they should be paid their #30.00 while an allottee would argue with them that how much did he buy the land from the government. The villagers then tapped their fingers at him. Could you believe that the allottee later wanted to sell the piece of land off and he could not sell it till now? The plot of land is still there overgrown with thick bushes and trees that could be used to complete a 3-bedroom flat (**Allottee-resident/IDI, May 1, 2017**).

Also, this interviewee said that:

Yes, they are effective till now, it is effective, and it is effective. You see when we got here; this place was a thick forest and over there up to *Egbeda*, thick forest. If you get there now, they are abandoned projects. The place is thick forest. You can't see an empty plot there now, but here we are in this place (**Allottee-resident/IDI, February 25, 2017**).

The data as shown above indicate the effectiveness of the resistance. This, as a result, led to the abandonment of the Ajoda community, with its negative consequences. For example, the overgrown, thick bushes in some places like the Ajoda secretariat building and health centre became hideouts for criminals. This is described in IDI and FGD, thus:

...we have the secretariat of the Oyo State Housing Co-operation in *Ajoda* which is not far from here. They came and they started the building in a little way till completion. After sometimes, they stopped working there and we have thick bush all around there that allowed thieves

in *there* and *disturb* us in the community (**Indigenous Land Owner/IDI, March 8, 2017**).

When they acquired all our land and abandoned them for a longtime, the whole place started growing up again to the extent that criminals and hoodlums were using it as ‘joints’. Assuming you came in the rainy season, you would be afraid of entering the community in some places. The health centre and the secretariat they built in *Ajoda* were covered with bush where these criminals hide (**Indigenous Land Owner/Male FGD, March 7, 2017**)

The two aforementioned places were indicated as having become hideouts for criminals. This, they said, threatened the security of the *Ajoda* community and made the community vulnerable to security challenges. Participants affirmed that the community still experiences some forms of burglary and theft up till the time of the fieldwork.



Figure 6: Plate showing the sign-post of Ajoda Housing Corporation covered with thick bush at the Headquarter



Figure 7: Plate showing the aesthetics of Ajoda New Town Secretariat



Figure 8: Plate showing the entrance of the Ajoda New Town Secretariat



Figure 9: Plate showing the sign-post of one of the institutions that rented Ajoda New-Tov Secretariat before vacating them of the building

However, few of the participants were of the opinion that the indigenous land owners' resistance was ineffective. An interviewee responded:

To the government, no; but to the Allottee, Yes! If government is ready, all the illegal structures on the land can't stand, because they did not have approval of the government. Even to government and the people occupying the plot now, the people that are occupying the land will have to pay the government because of demolition. That is money on the part of the government (**Allottee/ IDI, March 10, 2017**).

This particular interviewee has this to say:

No, it is not effective. They made themselves *Omo Abulesowo*<sup>14</sup> in the community. When they went to court and the government won, the government in its wisdom should have re-allocated those that the villagers have sold lands to back to the owners. Also, ask them to pay which the people did. Instead of demolishing their buildings, which they refused to do; I think the two parties did not lose totally. They paid to the indigenous sellers and they paid to the government (**Allottee-resident/KII, March 4, 2017**).

The data above present the views of those who considered the resistance ineffective. The data also indicate that government could deal with the indigenous landowners whenever it is ready to do so. This may be through demolition of illegal houses built on the government acquisition in Ajoda community.

#### **4.4.1 Relationship between government and landowners**

Land, as it were, is still the only means of production. Sociological analysis has demonstrated that every social structure in the society is centred on and developed around land. To that extent, land forms the basis of a network of social relations and serves as a drive for family and societal bond. These social relations and interaction within societal structures are common interest in Sociology. Thus, it is inevitable as no society can exist in isolation. Hall and Lamont (2013) explain that social interactions are structured by cultural frameworks. They further posited that when much force of material incentives are

---

<sup>14</sup> This refers to someone that turns himself to a sand-miner for the purpose of realizing money



infused into social institutions where more cultural understanding of the relations are embedded; makes the relations realizable. Also, one of the features of social interactions is the cooperative tendency of the people that are involved in the ecosystem. The purpose of these last two objectives (4&5) is to present the interaction that exists between the indigenous landowners, the allottee-residents and the government. The nature of the relationships among them explains the existence of peace and discordance among the actors in Ajoda after the land grabbing exercise. The findings revealed that participants are not a group of people without any form of relationships prior to and after the land grab.

This is evident in an interviewee's submission:

In planning, there is something we call inclusive planning. When you want to acquire land, the first thing you should take into consideration is that you want to displace some people from their land. The government at this point ensures that delegates from among government officials are sent to the indigenous landowners to intimate them about the intention of government. They first meet the village heads, exchange pleasantries and table their missions to them. After series of deliberations, they give to the village heads on behalf of the government whatever gifts they have brought while the village heads also reciprocate the gesture. This is a cultural practice, especially in a society like ours. That displacement will affect the socio-economic activities of the people and it will affect their psychology. So, the first thing you have to take into consideration is that a cordial relationship must exist. Thereafter, a stakeholders' meeting between the government and the villagers must be held, notifying the villagers that government wants to make use of their land. They must explain the things the government wants to do for the entire village before the lands are acquired (Government Official/KII, November 28, 2016).

Another participant confirmed the cordial relationship that existed between the government and the indigenous landowners of Ajoda at the inception of government acquisition of the land:

The indigenous landowners were very enthusiastic because they were ready to give their land. They had a friendly relationship while giving away their land. From history, the civil servants said that the locals gave them **Bush meat** to show their appreciation to the government, saying that they are very good oo, they support the government motion. In fact, I

met the first Town-Planner Director there sometimes ago, Tpl. Ajayi. She said that in 1981, *Ajoda* people or the *Omo-onile* will go to farm in the morning and come to their offices around 3-4 pm, chat with them, bring their friends and enjoy the air-conditioner with them. This shows that they really appreciated what the government brought to them (Government Official/KII, December 12, 2016).

The data above shows that the relationship between the government and the indigenous landowners was smooth when the land was acquired. The government set up a committee comprising delegates that pay visits to the indigenous landowners and communicates the government intentions to the community elders. This practice is considered important in African society where it is expected that visitors pay homage to community elders before engaging in any activity in a community (Ofiaja, 2014). The indigenous landowners initially considered the actions of the government as benevolent. Some of the indigenous landowners would go into the offices of the Housing Corporation freely to interact and associate with staff. In the process, they were exposed to a new atmosphere and were happy giving staff their farm produce as gifts. The initial meetings of the government representatives with members of the community featured discussions on projected developments for the local people. Such meetings between the government and the original landowners should have held for as many times as possible. That would have enabled each party to have a thorough understanding of the other at different points in time. Based on the information, meetings were conducted at the initial stage of the acquisition and compensation was offered to appropriate individuals for loss incurred on affected farmlands as stated in the previous chapters. However, the compensation paid to them created a lot of problems like dishonesty and unfaithfulness among the natives and the government officials. The development then affected the relationship that existed among the parties. The next comment by an interviewee further illuminates what the relationship was then:

There was a good relationship between them at first. It is possible that the few that knew about the government acquiring the land only knew about it then but I don't think it is general and it was also possible for the government to have given the elders something (money) in order to welcome their prospective plans and share to the people then. (Allottee-resident/IDI/May 1, 2017)

The data above presents evidence that there was a cordial relationship *ab initio*. It also shows that money was given to the elders, indicating the existence of a social exchange between the government and the indigenous landowners. The practice aligns with the traditional ethos of the land. However, the amount of money given by the government representatives could not be verified. It was rumoured among the indigenous landowners that the village heads had collected money on their behalf.

Land matters are extremely sensitive, as land is obviously a very important asset that can be transferred to the upcoming generations and can be used as social identity (Uchendu, 1976; Beckman, 1998; Nuhu, 2008; Arowosegbe, 2016). Land is also critical for human existence since it is used for farming and other agricultural production and development. For this reason, the community did not align with the desires of the government. Moreover, findings revealed that the community members hated how the meeting was coordinated that day the government officials arrived to disclose their plans.

Here is another interviewee's opinion:

Hen!!! The relationship was peaceful at the beginning but now that case is in court. On that day of the meeting, we so much relied on our elders to inform the government of how the whole community felt about the land acquisitions but they never did. We know what that means. There are agitations from the landowners. So, that's the situation I think (Indigenous landowners/ February 19, 2017).

From the data above, it can be deduced that the majority of the indigenous landowners did not have a cordial relationship with the government even at the initial stage of the land acquisition except the elders. Furthermore, it was perceived then that some of the community leaders were aware of the details of the proposed project, after a 'back-door' interaction with the government, details of which were not properly relayed to the entire community. This corroborates Beckman (1988) and Omobowale (2006) in their description of the relationship as a result of the vested interest that exists among patrons and clients.

During the fieldwork, the researcher tried to understand the state of the relationship at the time of the research. The study found out that the community members are till now sad

that the action of the government to the community had put them in a state of stagnation, poverty and underdevelopment. An indigenous landowner expressed this position in the following words:

Since the time they have taken our lands from us, we haven't seen anything or changes. It's as if one is being cheated. As I am seated with you here now, I cannot see you but I can only hear your voice. When I was seeing in the past, I used to sit with them to do meetings then. We begged the government to help us with borehole, but they did not do it. There is not any good relationship between the government and the *Omo-onile* at all (Indigenous Land Owner/KII, February 18, 2017).

Another interviewee also confirmed the situation:

Ever since the acquisitions took place, the indigenous landowners have never been happy with the exercise. They even diffused aggression on us the allottee-residents to the extent that we live in fear of the unknown. I tell you they are not happy about it at all (Allottee-resident/IDI, February 25, 2017).

Also, an interviewee said that:

I cannot see any relationship that is cordial amidst us. I told you that it's like they set us up and forcefully collected our property from us. Even all the elders are dead already. Everything they said they would do, they didn't do it. When our land has been grabbed, all what they promised to do, won't they do it? (Indigenous Land Owner/KII, February 19, 2017).

An interviewee retorted thus:

The relationship is like lion and dog after the acquisition. Whenever you get to Housing Corporation, they themselves will tell you that they fear us. They are always afraid of coming to *Egbeda*. I can remember when they came for expansion and liberation. The Housing people came with guns and soldiers sometimes ago and they thought that we would move out then. Thank God nothing evil happened that day. You would think it was Boko Haram that came that day (Indigenous Land Owner/IDI, March 8, 2017).

The data above demonstrate that there is still no good relationship between the indigenous landowners and the government after the acquisition of the communities' land. The indigenous owners up to date still believe that their land was taken by duress, as the government used all manner of threats within the confines of its power to dispossess them

of their ancestral communal land. Also, they felt that their civic rights were often abused as the government usually deployed armed policemen and soldiers to their community, indirectly turning their community to a battle field. The actions of the government had negative effects on the indigenous owners, who then visited their grievances on the current allottee-residents of the appropriated land.

Findings from the study also reveal that majority of the Ajoda community members were not carried along. However, the few supposed elite (traditional leaders) were approached at that time by government officials and bribed, while other community members remained unhappy. When the community members were informed about the government's proposed visit, they were so happy that the *egungun* came out to showcase their traditional display in honour of the visitors. However, it is common knowledge that the traditional musicians, drummers, and other instrumentalists are always happy at events like that. This is because apart from it being a generational tradition, it is a means of livelihood. An interviewee retorted that:

... When it is something we don't know before that is coming to us and the local people who will go there will collect money, *onilu*<sup>15</sup> will collect money; so they mobilised them and they won't do it free of charge. The local people believe in that type of thing. The *Egungun*<sup>16</sup> will be somersaulting, *onilu*<sup>17</sup> will be throwing *shekere*<sup>18</sup> up; *awon onibata a ma jo*<sup>19</sup> because they saw that Messiah has come and at the end of the day, all the *onilu* are dead now. The one still living is regretting why he took part in that kind of event (Indigenous Land Owner/KII, March 9, 2017).

