

PROVISIONING THE ARMED FORCES IN COLONIAL NIGERIA, 1914-1960

BY

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CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that this thesis was carried out by Oluwasegun Thaddaeus ADENIYI in the Department of History, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria, under my supervision.

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DEDICATION

This Ph.D Thesis is dedicated to the Almighty God for giving me the strength, knowledge, ability and opportunity to undertake this research study and to persevere and complete it satisfactorily. Without His divine intervention, this achievement would not have been realisable.

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ABSTRACT

Provisioning is an important aspect of military mobilisation that deals with stores and supply. Available studies on the Armed Forces in Nigeria during the colonial period have paid more attention to personnel, training, mobilisation and battles than to provisioning. This study was, therefore, designed to examine the politics of provisioning the Armed Forces in colonial Nigeria, with a view to analysing military food supplies during the First World War (1914-1918), the Inter-War years (1919-1939), the Second World War (1939-1945) and the Post-War period (1946-1960).

The historical approach was adopted, while the interpretive design was used. Primary and secondary sources were utilised. Primary sources were archival materials such as Annual Reports, Government gazettes, files on export trade and local foodstuffs, and tender for supply of locally produced foodstuffs obtained from the national archives in Ibadan, Enugu and Kaduna. In-depth interviews were conducted with 30 purposively selected respondents who had adequate knowledge of the military food supplies: 15 military personnel, five government administrators and 10 historians, aged between 34 and 81. Secondary sources were books, journals, monographs, unpublished theses and research projects accessed from the university libraries at Ibadan, Zaria, Nsukka and Lagos. Data were subjected to historical analysis.

Food provisioning was strategic to the prosecution of The First World War and II, leading to the neglect of the civilian population. During the First World War (1914-1918), Nigeria, being the headquarters of the West African Frontier Force, bore the burden of provisioning the Allied Forces. The provisioning during this period was effected by the Department of Public Works. There was periodic shortage of food supplies in the Inter-War years from 1919 to 1939, though it did not attract the same magnitude of attention and organisation as the First World War. Food supply was not satisfactory and prices were very high. During the First World War (1939-1945), provisioning the armed forces in West Africa was centrally controlled by the Resident Minister in Achimota, Ghana. Annual estimates were made by the Supply Centre on military food requirements in consultation with the West African War Council. The end of the First World War in 1945 gave rise to demobilisation and reduction in manpower, thereby easing the pressure on military food requirements. The world food crisis between 1946 and 1948 adversely affected military supplies, reducing the availability of food supply. It was not until the 1950s that the food production and supply to the military became stabilised up to the period of Nigeria's independence in 1960.

Provisioning the armed forces in colonial Nigeria was an expensive national project due to the two world wars that occurred during the period as well as the Great Depression and World Food Crisis that occurred during the Inter-War years and Post-War period, respectively.

Keywords: Military provisioning, Nigeria Armed Forces, Wartime food supplies,

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The period, 1914-1960, cuts across the First World War (1914-1918) and the Second World War (1939-45) mediated by the Inter-War years (1919-1939) and the Post-War Period (1946-1960). Wars are not only interruptions of normal life, but they provoke severe ruptures and breaks in food production, distribution and consumption, which can have long lasting effects on the economic structure of the food industry, government food policy as well as the individual food habits.¹ The control, production, and access to food can also be used as a weapon by protagonists in conflict.² For instance, food blockade and scorch-earth tactics have been used by war parties to destabilise and de-provision the army of their enemies. Food shortages and restrictions in war periods resulted in a search for substitutes or new products. This has always been the practice, globally, from time immemorial.³

In Europe, during the Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815), Napoleon's army got some supplies from occupied and allied territories, especially from Prussia and Poland. However, the distances were too long to get sufficient supplies, and so the soldiers plundered villages on their way to collect food. This turned out particularly devastating on their way back to their various camps and settlements: the Russians used scorched earth tactics and the army literally starved to death during the failed Napoleonic invasion of Russia.⁴

With the outbreak of the First World War (1914-1918), there was concern about food shortages in the United Kingdom, however serious shortages did not develop until 1915.

¹Ina Z., Duffett R. and Alain D. (Eds) 2012. *Food and War in Twentieth Century*. London: Ashgate Publishing Limited, pp.1.

²Collinson, P. and Macbeth, H. Ed. 2014. *Food In Zones Of Conflict. Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives*. Berghahn Books, pp.1-2.

³Ina, et al (Eds) 2012. *Food and War*, p.2.

⁴Olson, M. 1963. *The Economics of Wartime University Press Shortage: A History of British Food Supplies in the Napoleonic War and in World Wars I and II*. Durham, NC: Duke, p3.

Farmers, suppliers, and retailers held back supplies in the early stages of the crisis in the hopes of benefitting from the situation. The government considered introducing laws to solve this problem. If foodstuffs were being withheld from the market in an inappropriate manner, the Board of Trade was given the ability to interfere. In exchange for a fair price, the Board might take possession of such foodstuffs, guaranteeing that they are available to the general people. The media were full of warnings about buying too much food and hoarding it.⁵ In 1917, Germany began unrestricted submarine warfare, putting Britain's food supplies at risk. As a result, food shortages were a serious problem, and by 1918, hunger was widespread in poorer regions,⁶ such as South Wales and Liverpool.⁷

"The Recipe for Victory" written on posters became a famous phrase in all parts of the United States. This wartime practice depicts the national effort to push for and implement a plan to make food the key to winning the First World War. Americans were daily encouraged to do their part in producing for the war effort, the poster-inexpensive, accessible, and ever-present-was an ideal agent for making war aims the personal mission of every citizen. Food was in short supply for the European civilian and military allies. Americans were encouraged to save food by decreasing waste, swapping plentiful commodities for limited ones, and participating in the food-saving programmes. The Food and Drug Administration launched a programme to educate people about nutrition and food preservation in order to persuade them that eating less is safe. On signs and posters, it was written that "Food Will Win the War," and the "Doctrine of the Clean Plate" was pushed. The National War Garden Commission urged Americans to "put the indolent land to use" by growing war gardens and canning and drying any produce that couldn't be eaten fresh.⁸

Both during conflicts and long after they have finished, wars have had significant repercussions for civilian food and eating, including Post-War supply constraints. Allied powers, primarily from American sources, provided some help to afflicted Europe during the Inter-War years (1919-1939), notably in the early Post-War period. A relief program was organized under the aegis of the Supreme Economic Council from the Armistice in November 1918 to the summer of 1919, with the majority of supplies coming from the

⁵Barnett, L.M. 1985. *British Food Policy during the First World War*. London: George Allen & Unwin, p.57.

⁶ Craddick-Adams, P. 2014. The Home Front in World War One. History trails. Wars and Conflicts. bbc.co.uk/history.

⁷ Laybourn, K. 1999. *Modern Britain Since 1906: a Reader. Tauris History Readers*. I. B. Tauris. p. 105
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/zr64jxs/revision/4>

⁸William, B. L. JR. & Rubenstein, H. R. 1998. *Design for Victory: The First World War Posters on the American Home Front*. New York: Princeton Architectural Press, pp. 48-50.

United States. The majority of the aid was in the form of food. In addition to the subsidies for home-grown goods, Britain imported items from the "British Empire" that is, their colonial territories.⁹

During the Second World War, Britain implemented a "digging for victory" strategy (1939-1945). Waste ground, railway boundaries, beautiful gardens and lawns, sports fields, and golf courses were all requisitioned land that had previously been utilized for farming or vegetable production. Instead of being mowed, a sports field was sometimes left unmowed and used for sheep grazing. Victory gardens were seen planted in backyards and on the roofs of apartment buildings, with the occasional vacant lot being "commandered for the war effort" and turned into a cornfield or squash patch.¹⁰ In 1942, Australia launched the Dig for Victory initiative in response to restrictions and a labour shortage in the agriculture sector. The situation began to improve in 1943. Home gardens, on the other hand, remained unaffected by the war.¹¹ The US Department of Agriculture encouraged the planting of victory gardens during the Second World War, much as it had done during the First World War. Nearly a third of the veggies grown in the United States came from Victory Gardens. It was highlighted to American home front city and suburbanites that the produce from their gardens would help the US War Department cut the price of vegetables needed to feed the troops, saving money that could be spent elsewhere on the military: One American poster stated, "Our food is fighting."¹² Food shortages and constraints in Europe during the two world wars prompted a quest for new food supply sources.¹³ The mobilization of foodstuffs from colonial countries to the service of the Allied Forces in general, and the British Armed Forces in particular, was needed by this hunt for fresh sources of supply.

Nigeria, as a British colony, played an important role in the provisioning of goods. Nigerian contributions to the British war effort during the First World War (1914-1918), not just in military and financial terms, but also in terms of foodstuffs, were significant,¹⁴ are documented in archival sources. The supply of Nigerian foodstuffs, such as rice, yams, maize, garri, millet, guinea-corn, potatoes, fresh meat, fresh vegetables, cooking oil, and so

⁹Derek, H. A. 2006. *Europe's Third World: The European Periphery in the Inter-war years*. Aldershot-Burlington: Ashgate, pp.1-3., Kenwood, A.G. & Loughheed, A.L. 1971. *The Growth of International Economics 1820-1960: An Introductory Text*. New York: Routledge, p.186.

¹⁰Olson, M. 1963. *The Economics of Wartime Shortage*: pp.4-5.

¹¹Hopkins, J. C. 1919. *The Province of Ontario in the War: A Record of Government and People*. Toronto: Warwick Brothers and Rutter, pp. 60–61.

¹²Kallen, S. A. 2000. *The War at Home*. San Diego: Lucent Books, pp. 43–45.

¹³Ina, Z., et al (Eds) 2012. *Food and War*, p.5.

¹⁴ National Archives Ibadan (NAI), N.2029/1916. "Contribution of Nigeria during the War, 1916."

on, to Britain for military provisioning did not halt throughout the Inter-War years (1919-1939), although it did decrease due to the restoration of peace and the resumption of food production in war-torn Europe. The British War Council was in charge of mobilizing Nigerian foodstuffs for the provisioning of the Allied Forces in West Africa and Europe during the Second World War (1939-1945). The Post-War period in Nigeria was distinguished by the pattern of food provisioning by the Armed Forces, which lasted from 1946 to 1960, being the Post-War period.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Available studies on the role of the colonial states in the British War efforts during the First and Second World Wars have concentrated (in the case of Nigeria) on the contribution in soldiers, labourers, raw materials, and finance, but have downplayed the country's contribution in foodstuffs. Those that deal with Nigerian foodstuffs and the British Armed Forces, even though in part, have concentrated on the period of the Second World War and downplayed the period of the First World War and Inter-War years. Similarly, studies on commodity exports in colonial Nigeria have focused mainly on cash crop exports, almost to the total exclusion of the exports of foodstuffs. The result of these gaps has been the lopsidedness in the historiography of the Nigerian contribution to the war efforts, and the nature of commodity exports in colonial Nigeria. Where and how were the colonial Nigerian foodstuffs produced? By what means were they mobilised? Moreover, what was the place of the Nigeria foodstuffs in the provisioning of the British Armed Forces from the beginning of the First World War in 1914 to the end of the Second World War in 1945? Again, why the pattern behind the food provisioning of the Armed Forces in Nigeria in the Post-War period of 1946 to 1960?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

From the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 to the end of the Second World War in 1945, the study looks at the mobilization and supply of Nigerian foodstuffs to the British Armed Forces. It also examines the pattern of the food provisioning of the Armed Forces in Nigeria in the Post-War era between 1946 and 1960. These foodstuffs included cooking oils, yams, garri, potatoes, rice, maize, onions, and fresh meat. The study uses the mobilization and exports of these Nigerian foodstuffs during the colonial period as a point of entry into the on-going conversations on the intersection of food and wars, commodity exports, and centre-periphery relationship. The specific objectives are to:

- i. discuss the Allied military requirements of local foodstuffs during the First World War, Inter-War years, and the Second World War, 1914-1918, 1919-1939, and 1939-1945, respectively.
- ii. examine food production schemes initiated by the West African War Council.
- iii. analyse the process of mobilisation of these foodstuffs to their destinations as well as the contributions of these resources to the British war efforts.
- iv. examine the pattern of the food provisioning of the armed forces in Nigeria in the Post-War period, 1946-1960.

1.4 Scope of the Study

The research spans the years 1914 through 1960. The year 1914 marked the start of the First World War, 1939 marked the start of the Inter-War Years, 1945 marked the end of the Second World War, and 1946 marked the start of the Post-World War Years. In the history of Nigeria's local agricultural economy, the years 1914 to 1945 were a significant time in which it provided support to the British Armed Forces. From 1946 to 1960, on the other hand, there is an opportunity to investigate the politics of the Armed Forces' food provisioning in Nigeria during the Post-War period. It discusses the Post-War global food situation and its ramifications for the Nigerian people and the armed forces. The year 1960, which is the terminal date was Nigeria's year of independence.

The study covers the whole of Nigeria, most especially the zones from which the foodstuffs were mobilized and exported. The production of foodstuffs in Nigeria to some extent received simultaneous specialisation throughout all the three regions; for instance, the northern area was famous for maize, onions, meats and potatoes, while the western region produced yams and cooking oils. The eastern region produced yams, cassava, and oil palm. Nigeria is no doubt, a good case study of the contribution of a periphery country to the food provisioning during the World Wars.

1.5 Justification for the Study

The study addresses the imbalance in the historiography of the contribution of Nigeria to the British war efforts during the First World War, Inter-War years, the Second World War, and post Second World War era, most especially in the area of food supply to the military formations. It challenges the conventional wisdom that sees the export of Nigeria's agricultural produce in the colonial period as one involving cash crops alone. It will move the

discussions on commodity exports in new directions characterised by the narratives on the supply of foodstuffs to the British armed forces during the First World War, Inter-War years, and the Second World War. It also examines the pattern of the food provisioning of the Armed Forces in Nigeria in the Post-War period, dealing with the world food situation in the post-war period and its implications for Nigerian populace and the armed forces. The study is a contribution to knowledge on war-time (and also Post-War time) military food provisioning, commodity exports, and economic dependency.

1.6 Methodology

The study is based largely on primary sources. Archival sources and materials got from the national archives in Ibadan, Enugu, and Kaduna in Nigeria provided data for the analysis. These archival materials include annual reports and handling over notes by colonial administrative officers such as files on: Export Trade in Local Foodstuff, Tender for Inter-Colonial Trade Application, Tender for Supply of Locally Produced Foodstuffs to West African Colonies; Export of Local Foodstuffs; Endorsement; Minutes of Meetings; and Import Licensing of Locally Produced Foodstuffs from Nigeria; amongst many others. These documents provided a lot of first-hand information on the subject matter. It is also desirable to incorporate information from the National Archives, at Kew, London, such as files from Colonial Office (CO) on British Trade with Nigeria, on Ministry of Overseas Development, Tropical Products Institute as well as files on foodstuffs and fruiting specimen brought from Nigeria. Creditable information from newspapers, news magazines, and available published gazettes were also utilised. These were augmented by official documents and publications from relevant Federal Ministries and Parastatals such as the Ministry of Internal/Foreign Affairs, Information, and the National Orientation Agency.

Other primary sources include oral information, which involves one-on-one interview with persons considered particularly relevant to the event under consideration. By so doing, thirty respondents purposefully selected from cognate sectors to the war efforts were interviewed. These were former military and soldiers who didn't participate in the war, but had encounter with those who participated.

Secondary sources of data for this study included books, magazines, monographs, unpublished theses, and research initiatives. They were available for assessment in the libraries of the University of Ibadan, Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria, the University of Nigeria in Nsukka, and the University of Lagos. In addition to these are memoirs and books

written by actors and players familiar and involved with the issue under consideration. These secondary sources will provide information on the extant body of knowledge in the area of study and will constitute a good companion in combing the archives for new insights.

This study adopts the historical method of analysis, examining the export of the Nigeria's foodstuff to the British Armed Forces over a period of time. It utilises qualitative approach of interpretation. In this way, it is descriptive and analytical in nature. Interdisciplinary approach is also used, thereby incorporating other methods and analysis from cognate disciplines. The study used diagrams to illustrate some concepts.

1.7 Literature review

This literature review is thematic, featuring literature on food and war, the contributions of the periphery countries to the war efforts, on commodity exports, and on the Nigerian Armed Forces during the colonial period. The themes are examined consecutively.

Food and War

Scholars have determined that food and war have an inextricable relationship. Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Rachel Duffett, and Alain Drouard look at how conflict influenced food production, distribution, and consumption in twentieth-century Europe. While a nutritious diet is essential for supporting soldiers, it is also critical to sustain civilian health and morale in the era of total war, according to the book. Military provisioning and food rationing systems, as well as civilian survival strategies and the role of conflict in fostering innovation and modernisation, are all included in the inquiry. It examines the challenges of feeding big armies as well as the challenges of enforcing food rules and rationing schemes at home, arguing that food should not be considered as a finite resource. It explains how new and alternative foods were invented and used in times of scarcity. Advances in food processing technology, a shift away from meat in the diet, and the introduction of exotic delicacies like horsemeat are all examples of this. The study looks at belligerent, occupied, and neutral countries to see how competing claims of military and civilian supplies were managed in various countries and conflicts.¹⁵

Collinson and Macbeth argue that food supply is a critical issue in conflict zones because violence almost invariably disrupts food production and distribution, resulting in greater

¹⁵ Ina, Z. et al. (Ed) 2012. *Food and War*, pp.1-3.

competition for food, land, and resources. Food control, production, and access can all be used as a weapon by conflicting parties. Food supply logistics for military forces operating in crisis zones are also critical.¹⁶

Food and fighting archaeologies, according to Van Derwarker and Wilson, have grown independently over a few decades. The impact of warfare on daily food quests, warfare and nutritional health, ritual food ways and violence, warrior and army provisioning, status-based changes in diet during times of war, logistical constraints on military campaigns, and violent competition for subsistence resources are all discussed in this book. It addresses these concerns by presenting a global perspective on the relationship between war and food through case studies from around the world.¹⁷

Food insecurity, globalization, and conflict are all investigated by Ellen and Cohen. The procedure comprises a critical review of prior research on food insecurity as a source of conflict, war as a cause of food insecurity, and the conflict-globalization nexus. The focus then shifted to country-level historical factors that link export products like coffee and cotton to conflict generation and maintenance. These instances show that production and trade arrangements, as well as food and financial policy, are more important than export farming in determining peaceful or belligerent outcomes.¹⁸

Macrae and Zwi set out to look into six recent famines in Africa. They said that using food as a weapon of war through omission, commission, and provision led to recent famines. Internal pressures such as economic and environmental deterioration, political instability, and ethnic animosity appear to be preserving the momentum for conflict, despite the expectation for peace produced by the conclusion of the Cold War. Food is predicted to play an important strategic role in these fights. The relevance of tying food security and public health concerns to development, human rights, and international relations concerns is emphasized in this paper.¹⁹

Collingham Lizzie establishes the importance of food control and production in total conflict. The experience of the Second World War revolved around food, particularly the absence of

¹⁶ Collinson, P. and Macbeth, H. (Ed) 2014. *Food In Zones Of Conflict*, pp. 3-4.

¹⁷ VanDerwarker, A. M. and Wilson, G. D. (Ed) 2015. *The Archaeology of Food and Warfare. Food Insecurity in Prehistory*. 1st Edition. California: Springer Books, pp.1-11.

¹⁸ Ellen, M. and Cohen, M. J. 2015. 'Conflict, Food Insecurity and Globalization' Published Online Journal: *Food, Culture & Society*. Volume 10, 2007, Issue 2. 29 Apr 2015, pp. 297-315.

¹⁹ Macrae, J. & Zwi, A. B. 1992. 'Food as an Instrument of War in Contemporary African Famines: A Review of the Evidence', DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-7717.1992. Volume 16, Issue 4, December 1992, pp. 299–321.

it. She looks at the Second World War from a fresh and unique perspective, notably, how different countries dealt with the food crisis that affected practically all of them, with the exception of the United States. More than 20 million people died as a result of hunger and malnutrition. She described Herbert Backe's 'Hunger Plan,' which was designed in Nazi Germany with the goal of starving East European countries to death, particularly the Ukraine, and Hitler's eventual goal of moving German people into the Ukraine to cultivate the land there. The author claims that historians have mainly ignored the function of food in war. The author goes into great depth on Herbert Backe's 'Hunger Plan,' which was designed in Nazi Germany with the goal of starving East European countries, particularly Ukraine, to death. Hitler's ultimate goal was to relocate German families to Ukraine to farm the land there. She focuses on both the winners and losers in the battle for food, tracing the interaction between food and strategy on both the military and home fronts, bringing to light the striking fact that war-related hunger and famine was not only caused by Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, but was also the result of Allied mismanagement and neglect, particularly in India, Africa, and China. To overcome the view based on two major concerns, the book advocates for some form of international council that replaces national governments to oversee food production and distribution. (1) global warming (perhaps induced by climate change), and (2) overconsumption in the United States and other Western societies.²⁰

William Moskoff explains how the Soviet Union fed itself after the German invasion during the Second World War. As a result of the central organization's decreased relevance in feeding the populace, citizens were forced to become far more self-reliant in feeding themselves. Despite the fact that rationing was instituted soon after the war began, recurrent food shortages quickly rendered it obsolete. Despite the fact that the Soviet army was given priority over civilians, the population under German occupation was clearly in considerably worse position than Soviet civilians in the rear.²¹

Katarzyna Cwiertka writes that civilians and troops, as well as children, must eat three times a day, preferably three times a day, even during conflict. This fascinating collection of essays examines how people eat on and off the battlefield, as well as in wartime and post-war food storage facilities. It also considers the impact of wartime food habits on war outcomes, as well as post-war state construction, culture, and society. The work reflects the idea of food

²⁰ Collingham, L. 2013. *Taste of War: The First World War I and the Battle for Food*. Reprint Edition. Penguin Books, p.1-3.

²¹William, M. 2002. *The Bread of Affliction: The Food Supply in the USSR during World War II*. Cambridge Russian, Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies. (Book 76) Cambridge University Press, pp.1-4.

studies: to elevate the study of the ordinary dimension of conflict from the margins of scholarship to a position of significant importance for comprehending the human past.²²

Food policy is the subject of Tim Lang and Michael Heasman. Food is the source of many ailments in today's world, whether due to malnutrition or over nutrition, owing to a failing food policy. Though the consumer has responsibility, policy and governance play a significant role in the construction and regulation of the food system and supply. In other words, the writers want to know how and who makes decisions about the world of food and its structure, how it works, and how it is regulated. What is the purpose of this food policy, and what decisions have been made? There are proposed answers and solutions that are based on very specific statistics and references. This is a book about ideas for shaping and conceiving the future of food.²³

Adesina's study attempts a critique of the food supply politics of the colonial government in Nigeria during the Second World War, 1939 to 1945. It examines and explains the factors which informed the formation of British war-time economic policies with its attendant consequences for the people and societies of colonial Nigeria. From the evidence presented, it is discovered that the colonial government got involved in agriculture and commerce, both in control of the direct production and distribution and also in putting in place institutional infrastructures. The colonial government embarked on the "grow more food" campaign. They also put in place, price control measures of foodstuffs and the allocation of contracts through the establishment of the Tender Boards. This was aimed at catering for the food requirements of His Majesty's Forces. The study reveals that the new local entrepreneurial class that emerged during the period was a discouraged and disenchanting group.²⁴

The Contributions of the Periphery Countries to the British War Efforts

In the body of literature on the place of the periphery countries in the war efforts, concentration has been more on their contribution in men of arms, labour, finance and in raw materials.

For instance, the immense contribution made by the British West African colonies in men and materials to the Allied war effort during the First World War, 1914-1918, is now well

²² Katarzyna, C. 2013. *Food and War in Mid-Twentieth-Century East Asia*. Farnham, Ashgate, pp.1-6.

²³ Tim, L. and Michael, H. 2004. *Food Wars. The Global Battle for Mouths, Minds and Markets*. London: Earthscan, pp.1-3.

²⁴ Adesina, O.A. 2002. *A Critique of the Policy of the Supply of Foodstuffs to His Majesty's Forces in World War II, 1939-1945*. Being an M.A. Thesis submitted to the Department of History, University of Ibadan.

known. This enormous contribution led Killingray and Mathew to describe the West African contingents as the 'Beasts of Burden'²⁵ This was the case during the Second World War, which lasted from 1939 to 1945. According to Killingray, Britain recruited almost 500,000 African soldiers, who served in the Royal West African Frontier Force (West African colonies), the King's African Rifles (Eastern Africa), and the Sudan Defense Force, among others. African soldiers fought in a variety of conflict zones, including Abyssinia, North Africa, the Levant, Madagascar, Italy, India, and Burma. After a general reluctance on the part of British officials to send African troops outside of Africa and against armies with white men, except as unarmed military labourers in uniform, this changed. ²⁶ According to Lee Ready's research, the French recruited almost 200,000 people from her colonies, and they played an important role. Furthermore, the Free French government's headquarters were in Brazzaville, Congo.²⁷ The significance of Africa during the Second World War is the subject of Byfield Judith and Brown Carolyn's work. The book includes fresh research and novel methods to African historiography, and it explores the experiences of male and female warriors, as well as peasant producers, during the war, bringing up problems of race, gender, and labour. ²⁸

In respect of labour, Prest argues that direct recruitment for the army did not have overall drain on Nigerian manpower, though the exact figures for recruitment from Nigeria are not available. The total population was put at 20.6 million in 1938 but it had probably increased to about 22 million by 1945. Furthermore, construction works on local road and airfield was quite frequently arranged to take place in the season when least labour was needed for farming.²⁹ David Johnson investigates the challenges of colonial Zimbabwe's wartime mobilization of settlers, soldiers, and laborers, as well as the sacrifices demanded of tens of

²⁵ Killingray, D. and Mathew, J. 1979. "Beasts of Burden: British West African Carriers in the First World War." *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 13, Numbers.1/2, pp.7-23.

²⁶Killingray, D. and Martin, P. 2012. *Fighting for Britain: African Soldiers in the Second World War*. Reprint Edition. Woodbridge, Suffolk: James Currey, pp.2-4.

²⁷Ready, L. J. 1985. *Forgotten Allies: The Military Contribution of the Colonies, Exiled Governments, and Lesser Powers to the Allied Victory in the Second World War*. Reprint Edition. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc, pp.2-5.