The data above show that few leaders of the indigenous landowners were aware of the government intentions in acquiring their indigenous land. They accepted it in anticipation of certain benefits in return. To further show their appreciation to the government, they showcased their traditional masquerade to entertain their August visitors. Despite all these afore-mentioned narratives, the elite of the community felt that a great opportunity had come for the entire community to be liberated. However, the contrary was the outcome for

---

<sup>15</sup> This means drummers

<sup>16</sup> The belief in the spirit of the dead ancestors

<sup>17</sup> As in 3

<sup>18</sup> As in 1

<sup>19</sup> A kind of traditional cultural dance/display in Yoruba land

the community members. To this end, the reactions of the locals reveal that they did not align with the government's intention to acquire their land; it was the then elite of the community that acted in favour of government position and poorly disseminated the information to community members. The indigenous landowners reacted passively, even at the inauguration meeting between the government and the community members. They found it difficult to relay their reactions in the presence of the government representatives. Research findings revealed that the indigenous landowners wrote a letter to be presented to the government at the meeting. However, the letter was hid by those who represented the indigenous landowners at the meeting. Their murmurings during that meeting were also ignored. An interviewee stated that:

... Don't you understand what I have been saying? The person that led us as our representative that day the governor came tucked the written letter under the table. Till they finished the plan and all sorts of discussions, they did not let anybody know (Indigenous Land Owner/KII, February 2, 2017).

Another interviewee has this to say:

We wrote a letter before the inauguration day to the governor that the land does not belong to only Tanimu people; that we all would need to meet with him. Our fathers gave Bolatito (the first class village head then from Tanmo village) the letter to be given to the Governor but he did not. When the Governor came that day, instead of Bolatito to deliver the message, he tucked the letter given to him by our fathers under the tablecloth where the Governor was hosted. We as youths then called our fathers and told them that it seemed the land has been sold and taken by the government. When I now saw that there isn't anything on ground to be done or even work on, I left for Kano by rail the next week (Indigenous Land Owner/IDI, February 26, 2017).

The data presented above reveal the game of deception played by one of the leaders of the community in favour of the government. The indigenous landowners' representatives buried the complaints of their subjects by making sure that the letter they wrote in protesting the government action was not tendered to the government. That was done regardless of the fact that the indigenous landowners place a high value on land. The

community members felt that the government had dispossessed them of their only 'economic power'. Consequently, some of the youth then had to leave their community, travelling to distant cities like Kano in search for greener pastures. This reality dawned on them as they began to think of alternatives to meeting life challenges because they never saw anything good in any business apart from farming. Research findings revealed that the indigenous landowners were making it in farming to the extent that some of them supplied their produce to big companies like Tangalakis, UTC, and G.B. Ollivant. An interviewee retorted:

I followed my father to the farm; do everything about scale; scaling cocoa when my father was not even around. We do the reading for GB Ollivant, UAC, Leventis, Tangalakis, PZ etc. I will do the grading in the house of my father in that same *Egbeda*. My father was so rich that he bought Chevrolet and Desoto Dutch. He bought those two vehicles then. Anybody that has a car; even a bicycle as at that time is regarded as a king. All these wealth were gotten from farming in that *Egbeda* (Indigenous Land Owner/KII, March 9, 2017).

The data above shows the level of the achievement the indigenous landowners recorded through farming. They were aggressive peasant farmers and were able to earn a living and take care of other responsibilities through farming.

The government's response to initial reactions of the indigenous landowners was based on the landowners' actions in response to the government visit. For example, the *egungun* that was showcased and the way the community members danced in welcoming the officials made the government to conclude that everything was okay and that they could proceed to acquire the land. An interviewee has this to say in this regard:

It was what Jemibewon said that time that we recorded. Governor Jemibewon said that he was surprised that the people that he was told declined the government proposal of acquiring of the Ajoda land? Are they not the people dancing and jubilating with masquerade? Instead of getting angry, they are dancing and rejoicing (Indigenous Land Owner/IDI, February 26, 2017)

Another interviewee supported that:

When the government took over our land, they said they thought the landowners would pick up their cutlasses, knives, and traditional weapons, because the government wanted their land but reverse was the case. That was the reason Jemibewon said they would make and fulfill all the promises as said earlier which included water supply, school, hospital and also said that all these things would be built on their land which would also make them proud (Indigenous Land Owner/CS, February 19, 2017).

Yet, another interviewee has this to say:

I told you then that the government has two plans. That is, when they get to *Ajoda* and if they are received by the indigenous landowners, they will continue with the acquisitions and if otherwise, they would reverse their plans. But when they got there, the people came with drums, *sekere* and they were dancing. The Governor had to order for drinks for them from Castel Larger Beer Company beside us here. The indigenous landowners were so happy; that was what happened then (Allottee-resident/IDI, March 4, 2017).

The data above reveal the receptive gesture extended to the government by the indigenous landowners was considered as consent to the proposal to acquire *Ajoda* land for the new town project. Their gesture convinced the Governor that the people agreed to the acquisition plan.

#### **4.5.1 Relationship between indigenous landowners and allottee-residents**

In this section, this study describes the relations between the indigenous landowners and allottee-residents in the community. This relation between the allottee-residents and the indigenous landowners occurs within the ambit of a social context. It is not uncommon for a newcomer entering a new environment to feel strange and uncertain about how the newcomer will adjust to their new environmental challenges. However, some basic knowledge and understanding of the environment could promote a peaceful relationship of the occupants. For example, Natasha (2010) noted that there exist cultural modes of behavior in the remote areas like the indigenous landowners operating a free range practice with their domestic animals in the community. Also, Hughes, Hughes and Hudson (2010) explain the crime that could occur in the community such as property



crime and violence. In Ajoda, such crimes may be in manifestation and this could pose a serious challenge to both the indigenous landowners and allottee-residents, and then influences their level of interaction in the community. To this end, Hughes and Hughes (2010) further explain that values and interests historically accentuate relationship among people. This could be evident among the indigenous landowners and allottee-residents in Ajoda. Thus, the narratives of the participants skewed to the different social variability that shapes that relationship. For example, some of the narratives were expressed from the painful experiences and reactions, especially from the side of the indigenous landowners.

An interviewee has this to say:

The relationship will never be straight because among those occupants, there are some allottees that the government sold land for and it is mandatory that they have a good transaction with the government but when we are talking of those residents that the villagers sold land for, they have nothing to do with the government now. Everybody acts according to the way it comes. They will ask you that did I buy land from you. For example, I am an allottee from the government but on getting to this place, the indigenous landowners insisted that I will not erect my building. I now called them and said to them that what did they want? They said to me that if I'm going to build here, I will pay a certain amount which I agreed. Ever since then, we have been so friendly with one another. I settled the government and I equally settled the villagers. So, there is no problem whatsoever. There is no how you will never do that if you want live here in Ajoda. You have no option. This is because you must have been friendly with them before you complete your building. When they disturb you often and often, you too will look for a way and manner to be friendly with them by all means in order to have your peace (Allottee-resident/IDI, May 3, 2017).

The data above reveals the different sources through which allottee-residents in Ajoda community come from. The sources are either from the government or indigenous landowners. Also, the data still reiterates the issue of double payments on land to the government and the indigenous landowners. In doing this, the new residents experience peaceful relations with the indigenous landowners, in as much as the allottee-residents recognised the primordial connection of the indigenous landowners in the community.

Participants in the FGD agreed with the submission below:

You remember that day we are talking about, the government bulldozed Akin's<sup>20</sup> house and nothing came out of it. Since then, anybody that is interested in buying land here does not stay to buy because of this issue of government property. The intending buyer declines outright. What do we do? And you said that we will have a smooth relationship with them. Are the allottee-residents not from the government? In what kind of friendship is the dog with the tiger? Our relationship with the allottee-residents can never be smooth. Our eyes are wide opened now (Female/FGD, May 17, 2017).

An interviewee submitted as follows:

We, the indigenous landowners do not relate well with the allottee-residents at all. We relate to and think of each other as enemies. When the government collected something or properties from someone and give it to another person, how will the first person feel? Even if the person should have charms, he can use it on the person. We are not cordial at all because any benefit that should come for the people, we will be thinking that it supposed to be for us. Now, they are always saying that they bought land from the Housing Corporation and not from us the *Omo-oniles*' (Indigenous Land Owner/IDI, February 22, 2017).

Another interviewee recalled:

That one depends on the way you present yourself as an allottee-resident. If they see that the person is not in any way harmful to them, they will be very friendly with you. Let us assume that there is somebody that wants to build a house on a land. Whether the villagers have already sold the land and you now raise your voice and said that they have acquired the land you want to build on; they will never allow such person to enjoy living in that house. As children are dying, one will be confronted with another problem simultaneously. Nobody will tell you as an allottee-resident never to interfere in their matter again (Allottee-resident/KII, May 1, 2017).

The data reveal that indigenous landowners remain unhappy about the government acquisitions of their inherited land. Yet, government allottees that later became allottee-residents in Ajoda are seen in the light of the government acquisition position by the

---

<sup>20</sup> Akin was a resident that got a plot of land through the indigenous landowners and his house was demolished as a result of building on the government acquisition area

indigenous landowners which to them jeopardise the relationship between the indigenous landowners and the allottee-residents. They attested that their relationship is not cordial. It is also important to understand that indigenous landowners perceived the allottee-residents as threats. Therefore, this atmosphere makes the allottee-residents to keep a distance from indigenous landowners. Allottee-residents must cooperate with them by keeping silent in the face of whatever goes on (whether right or wrong) in the neighbourhood such as interfering in a land transaction with an indigenous landowners and a prospective buyer whether being earlier sold to someone else or not. It is whatever the indigenous landowners bring to their notice as allottee-residents that they are privileged to contribute to because that is where their opinion is wanted. In this vein, Harvey (2005) asserts that the higher levels or cordiality of relationship exists among the oppressors and the oppressed based on the values and interest. The relationship between landowners and landlord-allottee-residents is therefore potentially conflictual, however, they may have peaceful relationship provided the allottee- landlord/resident recognises the primordial over-lordship of the landowners, pays fees stipulated by the landowners and live in peace with the landowners. The fear of violent or 'spiritual' diabolical consequences of refusal to recognise the landowners, compel the allottee- residents/landlord to conform. This prevailing atmosphere may prevent crisis in the community, since the allottee-residents avoid the indigenous landowners as much as possible. However, it can equally endanger social integration within the community, and this may have a long-term effect on the development.

Furthermore, in spite of their differences, indigenous landowners and allottee-residents still coexist in the community without paying attention to the various forms of opposition that exist. They both remain in the position of permanent residents. For example, the allottee-resident/landlord who got their land through the government and finally recognised the indigenous landowners in respect to the financial terms and conditions assume the state of permanent allottee-residents as well; who have no any other place to go and build. Likewise, the indigenous landowners are permanent owners who have no any other place to go. They tend to tolerate and accommodate each other. In this regard, research findings further reveal that for the sake of the security of lives and property, it is

mandatory that they maintain a cordial relationship in the community. An interviewee has this to say:

If those people that bought land from the indigenous landowners or the people that succeeded in buying from government/Housing Corporation eventually compensate the original landowners, they are bound to live together at least for security reason. This is because they will have landlords association meetings together. If nothing is bringing them together, security will bring them together. They are bound to live together; their children will go to the same school. If they are Christians, they will go to church together and even Muslims. They will also go to the same market. So, they have to live together, whether they bought from the government or otherwise, they have to live together. They will even go to the same market every month, week or day. All the interests will definitely bring them together. Their relationship to me is very cordial (Original Land Owner/KII, March 9, 2017).