²⁸Byfield, J.and Brown, C. (Eds) 2015. *Africa and the Second World War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.5-6.

²⁹Prest, A.R. 1948. *War Economics of Primary Producing Countries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.1-27, 241-262.

thousands of Africans forced into settler production as a contribution to the British war effort.

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Throughout the Second World War, the British West African colonies, according to David Killingray, provided raw supplies and people for the war effort. The Gold Coast's small peacetime army swelled to almost 70,000 personnel, including technical and support units, and was used in overseas conflicts. Despite the fact that only drivers and craftsmen were technically conscripted, a large number of recruits were forced into service through a system of official quotas imposed on districts and through chiefs. Attempts to avoid recruiting parties, as well as a large number of desertions, indicate widespread hostility to military service, especially for overseas battles.³¹ Some gold mines were shuttered in order to free up labour for the military and safeguard scarce raw material sources.³²

West Africans gave more than £1.5 million to various war-time funds, according to Marika Sherwood. This was a significant sum when compared to daily wages of one to two shillings (£1=20 shillings). West African colonial administrations provided nearly £1 million in interest-free loans, while Caribbean states provided a comparable sum. By the end of 1943, the colonial empire had given the United Kingdom £23.3 million in gifts, including £10.7 million in interest-free loans and £14 million in low-interest loans. British Africa's £223 million sterling balances were distributed to the military in the amount of £100 million. The colonies' pound balances in Britain at the end of the war reached £454 million, which were money owed by Britain to the colonies for colonial produce.³³

Prest opines that the Nigerian government expenditure was not unnaturally small in relation to the previous figures. In 1938-1939, the military and defense expenditure was 310,000 Euro and by 1943-1944 it had reached a level of 405,000 Euro. In addition, the military expenditure which after 1914 took a form of contribution to His Majesty's Government, there was in 1943-1944 other items such as war measures of 187,000 Euro and the Nigerian Supply Board Administration provision of 156,000 Euro. A donation of 100,000 Euro was

³⁰David, J. 2000. *World War II and the Scramble for Labour in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1939-1948*. Zimbabwe: University of Zimbabwe Publications, pp.1-4.

³¹ Killingray, D. 1982. 'Military and Labour Recruitment in the Gold Coast During Second World War'. *The Journal of African History*. Volume 23. Vol. 01. pp. 83-95.

³² Killingray, D. and Richard, R. 1986. Labour Mobilisation in British Colonial Africa for the War Effort, 1939-46, in *Africa and the Second World War*, Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 68-96.

³³Sherwood, M. 1985. *Many Struggles*, London: Karia Press, p.2., Sherwood, Marika and Martin Spafford (1999), *Whose Freedom were Africans, Caribbeans and Indians fighting for in World War II?*, BASA: Savannah Press, pp.1-3.

also made to His Majesty's Government. However, it is more difficult to deduce the figure for overall output in Nigeria because separate figures for exports do not exist. Though it was perceived that the production of crops increased and that the supply to the armed forces was stable, also consumption of home grown food was roughly maintained but the exact concrete evidence was not available. Production of goods from light industries, such as timber, rope, cotton, building materials and many more industries in Nigeria increased considerably during the Second World War.³⁴

The "Nigeria Win the War Fund," according to Mordi, was founded on June 15, 1940 as a supplement to the Second World War efforts. The incident occurred just two weeks after France's capitulation to Germany and just two weeks after the disastrous Dunkirk evacuation, at a time when the need for armaments was at an all-time high. Britain lost 700 tanks, 2,450 guns, and 50,000 vehicles of all types at Dunkirk. As a result, the Nigeria Win the War Fund was established with the objective of purchasing military supplies for the British troops. The Gold Coast Legislative Council, Nigeria's neighbour, had loaned the Imperial Government £100,000, and the governor of the West African colony had set up a separate fund for the purchase of military weapons. There is no evidence of a similar initiative being launched by the press in partnership with the government anywhere else. As a result, the Nigerian instance was unique, demonstrating the fruitful collaboration between the local press and the colonial authorities in the fight against Nazism. Similarly, during the First World War, 1914-1918, the Nigerian press advocated and supported Nigerian monetary contributions and donations to various organizations, particularly the National Relief Fund.³⁵

Allister Hinds believes that, in terms of raw material supplies, Sub-Saharan Africa would not have been able to avoid monetarily contributing to the Second World War. The economies of the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Portugal, and Spain, as well as their colonies in the region, had fused into a single economy by the time the war broke out in 1939. Furthermore, Sub-Saharan Africa has uncovered many of the significant mineral and agricultural resources sought by warring nations. The primary mineral exports of Sub-

³⁴Prest, A.R. 1948. *War Economics of Primary Producing Countries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp.1 -27, 241-262.

³⁵Mordi, E.N. 2015. The Nigeria Win the War Fund: An Unsung Episode in Government-Press Collaboration in Nigeria during the Second World War, *Kamla-Raj 2010 J. Social Sciences*, Vol. 24 No. 2, 87-100 (2010); Mordi, Emmanuel Nwafor, Fighting with the Pen: Nigerian Press' Collaboration in the Promotion and Success of British Win-the-War Efforts in Nigeria during the Second World War. *Research on Humanities and Social Sciences*. Vol. 5, Number 10. pp.90-104.

Saharan Africa were strategically vital to the warring parties. Many African countries supplied Britain and the United States with copper, cobalt, industrial diamonds, tin, gold, silver, bauxite, and uranium for their rearmament operations.³⁶

Commodity Exports

On the economic history of West Africa, there is a large amount of literature. These works include those of Paul Zeleza,³⁷ P.T. Bauer,³⁸ Edward Bovill,³⁹ Polly Hill,⁴⁰ A.G. Hopkins,⁴¹ and Lanre Are et al.⁴² Studies on Nigeria's economic history, in particular, have also been conducted. These works include those of Margret Parham,⁴³ R.O. Ekundare,⁴⁴ and Onwuka Njoku.⁴⁵ Beyond studies on the general economic history of Nigeria, there are works that focus on different economic themes, such as production, manufacturing, and trade. With regard to commodity production in colonial Nigeria, significant contributions have been made by Bill Freund,⁴⁶ Gerald Helleiner,⁴⁷ E.J. Usoro,⁴⁸ Sara Berry,⁴⁹ and Galletti et al.⁵⁰ In the manufacturing sector, Alan Sokolaski,⁵¹ Peter Kilby⁵² and Tom Forrest⁵³ have made enormous contributions.

³⁶Allister H. 2015. The Second World War: Sub-Saharan Africa: Economic. L
mpact.<http://www.worldhistory.biz/sundries/27541-world-war-ii-sub-saharan-africa-economic-impact.html>;
<http://cw.routledge.com/ref/africanhist/contributors.html>.Date downloaded: July 29, 2015, p.1.

³⁷ Zeleza, P.T. 1997. *A Modern Economic History of Africa: The nineteenth century*. Vol. 1. East African Publishers, p.275.

³⁸Bauer, P.T. 1963. *West African Trade: A Study of Competition Oligopoly and Monopoly in a Changing Economy*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp.15-26.

³⁹Edward, W. B. 1968. *The Golden Trade of the Moors*. London: Oxford University Press.

⁴⁰ Polly H. 1970, *Studies in Rural Capitalism in West Africa*. London: Cambridge Press

⁴¹ Hopkins, A. G. 1973. *An Economic History of West Africa*. New York: Colombia University Press.

⁴² Are, L.A. and Gwynne-Jones, D.R.G. 1974. *Cocoa in West Africa*. Ibadan: Oxford University Press

⁴³ Margery, P. 1948. *Mining, Commerce, and Finance in Nigeria*. London: Farber and Farber

⁴⁴ Ekundare, R.O. 1973. *An Economic History of Nigeria, 1860-1960*. Suffolk: Methuen

⁴⁵ Onwuka, N. 2001. *Economic History of Nigeria, 19th and 20th Century*, Nsukka: University of Nigeria

⁴⁶ Freund, B. 1981. *Capital and Labour in the Nigerian Tin Mines*. Essex: Longman.

⁴⁷ Helleiner, G. 1966. *Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic Growth in Nigeria*. Illinois: Richard D. Irwin.

⁴⁸Usoro, E.J. 1975. *The Nigerian Oil Palm Industry, Government Policy and Export Production, 1906-1965*. Oxford: Clarendon.

⁴⁹ Berry, S. S. 1975. *Cocoa, Custom, and Socio-Economic Change in Rural Western Nigeria*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p.9.

⁵⁰ Galletti, R., Baldwin, K.D.S., and Dina, I.O. 1956. *Nigerian Cocoa Farmers: An Economic Survey of Yoruba Cocoa Farming Families*. London: Oxford University Press.

⁵¹ Alan, S. 1965. *The Establishment of Manufacturing in Nigeria*. New York, London: Frederick A. Praeger.

⁵² Kilby, P. 1968. *Industrialization in An Open Economy: Nigeria 1945-1966*. Cambridge: At The University Press

⁵³ Forrest, T. 1982. "Recent Developments in Nigerian industrialization." *Industry and Accumulation in Africa*. Martin Fransman. Ed. London: Heinemann.

Kenneth Dike's *Trading and Politics in the Niger Delta*, published in 1956, established the history of commodity trade in Nigeria. Despite the fact that the study concentrates on the Niger Delta, the time period (1830-1885) serves as an introduction to Nigeria's economic and political history. The book looks into the details of how native governments were gradually replaced by British consular power, and finally by Crown Colony administration.⁵⁴ He says that modern West Africa's history is mostly the product of five centuries of trade with European nations, and that business was the fundamental link between Africa and Europe. This lengthy trade period can be broken into two halves. The first began with the entrance of the Portuguese and ended in 1807 when the slave trade was outlawed. The second half covers the years 1807-1885.

Nigerian Groundnut Exports: Origins and Early Development was published by Hogendorn in 1978. "The Hausa traders' enterprise, the farmers' response to the economic incentives, and the tremendous scope of the result" is the focus of this study."⁵⁵ The study "highlights the economic initiative and adaptability of Hausa traders and farmers in 1912-1914, and argues that all-too-general tendency to minimize indigenous entrepreneurial efficacy may lead to rash prediction and bad policy."⁵⁶ He notes that the Hausa people participated in the long-distance trade and extensive market trade for about 400 years, featuring trade in foodstuffs and textiles. He demonstrated that Kano traded throughout Borno and southern Nigeria, past Timbuktu to the Atlantic, through Chad and southern Libya and north to Tripoli, noting that "French officers at the turn of the century were of the opinion that nearly everyone living in the central and east Sahara, and two-thirds of the population of the savanna region, wore Kano cottons-shirts, robes, even the veils of the Tuareg. The indigo dyes associated with the cloth were sometimes sent to Kano for dyeing and reshipment."⁵⁷ He concludes that Hausa experience in kola buying was especially important for the eventual foundation of a large-scale groundnut trade.

Also in 1978, Northrup published his *Trade without Rulers*. The scope of this study is the pre-colonial south-Eastern Nigeria. The study was concerned with "the internal political organization of south-eastern Nigeria, but with the institutions and personnel of its commercial organization: markets and market networks, regional and long-distance trade,

⁵⁴ Dike K. O. 1956. *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1885: An Introduction to the Economic and Political History of Nigeria*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p.v

⁵⁵Hogendorn, J. S. 1978. *Nigerian Groundnut Exports: Origin and Early Development*. Zaria and Ibadan: Ahmadu Bello University Press and Oxford University Press, p.xvii

⁵⁶ Hogendorn, J. S. 1978. *Nigerian Groundnut Exports*, p.5

⁵⁷ Hogendorn, J. S. 1978. *Nigerian Groundnut Exports*, p. 7

commodities and currencies, trade routes and professional traders.”⁵⁸ By so doing, the study examines the development of trade in the region before 15,000, peoples and polities of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the slave trade and its organization, the growth of agricultural exports as well as its role on economic development. Although this study discusses trade in foodstuff during the slave trade and middle passage, it concentrates more on the pre-colonial period.

Lovejoy published in 1980 his work on kola trade which was the second most well-known economic activity among the Hausa. This study examines the kola trade from Ashante to Kano.⁵⁹ According to Lovejoy, the Agalawa, the Tokarawa, and the Kambarin Beriberi were three professional Hausa trading gangs who developed to prosecute the trade. According to him, these trading groups gathered cash, gained specialized knowledge of the kola-producing regions, and created social ties that aided long-distance kola trade.

Susan Martin’s *Palm Oil and Protest* hit the intellectual market in 1988.⁶⁰ The research looks at the impact of capitalism and colonialism on rural West African economic history since 1800, with a particular focus on Ngwa, a location where cash crops were heavily used. The result is a history of the Ngwa people that demonstrates how the natural environment, social institutions, and economic and political changes inflicted by outsiders all influenced the economic prospects available to them.⁶¹ It looks at how local and external drivers of change interacted between the First and Second World Wars, as well as up until the 1980s. According to the study, the collapse of the oil palm export industry in the 1970s, which provided most of the region's import-purchasing power during the colonial period, did not result in a drop in overall incomes because it occurred concurrently with the rise of profitable urban industries and state employment fuelled by the mineral oil boom. This is a research paper on the impact of the global economy on the local community. Its relevance to the current research is very incidental.

The paper by Adesina deals directly with the experience of the indigenous entrepreneurial class in western Nigeria. Specifically designed to fill the existing gaps in the study of the impacts of the Second World War on the Nigerian society. Available literatures had focused

⁵⁸ Northrup, D. 1978. *Trade Without Rulers, Pre-Colonial Economic Development in South-Eastern Nigeria*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p.5.

⁵⁹ Lovejoy, P. 1980. *Caravan of Kola: The Hausa Kola Trade, 1700-1900*. Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press.

⁶⁰ Martin, S. 1988. *Palm Oil and Protest: An Economic History of the Ngwa Region, South-Eastern Nigeria, 1800-1980*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

⁶¹ Martin, S. 1988. *Palm Oil and Protest*, p.1.

on the aspect of political and social issues in addition to the strategies evolved to deal with the economic exigencies which the war threw up. The existing entrepreneurial classes that emerged during the war was deprived and weakened. The class took up the challenge headlong wanting to bring about the needful change to effect positive leverage in the polity for the purpose of equality in economic partnership. However, they soon found out to their dismay that the level of distortion was high, in addition to the existing lack of accessibility to equal opportunities and advantages which had impacted negatively on their economic capabilities. The implication was that the class got its capacity to assert its rights alongside other classes trampled upon as they moved towards the post-colonial era.⁶²

Olukoju investigates the dynamics and impact of marine trade on Lagos throughout the waves of the first half of the twentieth century and the period of British colonial authority in *The Liverpool of West Africa*, released in 2004.⁶³ There are six chapters in the book. The first chapter examines government, business, and maritime trade in Lagos from 1900 to 1914, with a focus on the establishment of British rule and the emergence of a business community in Lagos, the provision of trade infrastructure, fiscal policy, trade dynamics, population growth, urban development, and the cost of living in pre-war Lagos. The second chapter looks at shipping and marine trade in Lagos during the First World War, with a focus on the eclipse of German trade in Lagos, wartime maritime trade and shipping in Lagos, and the structure of Lagos society throughout the conflict. The third chapter dwells upon government policy and trade from 1919 to 1928. It examines government and business in the colonial context, fiscal policy and trade, railway tariffs and trade as well as the inspection and grading of produce for export. Chapter four is about the dynamics of maritime trade in Lagos, 1919-1928, the Post-War boom, the currency crisis and the depression of 1920-1922, while chapter five focuses on government, trade and Lagos society, 1929-1938, and chapter six dwells on Lagos trade and society 1939-50. The study is an economic history of colonial Lagos, with a major focus on maritime trade with overseas countries.

Olisa Muojama examines the role of cocoa exports in the incorporation of Nigeria into the global capitalism and the effect of integration on the Nigerian cocoa industry in the colonial period. The industry of cocoa exports in colonial Nigeria was stimulated by the penetration of

⁶² Adesina, O. C. 1997. The Colonial State's War-time Emergency Regulations and the Development of the Nigeria Entrepreneurial Class, 1939-1945. *Ibadan Journal of Humanistic Studies*, Number 7 October 1997, pp 867-876

⁶³ Olukoju, A. 2004. *The Liverpool of West Africa: The Dynamics and Impact of Maritime Trade in Lagos, 1900-1950*. Trenton: African World Press, p.xiv.

European merchant capital into the country. The thesis is foundation on the argument that Cocoa exports contributed significantly to the integration of Nigeria into the global capitalism between 1914 and 1960. Thus, the dynamics of world political economy constrained cocoa exportation during the period.⁶⁴

In all these conversations, the export of the Nigerian foodstuff to the British Armed forces in the colonial period, most especially from 1914 to 1945 has been a neglected theme in extant literature on food and war, contributions of the periphery countries to the war efforts as well as literature on commodity trade in colonial Nigeria.

Nigerian Armed Forces during the Colonial Period

There is a large corpus of literature devoted to the military history of West Africa throughout the colonial period. These works include those of Tim Stapleton,⁶⁵ Judith A. Byfield, et al,⁶⁶ and McKinlay,⁶⁷ Andy, et al. In a similar line, research has been conducted on Nigerian military history in general. These works include those of Kirk-Greene, A.H.M.,⁶⁸ Akintunde A. Akinkunmi,⁶⁹ Suberu O. Abdulrahman and Henry G. Mang.⁷⁰ Beyond studies on the general military history of Nigeria, there are researches that focus on different Nigerian military themes during the colonial era, such as African Military History, Men In Arms, Maintenance of Law and Order, Nationalism and Ex-Servicemen, and the Inter-War Years are only a few of the topics covered. The following are some of the major contributions made in these fields by various authors:

African Military History

African military history, according to Parsons, is about more than "tribal conflict," imperial conquest, military coups, and child soldiers. According to him, the resulting collection of literature is useful for studying military structures and collective violence in Africa. Scholars throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, he argues, were similarly interested in the role and effect of African soldiers, military women, and veterans in society. In this way, African

⁶⁴Muojama, O.G. 2013. *Nigerian Cocoa Exports and Global Capitalism*. Unpublished Ph.D thesis submitted to the Department of History, University of Ibadan.

⁶⁵ Stapleton T. 2014, *The First World War in Africa: the forgotten conflict among the European powers*, *Journal of First World War Studies* , Vol. 5, Number 2, Pp 251-252

⁶⁶ Byfield, J. A. Et Al, (Ed) 2015. *Africa and the Second World War*, Cambridge University Press.

⁶⁷ McKinlay, A. Et Al, (Ed) 1987. *Africa and the First World War*. Palgrave Macmillan UK

⁶⁸ Kirk-Greene, A. H. M 1980. *African Affairs*, Volume 79, Issue 315, April 1980, Pages 274–275.

⁶⁹ Akintnde, A. A. 2019. *Hubris- A Brief Political History of the Nigerian Army* AMV Publishing Services.

⁷⁰ Suberu, O. A. and Henry G. M. 2017. *The Nigerian Army as a Product of Its Colonial History: Problems of Re-building Cohesion for an Army in Transition* *International Affairs and Global Strategy* www.iiste.org ISSN 2224-574 X 8951 (Online) Vol.53, Number 21.

military history is part of a larger effort to retrieve the lived experiences of ordinary people, which have been mostly lost to colonial archives and documentary records. Similarly, historians focusing on the national age in Africa are resurrecting previous journalistic and social science theories for military coups, failed governments, and wardlordism.⁷¹

In this collection of essays, Melvin E. Page analyzes the origins of the assumption that there were various strands in the story of Africa and the Great War that needed to be united. The essays' common thread is the writers' opinion that genuine African engagement in the war as soldiers, transport carriers, or in a variety of other roles—rather than policy decisions made in European capitals, is the best way to grasp the impact of the First World War on African people. Melvin, on the other hand, believes that such a collaborative endeavor is critical, because our different investigations and discoveries add texture to our understanding of this pivotal chapter in African history.⁷²

Clarke explores the origins and service of the Royal West African Frontier Force. He asserts categorically that no regimental history has been written about this force, which is made up of contingents from Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and Gambia, organized into units named after their respective colony of origin. Later, crude police forces were founded, forerunners to the Gold Coast Constabulary. The Force received colors in 1922, and it became a Royal Corps in 1928, with H.M. King George V as its first Colonel-in-Chief. As the country was opened up by various governments, local corps were formed. The majority of the quota is provided by Nigeria. The author concludes by underlining that "our" two African Forces have offered good and faithful service for more than half a century in their own territories, other African regions, and beyond.⁷³

Though the outline history of the West African Frontier Force (W.A.F.F.) is pretty well-known, Ekoko contends in his article that it cannot be argued that the final word has been written on it. According to him, the History of the Royal West African Frontier Force, co-authored by A. Haywood and F.A.S. Clarke, should be viewed as a contribution from West Africa to British imperial defense. According to Ekoko, the war office was usually opposed to the use of their soldiers in what Secretary of State for War Edward Stanhope derided as

⁷¹ Parsons, T. 2018. African Military History and Historiography. *Historiography and Methods, Military History, Political History*. Online Publication.

⁷²Melvin E. P. (Ed) 1987. *Africa and the First World War*. New York: St Martins Press.

⁷³ Clarke, F.A.S. 2009. The Story of the Royal West African Frontier Force. Pages 223-229/ Published online: 11 September 2009.

"extended military operations" in 1888. In general, the war office's troops in West Africa were intended to conduct solely imperial responsibilities; if they were called upon by colonial authority, they were expected to carry out orders quickly and then return to their coastal base.

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Between 1959 and 1960, the Royal West African Frontier Force vanished as the ancient British colonies in West Africa, which became Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria, according to Haywood and Clarke. According to the book's description, this development is a worthy legacy, a model regimental history embracing a wide range of activities, from Lugard's early practically tribal fighting to the gigantic operations in Burma and the Arabian against the Japanists.⁷⁵

The South African Union Defence Forces, according to Gewalt, invaded German South West Africa, which is now Namibia, in 1915. According to his statement, South African soldiers seized an African soldier serving in the German army named Mbadamassi in the region's north. The book chronicles the life of Mbadamassi, an African soldier who served both the King of the British Empire and the Kaiser of the German Empire between 1903 and 1917. Mbadamassi also claimed that he took part in a revolt while serving in the German army in Cameroon, and as a result was sent to German South West Africa. He also provides light on a single African's career.⁷⁶

Men in Arms

Ukpabi explains how the Nigerian army's evolution must be seen in light of the country's political environment. He states that the notion of merging the Niger territories in 1898 coincided to ideas at the War Office and Colonial Office in London about creating a more effective army in West Africa by consolidating and extending existing colonial troops. He states that in 1886, the Royal Niger Company was granted a charter, allowing it to assume power over areas and raise the Royal Niger Constabulary in the same year. Captain J. Glover, R.N., the administrator, founded the Lagos Constabulary in 1862 after the British acquired

⁷⁴ Ekoko, E. 1979. The West African Frontier Force Revisited, *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*. Vol. 10, Number. 1. pp. 47-63.

⁷⁵ Haywood A, & Clarke, F.A.S. 1964. *The History of Royal West African Frontier Force*. Alder Short: Gale & Polden, p.428.

⁷⁶ Gewalt, J.B. 2009. Mbadamassi of Lagos: A Soldier for King and Kaiser, and a Deportee to German South West Africa. *African Diaspora*, Vol, 2, Number, 1, pp.103-124

control of Lagos in 1861. The title constabulary disguised the fact that these municipal troops were all military units with artillery, assigned to support the governments they served.⁷⁷

The enrollment and conscription of combatants and non-combatants in Nigeria during the First World War, according to James K. Matthews' book, marked an unparalleled mobilization of the country's labour force. James believes that 17,000 fighters, 2,000 enlisted carriers, and 35,000 non-enlisted carriers had participated in the Southern Cameroons and German East Africa battles by September 1919, when Nigeria's military recruitment effort ceased. He goes on to say that the British recruited tens of thousands of Nigerians to serve in the military around the country's northern and eastern borders, as well as for internal responsibilities.⁷⁸

According to Gorges, the conflict in West Africa during the First World War eclipsed by the more legendary battle in East Africa against Gen. von Lettow-Vorbeck, the elusive German guerilla warfare strategist. The Allies had to wait until January 1916, according to mythology, to wipe off German resistance and pursue the final German forces into neutral territory.⁷⁹

The First World War, according to Koller, had a wide-ranging and severe influence on the colonies. As a result, he uses famous cases to back up his claims: The Entente powers attacked German South West Africa; the British Empire's South African war with the Boers had only ended 12 years before, and many Boers had maintained their anti-British fervor; the German colonies in Africa were defended by so-called 'Schutzgruppen,' made up of German officers and African soldiers. The majority of these areas were rapidly taken over by the Entente countries.⁸⁰

According to John Barrett, the First World War led in a European mobilization of African labour on a scale never seen before, with the possible exception of the South African mines. In his article, he describes how Africans were depicted by the opponents as an alive geographical backdrop during the first full-scale war between European soldiers on African land, the Boer War. He contends, in particular, that the effect of this volume of recruiting was

⁷⁷ Ukpabi, S. C. 1976. The Changing Role of the Military in Nigeria, 1900-1970. *Africa Spectrum Institute of African Affairs at GIGA*, Vol. 11, Number.1, pp. 61-77.

⁷⁸ James K. M. 1982. The First World War and the Rise of African Nationalism: Nigerian Veterans as Catalysts of Change, *The Journal Of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 20, Number 3, pp. 493-502.

⁷⁹ Gorges E. H., 2009. *The Great War in West Africa*. London: Naval & Military Press.