Another interviewee said that:

There is a good relationship between us. No enmity, irrespective of tribe and religion. Whenever anybody comes to commence his/her building from housing, we only ask them questions to ascertain their ownership but we don't disturb them. We may pray together and at the end give a token for the prayers. At times, they may come with local gin or Schnapps for prayers. Therefore, good relationship exists. We ask after one another. Some will soon meet us here to have a nice time with us (Indigenous Land Owner/IDI, February 27, 2017).

In this case, another interviewee contributed that:

It is peaceful. The indigenous landowners don't have a choice; they have to cooperate. Like I told you earlier, before anybody will come here to stay, you must know that the person is rugged. We are rugged people. The problem now is the case of armed robbery (Allottee-resident/KII, March 1, 2017).

An interviewee and government official added:

Well, by our culture, the moment people get in there, they collaborate and they are together. *Ti ayabamoojuoko tan,*

*alarinaayeba*<sup>21</sup>. However, we still tell them to use their discretion to settle the indigenous landowners if the need arises (Government Official/KII, November 30, 2016).

The findings presented here indicate that peaceful relationship exists between the indigenous landowners and the allottee-residents, provided the indigenous landowners were recognised in terms of agreement as indicated earlier by some of the interviewees. Moreover, social gathering venues like church, mosque, and marketplace serve as major uniting points where the indigenous landowners and the allottee-residents meet and socialize together. The contacts that they make in such places should promote peaceful coexistence between them.

As a result of the peaceful relationship that may exist in respect of the fulfilled financial agreement to the indigenous landowners, the indigenous landowners task themselves in safeguarding the land and properties acquired by the allottee-residents. For example, the community which hosts the private low-cost estate called Pacesetter claimed to be very peaceful because the private developer brought himself low, and at last repurchased the plots of land at a reasonable amount. This makes the indigenous landowners very happy, to the extent of guarding the acquired land for the private developer. An interviewee confirmed this:

.... If you approach the indigenous landowners for any land acquisition, they will tell you that “my brother, you are welcome, *omo mi, yio da fune*<sup>22</sup>, all these years we have been living inside the bush. *So o fe liberate wa? Yio da fun e.*<sup>23</sup> *Awon to gbailowowa o se nkannkan,*<sup>24</sup> they just acquired the land and left us like this. So the villagers are the ones monitoring the development of Pacesetter Estate. If anybody wants to enter the land from any part, they will barricade and tell him that there is no way. Also, the owner of the project is a wise and knowledgeable person. He sees these locals as their friends, and he relates well with them. He brought himself low as if he did not come from America. He relates with them, eats with them, he even ask for the kind of food they cooked and will cook tomorrow. He brought himself down to their level

---

<sup>21</sup> That is, when two dating couple eventually marries each other, then the middle man stays clear from them  
<sup>22</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Oh, you have come to liberate us

<sup>24</sup> Those that accumulated/took away our land refused to do something

and that is why the project prospered (Government Official/KII, November 30, 2017).

Another interviewee said that:

The Pacesetter clarified that they didnot want any fight between the indigenous landowners and the allottee-residents of the Peacesetter Estate because they know quite well that government is just swindling us and getting away with our lands cheaply. Furthermore, they said that they were going to make us happy by giving us something on each of the acres acquired from the natives and they gave us as promised according to their capacity. They gave ₦250,000 on each acre on acquisitions. At least, since the government acquired our land in 1976, there were no benefits attached to it at all like this of Pacesetter (Indigenous Land Owner/IDI, February 27, 2017).

The data above show that good relationship with kind gesture, and recognition of the indigenous landowners is important whenever acquisition of land is demanded. The indigenous landowners in Ajoda attested to this fact. To the indigenous landowners where Pacesetter is located, their relationship with the allottee-residents is peaceful and not acrimonious like it is in other places.



Figure 9: Plate showing the Pacesetter Estate at Ajoda New-Town

#### 4.5.2 CASE STUDY APPROACHES

The following case studies in boxes 1 and 2 explain the consequences of land grabbing among stakeholders.

Box 1: A civil servant (allottee-resident) in *Ajoda* New Town

Abednego (not real name) is a civil servant. Mr Abednego is 56 years old. He is a Mechanical Engineer by profession.

Mr Abednego's experience as a result of the government land grabbing in *Ajoda* was a memorable one. He said that before his arrival, the villagers had already sold part of his land without his knowledge to someone else. He further narrated that he just came one day and saw a house on the part of his land. Mr Abednego then reported the case to the Housing Corporation office at Bodija. Indeed, Housing Corporation officials came and re-marked the building for demolition but at the end of the day, he said that they had to make amicable settlement between himself and the villagers in order to foster peace among them. He reported that the land grabbing affected him in the sense that his acquired land that was originally a perfect square later which turned to be an L-shaped land because of the portion that was sold to the person. In the long run, his actual plan could not be realized and he was forced to manage the left over land because of his life and family. He said that his intention was to build a portable bungalow for a tenant so that it will serve as a means of income for him, but now it never came to reality. He also said that he does not have any other thing that can fetch him money to augment his income.

The above scenario simply explains the consequence of land grabbing as a result of the indigenous landowners reaction in the community. Mr Abednego was affected by the size of the land he acquired through the government. In addition, his plan was frustrated and succumbed to the agreed terms with the indigenous land owners because of his life and rest of the family.



Mr. Ayokunnu (not real name) is 79 years old. He's a farmer by profession. He's married with two wives and many children. Mr Ayokunnu reported that the government land grabbing in *Ajoda* really affected him a great deal. He said that the government acquisitions have brought bitterness to him because it turned him to who he is today. He narrated that his inherited land has been taken over by the government which renders him inactive as a farmer. He further said that he could no more meet up with his everyday expenses as a result of this acquisition. Mr Ayokunnu also said that he thought it was a joke at the beginning until his house was gone in the process and he had to come to this place that he is today. He equally buttress the point that, in fact, his children were affected because he could no longer meet up with their school fees which made him borrow from friends to fulfil that purpose then. He also said that he completely lost his stability as a result of this occurrence. He further disclosed that when the eye problem started, he never knew it could end up the way it is today. He equally demonstrated that had it been he had enough money to take up the necessary bills when it started, that he wouldn't have lost the sight completely. Mr Ayokunnu further said that his large tract of farm land had been acquired by the government where his sustenance depended. As a matter of fact, he said that he never knew he could still be alive up till now because of the crisis but he thanked God because He is never slumbered. He emphasized that Oh; he was never in this kind of situation before because he was relatively okay. Also, he unveiled that today; he now relies on the small token given to him by his children and the people in general.

Box 2: An indigenous land owner who lost his building, farmland and sight

Land grabbing in the community had adverse effect on his children schooling and it had negatively affected his sociological, psychological and physiological make-up. The above supports the views of (Acharya, 2003; Cotula, *et al*, 2009; Borrás *et al*, 2011; Aabo and Kring, 2012; Grajales, 2013; Attah, 2013 and Odoemene, 2015) that land grabbing activities are creating more poverty and increase rate of job loss simply because of how the indigenous land owners were dispossessed and alienated of their land. This is exemplified in the case of *Ajoda* new-town.

Mr. Deinde (not real name) is 40 years old.

He is a civil servant. He's married with three children.

Mr Deinde bought a plot of land from the indigenous land owners about 6 years ago. He narrated that the indigenous land owners told him that the land had never been acquired by the government; that he was free to purchase the plot without any problem. Mr. Deinde disclosed that he never bothered to enquire thoroughly from people that he had no knowledge about the government acquisitions. He later rushed down to the workplace cooperative and requested for a loan of ₦500,000.00, which was later granted him by the cooperative. After the necessary payment was done, he set for the building of the house. He had almost completed the building with the intention of packing into the accommodation before the Ileya celebration which was about two/three weeks away from that period of demolition and the conduction of the interview. He reported that he was surprised when he was contacted on phone that his house was among the demolished houses at *Ajoda*. When he got to the scene, he asked the indigenous land owners for the reasons of the demolition but none could give him a reasonable response. However, he reported that one of them was able to inform him categorically that he ought to make some payment at Housing which he did not do. The victim said he started crying and asking himself how to recoup the hard labored money he had spent so far on the building considering the nature of the civil service he does. He concluded that he had no choice than to do as advised. Also, he submitted that whenever he gets the money that he will pay to the government and start all over again.

Box 3: An allottee's through the indigenous land owner's experience after the demolition of buildings at *Ajoda*

Land grabbing could be seen as affecting people without the knowledge of the government acquisitions in *Ajoda* area. The loan the victim collected turned out to be a waste which could have been averted if there was a clear knowledge and understanding of the crisis. The indigenous land owners still laid claims to their land because they believed that the entitlements and benefits were denied them and they can devise means of realizing their benefits.

### **4.5.3 Demolition Report of Houses at Ajoda**

The Housing Corporation officials went to *Ajoda* community unnoticed for demolition exercise which was done in July and August, 2017. The demolition took place predominantly at Fashade, Gbenku and some other communities. The researcher went round and took pictures of some of the demolished buildings. The government officials equally covered the event digitally, and it featured on the Broadcasting Corporation of Oyo State (BCOS) television. The researcher and the team attended meetings with the community members whenever slated. The community members were of the view that their land should be released to them finally that the government had already done the worst it could do. However, the chiefs-in-council noted that their forefathers had initially made a mistake by allowing the government to acquire their lands the way it did. They further said that the only thing they could do was to go and appeal to and have roundtable meetings with the government. They warned the community members against violence; assuring them that all would be well soonest. The aggrieved community members were of the opinion that the demolition was political. They indicated that some notable men's houses were not demolished. They said that they overheard the government officials that came around for the demolition that they had marked some houses for the exercise and that they knew them. The indigenous landowners further said that the current government of the state deliberately acted that way because they did not allow it to cite the Technical University in *Ajoda*. This view was buttressed by one of the government officials that the incumbent government aided them in achieving that goal. He further said that the Governor was in the UK when the exercise started. He said the Governor watched the demolition exercise live over there and applauded them for accomplishing it.

In December, 2017, the researcher went to the Housing Corporation to observe the activities in the corporation. The researcher was made to understand that the demolition carried out at *Ajoda* made the indigenous landowners to come for amicable settlement in order to put an end to further demolition. According to one of the indigenous landowners, the management of the corporation insisted that the indigenous landowners should withdraw the land case at the Appeal Court. The indigenous landowners gave a condition that the *Ajoda* community would do as highlighted by the government if the Housing Corporation was ready to let the government take the unoccupied vast tract of land and the

community to retain the already built houses on the land without any further threat of demolition. As at the last discussion, both sides were still considering the conditions before the next point of action is taken.

Moreover, the researcher was made to understand that demolition exercise is not very easy. It is expensive, involving a lot of other administrative activities. One of the government officials estimated the number of illegal houses built in Ajoda as about 2000. The official noted further that while the demolition exercise had not got anywhere, the fund earmarked for it was already exhausted. He further said they were already tired of the demolition exercise. It was gathered that the elite already living in the community approached the government officials in Housing Corporation to declare interest in acquiring the demolished plots of land. The Housing Corporation later publicized that allottees already granted lands in *Ajoda* community should ensure that they report to Housing Corporation on or before 8<sup>th</sup> December, 2017. They started ordering allottees to commence construction on the land immediately.



Figure 10: Plate showing demolished buildings at Fashade in Ajoda New Town



Figure 11: Plate showing demolished buildings at Ajule in Ajoda New -Town



Figure 12: Plate showing one of the demolished buildings at Ajule in Ajoda New -Town

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **5.0 Introduction**

This chapter concludes this report. It summarises the research presentations and generally discusses the findings and interpretations of the study. Also, the chapter explains the significance and recommendations, then showing the researcher's contribution to knowledge which caps it all.