⁸⁰ Koller, C. 2008. The Recruitment of Colonial Troops in Africa and Asia and their Deployment in Europe during the First World War. Immigrants & Minorities. *Historical Studies in Ethnicity, Migration and Diaspora*, Volume 26, Numbers 1-2. pp, 111-133.

comparable in local significance to the subsequent military mobilization of 10,000 Nigerians during the Second World War because of the population size and degree of British administrative control. According to the study, the Nigerian Administration alone recruited 13,980 men and furnished nearly 10,000 carriers, putting the British armed forces ahead of the tin mines and railways as a source of Nigerian labour during this period.⁸¹

Ukpabi concentrates on the history of English-speaking West Africa in the second half of the nineteenth century, which was entwined with European military advances on the West Coast to a large extent. He believes it is remarkable that there is a dearth of interest in studying the military aspects of West Africa's growth, given the military's major role in the general development of the continent. Ukpabi claims that although while officers were appointed as District Commissioners, especially in border areas where they merged political and military responsibilities, officers were not appointed as District Commissioners. This is not to say that the military had been absent as a driving force in West African history up until this point. The use of the army by European powers in West Africa, whether for "holding operations," provisioning ships en route to the cape coast, or the defense of static defensive works, garrison duties, or the safeguarding of European interests, is as old as European interests in this part of Africa themselves. But never before had these nations used so many troops and other resources to consolidate their authority on the West Coast as they did in the second half of the nineteenth century, particularly in the last two decades.⁸²

Bruce Vandervort examines the origins and conduct of colonial warfare in Africa in the late nineteenth century from the perspectives of both European invaders and African resisters, demonstrating the impact of these wars, both immediate and long-term, on both victors and vanquished societies, political structures, and military theory and practice. North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the sub-Saharan region of Africa are included in "Imperial conquest battles in Africa, 1830-1914." The author posits two scenarios: first, the French experience in Algeria from 1830 on had a profound impact on French military conduct and relations with African peoples south of the Sahara (especially Muslims). Finally, the defeat of an Italian army by Ethiopians at Adowa in 1896 reverberated across the imperial world, serving as a

⁸¹ John B. 1977. The Rank and File of the Colonial Army in Nigeria, 1914–18'' *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 15, Number, 1. pp.105-115.

⁸² Ukpabi, S. C 1996. The Origins of the West African Frontier Force. *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*. Vol. 3, Number. 3, pp.485-501.

beacon of hope for colonized peoples across Africa and oppressed people of color everywhere, both then and later.⁸³

Macestern submits that only few countries have experienced the joyous and sorrows of the influence of sea-power more often and as poignant as Great Britain, This beautifully produced volume in Batterford's "British battles" series deals with both naval and military events between June, 1940 and May, 1943, when the defeated Germans and Italians in Africa laid down their arms. The book gives a vivid account of airpower, Malta convoys, submarines, Croats, North Africa, victories, losses, defeats and mistakes: a recommended reading for all interested in military history.⁸⁴

The Preservation of Law and Order

Many studies of colonial Africa, according to Killingray, have tended to focus on administrative systems and judicial processes. He goes on to say that efficient colonial government is based on two pillars: first, maintaining law and order to defend the administration's authority, and second, collecting enough money to fund the colony's operations. He also claims that while much has been written about colonial taxation and the role of law in Africa, relatively less has been written about maintaining Law and Order. Similarly, current British colonial Africa history frequently assumes or ignores the methods in which the colonial government's authority, as well as the main hierarchies it constructed and patronized, was upheld and sustained. He believes Historians of Africa have also neglected the role of the police.⁸⁵

The artists David Anderson and David Killingray focus on how pictures of police officers have shaped popular ideas of colonial policing in the literature of empire. The colonial police, for example, were sometimes indistinguishable from a military garrison in function and form during the early stages of colonial authority, or throughout the process of colonial power's spread over outlying regions. They argue that the flow of personnel from one colony to another was the most essential part of imperial connection in colonial police.⁸⁶

⁸³ Vandervort, B. 1998. *'Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830-1914'*. London & New York: Routledge-Taylor & Francis Group.

⁸⁴ Macestern, D. 1964. *The Battle for The Medditerranean*. London: Batterford.

⁸⁵ Killingray, D. 1986. The Maintenance of Law and Order in British Colonial Africa *African Affairs*, Vol. 85, Number 340, pp. 411-437.

⁸⁶ Anderson, D. M. and Killingray, D. 2017, *Consent, Coercion and Colonial Control. Policing the Empire, 1830–1940 in Policing the Empire*. Manchester University Press.

Deflem Mathieu examines the history and character of law enforcement in the former British colonies of Nyasaland, the Gold Coast, and Kenya. Given the relative neglect of the study of colonial policing, which provides a provocative topic of inquiry to assess the impact of British colonialism on the subjugated African population, he approaches law enforcement in the colonial period from the perspective of sociological and criminological police literature, which has so far mostly been applied to western models of policing. Finally, the author raises certain concerns that will need to be addressed in future research on the subject.⁸⁷

David Killingray's study focuses on one policy involving the African Colonial Forces, in which the British Colonial Office attempted to limit the severity of corporal punishment and more closely supervise its use in the colonies throughout the twentieth century. Throughout the Second World War, officials and other humanitarian organizations grew more opposed to the justification for continuing to punish African soldiers with corporal punishment. While most military officers believed that corporal punishment was necessary to maintain discipline, particularly during times of war or active service, the Colonial Office sought to limit the circumstances in which it could be used, but agreed that it should be retained or revived during the two World Wars. Once the war was over, the Colonial Office ordered that this "relic of prejudice" be eradicated.⁸⁸

According to Eleazu, the largest challenge facing African countries, is the unrecognized, often concealed impact (planned and unintended) of outside powers toward them. He believes that without such programs, African countries would have experienced political instability (which is to be expected in societies undergoing rapid economic and social change), but that such instability would not have prevented normal political development from emerging through trial and error with various conflict resolution methods. Eleazu feels that no aspect of military assistance programs and their effects on civilian-military relations is clearer than in this arena.⁸⁹

Nationalism and the Ex-Servicemen

According to Headrick, the Second World Wars often regarded as the spark for decolonization in the Third World. She believes that one aspect of this, the impact of military

⁸⁷ Deflem, M. 1994. "Law Enforcement in British Colonial Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Imperial Policing in Nyasaland, the Gold Coast, and Kenya." *Police Studies*. Vol. 17, Number, 1, pp.45-68.

⁸⁸ Killingray, D. 1994. The 'Rod of Empire': The Debate Over Corporal Punishment in the British African Colonial Forces, 1888–1946. *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 35, Number 2, pp. 201-216. .

⁸⁹ Eleazu, U.O. 1973. The Role of the Army in Africa Politics: A Reconsideration of Existing Theories and Practices. *The Journal of Developing Areas*, Vol.7 Number 2, pp.265-286

experience on African troops' attitudes, deserves more investigation. Furthermore, a clear distinction must be made between the effects of the French Africa, British West Africa, and British East Africa experiences. According to Headrick, the key to Post-War political sentiments is found in demobilization strategies, not in the combat experience itself.⁹⁰

Before the late 1960s, historians commonly thought that the Second World War had bolstered widespread support for African nationalism, according to Adrienne Israel. They claimed at first that soldiers returned home politicized by their combat experiences and sought ways to propagate new perspectives gained from interactions with Asian nationalists, he said. However, the study reveals that the later perspective argues that African troops' reactions to the battle were impacted by their ethnicity, social class, educational levels, and military occupations, as well as their engagement in independence politics by local variables.⁹¹

The Inter-War Years

One of the Royal Air Force's main duties during the Inter-War years, according to David Killingray, was imperial defense. The Royal Air Force's first successful large-scale mission in Somaliland in 1920 inspired the extension of air policing to the volatile Middle East, he adds. He explains why the R.A.F. believed the Sudan to be an important part of its Middle East operations, and why military aircraft were stationed in Khartoum to deal with the Southern Sudanese revolt in the late 1920s and 1930s. According to Killingray, the demand for defense economics arose from the Depression, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, and the unrest on the Copperbelt, which convinced authorities in London and the colonies of the need for an Air Force presence in East and Central Africa.⁹²

Nigeria in the Post-Second World War Up To 1960

It must be stressed that there exist is a rich body of literature focusing on the Post-Second World War developments in Nigeria up to the eve of her independence in 1960. Important national issues attract the attention of writers both during and after the period under consideration. These issues would be considered one after the other.

⁹⁰ Headrick, R. 1978 African soldiers in World War 11, *SALE Journal- Armed forces & Society*,

⁹¹ Adrienne M. I. 1992. Ex-Servicemen at the Crossroads: Protest and Politics in Post-War Ghana. Volume 30, Number 2, June 1992, pp. 359-368.

⁹² Killingray, D. 1984. 'A Swift Agent of Government': Air Power in British Colonial Africa, 1916–1939. *The Journal of African History*. Volume 25, Number 4, pp.429-444.

Political Development

The Second World War, according to Olusanya,⁹³ altered the nature of Nigerian politics. Prior to 1939, any political activity was forbidden. The ones that were available were limited to a few of southern cities. This was a period of 'demonstrations politics,' emphasizing on the exclusivity and racial basis of the Crown Colony system, and events on the Indian continent had also contributed to the rise of Nigerian nationalism. He said that tens of thousands of Africans were drafted into the military when the Second World War broke out. Because of Germany's racial policies and attitudes toward the black race, Nigerian nationalists allied with the United Kingdom. The talented publicist Nnamdi Azikwe loaded his publications with pieces applauding the Allied Powers for highlighting the right of all peoples to select their own fate. Nigerians reacted warmly at first, but when self-determination was not granted, the propaganda backfired, and support for the nationalist cause surged quickly. According to the author, the war brought Nigeria some wealth, but inflationary pressures and the Governor's unwillingness to cope with the workers' demand for increased pay led to the countrywide strike of 1945.

In his seminar, Babatola claims that ethnically and religious disparities have fueled political tendencies in post-colonial African states, and that ethnicity and religious divisions are the most severe dangers to the attainment and maintenance of democratic government. Further research, he claims, revealed that many independent African republics emerging under colonial rule experienced comparable issues as a result of ethnic disparities and a fierce struggle for power.⁹⁴ He believes that ethnic tensions and aspirations can be traced back to a series of political crises and instability in Africa, including the Belgian Congo crisis in the 1960s, the Nigerian-Biafran War (1967-1970), the Uganda civil war between Idi Amin and Obote's group and the eventual Tanzania war of aggression against Uganda, the Hutu-Tutsi civil war and genocides in Rwanda, and the recent Seleka genocide. The author believes that in Nigeria's political history and struggle for independence, the political class and actors (nationalists turned politicians) dominated the critical roles and leadership activities of major political parties and political associations, and that their successor or successive associations tend to follow the same pattern through the nature and activities of their political movements

⁹³ Olusanya, G.O. 1973. *The Second World War and Politics in Nigeria, 1939-1953*. Lagos and London: Evans brothers.

⁹⁴ Babatola, J.T. 2014. Politics And Power Struggles In Nigeria, 1945-1999. *Departmental Postgraduate Seminar* at Department of History and International Studies, Ekiti State University, Ado-Ekiti.

and ethno-cultural organizations. He goes on to say that ethnic disparities led in ethnic rivalry, suspicions, and mistrust, which pervaded the phenomenon of struggle and access to power as a denominator of political stability and democratic governance survival in Nigeria's political history since the country's independence. He goes on to say that with Nigeria's high proclivity for ethnic and religious violence throughout the last three decades (1960-1990), the hardening of ethno-regional attitudes and development of ethnic militias have unleashed varied degrees of bloodshed on the Nigerian state and citizens. Without equivocation, the essay aims to place the trends and problems of politics and power struggle from 1945, when the struggle for nationalism developed strong roots in modern nationhood, until 1999, when Nigeria began and observed its current budding democracy after several years of military dictatorship.

Military Matters

Mordi investigates Britain's postwar recruitment policy in Nigeria from 1945 to 1953 in this essay. It's possible that his attention is on a topic that hasn't been thoroughly researched by academics. As the Second World War came to an end, he argues, the Nigerian colonial military announced that it had enough illiterate, 'pagan' infantrymen of northern Nigerian 'tribal,' including Tiv, ancestry to meet any but unanticipated needs for troops for service in the South East Asia Command (SEAC). After the war, however, the recruiting of the same type of infantrymen, as well as ex-servicemen, was resumed. To investigate Nigerian and British archival sources on the subject, the author employs a critical/analytic historical method. Unlike the High Commission Territories Corps (HCTC), Nigeria's postwar recruitment was not intended for overseas deployment, according to the report. It was principally motivated by Britain's desire to return the army to its pre-war duty of maintaining colonial law and order in order to sustain the colonial state in Nigeria in the face of postwar militant nationalism.⁹⁵

In their paper, Suberu and Mang analyze the emergence of and challenges with cohesion in the Nigerian army.⁹⁶ They based the obvious rationale on the fact that the Nigerian army was inherited from a colonial force that was itself derived from a group of military expeditors. As

⁹⁵ Mordi, E.N. 2019. 'Sufficient Reinforcements Overseas': British Post-War 'Troops' Recruiting Policy in Nigeria, 1945–53, *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 55, Number 4, pp.823-844

⁹⁶ Suberu, O.R. & Mang, H.G. 2017. The Nigerian Army as a Product of Its Colonial History: Problems of Re-building Cohesion for an Army in Transition. *International Affairs and Global Strategy* www.iiste.org Vol.53, Number 21.

a result, the army was introduced to numerous cohesiveness patterns. The couple went on to explain partitioned cohesion in their work, which is a condition in which a group, while appearing to be one, is discreetly divided into units, with some being offered certain preferences. The authors suggest that in the instance of Nigeria, this split resulted in the North being favoured first for its martial peoples, while the South, which showed promise in terms of education, rose to prominence in the NCO and officer corps later on. They argue, however, that while these temporary favours benefited the British colonialists, they were detrimental to the fledgling Nigerian army's unity and success. As a result of the disparities in the rank and file's ideas of themselves, the development was equivalent to sitting on a keg of gunpowder waiting to burst. Because they were developed in diverse ways, the numerous different cadres of officers created between 1946 and 1966 witnessed a distinct but visible division. Because the officer corps was not only new, but also unknowingly immature to the process, they displayed a variety of characteristics.

In this article, Mordi examines the Nigerian Ex-Welfare Servicemen's Association as an institutional mechanism used by Britain to assess and control the reintegration of Nigerian ex-servicemen into civilian life. The demobilisation instrument, wartime recruitment promises, and the skills ex-servicemen gained during their military service had heightened their aspirations of gainful post-war resettlement, according to the article, which is based on Nigerian archival sources. The Nigerian Ex-Welfare Servicemen's Association, established by the government in 1946 and directed by British military officials, served as a buffer between ex-servicemen and the government, as well as a part of the regulatory bureaucracy that slowed the processing of veterans' applications.⁹⁷

In *Nigeria and the Second World War*,⁹⁸ the story of the Nigerian people and societies is told by Korieh, who grew up in Britain's most important colonial property and most successful West African colony, Nigeria. He focuses on the foreign service of a huge number of African soldiers, as well as the involvement of men, women, and children on the home front in aiding the Empire's war effort. The broad population's support base, which included various social classes, traditional authority, natural and financial resources, and the compulsory investment

⁹⁷ Mordi, E.N. 2019. 'Forward Petitions to NEWA for Whatever Guidance and Assistance, if any': Post-War Demobilisation Conundrum in Nigeria, 1946–1951. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*. Vol 55, Number 4, pp, 586-599

⁹⁸ Korieh, J.C. 2020. "*Nigeria's Role in the Second World War Unearthed*" Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

of cash in the war at the expense of their own budgets, had both short and long term effects for Nigeria. In doing so, the author refutes the widely held misconception held by some historians that the Second World War was primarily a European battle, at least in terms of ordinary people's contributions, the overwhelming importance of non-combatants in supporting the war effort, and their global influence. He emphasizes the complexity and diversity of worldwide Second World War experiences, demonstrating that there is no unified social experience, but that the experiences cut across multiple domains. Nigeria's experience of the Second World War was determined by the relationship between Britain as an imperial state and the hegemonic authority she exerted over Nigeria as a colony, as Nigeria was a British colony at the time.

The author goes on to say in the book that the war required new types of interactions between the metropole and the colonial estate, as well as expanding the borders of imperial rule over Britain's various colonial territories. As a result of the conflict and how it affected individuals, Nigeria fostered this shifting relationship. This undoubtedly resulted in the rearrangement of commodity production, distribution, and consumption, as well as the reshaping of social and political systems. In actuality, Nigerians' involvement as individuals at home, soldiers on the battlefield, and propagandists presented prospects for redefining of the relationship between "metropole" and "colony" and the aftermath Post-War interactions.

International Relations

According to Coates, the years 1914–1960 witnessed an acceleration and intensification of contacts between Nigerians and the wider world. While certain repercussions, such as the worldwide depression of the 1930s, two World Wars, and the growth of anticolonial nationalism after 1945, are well-known, he claims that the other links are not. The write-up showcases notable developments in Nigerian politics during the colonial era and reveals key political gladiators. It demonstrates the recurrent importance of Nigerian connections overseas and other places in Africa. He is of the opinion that irrespective of the professional background either as soldiers, Islamic scholars, or nationalist politicians, these international links provided a vital conduit for new ideas, languages, and relationships. He asserts that a combination of burgeoning trade union movement (after the 1945 General Strike), the critical influence of African-American politics, and renewed contact with the wider Islamic world provide the winning formula. As a matter of reverence, the article closes with a discussion of

Northern Nigerians who traveled abroad for the hajj and as students of Islamic history, theology, and the Arabic language.⁹⁹

Infrastructure Development

According to Ayoola, the Nigerian Railway system included more than 2,500 kilometers of single-track railroads on the eve of the Second World War, making it one of the longest in Africa. He also discloses that the main railroad networks were built between 1898 and 1930 by the British imperial government and the Nigerian colonial administration. The network was primarily built to facilitate economic exploitation and overall management of the African colony, according to the report. He claims that the evacuation of export crops and mineral resources was the primary goal of this mode of transportation. As a result, the railroads were built in a perpendicular fashion, beginning in the colony's southernmost region and heading northward. The train line runs from the ports of Port Harcourt and Lagos into the hinterland, passing through mines, agricultural production zones, and densely populated places. As it stands, the rail lines network supplied the cornerstone of colonialists' political economy in Nigeria, particularly before the late 1950s, when road transport caught up with and overtook it as the principal movers of goods and passengers. During the Second World War, the railroad sector's capacity was severely taxed, and its infrastructure was stretched to the maximum, in addition to other obstacles such as a scarcity of replacement parts, locomotives, and rolling stock for the business. As a result, Ayoola intends to examine the role and influence of the Second World War on the management of Nigerian Railways from 1939 to 1955 in this study. This was the period when the Nigerian Railway Department, a colonial bureaucracy entity, was reformed and changed into the Nigerian Railway Company, a statutory public corporation (NRC)¹⁰⁰

The role and influence of road transportation on the economy of southwestern Nigeria after the Second World Wars examined in this study by Olubomehin, with a focus on how road transportation spurred the growth of agriculture and trade. The author contends that studying the Post-Second World War period is significant because it allows for the investigation of two key aspects of Nigeria's economic history. The pursuit of British colonial economic

⁹⁹ Coates, O. 2018. Nigeria and the World: War, Nationalism, and Politics, 1914–60 The Oxford Handbook of Nigerian Politics, Online Publication, Nov 2018, DOI:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198804307.013.52

¹⁰⁰ Ayoola, T. 2008. Examination of the impact of the Second World War on the Nigerian Railway, 1939-1955. *The Business History Conference*, Birmingham University. www.bh-org

interests is the first obvious reason, and the nationalist goal in the era of transition to self-rule is the second. There are two phases in the Post-Second World War. The first covers the period of British rule of Nigeria's Western area, from 1945 to 1952. The colonial authority exploited road transportation to pursue its commercial interests in Nigeria at the time. Since colonial rule began in Nigeria around the turn of the century, this has been the pattern of colonial rule. The second phase runs from 1952 to 1960, when the country gained independence. This phase covers the period of the Western region's first indigenous administration. Since that time, Nigeria's road transportation history has taken a turn for the better. In contrast to the pre-1952 past, when road transportation was utilized to advance colonial interests, the indigenous government began to take actual actions to develop the region's economy and improve people's living conditions. In order to do this, the administration turned to road transportation as a means of facilitating the required social and economic reform at the national level.¹⁰¹

The Sociopolitical and Economic Changes

Korieh examines and contextualizes the social and economic developments that occurred in Nigeria during the critical postwar years in this book. According to him, the anticipated effects of the demobilization of thousands of men who had been employed as soldiers and in auxiliary services, such as drivers and hospital orderlies, and who had received higher pay, as well as the inseparable unemployment that would be experienced after demobilization, were prominent on the minds of colonial officials. According to the author, severe food and other critical item shortages characterized the postwar period. Ex-servicemen returned to their villages with significant sums of money, and trade firms paid higher prices for export produce than in prewar times, according to Korieh, the large sums of money that entered the economy as a result of the war sparked the emergence of new social structures. The notion is maintained that during the war years, cultural behaviors, particularly local marital norms, were influenced by the circulation of money. During this period of significant social and economic upheaval, the political changes that eventually led to Nigeria's independence from colonial authority took place.¹⁰²

In this study, Olukoju asserts that recent events have revealed that, if properly harnessed, the marine sector might play a crucial role in the growth of regional, national, and global

¹⁰¹ Olubomehin, O.O. 2010. 'Road Transportation, Agriculture and Trade in Western Nigeria after The First World WarI' *African Journal Online Lagos Historical Review* Vol.10, Number 1, pp.82-100

¹⁰² Korieh, C.J. 2020. *The Second World War and Its Aftermath*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

economies. This is due to the port and accompanying businesses' growth-pole potential. He makes a comparison of Japan, a prominent global power, with Nigeria, a massively underachieving African country, in this article.¹⁰³ He believes that, despite the fact that the concept appears to be imbalanced, the effort is worthwhile. The essay, on the other hand, highlights the ramifications for public policy formulation and implementation in both countries in relation to port development, mercantile marine, and port industries. It situates the debate in a broader, global comparative framework by focusing on the responsibilities of the government and the private sector. In both Nigeria and Japan, the potential and constraints of regional development through the maritime sector are examined in light of notions such as "maritime industrial development areas (MIDAs)" and "developer ports." The study highlights important lessons in comparative history and public policy analysis, which are the outcome of primary research in both countries.

According to Helleiner, much has changed in the Nigerian economy since the early 1950s debates over the West African Marketing Boards. He cites examples to back up his claim. For instance, the powers of the Regional Government have been greatly expanded; Nigerian export markets have been severely weakened; the manufacturing industry has grown rapidly; oil has been discovered and exploited in the Eastern Region; nearly universal primary education has been introduced to the Southern Regions; and urban unemployment has begun to take on the proportions of a major problem. In terms of politics, he continues, Nigeria has progressed from internal self-government to its current status as a Commonwealth sovereign republic. Several components of the economy had remained constant as the Federation neared the end of the second year of its first six-year national development plan. The Marketing Boards' dominance in the national economy, which has been organized on a regional rather than commodity basis since 1954, is one example. In 1962, the exports of these Boards amounted for 63.2 percent of Nigeria's total exports.

According to Helleiner, Nigeria's Marketing Boards were statutory monopsonies in command of the country's primary agricultural exports. They began as wartime measures to ensure the orderly sale of West African goods and the preservation of the UK's raw material supplies. Following the war, they assumed responsibility for the stabilization of producer pricing as well as the development of the industrial industries. The economics profession has paid

¹⁰³ Olukoju, A. 2003. Maritime Policy and Economic Development: A Comparison of Nigerian and Japanese Experiences since the Second World War. *Afrika Zamani*, Numbers 11 & 12, pp. 160-182

special attention to how the Marketing Boards' role in stabilization is interpreted and implemented. It is not, however, the most important aspect of the Nigerian Marketing Board's operations.¹⁰⁴

Nationalism

From 1945 to 1960, the goal of this research is to examine postwar propaganda as a tactic of British control of militant nationalism in Nigeria. Its goal is to investigate the mechanics, dynamics, and repercussions of the decolonization strategies that defined Nigeria's decolonization process, which were subsumed under propaganda but repackaged as public relations to gain acceptance. Mordi argues, according to conventional thinking, that propaganda was not a transient expedient, but a major element of British colonial empire in the essay by adopting a historical method based on archive and newspaper data hitherto disregarded by academics. It contends that the British used this technique in Nigeria, which resulted in the defeat of postwar militant nationalism and the turnover of power to the emergent elite's pliable wing upon independence.¹⁰⁵

Nwaka claims that little is known about the experiences and activities of these ex-soldiers because general accounts provide few details about local conditions and events in the regions, particularly in Eastern Nigeria, where ex-soldiers' frustrations and disillusionment led to violent agitations and a "resolute campaign of gross civil disobedience, defiance, and intimidation."

However, the author contends that the rebellion in Umuahia, as well as the civil unrest that accompanied it, provide an excellent opportunity to discuss not only the failure of planned resettlement for ex-soldiers following the Second World War, but also the political and economic conditions that influenced their organization and role in the anti-colonial crusade of the time. Nwaka is a film about Nigerian ex-servicemen who heroically served in the Middle East, Burma, East Africa, and other regions of the world. After the Second World War, they quickly saw themselves as victims of the government's broken promises and injustice. They wanted paid work, a War Bonus, large pay arrears, tax exemptions, and other benefits, which the administration described as impossible and a "total fabrication." The official attitude was that the ex-soldiers were now civilians, and that the government would endeavor to make the

¹⁰⁴ Helleiner, G.K. 1964. The Fiscal Role of the Marketing Boards In Nigerian Economic Development, 1947-61. *The Economic Journal*, Vol. 74, Number 295, pp. 582-610

¹⁰⁵ Mordi, E.N. 2011. Postwar propaganda as public relations: British containment of militant nationalism in Nigeria, 1945-60. *International Communication Gazette*, Vol. 73, Number 3, pp.198-215

transition from military to civilian life as smooth as possible without considering or treating them as a special or privileged category.¹⁰⁶

From the foregoing, the arrays of the literature reviewed have established the position taken by the thesis that from the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 to the end of the Second World War in 1945, Nigeria effectively mobilized and supplied Nigerian foodstuffs to the British Armed Forces. Literature also confirmed the position that the pattern of food provisioning of the Armed Forces in Nigeria in the Post-War era between 1946 and 1960 was nothing different from the existing policy of satisfying the military at the expense of the civilians. Furthermore, the literature lent credence to the fact that the mobilization and exports of Nigerian foodstuffs during the colonial period is used as a point of entry into the on-going conversations on the intersection of food and wars, commodity exports, and centre-periphery relationship.

¹⁰⁶ Nwaka, G.I. 1987. Rebellion In Umuahia, 1950 – 1951: Ex-Servicemen And Anti-Colonial Protest In Eastern Nigeria. *Transafrican Journal of History*. Vol.16, pp.47-62.