#### **5.1 Summary**

The problem of land grabbing has been in existence from time immemorial. It is the implications of land grabbing that give rise to different forms of resistance in the society where land is grabbed. As was stated by an economist Adam Smith that human wants are insatiable, governments crave for land for public purpose knows no end. Government needs such land for infrastructural development, which is for public good. But how the government acquires land from indigenous landowners is essential to ascertaining if the process will be responsive to the growth and development of the grassroots. Whether the government officials reckon with the principle of free, prior and informed consent or satisfy the indigenous contents and belief as established by scholars or use their discretion in the acquisition of the indigenous land matter a lot.

The study summarises the first objective which investigated land grabbing in the pre-colonial and colonial era thus: It discovers that the pre-colonial Yorubaland had land in abundance, such that there was no need selling land for whatever reason. Nevertheless



the protocol of going through the chief head of the community before any portion of land would be released was maintained. Land grabbing erupted in pre-colonial Ibadan when Ibadan imperialism was practiced by the leading warriors. The consciousness of the need to expand Ibadan territory was accomplished in different ways, using different methods. One of the methods used by Ibadan people was diplomacy. This, in a way, is captured in the saying: *'Ibadan lomo, o mo laipo'*; literally meaning that 'You only know Ibadan but you don't know Ibadan for subtlety and deceptions. Also, Ibadan warriors in the pre-colonial days were powerful in wars. They were popular for defeating their opponents whenever there was a crave for territory expansion. Ibadan soldiers appropriated slaves and dominated the won territories.

In the colonial era, the study summarises and discovered that the British colonial government also exercised both diplomacy and political power in alienating natives from and dispossessing them of their land. This was achieved through the introduction of the constituted native authority. The colonial officials created enough time to understudy the land use practices among the Yoruba before the introduction of British law of land tenure. They then used their veto power of governance to lord it over the indigenous people. The colonial government introduced titles and registration of bills, gazette of the interested land and Certificate of Occupancy for public acquisition of land and for their socio-economic gain. The style of public land grabbing in the general sense has not changed. Members of the higher class, especially government, still make use of the weapons over the indigenous landowners (lower class) to acquire land for their selfish goal and purported as public land; all in the name of development.

The study found out that the colonial style of land appropriation was adopted by the military government in 1978. Equally, the then military government introduced Land Use Decree in order to acquire land from the indigenous landowners for public interest. The then military government claimed that some local people made access to land for public good difficult and that such people enriched themselves through the land tenure in practice then. Those were what prompted the government to come up with the decree. The decree was styled after the colonialist's way of gaining control over indigenous land to achieve their goals.

The second objective of the study which delved into the processes of land grabbing in Ajoda revealed that government acquired land at Ajoda to create a new town/satellite town to address the over-population and deplorable state of Ibadan. The development of the new-town was in line with creating urban settlement in different stages with a workable Master Plan. It was discovered that the government chose Ajoda community for the project because of the connectivity in the road network. Moreover, it was stated that natives of Ajoda community are welcoming and allowed such a project to be sited in their community. However, series of meetings were held by the government officials and the community representatives that led to divide and rule consequent on the natives' responses to the government intention of acquiring the community land. Also, at the event of the community land acquisitions, the government of the day made some promises to them (social contracts). Such promises included resettling the indigenous landowners, paying compensation on the land with food and arable crops on the land, building of houses, schools, hospitals, good roads, and providing constant electricity supply. However, majority of the promises were never fulfilled by the government before the transition of democratic rule. For example, the compensation on land was done prior to the introduction of Land Use Act of 1978. Also, the resettlement scheme as promised by the government failed due to the lack of fund and the emphasis of Name as an identity to be tagged to the different resettlement centres.

Findings of the study show that the land acquisition in Ajoda was succinctly in two phases. The first phase was in 1976 and One Thousand Two Hundred (1,200 hectares) was acquired before the introduction of the Land Use Decree. The second phase was in 1978 where Three Thousand Eight Hundred (3,800 hectares) was acquired and that was when the decree had been promulgated. It was discussed that government paid on parts of the acquired land in this category to the indigenous landowners (see Appendix on payment made to some family representatives) before the introduction of the Land Use Decree. Furthermore, participants further explained that the money paid on land does not in any way measure up to the value of the acquired land. That led to the annoyance of the indigenous landowners. It was also discovered that in the periods of payment, there were series of corrupt practices displayed by both the then government officials and indigenous landowners, especially in misrepresenting different communities in Ajoda. However, there

was nothing like payment of compensation on land in the second phase of acquisition because government had already been empowered by the decree which supported the action.

The study findings underscored why modernization should not erase important elements of local cultures. Participants consider visiting one's hometown of origin as important to ensuring that one does not lose connection to one's culture, particularly in the issue that pertains to land. Also, the study revealed that the most convenient periods for discussing the Ajoda land crisis among the community members was the festive periods. Examples of these are Ileya and Christmas festivals celebrated by Muslims and Christians faithfuls respectively. Other such events include christening of a new birth, funerals, Baale's coronation anniversary, and launching of projects like town hall. It was equally shown that Ajoda community members had a strong cultural affinity and they respected and preserved their cultures and spirituality over land. The respect reflects in their practice of burying dead bodies in the ancestral land rather than in land issued with Certificate of Occupancy.

The objective three of the study that probed into the resistance as carried out by the indigenous landowners showed that the resistance witnessed in Ajoda community was provoked by non-fulfilment of the promises the government made to the community. Research findings highlighted that in order for the indigenous landowners register their grievances, the indigenous landowners of Ajoda community would block access roads into the community against the Housing Corporation officials and allottees whenever they considered doing so needful. The locals even resisted by laying ambush for government officials. It was equally discovered that locals engaged in sand mining. They considered the act justifiable on the ground that they did not reduce the size of the land by mining the top soil. They did not consider the negative implications soil mining can have on the value of the land. The indigenous landowners posited that such action is necessary because they were denied their rights over their land and as result were absolutely disempowered by the government. To them, sand mining amounted to an alternative means of survival.

The indigenous landowners also resorted to meta-physical means in resisting the government. In the course of the fieldwork, they made the researcher understand the traditional and cultural beliefs that wherever a building is pulled down like in the case of Ajoda, no building will spring up again in the area. So, they emphasized that the cultural aspect to any land grabbing should be taken seriously. This, in a nutshell, demonstrated how the indigenous landowners were placing juju mainly tagged as 'iga' on land in order to scare away or attract an allottee to mandatorily look for the indigenous landowner for settlement. Another way they showed their resistance against the public land grabbing was confronting government inspectorates and allottees with machetes, protesting, delay approach, re-selling of land, disruption of activities on building sites, collection of toll fee (*owo iwoko*), letter writing, and going to court. In addition, money is considered central or symbolic in Ajoda. Before any substantive building is constructed in Ajoda community, the allottees had to purchase the land twice; that is, settle the government and the locals.

The objective four of the study which investigated the government-local relations found out that there were peaceful relations between the government and the locals at the initial stage. It was established that the indigenous landowners would have sustained the peaceful relations had the government addressed them and declared its intentions on their land. The larger percentage of the indigenous landowners was not happy with the government motives because their only means of survival is taken away from them. Some of the community heads felt that they were enlightened enough to relate with the government on the issue of land acquisition and engaged in a back-door arrangement with the government. It was indicated that the majority of the community members already wrote a letter to the government to express their grievances about the land acquisition but the community representatives at the inauguration meeting refused to present it to the government. Also, it was said of the community heads that the government bribed them with a good worth of money in order to secure the supports of the community members for the project.

The research objective five that discusses the relation between the indigenous landowners and allottee-residents showed that allottee-residents minded their business for peaceful coexistence because they were made to understand by the indigenous landowners

that they could not live above the customs of the land, since they are foreigners in the community. Therefore, they were sensitive to such issues. Nevertheless, there were cases where allottee-residents and indigenous landowners maintained a symbiotic relationship. For instance, some of the allottee-residents sponsored some of the children of indigenous landowners to schools and to vocation trainings. There were ways indigenous landowners were useful to allottee-residents too. More importantly, places like mosque, church, and marketplace serve as uniting platforms for both the indigenous landowners and the allottee-residents.

## **5.2 Conclusion**

The study concludes that the locals' resistance in Ajoda is consequent on land grabbing by the government of Oyo state. Land grabbing in the pre-colonial Ibadan period was facilitated by the native warriors using military power, fame, slaves and diplomacy. The colonial era showed that land grabbing was achieved through the introduction of land legislation and ordinances, gazette, incorporation of native authority and colonialists using diplomacy, political power and indirect rule with the aid of constituted native authority in Ibadan. The colonialist introduced the idea of holding land in custody in perpetuity with the aid of Land Use Decree, which the Obasanjo regime too adopted in 1978. The decree, according to the study, seems faulty because it reduces the power the indigenous landowners have on their ancestral land. Also, it also undermines the relevance of land as social identity in the community. It, in a way, eradicates the socio-cultural aspects of land considered important by the indigenous landowners. The decree abolishes the socio-cultural practices of the indigenous landowners, and alienates them from their means of livelihood. The indigenous landowners in Ajoda were strictly poor farmers and knew nothing in other areas of vocations like mechanic, driving, and panel-beating. The introduction of the decree renders land and the indigenous landowners useless. This was evident in the fact that no compensation was paid for their land grabbed by the government after the introduction of the decree; the government compensated them only for arable and food crops met on the land. This provision of the Land Use Decree of 1978 has a historical roots in and connections to the colonialist's amendment of the natives' socio-cultural practices as regards land. Such law was ratified for selfish interest. Surprisingly, the social

contracts between the government and the Ajoda community as at when the acquisitions took place were not fulfilled by the government either.

The rationale behind Oyo State government's urbanization extension project in Ajoda was consequent on the congestion problem resulting to social infrastructural decay in Ibadan metropolis in the mid 1970 which led to urban decongestion scheme, in which people would be moved from Ibadan to new-towns. Government acquired Ajoda land twice. The first acquisition was done in 1976 before the introduction of Land Use Decree and the other was acquired after the ratification of the decree in 1978/9. The indigenous landowners considered government initiative in Ajoda community as a good one. However, they felt cheated because of the non-fulfilment of the promises made by the Jemibewon administration. This further explains why the indigenous landowners later regarded the initiative as a business because the indigenous landowners discovered that government was selling the acquired land to the public per square metre as much as ₦50,000 and above, depending on the location/phase of the land as at that time before the indigenous landowners instituted a case twenty-three (23) years later.

The reasons for the undeveloped state of Ajoda land acquisitions include creation of new states like Osun and Ekiti, government abandonment of the acquired land for several years which led to the worries of the indigenous landowners, lack of adequate professionals in Housing Corporation as at that period, lackadaisical attitude of the government in discharging its duty as it ought to, speculation of the land by the buyers, change of government, political structure, and lack of continuity of *Ajoda* new town project in subsequent dispensations. However, the attraction to acquiring land at Ajoda emanated from the Ajoda Master Plan and the proximity of one home-town.

The study also concludes that government was seen as an agent of underdevelopment being experienced in Ajoda new town. The reason is that the government abandoned the massive acquisitions for many years. Whenever any interested person interested in buying land in Ajoda heard of the government acquisitions, he or she would go for another land elsewhere. This leaves Ajoda community underdeveloped while the neighbouring communities without government acquisition are experiencing rapid

development. More so, the neighbouring communities were selling their land without any interference from the government. This action became so displeasing and depressing to the indigenous landowners in Ajoda community which provoked their reactions against the government. The resistance as executed in Ajoda therefore took the form of road blocks, ambushing, sand mining, placing juju (*igà*) and abandonment (*eti*), confrontations with machetes against government inspectorates and allottees, protesting, delay approach, re-selling of land, disturbances on building sites, collection of toll fee (*owòiwoko*), letter writing and going to court. Money therefore remains symbolic in local's resistance in Ajoda. This, as a result, determines the safety of prospective buyers and government officials. In addition, government and the locals had to be *settled* before any meaningful building is constructed in Ajoda. With this, the indigenous landowners act as the safety valve for the properties of the prospective allottees turned allottee-residents and allottee-residents in themselves.