CHAPTER TWO

NIGERIA IN THE WORLD FOODSTUFFS ECONOMY UP TO 1913

The contribution of Nigeria to the global economy prior to the commencement of the First World War 1914 is highlighted in this chapter. It states that, prior to the commencement of the war, food economy was the traditional economy of Nigerians, which both men and women participated in. This substructure of the Nigerian economy endured interruption, disruption and dislocation during the colonial period occasioned by several developments such as the British colonial economy policy (which emphasised the production of cash crop) during the outbreak of the First and Second World Wars. Attempts would be made to historicise the origin and spread of major foodstuffs such as yam, cassava, maize, and rice among others in Nigeria during this period.

2.1 Conceptualization of Foodstuffs

A foodstuff is a substance that has nutritional value, such as the raw material of food before or after preparation. It's a substance that can be eaten or prepared to be eaten. Foodstuffs are the raw materials used in the production of food. It is any substance that is acceptable for ingestion as food or that is utilized to prepare food. Foodstuffs are materials that can be used as food after undergoing certain procedures, whereas food is any item that is or can be absorbed by living creatures, particularly through eating, in order to maintain life.

According to Wash, foodstuffs are the edible substance of agriculture and comprise vegetables, fish, meat, fruits and cereal products¹. Reeds observes that foodstuffs are the products of agriculture or manufacturing industry. He further explains that while some agricultural crops need further processing before they could be described as foodstuffs such as cassava into garri and palm fruit into palm oil, others such as plantain and yam do not.²

¹Wash, E. 1914. Foodstuffs. Production, Care, and Sale. (Ord. 1551, Oct. 28, 1913). *Public Health Reports* (1896-1970), Vol. 29, Number, 14, pp. 868-870

²See Reed, C. A. (Ed.). 1977. *Origins of Agriculture*. The Hague: Mouton

From the above conceptualisation, one can conclude that foodstuffs are edible substance derived from agriculture in addition to end products of manufacturing industry. However, in this study, our discussion will be restricted to foodstuffs, which are the edible substances of agriculture obtained from both food and cash crops. While some of these edible substances are eaten by people in their raw form such as pineapple, maize, yam, and cocoyam, others require further processing such as cassava and palm fruit.³ Palm fruit is processed into palm oil, and palm kernels are processed into palm kernel oil, while cassava is processed into garri, pupuru, lafun, fufu (among the Yoruba), and apu (among the Igbo).

We can, therefore, argue that there exists a connection between foodstuffs and agriculture. This is because the end products of agriculture are generally described as foodstuffs.⁴ Even some of the foodstuffs produced from the manufacturing industry such as beverages and drinks are made possible by the agricultural sector. In other words, the larger percent of the raw materials needed by the manufacturing industries are from the agricultural sector. Therefore, any discussion on foodstuffs without adequate reference to agriculture is incomplete. Hence, in this study, our discussion will be restricted to the edible substance of agriculture (also known as food crop production).

2.2 Evolution of World Foodstuffs Production

The Fertile Crescent of the Middle East's early exposure to food production and animal domestication demanded the availability of a complete food package, allowing civilisations to emerge. It's likely that the requirement for common facilities to thresh and store grain was a driving force behind cities; the wall of Jericho, for example, was reportedly intended to protect the city's food supply and dates from around 8,000 B.C.E. Despite the fact that food production arose separately in Mesoamerica, Peru's Andean highlands, the American Midwest, north and south China, and Africa, the Fertile Crescent had a head start and the best combination of plants and animals, resulting in a huge cultural edge for Europe.

The city of Rome became reliant on wheat imported from Egypt and North Africa to supply the grain (and later, bread) that was freely supplied to the plebeians. By 350 B.C.E., the "annona" (free or low-cost grain or bread distribution) had reached incredible proportions: an estimated 120,000 people were receiving six half-pound loaves per day from 274 public

³Bonnie, W. 2010. Feeding the war effort: agricultural experiences in First World War Devon, 1914–1917. *The Agricultural History Review*, Vol. 58, Number. 1, pp.95-112

⁴Cohen, M. N. 1977. *The Food Crisis in Prehistory. Overpopulation and the Origins of Agriculture*. New Haven: Yale Univ Press.

bakeries. It was one of the world's first examples of mass production of a single food item. The "villa rustica," a vast estate with extensive grain, vegetable, fruit, nut, and livestock production, was the center of Roman agriculture. Following the fall of the Roman Empire, these estates constituted the foundation for the medieval fief, which was a lord's property cultivated by serfs legally bound to the land.

When a heavy plow capable of breaking the deep, damp soils of northern Europe was invented, it reached Germany, resulting in the establishment of a major new grain source for the rest of Europe. Millet, wheat, and soybeans were also important in China, which is noted for its rice. Rice production soared as new types of rice were imported from Southeast Asia in the eleventh century. The discovery of the New World resulted in the world's greatest and fastest spread of new crops. The Americans introduced maize (corn), potatoes, tomatoes, and peppers to Europe, whereas the Europeans brought wheat and other staple crops, as well as sugarcane, which thrived in Brazil and later the Caribbean region. Before cross-continental trade, rice, millet, and lentils were widespread staples.

The Portuguese were the first Europeans to visit Nigeria in the 15th century, where they established a slave trafficking base. Portuguese explorers and traders introduced cassava to western Africa, including present-day Nigeria, through their trade with African shores and nearby islands. European explorers and traders introduced a variety of food staples to western Africa in the early nineteenth century, including beans, cassava, and maize. On their trips to America, explorers were acquainted to these delicacies, which they brought back to Western Africa.

2.3 Foodstuffs Production in Nigeria up to 1900

Almost all foodstuffs are of plant and animal origin. While those of plant origin comprise cassava, rice, beans, yam, cocoyam, maize, potato, wheat, palm oil and vegetables, those of animal origin consist of meat, fish, and milk. Aside these two categorisation of foodstuffs, there are other foodstuffs neither from animal nor plant sources, which are more edible. These kinds of food include alcoholic drink, cheese, yogurt, pickles, kombucha, and so forth. Among the major perspectives of foodstuffs identified above, our main concern is the foodstuffs obtained from plant origin, which are direct products of traditional farming (one of the main components of agriculture).

Foodstuffs production was a major aspect of traditional economy of the Nigerian peoples in the pre-colonial period. These foodstuffs are derived from the two main categories of crops, namely tree crops and non-tree crops. While palm oil is a major foodstuff derives from tree crop (oil palm), cassava, yam, pepper, maize, rice, pineapple, vegetables are foodstuffs which are not only derived from food crops, but also constitute food crops. It is imperative to examine the evolution of major foodstuffs in Nigeria up to 1900.

The problem arising as to the origins of foodstuffs grown and consumed in Nigeria has to be solved first. There have been many speculations about the origins of the staple Nigerian foodstuffs. For instance, millet is thought to have existed somewhere in the oasis of Hoggar in the Sahara desert at about 6100 B.C. from where it probably spread southward into the Sahel region of West Africa and then into northern Nigeria. Although no conclusive evidence of millet domestication has been found in Nigeria, it is obvious from Arab records dating back to the tenth century that millet has been farmed and utilized in food preparation for many centuries. As Ikpe puts it, earliest information concerning the cultivation and consumption of millet in West Africa originated from Arab travellers such as Al-Muhallabi in the tenth century, El Omari in the fourteenth century and Leo Africanus in the fifteenth century; all these writers stressed the importance of millet, beans and wheat in the agriculture of the people of northern Nigeria. Other staple foodstuffs of significant importance in the diets of many northern Nigerians in the pre-colonial period were sorghum or guinea corn (sorghum vulgare), wheat and rice.⁵ She explains further that Leo Africanus, compared to any other writer, was impressed by the abundance of grains in Hausaland, especially, in the regions of Kano, Zamfara, Zaria (Zeg Zeg), Borno and Gobir where grains were grown on irrigated river valleys.⁶ It would seem that the staple foodstuffs in northern Nigeria remained essentially the same through the centuries as confirmed by Heinrich Barth and Nachtigal in their exploration reports of the nineteenth century in which they reported on the importance of millet in the food economy of the Hausa states such as Kano, Katsina, Zamfara, Gobir and Borno. Wheat, although was essential in the pre-colonial diets of some Nigerians, was rather minor in the diets of a segment of the people. It was sparsely grown in small gardens. In northern Nigeria, it remained a foodstuff used in religious rituals and consumed only by the most privileged people in the aristocracy. Some doubts exist on how this crop reached northern Nigeria, but its spread is generally associated with the penetration of Arabic and

⁵ Ikpe, E.B., 1994. *Food and Security in Nigeria: A History of Food Customs, Food Economy and Cultural Change, 1900-1986*. Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag Publishers.

⁶ Ikpe, 1994. *Food and Security in Nigeria: A History of Food Customs, Food Economy and Cultural Change*,

Islamic influences from North Africa into the trading centres of West Africa where the crop was found to have existed, grown and consumed since the fourteenth century.⁷

One other staple foodstuff of significant importance in the diets of many northern Nigerians in the pre-colonial period was sorghum or guinea corn *sorghum vulgare*. Debates existed as to the origins of cultivation of this crop. It was traced to the Nile valley in Egypt from where its cultivation probably spread to West Africa. However, H. Dogget does not agree with this submission, his opinion is that the crop was domesticated at three separate centres, one of them being in West Africa: domestication must have been achieved by the culturing and recultivation of the wild specie known as *sorghum arundinaceum*.⁸ This view is corroborated by Murdock who traced one of the centres of sorghum domestication to the Mende area of the Nigerbend. Sorghum is mentioned in Arab sources as one of the staple foodstuffs in northern Nigeria.⁹ El-Omari reported on the consumption of sorghum in Kanem in the fourteenth century. Both Leo Africanus in the fourteenth century and Heinrich Barth in the nineteenth century confirmed this finding, commenting on the vast cultivation of sorghum and its uses in food preparation and beer production.¹⁰

Rice was essential during the pre-colonial period, particularly in the Sokoto region. It was grown in the valleys of the Sokoto, Rima, and Hadeja rivers. Rice was first introduced into West Africa by the Portuguese in the fourteenth century, according to popular belief.¹¹ Porteres, on the other hand, has successfully demonstrated that there were two centers of rice domestication in West Africa: the Nigerbend in the middle Niger and the Senegambia basin. According to his calculations, rice production in these locations began approximately 1500 B.C.¹² In the eighteenth century, four types of rice were identified as being frequently farmed in West Africa; *oryza breviligulata* and *Oryza Barthii* are West African natives. *Oryza glaberrima* is thought to have been domesticated in the Senegambia basin, then spread to other parts of West Africa before reaching Hausa land by Hausa traders who traveled

⁷ Levtzion, N, & Hopkins, J.F.P., 1987. *Corpus of Arabic sources for West African history*. London: Cambridge University Press, p.236

⁸ Dogget, H. 1965. *The development of the cultivation of sorghums in: Joseph Hutchinson (ed.,) Essays on Crop Plant Evolution*. London: Cambridge University Press p.50ff

⁹ Murdock, G.P. 1959. *Africa, its people and their culture*, New York: Mc Graw Hill, pp. 64-67: see also Thurstan Shaw, Prehistory, in Obaro Ikime (ed), 1980. *Groundwork of Nigerian History*. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books pp. 31-32

¹⁰ Ikpe, 1994. *Food and Security in Nigeria: A History of Food Customs, Food Economy and Cultural Change*,

¹¹ Ikpe, 1994. *Food and Security in Nigeria: A History of Food Customs*,

¹² R. Porteres. Le Cereales mineurs du genre *Digitaria* en Afrique et en Europe, in: *Journal d'Agriculture Tropicale et de Botanique*. vol. 2, Pars 1954. pp. 620-673: see also Bernhard Mohr. Reiskultur in West Afrka. Munchen: ifo-Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Weltforum-Verlag 1969. p.15-25

extensively in West Africa during the pre-colonial period. Rice growing in Hausa territory was first mentioned in the fourteenth century by Leo Africanus. Heinrich Barth, who witnessed huge irrigated rice fields in Sokoto and was supposed to be given rice as a present wherever he went, later confirmed to this truth.¹³

However, another school argues that the origin of rice cultivation in Nigeria dated back to the late 19th century with an influx of the Sierra Leoneans into the major cities along the West African coast.¹⁴ Rice was to have been introduced to Badagry when the “*Saros*” entered Nigeria from the town.¹⁵ Faluyi explains that the crop could not thrive in Badagry because of its poor soil. He further observes that rice probably spread from Badagry to other parts of Yorubaland like Abeokuta, where Christians showed great enthusiasm in its culture. Just as the activities of Christians popularized cocoa cultivation in Western Nigeria, they also contributed to the spread of rice production in Southern Nigeria.¹⁶ Despite the growth of rice culture along Yoruba coastal towns in the 19th century, Agboola claims that its cultivation did not appear to have penetrated efficiently into the interior until after The First World War I.¹⁷ The indigenous rice variety (*Oryza gbalberriwa*) had red grains and was and is still grown in places like Birni Kebbi, Sokoto, Zaria, Benin, Ekiti, and others. There were numerous types of indigenous rice.¹⁸