The study concludes that government–local relation was peaceful at the event of land grabbing. This relationship between the government and the locals later turned sour when government failed to fulfil their promises made to the indigenous landowners. Equally, the local-allottee-residents relation was also peaceful provided the allottee-residents acknowledge the primordial nature of the indigenous landowners. Symbiotic relationship exists in Ajoda irrespective of the seemingly unfriendly relationship between the indigenous landowners and allottee-residents. The allottee-residents assist the children of the indigenous landowners in schools and vocational trainings. Uniting venues like market, church, mosque accentuates their relationship and fosters on the security of both parties and their community. However, the development in Ajoda is very regressive compared to other neighbouring communities in the area as a result of the resistance connected with the government intention of initiating a new-town in Ajoda.

Finally, the theory of Accumulation by Dispossession finds prominent in the study. It shows further the relations between and among class structures. Also, it succinctly highlights obviously, that the trusts of indigenous landowners are violated whenever there is an opaque transaction on land matters, irrespective of the government intentions. This is

because the indigenous landowners share the same cultural identities and their lives and inherited properties are affected. Hence, this action will likely provoke resistance.

### **5.3 Recommendations**

1. There should be series of thorough meetings between the government and the indigenous landowners in order to facilitate absolute understanding of the land deals between the two parties. As a result, considering a review of the promises made to the indigenous landowners by Oyo State Housing Corporation.
2. There should be a review of the Land Use Act of 1978 to reflect the ideals of democratic governance instead of its military orientation.
3. Government officials should constantly visit Ajoda Estate to ascertain when and where to repair faulty or dilapidated social amenities.
4. Both natives and the government have to be settled in cash in order to foster peaceful living in Ajoda estate.
5. More attention should be given to the indigenous landowners considering the fact that their means of livelihood is taken away from them when their land is acquired by government without paying necessary compensations as and when due. Therefore, the principles of free, prior and informed consent should be adhered to whenever there is the need for massive land acquisition. This will mean a departure from the same government ideologies adopted right from the pre-colonial era.
6. There should be robust top-bottom consultations between the government and any person interested in massive acquisition of land for building an estate. This is to ensure maximum transparency in the negotiation of the needed land.
7. The culture of the indigenous landowners should be considered essential when negotiating such massive acquisitions of their land.
8. Whenever a massive acquisition of land is secured, there should be a prompt utilisation of the land for the purposes stated in the Memorandum of



Understanding (if any) or agreement, in order to enhance a speedy development in the community.

#### **5.4 Contributions to knowledge**

1. This study has contributed to the body of literature on local resistance to public land grabbing.
2. The study reveals the important positions cultural identity and communal values occupy innegotiating land acquisition.
3. Politics, force, diplomacy and power interplay are strong weapons used by the government in penetrating a community of interest to appropriate massive land for estate development. This was clearly shown right from the pre-colonial era, indicating that the techniques have been from the time immemorial and they are still found useful. However, resistance by the indigenous landowners was found to be dynamic consequent upon the approaches used by the government in utilizing its afore-mentioned machinery. More often than not, benefits seldom get to the core grassroots indigenes.
4. Money remains central and symbolic in peasant resistance to land grabbing in Ajoda. This determines the survival of government inspectorates against the peasant resistance techniques and any building project under construction. It may also be used as a form of protection for the life and property of allottee-residents by the indigenous landowners.
5. Groups that make audible the yearnings of the community are powerful. They modify their resistance strategies based on the tenacity of the problem and keep resisting, whether the government responds to their demands or not.
6. Public land grabbing would not have been considered a fraud if the government had fulfilled the promises it made to the locals in *Ajoda* community. However, for rapid infrastructure development in *Ajoda* community, reviewing the Land Use Act of 1978 and the government promises to the locals were recommended.

## REFERENCES

- Aabo, L. and Kring, A. 2012. The political economy of large scale agricultural land acquisitions: implications for food security and livelihoods/employment creation in rural Mozambique. *UNDP working paper- 004*.
- Abdulai, R. T. and Antwi, A. 2005. Traditional land holding institutions and individual ownership of land rights in sub-saharan Africa. *World Review of Science, Technology and sustainable Development*, Vol.2, pp.3-4
- Adams, W. M 1988. Rural protest, land policy and the planning process on the Bakolori Project, Nigeria. *Africa*, 58.3:315-336.
- Adediran A. A. 2000: *Ibadan Imperialism: A Historical, Cultural and Socio-Economic Study of an African City*, edited by G. O Ogunremi, Published by Oluyole Club, Lagos.
- Adediran, B. 1994. The Frontier States Western Yorubaland, Ibadan: *IFRA* 1994 Ch. 7
- Adediran, P.K. 1984. Ibadan urban sprawl problem: A challenge to urban and regional planning. Masters thesis, Urban and Regional Planning, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria.
- Adelugba, D., Raji, R. Segun, O., Olayebi, B. 2001. Ibadan Mesiogo. A celebration of a city, its History and people. published by Bookcraft ltd.
- Ajayi, J.F and Akintoye, S. A. 1980. Yorubaland in the 19<sup>th</sup> century in *Groundwork of Nigerian History* (ed) O. Ikime, Ibadan: Heineman, pp. 289
- Ajayi, J.F.A. 1974. The Aftermath of the Fall of Old Oyo in *History of West Africa* Vol. 2, pp. 129-166.
- Ajayi, M. O 2001. the Land Use Act in the context of Urban Development Policy. Paper presented in a seminar on Urban Development Policy Organised by the Nigerian Instituted of Town Planners (NITP) in Abuja, May 15, 2001.
- Ajoda New Town Master Plan 1978. Ajoda New Town Development Corporation, Oyo state, Nigeria.

- Ajzen I. 1987. Attitudes, Traits, and Actions: Dispositional Prediction of Behavior in Personality and Social Psychology. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, vol. 20(1), pp. 1-63
- Akanle O. 2017. The Intersectionalities of Land Grab in Nigeria. *Africa Insights*, vol. 46(4), pp. 41-53
- Akhbar-Williams, Tahira. 2010. "Class Structure". In Smith, Jessie C. *Encyclopaedia of African American Popular Culture*, Volume 1. ABC-CLIO. p. 322.
- Akintoye, S. A. 1971. *Revolution and power politics in Yorubaland, 1840-1893: Ibadan Expansion and the Rise of Ekitiparapo*, Longman.
- Ako, R. T 2009. Nigeria's Land Use Act: An antithesis to environment justice. *Journal of African Law*, 53.2: 289-304.
- Amin, A. 2016. Regions unbound: towards a new politics of place, Vol. 86(1), pp. 33-44
- Amr F., 2006. Land Grab and Development Fraud in India; editorial in *Analytical Monthly Review*, Kharagpur
- Anthony G. On-Yeh and Fulong W. U. 1996. The new land development process and urban development in Chinese cities. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, vol. 20(2), pp. 330-353
- Archaya, A. 2003. Land acquisition, employment loss, and women's participation in income generation in the coastal belt of South Gujarat. *Development in Practice*, 13.1: 97-103.
- Arowosegbe, J. O 2016. Ethnic minorities and land question in Nigeria. *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 14, pp. 1-18
- Arrighi, G, Aschoff N & Scully, B 2010. Accumulation by dispossession. *Journal of St Comp Int Dev*, 45: 410-438.
- Ashton, G. 2009. 'Madagascar: The new land grab'. In: Manahan, M. 2011. Is Asia for Sale? Trends, issues and strategies against land grabbing. *Philippine Journal of Third World Studies*, 26.1-2: 466-481.
- Attah, N. E. 2013. *Land Grabbing in Nigeria and Responses: Protest or Acquiescence?* Paper for Panel 130: "Possession by Dispossession: Interrogating land grabbing and protest in Africa" presented at the 5th European Conference on African Studies on African Dynamics in a Multipolar World organized by the Centro de Estudos Africanos – Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (Center of African Studies of the University Institute of Lisbon) on behalf of, the Africa-Europe Group for Interdisciplinary Studies (AEGIS), 27th-29th June, 2013.

- Awe, B. A. 1964. The Rise of Ibadan as a Yoruba Power in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. D.Phil. Thesis Oxford.
- Banerjee, P. 2006. Land Acquisition and Peasant Resistance at Singur. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 41.46: 4718-4720.
- Barr, D. A. 2008. Health disparities in the United States: social class, race, ethnicity, and health. JHU Press. pp. 1–2.
- Basu, P. K. 2007. Political economy of land grabs. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 42.14: 1281-1287.
- Bayat, A. 2013. Life as politics: how ordinary people change the Middle-East.
- Bealey, F. 1996. Democratatic elitism and antonomy of elites. *International Political Science Review*, 17.3: 319-331.
- Beckman, B. 1988. Peasants and democratic struggles in Nigeria. *Review of African Political Economy*, 41: 30-44.
- Behrman, J. Meizen-Dick, R. and Quisumbing, A. 2012. The gender implications of large-scale land deals. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 39.1: 49-79.
- Bell, A. and Parchoniovosky, G. 2006. The uselessness of public use. *Colombia Law Review*, 106.6: 1412-1449.
- Bengston D N, Fletcher J O and Nelson K C., 2004. Public policies for managing urban growth and protecting open space: policy instruments and lessons learned in the United States, *Landscape and Urban planning*, vol. 69(1-2), 271-286
- Berke, P. R. and Conroy, M. M., 2000. Are we planning for sustainable development? *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 66.1: 21-33.
- Berry, S. 2002. Debating the land question in Africa. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 44.4: 638-668.
- Besnier, N. 2009. Modernity, cosmopolitanism and the emergence of middle classes in Tonga. *The Contemporary Pacific*, 21.2: 215-262.
- Beyene, F. 2009. Property rights conflict, customary institutions and the state: The case of agro- pastoralists in Mieso district, Eastern Ethiopia. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 47.2: 213-239.
- Birega, G. and Botto, Y. 2008. Rapid assessment of recent developments of investments in biofuel feedstock production in Wolaiita, Ethiopia case study of three Woredas: Offa, Damot Weiyde and Kindo Koysha Rapid Assessment.

- Bloomer, P. 2012. Food: Human rights, human wrong. *Winter*, 8.4
- Bornschier, V. 1996. 'Western society in transition' New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers.
- Borras, Gomez, Kay and Wilkinson, 2012. Land grabbing and global capitalist accumulation: key features in Latin America. *Canadian Journal of Developmental Studies*, 33.4: 402- 416.
- Borras, Jr. S., & Franco, J. 2010. From threat to opportunity? problems with the idea of a “code of conduct” for land-grabbing. *Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal*, 13.1: 507–23.
- Borras, S. M. and Franco, J. C 2010. Contemporary discourses and contestations around pro-poor land policies and land governance. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 10.1: 1-32.
- Borras, S. Jr., 2012. ‘The Politics of Transnational Agrarian Movements’. *Development and Change*, 41(5):771-803.
- Borras, S, Franco J. C., Gomez S., Kay C. and Spoor M., 2012. Land grabbing in Latin America and the Caribbean. *Journal of Peasant Studies* 39(3-4): pp. 845-872
- Borras, Saturnino and Franco J. C 2013. Global land grabbing and political reactions ‘From Below’ .*Journal of Third World Quarterly*, 34.9: 1723-1747.
- Borras, Saturnino Jr., Jennifer C. Franco, Sergio Gomez, Cristobal Kay, and Max Spoor. 2012. “Land grabbing in Latin America and the Caribbean.” *Journal of Peasant Studies* 39.3–4: 845–872.
- Borras, Saturnino M., 2011. Towards a better understanding of global land grabbing: an editorial introduction. *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38.2: 209-216.
- Bouniol, J. 2013. “Scramble for land in Romania jeopardizes rural territories development.” In *Land concentration, land grabbing and people's struggles in Europe*, edited by J. Franco and S. Borras, 158–181. Amsterdam, Brussels: Transnational Institute, European Coordination Via Campesina.
- Bukar, D. S 2014. Who is selling papa’s land? Africa is not for sale! *International Journal of Humanities and Social Studies*. Vol. 2 (6), pp. 1-5
- Bulkeley, H. and Betsill, M. 2005. Rethinking sustainable cities: multilevel governance and the urban politics of climate change. *Environmental Politics*, 14.1: 42-63.
- Buthe, T. 2002. Taking temporality seriously: Modeling History and use of narratives as evidence. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 96(3), pp. 481-493.
- Buttner, T. 1970. The Economic and Social character of Pre-colonial States in Tropical Africa. *Journal of the History Society of Nigeria*, Vol. 5(2), pp. 275-289

- Cai, Y. 2008. Local governments and the suppression of popular resistance in China. *The China Quarterly*, 193: 24-42
- Campbell, S. 1996. Green cities, growing cities, just cities? Urban planning and the contradictions of sustainable development. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 62.3: 296-312.
- Clarke, L. and Chess, C. 2008. Elites and panic: more to fear than fear itself. *Social Forces*, 87.2: 993-1014.
- Cock, A. R. 2010. External actors and the relative autonomy of the ruling elite in post-UNTAC Cambodia. *Journal of South-East Asian Studies*, 41.2: 241-265.
- Cotula and Lorenzo, 2012. The international political economy of the global land rush: A critical appraisal of trends, scale, geography and drivers. *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 39.3: 649-680
- Cotula, L. and Toulmin, C. 2004. Till to tiller: linkages between international remittances and access to land in West Africa, *LSP Working paper 14 Access to Natural Resources Sub-Programme*. International Programme for Environment and Development (IIED) UK
- Cotula, L., Vermeulen S., Leonard and Keeley J. 2009. Land grab or development opportunity? Agricultural investment and international land deals in Africa. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, International Fund for Agricultural Development, and International Institute for Environment and Development.
- Crawford, B. and Ligphart, A. 1995. Explaining political and economic change in post-communist eastern Europe old legacies. *New institutions, hegemonic norms and international pressures*, 28.2: 171-199.
- Crewett, W. and Korf, B. 2008. Ethiopia: reforming land tenure: *Review of African Political Economy*, 35.116: 203-220.
- Daniel, S. 2012. Land grabbing and potential implications for world food security. Sustainable agricultural development. *International Business and Economics Research Journal*, 11.6: 687-696
- Daniel, S. and Mittal, A. 2010. "(Mis)Investment in agriculture- The role of the international finance corporation in global land grabs," the Oakland Institute, CA, USA
- Davis, K. F., D'Odorico, P., Rulli, M. C 2014. Land grabbing: a preliminary quantification of economic impacts on rural livelihoods. *Journal of Population Environ*, 36.10: 180-192.

- De Schutter, O., 2011. 'Forum on Global Land Grabbing: How not to Think Land Grabbing: Three Critiques of Large-Scale Investments in Farmland'. *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38.2: 249-279.
- Dike, A. A. 1983. Land tenure system in Igbo land. *Anthropos*, 78.5-6: 853-871.
- Duffy, A. 2008. Indigenous peoples' land rights: developing a 'Sui Generis' approach to ownership and restitution. *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*, 15.4: 505-538.
- Echenique, M. H., Hargreaves, A. J, Mitchell, G., Namdeo, A. 2012. Growing cities sustainably: does urban form really matter? *Journal of American Planning Association*, 78.2: 121-137.
- Egolum C. C. and Emoh F. I. 2017. The issues and challenges of urban renewal in developing economy. *International Journal of Development and Economic Sustainability* 5(1): pp. 32-44
- Ejiogu, E. C. 2006. State building in Pre-colonial sub-saharan Africa: the case of Yorubaland, in Diane, T. Davis (ed). *Political Power and Social Theory*, Vol. 18(2), pp. 3-40
- Ekman, M. 2012. Understanding accumulation: the relevance of Marx's theory of primitive accumulation in media and communication studies. *TripleC*, 10.2: 156-170.
- ELHadary, Y. A. E and Obeng-Odoom, F. 2012. Conventions, changes, and contradictions in land governance in Africa: the story of land grabbing in North Sudan and Ghana. *Africa Today*, 59.2: 59-78.
- Fadipe, N. A. 1970. *The Sociology of the Yoruba*, Ibadan University Press, University of Ibadan, Ibadan.
- Falola, F. 1984. *The Political Economy of a Pre-colonial African State: Ibadan 1830-1900*, University of Ife Press
- Fisiy, C. and Goheen, M. 1998. Power and the quest for recognition: neo-traditional titles among the new elite in NSO, Cameroon. *Journal of the International Africa Institute*, 68.3: 383-402.
- Franco, J., L. Levidow, D. Fig, L. Goldfarb, M. Hönicke, M. L. Mendonça, 2010. 'Assumptions in the European Union Biofuels Policy: Frictions with Experiences in Germany, Brazil and Mozambique'. *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 37(4): 661-98.
- Franco, J., and Borras, S. 2013. *Land concentration, land grabbing and people's struggles in Europe*. Amsterdam, Brussels: transnational institute, European coordination via Campesina.

- Geisler, C. 2015. Trophy lands: why elites acquire land and why it matters, *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*, 36.2: 241-257.
- German L. and Mwangi E. 2013. Contemporary Processes of Large-Scale Land Acquisition in Sub-Saharan Africa: Legal Deficiency or Elite Capture of the Rule of Law? *World Development*, vol. 48 (1), pp. 1-18
- Ghatak M. and Mookherjee 2014. Land acquisition for industrialization and compensation of displaced farmers *Journal of Development Economics*, vol. 110, pp. 303-312
- Godschalk, D. R. 2004. Land use planning challenges: coping with conflicts in visions of sustainable development and livable communities. *Journal of American Planning Association*, 70.1: 5-13.
- Gonslaves, C. 2010. Judicial failure on land acquisition for corporations. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 45.32: 37-42.
- Grajales, J. 2013. State involvement, land grabbing and counter-insurgency in Colombia. *Development and change*, 44.2: 211-232.
- Guha, A. 2004. Land acquisition in a West Bengal district. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 39.42: 4620-4623.
- Guha, A. 2007. Peasant resistance in West Bengal: a decade before Singur and Nandigram. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 42.37: 3706-3711.
- Guyot, S. and Seethal, C. E. 2012. Identity of place, places of identities: Change of place names in post-apartheid South Africa. *The South Africa Geographical Journal*. 89.1.
- Gyasi, 1994. The adaptability of African communal land tenure to economic opportunity: the example of land acquisitions for oil palm farming in Ghana. *Journal of the International African Institute*, 64.3: 391- 405.
- Hall R., Edelman M., Borrás, S. M 2015. Resistance acquiescence or incorporation? An introduction to land grabbing and political reaction 'from below'. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 10.1: 1-32.
- Hall, R. 2011. Land grabbing in Southern Africa: the many faces of the investor rush. *Review of African Political Economy*, 38.128: 193-214
- Harvey, D. 2003. *The new imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harvey, D. 2005. The 'new' imperialism: accumulation by dispossession. *Socialist register* 40: 63-87.



- Haynes D. E. 1992. Contesting power: resistance and everyday social relations in South Asia
- Hennings, A. 2015. Resistance against land-scale land acquisitions: Bougeinville's peace process under threat. *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 42.3-4: 671- 694.
- Hennings, A. 2016. Assembling resistance against large-scale land deals: challenges for conflict transformation in Bougeinville, Papua New-Guinea. *Australian Journal of South-East Asian Studies*, 39.3-4: 681-701.
- Hilson G., 2002. An overview of land use conflicts in mining communities. *Land use policy*, vol. 19(1), pp. 65-73
- Hollis, C. 1935. Two nations: a financial analysis of English history. London: George Routledge and Sons.
- Hopkins, A. G. 1969. A Report on the Yoruba, 1910. *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 5.1: 67-100.
- Hughes, C. 2007. Development and dispossession in Cambodia. *Asian Survey*, 48.1: 69-74.
- Hunt, S. 2011. "Class conflict". In Ritzer, George & Ryan, J. Michael. *The Concise Encyclopedia of Sociology*. John Wiley & Sons. p. 66
- Johnson, O. 1921. *The History of the Yorubas. From the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate*, Routledge.
- Kadiri, W. and Oyalowo, B. 2013. Land alienation and sustainability. Issues in the peri-urban interface of South-west Nigeria. *Development*, 54.1: 64-69
- Kay, C. 2001. Reflections on rural violence in Latin America. *Third World Quarterly*, 22.5: 741-775.
- Kerssen, Tanya and Zoe B. 2014. *Land & resource grabs in the United States: five sites of struggle and potential transformation*. Land & sovereignty brief No. 7. Oakland: Food First.
- Kishindo, P. 2010. Emerging reality in customary land tenure: the case of Kachnga village in Balaka district, Southern Malawi. *African Sociological Review*, 14.1: 324- 339.
- Klopp, J. M., 2000. Pilfering the public: the problem of land grabbing in contemporary Kenya. *Africa Today*, 47.1: 7-26.
- Klopp, J. M., 2002. Can moral ethnicity trump political tribalism? The struggle for land and nation in Kenya. *Journal of African Studies*, 61.2: 269-294.

- Kumar-Bose, D., 2007. Land acquisition in West Bengal. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 42.17: 1574-1575.
- Lachmann, R. 2003. Elite self-interest and economic decline in early modern Europe. *American Sociological Review*, 68.3: 346-372.
- Lin, G. C. S. and Ho, S. P. S., 2005. The state, land system and land development processes in contemporary China. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 95.2: 411-436.
- Lindsay, M. 2008. Evngels in the power elite: elite cohesion advancing a movement. *America Sociological Review*, 73.1: 60-82.
- Liu, W. M. 2010. *Social class and classism in the helping professions: research, theory, and practice*. SAGE. p. 29
- London, B. 1979. Elites and classes in Thai history: the comparative use of power elite and ruling class analysis. *South-East Asian Journal of Social Science*, 7.1-2: 30-59.
- Lopata, J. 2013. "Land issues and land struggles in Poland." In *land concentration, land grabbing and people's struggles in Europe*, edited by J. Franco and S. Borras, 206–211. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute.
- Mamonova, N. 2012. "Challenging the dominant assumptions about peasants' responses to land grabbing. A study of diverse political reactions from below on the example of Ukraine." Paper presented at the Land Deal Politics Initiative Conference (LDPI), Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, October 2012.
- Manahan M., 2011. Is Asia for Sale? Trends, issues and strategies against land grabbing. *Philippine Journal of Third World Studies*, 26.1-2: 466-481.
- Manatsha, B. T. 2010. Land reform in the East district of Botswana: an elite-hijacked project? *Botswana Notes and Records*, 42: 90-99.
- Mann, M. 2009. The autonomous power of the state: its origins, mechanism and result. *European Journal of Sociology*, 25.2: 185-213.
- Marcus, G. E. 1978. Land tenure and elite formation in the neo-traditional monarchies of Tonga and Baganda. *American Ethnologist*, 5.3: 509-534.
- Marti, I. and Fernandez, P. 2013. The institutional work of oppression and resistance: learning from the holocaust

- Mason P. and Cheyne J. 2000. Residents' attitudes to proposed tourism development. *Annals of Tourism Research*, vol. 27(2), pp.391-411
- Mc-Cleskey, T. 1990. Rich land, poor prospect: real estate and the formation of a social elite in Augusta County, Virginia, 1738-1770. *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, 98.3: 449-486.
- McLennan, W. 2011. 'Sugar: Why our favourite spoonful is not sweet': In Richardson B and Anderson J, Heath H, Mostad I and Sivalingam, 2012. Sugar-cane and the global land grab: a primer for producers and buyers
- McNamee, Stephen J. & Miller, Robert K. 2009. The meritocracy myth. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 199
- Medarov, G. 2013. "Land concentration, land grabbing and land conflicts in Europe: The Boynitsa case in the poorest region of Bulgaria." In *Land concentration, land grabbing and people's struggles in Europe*, edited by J. Franco and S. Borrás, 182–211. Amsterdam, Brussels: Transnational Institute, European Coordination Via Campesina.
- Mendie, A., Atser, J. and Ofem, B. 2010. Analysis of public lands acquisitions in Akwa Ibom state, Nigeria, *Journal of Ecology*, 31.3: 197-203.
- Momba, J. C. 2007. Peasant differentiation and rural party politics in colonial Zambia. *Journal of Southern African Studies*
- Momoh, A. 1996. Popular struggles in Nigeria 1960-1982. *Afr.j.polit. Sci.*, 1.2: 154-175.
- Moreda, T. and Spoor, M. 2015. The politics of large-scale land acquisitions in Ethiopia: state and corporate elites and subaltern villagers, *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*, 36.2: 224-240.
- Moyo, S 2000. The political economy of land acquisitions and redistribution Zimbabwe, 1990-1999. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 26.1: 5-28.
- National Association of Professional Environmentalists 2012. A study of Land Grabbing Cases in Uganda, pp 1-36
- Ndi, F. A. 2017. Land grabbing, local contestation and the struggle for economic gain: insights from Nguti village, South West Cameroon. *Sage*, pp. 1-14
- Nnoli, O. 2013. Ethnic violence in Nigeria: A Historical perspective. *Journal of Political Science*, Vol.8(2), pp. 11-32

- Nuhu, B, 2008. Compulsory purchase and payment of compensation in Nigeria: a case study of Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja. *Nordic Journal of Surveying and Real Estate Research*, special series, 3: 102-126.
- Nwabueze, R. N. 2009. Alienations under the land use act and express declarations of trust in Nigeria. *Journal of African Law*, 53.1: 59-89.
- Nyambara, P. S. 2001. The politics of land acquisitions and struggles over land in the communal areas of Zimbabwe: The Gokwe region in the 1980s and 1990s. *Journal of the International African Institute*, 71.2: 253-285.
- O’Fairchellaigh C. 2013 Community development agreements in the mining industry: an emerging global phenomenon. *Journal of Community Development*, vol. 44(2) Pp. 222-238
- Obateru, O. 2003. *The Yoruba city in History*, 11<sup>th</sup> Century to Present, Penthouse Publications, Nigeria.
- Ocheje, P. D. 2007. “In the Public Interest”: forced evictions, land rights and human development in Africa. *Journal of African Law*, 51.2: 173-214.
- Odeyemi, I. 1982 "How it (Bakolori massacre) all started" in Yusuf Bala Usman (*ed.*), *Political repression in Nigeria* kano: bonnic.
- Odoemene, A. 2012. “White Zimbabwean Farmers in Nigeria: Issues in ‘New Nigerian’ Land Deal and the Implications for Food and Human Security”, *African Identities*, Vol. 10 (1) (February).
- Odoemene, A. 2014. “White Zimbabwe farmers in Nigeria: issues in “New Nigerian” land deals and the implication for food and human security”, *African Identities*, 10.1: 63-76.
- Odoemene, A. 2015. Socio-political economy and dynamics of government-driven land grabbing in Nigeria since 2000, GEG Working Paper, No. 2015/103, University of Oxford, Global Economic Governance Programme (GEG), Oxford
- Ojeda, D. 2012. Green pretexts: ecotourism, neoliberal conservation and land grabbing in Tayrona national natural park, Colombia. *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 39.2: 357-375.
- Olawale, S.B. 2012. Slaves in Agricultural Development of Ibadan, 1835-1893, *Research on Humanities and Social Sciences*, vol.2 (11), pp. 121-125
- Olutayo, A. O. 1991. The development of underdevelopment: rural economy of colonial South-Western Nigeria. Unpublished Ph.D thesis held by Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan

- Olutayo, A. O. 2002. The concept of mode of production in the analysis of development. In: *Currents and Perspectives in Sociology*, edited by Uche C. Isiugo-Abanihe, Austin N. Isamah and Jimi O Adesina. Malthouse Social Science Studies
- Olutayo, O. A. 1999. The Igbo entrepreneur in the political economy of Nigeria. *African study Monograph*, 20.30: 147-174.
- Omobowale, A. O 2006: Political Clientilism and Rural Development in Selected Communities in Ibadan, Nigeria. A Ph.D thesis in the Department of Sociology, submitted to the Faculty of The Social Sciences, University of Ibadan (Unpublished).
- Omotola, J. A. 1980. Compensation provision of the Land-use decree. *Nigerian Bar Journal*, 16: 32-40
- Omotola, J. A. 1985. Comments on Land use. *Journal of Private and Property Law*, 3:1.
- Omotoso, O. J. 2017: Authoritarianism and the Question of Environmental Justice in Africa: The Example of the Land Use Act of 1978 in Nigeria. *Afro Asian Journal of Social sciences*, Vol. 8.1: pp. 1-23
- Onibokun, A. G. and Kumuyi, A. J. 1996. Urban poverty in Nigeria: towards sustainability strategies for its alleviation. Centre for African settlement studies and development, Ibadan, Nigeria. *CASSAD Monograph series 10. 1-2*
- Onibokun, A.G. 1988. *Socio-economic Survey of Ibadan City*. Ibadan Metropolitan Planning Authority, Ibadan, Nigeria.
- Oriola, T. B. 2017. Alienation as a Harbinger of Criminal Resistance. Faculty Lecture, Faculty of The Social Sciences, University of Ibadan
- Ortner S B 1995. Resistance and the problem of Ethnographic Refusal
- Oxfam Report, 2012. Our land, Our Lives: Time out for Global Land Rush. In Oxfam Briefing Note

- Oyesiku, O. O. 1997. Modern urban and regional planning Law and Administration in Nigerian. University of Ibadan. Ibadan: Kraft Books Limited.
- Palmer, R. 2011. Would Cecil Rhodes have signed the code of conduct? Reflections on global land grabbing and land rights in Africa, past and present. Paper presented at the international conference on global land grabbing. Organised by the Land Deals Politics Initiative (LDPI) in collaboration with Journal of Peasant studies and hosted by the Future Agricultures Consortium at the Institute of Development studies, University of Sussex
- Panap Report, 2012. Of collusions and collaborations: a case of land grab in Sindh, Pakistan
- Payer, C. 1979. The World Bank and the small farmers. *Journal of Peace Research*, 16.4: 293-312
- Pederit, S. K. 2000. Rethinking resistance and recognizing ambivalence: A multidimensional view of attitude towards an organizational change. *The Academy of Management Review*, 25.4: 783-794
- Penney, R. 2003. "Class, social". In Christensen, Karen & Levinson, David. *Encyclopedia of community: from the village to the virtual world*, Volume 1. SAGE. p. 189.
- Peters, P. E. 2004. Inequality and social conflict over land in Africa. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 4.3: 269-314
- Place F. 2009. Land Tenure and Agricultural Productivity in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of the Economics Literature and Recent Policy Strategies and Reforms. *World Development* vol. 37(8), 1326-1336
- Platteau, J. P. and Seki, E. 2007. Heterogeneity, social esteem and feasibility of collective action. *Journal of developmental Economics*, 83.2: 302-325
- Poyry S. and Maury B. 2010. Influential Ownership and Capital structure. *Managerial and Decision Economics*, Vol. 31(5), pp. 311-324
- Price, W. 1933. *Land tenure in the Yoruba Provinces*. The Government Printer, Lagos. Archives- (RG/W2).
- Purnell, J. 1999. With all due respect: popular resistance to the privatization of communal lands in nineteenth century Michoacan. *Latin American Research Review*, 34.1: 85-121.
- Qiu, J. L. 2005. Network labour and non-elite knowledge workers in China. *Work Organisation, Labour and Globalisation*, 4.2: 80-95.

- Raikes, P. 1978. Rural differentiation and class formation in Tanzania. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 5.3: 285-325.
- Randall, A. 2009. Business as usual: responses within ASEAN to food crisis. Occasional papers. Bangkok: focus on the global south
- Reddy, V. R. and Reddy, B. S. 2007. Land alienation and local communities: case studies in Hyderabad-Seunderabad. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 42.31: 3233-33240.
- Richards, P. 2010. Of Indians and Terrorists: how the state and local elites construct the Mapuche in neoliberal multicultural Chile. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 42.1: 59-90.
- Riddell, P. 2013. 'Land grabs' and alternative modalities for agricultural investments in emerging markets. In John Anthony Allan (Editor), Martin Keulertz (Editor), Suvi Sojamo (Editor), Jeroen Warner (Editor) Handbook of Land and Water Grabs in Africa: Foreign direct investment and food and water security. 160-177. Routledge. United Kingdom
- Rose, L. L. 2002. African elites' land control maneuvers. *Etudes Rurales*, 163-164: 187-214.
- Rubin, M., Denson, N., Kilpatrick, S., Matthews, K. E., Stehlik, T., and Zyngier, D. 2014. "I am working-class": Subjective self-definition as a missing measure of social class and socioeconomic status in higher education research". *Educational Researcher* 43: 196–200.
- Runk, J. V. 2012. Indigenous land and environmental conflicts in Panama: Neoliberal Multiculturalism, changing legislation and Human Rights. *Journal of Latin American Geography*, 2.2: 21-47
- Rutten, R. 2010. Who shall benefit? Conflicts among the landless poor in a Philippine agrarian reform programme. *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 38.2: 204-219.
- Sackeyfio, N. 2012. The politics of land and urban space in colonial Accra: *History in Africa*, 39: 293-329.
- Sacks, P. 2007. Tearing down the gates: confronting the class divide in American education. University of California Press. pp. 112–114.
- Salami and Olawale B. 2013. Ibadan Slaves and Ibadan Wars in Pre-colonial South-Western Nigeria, 1835-1893. *Journal of Humanities and social science*, Vol. 7(3), pp. 32-38

- Savage, M., Devine, F. 2013. "The great British class calculator: Sociologists are interested in the idea that class is about your cultural tastes and activities as well as the type and number of people you know." .BBC.Retrieved April 4, 2013.
- Scoones, I. 2009. Livelihoods perspectives and rural development. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 36.1: 171- 196.
- Scott, J. 1996. *Class: critical concepts*, Volume 2 P. 310
- Scott, W. J. 1986. Gender: A useful category of historical analysis. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91.5: pp. 1053-1075.
- Scott, W. J. 1986. Gender: A useful category of historical analysis. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91.5: pp. 1053-1075.
- Seed, P., Hulme, P., Pastor, B., Sullivan, P., Rafael, V., Lledo, R. 1991. Colonial and post-colonial. *Latin America Research Review*, 26.3: 181-200.
- Segal, A. 1968. The politics of land in East Africa. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 16.2: 275-296.
- Simmons, C. S. 2004. The political economy of land conflict in the Eastern Brazilian Amazon. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 94.1: 183-206.
- Socpa, A. 2010. New kinds of land conflict in urban Cameroon: the case of the 'landless' indigenous peoples in Yaounde. *Journal of the International African Institute*, 80.4: 553-572.
- Sommerville, M. 2011. "Financialising Prairie Farmland: farmland investment funds and the restructuring of family farming systems in central Canada." Land Deal Politics Initiative (LDPI) Working Paper # 38. LDPI/International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague.
- Southall, R. 2005. Imperialism and African social formations. *Journal of African Political Economy*, 32.103: 142-151.
- Sparks, D. L, 2012. Large scale land acquisitions in sub-Saharan Africa: the new scramble? *Journal of International Business & Economic Research*, 11.6: 688-696.
- Steedman, M. D. 2009. Resistance, Rebirth and Redemption: the rhetoric of white supremacy in post-civil war Louisiana. *Historical Reflections*, 35.1: 97-113.
- Sun, X. 2015. Selective enforcement of land regulations: why large-scale violators succeed. *The China Journal*, 74: 66-90.
- Swyngedouw, E. 2000. Authoritarian governance, power and the politics of rescaling. *Environ plan D Journal*, 18.1: 63-76.



- Thill, S. 2009. Why corporations, emerging powers and petro-states are snapping up huge chunks of farmland in the developing world. In: Manahan, M. 2011. Is Asia for Sale? Trends, issues and strategies against land grabbing. *Philippine Journal of Third World Studies*, 26.1-2: 466-481.
- Todd, A. 2007. A chronicle of land. *The Black Scholar*, 37.1: 20-22
- Tshuma, L. 1995. Law, state and the agrarian question in Zimbabwe. A Ph.d thesis to Warwick University. Unpublished.
- Uchendu, V. C. 1979. State land and society in Nigeria. A critical assessment of land use decree of 1978. *Journal of African Studies*, 6: 64-75.
- Udo, R. 1990. Land use policy and land ownership in Nigeria. Lagos: Ebieakwa ventures limited
- Udoko, N. J. 1993. Colonial capitalism and politics of under-development in post-colonial Africa. The case of Nigeria, 1960-1990. ETD collection for AUC Robert W. Woodruff Library. Paper 1495
- Verma, R. 2014. Land grabs, power and gender in the East and Southern Africa: so, what's new? *Journal of Feminist Economics*, 20.1: 52-75.
- Vinthagén, S. 2006. Power as subordination and resistance as disobedience: non-violent movement and the management of power. *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 34.1: 1-21.
- Visoka, G. 2011. International governance and local resistance in Kosovo: the thin line between ethical, emancipatory and exclusionary politics
- Visser, O, Mamonova, N. and Spoor M. 2012. "Oligarchs, megafarms and land reserves: understanding land grabbing in Russia." *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 39. 3-4: 899-931.
- Visser, O. and Spoor M. 2011. "Land grabbing in post-soviet Eurasia: the world's largest agricultural land reserves at stake." *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38.2: 299-323.
- Walker, K. L. M 1999. Chinese modernity and the peasant path: semi colonialism in the Northern Yangzi Delta
- Watson, M. D. 2013. The Colonial Gesture of Development: the Interpersonal as a Promising Site for Rethinking Aid to Africa. *Africa Today*, Vol. 59(3), pp. 2-28
- Watson, R. 1999. 'Ibadan- a model of historical facts': militarism and civic culture in a Yoruba city, vol. 26(1), pp. 5-26

- Watson, R. 2005. Civil Disorder is the Disease of Ibadan and Chieftaincy and Civic Culture in a Yoruba City. Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Plc, Ibadan.
- White, B., Borrás, S. M., Hall, R., Scoones, L. and Wolford, W. 2012. The new enclosures: critical perspective on corporate land deals. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 39:3-4.
- Whitehead, A., Tsikata, D. 2003. Policy discourses on women's land rights in sub-Saharan Africa: the implications of the re-turn to the customary. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 3.1-2: 67-112.
- Wilkinson, J., Reydon, B., Di Sabbato, A 2012. Concentration and foreign ownership of land in Brazil in the context of global land. *Journal of development studies*, 10.1: 417-438.
- Williams, B., Stacey, C., Sawyer, and Carl M. W. 2005. Marriages, Families & Intimate Relationships. Boston, MA
- Wolford W, Borrás, S. M., Hall R, Scoones, L. and White, B. 2013. Governing global land deals: the role of the state in the rush for land. *Development and Change*, 44.2: 189-210.
- Wolford, W.& Nehring, R.2015. Constructing Parallels: Brazilian expertise and the commodification of land, labour and money in Mozambique, *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*, 36.2: 208-223.
- Wolters, W. G. 1989. Rise and fall of provincial elites in the Philippines: Nueva Ecija from the 1880s to the present day. *Journal of Social Issues in South-East Asia*, 4.1: 54-74.
- Yahaya, M. K. 2002. Development and challenges of Bakolori irrigation project in Sokoto state, Nigeria. *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, 11.3: 411- 430.
- Yakub, J. A. 2002. Colonialism, customary law and post-colonial state in Africa: the case of Nigeria. Paper presented for Codesria's 10<sup>th</sup> General Assembly on Africa in the New- Millenium, Kampala, Uganda, 8-12 December, 2002.
- Yamokoski, A. and Dubrow, J. K. 2008. How do elites define influence? Personality and respect as sources of social power. *Sociological Focus*, 41.4: 319-336.
- Yaro, A. J. 2010. Customary tenure systems under siege: contemporary access to land in northern Ghana. *Geo Journal*, 75.2: 199-214.
- Zoomers, E. B. and Kleinpenning, J. M. G. 1990. Elites, the rural masses and land in Paraguay: a case study of the rural masses to the interests and power of the ruling class. *Revista Geografica*, 111: 129-148
- Zubek, V. and Gentleman, J. 1994. Economic crisis and the movement toward pluralism in Poland and Mexico. *Political Science Quarterly*, 109.2: 335-359.

## APPENDIX 1

### Interview Guide

Department of Sociology  
University of Ibadan,  
Ibadan, Nigeria

Age: .....Time interview started: .....

Community: .....Time interview ended: .....

Profession: .....Date of interview: .....

Remarks: .....

### KII, IDI AND FGD Guide

#### A: Processes of land grabbing for Ajoda development by the government

##### Probe for:

1. Opinions about land grabbing for estate development by the government?
2. Whether the community was involved in the process of land acquisitions by the government?
3. Interviewees understanding of Land Use Decree, 1978 with respect to land grabbing/acquisition?
4. Terms and conditions presented by the government during the processes of land grabbing?
5. Terms and conditions presented by the community during the processes and forms of compensation pay?
6. Resettlement plans/policy implemented by the government?

#### B: Relations between government and land owners in the event of land grabbing

##### Probe for:

1. Relationship between government and indigenous land owners (whether it is acrimonious/peaceful) in the event of land grabbing?
2. Preliminary people's reactions when informed about government decisions to acquire land?
3. Historical accounts of reactions from the locals (provide illustrations)?
4. Government response to preliminary reactions?

#### C: Resistance of the indigenous owners against land grabbing

**Probe for:**

1. Forms of resistance by indigenous owners against land grabbing (court cases, violence, resale of land to allottees by land owners). Can you give illustrations?
2. Effectiveness of resistance (provide illustrations)
3. How resistance is organized and executed?
4. Symbols of resistance?
5. Generational socialization processes in resistance against land grabbing?

**D: Relationship between indigenous land owners and allottee-residents**

**Probe for:**

1. Relationship between indigenous land owners and allottee-residents (whether relationship is acrimonious or peaceful)?
2. Processes of engagement between indigenous land owners and allottee-residents?
3. Opinions of indigenous land owners about allottee-residents/ allottees (strictly for indigenous land owners and government officials)?
4. Opinions of allottee-residents and allottees about indigenous land owners (strictly for allottees and allottee-residents and government officials)?
5. Opinions about development in the housing estates?

## APPENDIX 2

### Case Study Guide

1. Educational status: .....
2. Age: .....
3. Profession: .....
4. Please can you give account of your experience as a result of land grabbing that transpired in this community?
5. How have you been affected?
6. Did you/ your parents or close relatives received compensation?
7. What efforts have been put in place for redress and how have you been involved in such efforts?
8. Describe how government acquisition has affected the community?

#### **Land grabbing for estate development by the government**

##### **Probe for:**

9. Opinions about land grabbing for estate development by the government?
10. Whether the community was involved in the process of land acquisitions by the government?
11. Interviewees understanding of Land Use Decree, 1978 with respect to land grabbing/ acquisition?
12. Terms and conditions presented by the government during the processes of land grabbing?
13. Terms and conditions presented by the community during the processes and forms of compensation pay?
14. Resettlement plans/policy implemented by the government?

#### **B: Relationship between government and land owners in the event of land grabbing**

##### **Probe for:**

15. Relationship between government and indigenous land owners (whether it is acrimonious/peaceful) in the event of land grabbing?
16. Preliminary people's reactions when informed about government decisions to acquire land?
17. Historical accounts of reactions from the locals (provide illustrations)?
18. Government response to preliminary reactions?

#### **C: Resistance of the indigenous owners against land grabbing**

##### **Probe for:**

19. Forms of resistance by indigenous owners against land grabbing (court cases, violence, resale of land to allottees by land owners). Can you give illustrations?
20. Effectiveness of resistance (provide illustrations)
21. How resistance is organized and executed?
22. Symbols of resistance?
23. Generational socialization processes in resistance against land grabbing?

**D: Relationship between indigenous land owners and allottee-residents**

**Probe for:**

24. Relationship between indigenous land owners and allottee-residents (whether relationship is acrimonious or peaceful)?
25. Processes of engagement between indigenous land owners and allottee-residents?
26. Opinions of indigenous land owners about allottee-residents/ allottees (strictly for indigenous land owners and government officials)?
27. Opinions of allottee-residents and allottees about indigenous land owners (strictly for allottees and allottee-residents and government officials)?
28. Opinions about development in the housing estates?



Figure 13: Plate showing a key informant interview with one of the participants



Figure 14: Plate showing a just concluded key informant interview with one of the participants





Figure 15: Plate showing a key informant interview with one of the family heads of the indigenous landowners



Figure 16: Plate showing an in-depth interview with one of the indigenous landowners



Figure 17: Plate showing a female focus group discussion session with the indigenous landowners



Figure 18: Plate showing a male focus group discussion session with the indigenous landowners



Figure 19: Plate showing a just concluded in-depth interview with one the allottee-residents



Figure 20: Plate showing a just concluded in-depth interview with one of the indigenous landowners



Figure 21: Plate showing a key informant interview with one the indigenous landowners



Figure 22: Plate showing Egeda Local Government Headquarter/Secretariat





Figure 23: Plate showing a case study interview with one the indigenous landowners



Figure 24: Plate showing a key informant interview with one the traditional chiefs of the indigenous landowners



Figure 25: Plate showing the undeveloped state of Ajoda New Town



Figure 26: Plate showing one of the controversial lands ready for building construction



Figure 27: Plate showing the dispersed type of development observed at Ajoda New Town



Figure 28: Plate showing an in-depth interview with an indigenous landowner



Figure 29: Plate showing a participant in a key informant interview at Ajoda New Town



Figure 30: Plate showing a land resold after government acquisition by the indigenous landown at Ajoda New Town





Figure 31: Plate showing the description of the undeveloped state of Ajoda New-Town



Figure 32: Plate showing an in-depth interview with one of the allottees that never came back to build at Ajoda because of the resistance orchestrated by the indigenous landowners



Figure 33: Plate showing an in-depth interview with one the allottee-residents justifying the authenticity of the land purchased through government with the land documents in his hand at Ajoda New Town



Figure 34: Plate showing an in-depth interview with an allottee-resident at Ajoda New-Town



Figure 35: Plate showing a key informant interview conducted by a trained Research Assistant with one the family heads of the indigenous landowners at Ajoda New Town



Figure 36: Plate showing a case study interview with an allottee-resident being conducted by the Researcher



Figure 37: Plate showing a key informant interview with a participant