Maize was (and is) a food crop widely cultivated mostly in Southern Nigeria. This crop, which was widely cultivated before 1850, also tasted the export boom in Nigeria.¹⁹ Maize originated from South America about 4,500 years ago,²⁰ the Portuguese brought maize to West Africa in part to provide cheap nourishment for slaves on their lengthy journey to the New World.²¹ According to Faluyi, scholars are yet to fully establish the source through which maize came to West Africa.²² While one source indicates that maize was introduced and farmed in West Africa before the Portuguese arrived, another source claims that it was

¹³ Lewicki, T. 1974. *West African Foods in the Middle Ages According To Arabic Sources*. London: Cambridge University Press. pp. 21-28; Heinrich Bart, 1967. *Ine Sattle durch Nord und Zentralafrika:Entdeckungen in den Jahren 1849-1855*, Bd. 3. Wiesbaden: F.A. Brochklus, p.170

¹⁴ Agboola, S.A. 1968. Introduction of cassava and spread in Western Nigeria. *Nigerian Journal of Economics and Social studies*, Vol.10. No.3, p.371

¹⁵ Agboola, S.A. 1968. *Introduction of cassava and spread in Western Nigeria....*

¹⁶ Faluyi, E.K. 1994. *A History of Agriculture in Western Nigeria, 1900-1960....*p.294

¹⁷ Agboola, S.A. 1968. *Introduction of cassava and spread in Western Nigeria....*p.372

¹⁸ Agboola, S.A. 1979. *An Atlas of Agricultural history of Nigeria*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 89

¹⁹ Agboola, S.A. 1980. Agricultural Changes in Western Nigeria, 1850-1910. A.I Akinjogbin and S.O Osoba. Eds. *Topics on Nigerian Economic and Social History*. Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press Limited, pp 128-145

²⁰ Reay T. 1975. *Food in History*. Paladin, pp.207-208

²¹ Faluyi, E.K. 1994. *A History of Agriculture in Western Nigeria, 1900-1960*. Unpublished PhD thesis. Department of Lagos, University of Lagos, p.207

²² Faluyi, E.K. 1994. *A History of Agriculture in Western Nigeria, 1900-1960....*

likely carried from Brazil by an unknown pre-Columbian traveller of Arab or African ancestry.²³ As argued by Agboola, the crop was introduced into Nigeria from four major areas. First was through the Spain-Venice-Turkey-Egypt route; and second, more recently through the Bahia-Cape-Coast-Sao Tome-Benin route.²⁴ Yet, another source traces the origin of maize in West Africa through the Nile and Bahrel Ghazal.²⁵ Although there is no general consensus among scholars on how maize came to West Africa, there is the over-whelming evidence to suggest that the Portuguese probably brought the crop to the West African coast as they were the first Europeans to establish trade contact with West Africa and one of the pioneers of the slave trade.²⁶ It is also probable that maize came to West Africa through Sao Tome because it was the first centre of Portuguese plantation activity on the African coast. Also, the existence of varieties of maize such as Turkish, Asian and Indian corn may have given rise to the assumption that since maize came through Egypt (as argued by Agboola) or the Maghrebian coast to West Africa, it may have been of oriental or eastern origin.²⁷

Although there is no precise date for the arrival of maize in Nigeria, or West Africa in general, it was believed to be accessible in modest quantities in Benin around 1651.²⁸ This, as observed by Faluyi, suggests that maize was introduced shortly after its knowledge came to the Portuguese. He further explains that Christopher Columbus was probably the first European to see and describe the crop found by members of his crew during their voyages of exploration in Cuba and named it maize.²⁹ Therefore, one can conclude that maize entered Nigeria from Asia and South America. The crop was mainly cultivated by the Southern people of Nigeria. However, Southwestern Nigeria was regarded as the largest centre of maize cultivation in Nigeria.³⁰ It was also cultivated to a less extent in other parts of Nigeria such as Zaria, Benue and Kabba.³¹ This was observed by Walter Fitzgerald when he said that:

²³ Havinden, M.A.H. n.d. History of crop cultivation in West Africa. A Bibliographical guide. *Journal of Economic History*, Vol. p.541

²⁴ See Stanton, W.R. 1962. The analysis of the present distribution of varietal variation in maize, Sorghum and Cowpea in Niger as an aid to the study of tribal movement. *Journal of African History*, Vol. 111, No2, pp.251-262 and Agboola, S.A 1979. *An Agricultural Atlas of Nigeria*. London: Oxford University Press, P.85.

²⁵ Blanda, B.F. 1971. *Food crop production, Cereals and Legumes*. London and New York: Academic Press, p.210

²⁶ Faluyi, E.K. 1994. *A History of Agriculture in Western Nigeria, 1900-1960*, p.207

²⁷ E.K. 1994. *A History of Agriculture in Western Nigeria, 1900-1960....*

²⁸ Ryder, F.C. 1969. *Benin and the Europeans, 1485-1987*. Longman: Appendix II, p.315

²⁹ Faluyi, E.K. 1994. *A History of Agriculture in Western Nigeria, 1900-1960*, p.208

³⁰ Agboola, S.A. 1979. *An Atlas of Agricultural history of Nigeria*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p87

³¹ Agboola, S.A. 1979. *An Atlas of Agricultural history of Nigeria....*

Maize, yam, cassava are staple food crops and the first of these are reserved the best soil of the farm, which on the average is about three acres per family.³²

Though maize was grown in other parts of Nigeria prior to colonial domination, such as Nsukka, Benin, Zaha, Kabba, Borno, and other parts of Hausaland, it was the principal grain grown in Yorubaland during the 19th century. Maize was an important crop in Borno in the 15th century, according to Robinson.³³ Faluyi observes that it was not unknown whether it was grown there or brought from other areas into Borno during this period.³⁴ During his visit from the coast to parts of Northern Nigeria in the early nineteenth century, Clapperton is believed to have seen extensive fields of Indian corn along his trip from Katunga to Hausaland.³⁵ Clarke observes many maize farms in virtually every part of Yorubaland during his travels in the country between 1854 and 1858.³⁶ People in Yorubaland, for example, used maize to make popcorn (guguru), eko, ogi, and powder, among other meals. In general, records of European travelers to Nigeria in the nineteenth century noted the presence of enormous corn fields throughout the country.³⁷ The grain later became a major export commodity before and during the colonial period because of its value. In the following chapter, the details of its importance and high demand by the British during the colonial period will be examined. Maize, for example, was exported from Nigeria to other parts of West Africa in the nineteenth century. For example, in 1894, large quantities of corn were shipped from Western Nigeria to Sierra Leone to alleviate a famine-related food scarcity.³⁸

Yams are foodstuffs that equally played important role in the traditional economy of the Nigerian peoples. It is an indigenous food crops cultivated in different parts of Nigeria. While some authors like G.T. Basden claim that yams were introduced into Nigeria by the Portuguese who are said to have imported it from Asia or the pacific islands,³⁹ others postulate that all species except *dioscorea alata* have their origins in West Africa. Yams are considered to have been brought under cultivation in the area east of the Niger. It has not yet

³² Walter Fitzgerald. 1967. *Africa: A socio-economic and political geography*. Methven.p.264.

³³Robinson, C.H. 1897. *Hausaland*. Sampson Low Co. Limited, pp.153-154

³⁴Faluyi, E.K. 1994. *A History of Agriculture in Western Nigeria, 1900-1960...*

³⁵Clapperton, H. 1966. *Journey of the Second Expedition into interior of Africa*. Frank Cass, p.97

³⁶ Atanda, J.A. (Ed) 1967. *Clarke, C.W. Travels in Yorubaland, 1854-1858*. Ibadan: University of Ibadan press.

³⁷Faluyi, E.K. 1994. *A History of Agriculture in Western Nigeria, 1900-1960...*

³⁸Otunba Paye. 1894. *Almanark of West Africa*. Lagos, p.28

³⁹ G. T. Basden. *Among the Igbos of Nigeria*, London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1966. p.47: Paul Ozanne, Notes on the Origins of African Yam Cultivation, unpublished mimeograph: M. Posnansky, Yams and the origins of West African Agriculture, in: *Odu*, No, 1, 1969 pp. 103-106: B. Okigbo, *Plants and Food in Igbo Culture and Civilization*, Ahianjoku Lectures, Owerri: Government Printer 1980.

been ascertained when this crop was first domesticated but it has been argued that the complex methods of cultivation with the accompanying rituals coupled with the numerous varieties of indigenous species are indications of millennia of cultivation and development. Ikpe submits that the first written reference to yams as food crop was made by the Arab traveler El Omari who in the fourteenth century noted the cultivation of qafi (yams) in West Africa. According to his description this crop “consists of fine roots which are buried in the ground and left till they grow thick. Its taste resembles that of colocasia qul qas but it is better than colocasia.⁴⁰ . The inference is that, contrary to Basden's claims that the Portuguese introduced yam to the West African Coast in the fourteenth century, the crop was produced and consumed as a primary food crop long before Europeans arrived.

Northrup seems to support this assertion in his book on the people of Arochukwu where he claims that their agricultural exports started with yams. He contends that the European slave traders bought yams in thousands to feed their slaves from the indigenes. Northrup further submits that there was trade between the peoples of locality he called the coastal area (those villages and towns just by the Atlantic/Bight of Biafra) and the hinterland. He establishes that the major occupation of the coastal areas is fishing and that of the hinterland as farming. Since the trading system during this period was the trade by barter system, the author believes that the exchange pattern were fishes and salt by the coastal land people for yams and palm oil by the hinterland people.⁴¹ Northrup argues that the Europeans expanded trade in the region. It is emphatically stated that early sets of trade between the Europeans and the coastal land saw the Europeans adapting to the existing trading patterns or rather existing African economic system as opposed to the claim of many European writers that the Africans did things the way the whites wanted it. However, in the 19th century, the trade in slave declined and palm oil became the biggest export from the region which subsequently led to economic prosperity. Though, the decline of slave trade was a blow to the Aro people's hegemony over trade, they were not left behind for too long in this new trade because of their superior trading skills and contacts. Northrup's focus on the occupational activities of the South Eastern Nigerian communities even before the advent of colonialism reveals that the history of slave

⁴⁰ Levtzion, N. and J.F.P. Hopkins, 1987. *Corpus of Arabic Sources for West African History*, London: Cambridge University Press.p.236: Tadeuz Lewicki, *West African Foods*, pp. 12 & 32

⁴¹ Northrup, D. 1978. *Trade Without Rulers: Pre-Colonial Economic Development in South-Eastern Nigeria*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp.26-28

trade, food production as well as the trade craftiness of the people all combined to lead to the sustenance of their economic lives even after the end of slave trade.⁴²

Yams were the backbone of the people's traditional economy. They were even ritualized among the Igbo. Yams were thought to have a spirit-force (arusi) that established certain guidelines for farming, harvesting, preparing, and consuming them.⁴³ Afigbo further describes yam as “the king of Igbo crops”.⁴⁴ Yam was the commonest and the most important and most widely cultivated traditional food crop in the pre-colonial Nigeria. Yellow yam, water yam, white yam, and more types of yam exist, just as cassava. According to travelers to areas of Nigeria's woodland zone in the 1850s:

Yams were one of the most important foods, serving as both a source of sustenance and a staple food for the populace.⁴⁵

Yams were also cultivated by some people in the then middle belt of Nigeria such as the Igala, Idoma, Tiv and Ebira. Forde observes that the position of yams in the food economies of Southern Nigeria in the 19th century was that the crop was everywhere as the staple food and the main care of the cultivators.⁴⁶ Among the Yoruba people, the crop could either be eaten when cooked or be processed into another variety known as *iyam* (pounded yam). Yams, which were principally grown as a foodstuff entered into local and inter-regional trade in pre-colonial period.⁴⁷ Miege observes that about fifteen varieties of yam exist in West Africa, of which only six of them are cultivated, while the others are of wild species.⁴⁸ Waitt, however, identifies the cultivated varieties of yams being, white yam, yellow yam, cluster or trifoliate yam, bulbiferous yam, water yam and the Chinese yam.⁴⁹ Yam cultivation was significant in different parts of Nigeria in the nineteenth century. In the zone where forest and grassland meet (savanna), yams formed the staple food of the population.⁵⁰ According to

⁴² Northrup, D. 1978. *Trade Without Rulers*: pp.26-28

⁴³ Afigbo A.E. 1980. Economic Foundation of Pre-colonial Okoba Eds. A.I Akinjogbin and S.O Osoba. Eds. *Topics on Nigerian Economic and Social History*. Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press Limited. *Topics on Nigerian Economic and Social History* (pp. 1-34), P.4.

⁴⁴ Afigbo A.E. 1980. *Economic Foundation of Pre-colonial Okoba*....

⁴⁵ Agboola, S.A 1979. *An Agricultural Atlas of Nigeria*. London: Oxford University Press, p.85.

⁴⁶ Forte, C.D. 1934. *Habitat, Economy and Society*. London: Methuen.

⁴⁷ Agboola, S.A. 1979. *An Atlas of Agricultural history of Nigeria*...p.55

⁴⁸ Miege, J. 1958. Deux ignames oust-africaines tubercle vivace. Bulletin institute D'Afrique Noire, Serie A. Vol.xx, Number.1

⁴⁹ Waitt, A.W. 1961. Review of yam research in Nigeria, 1920-1961. Federal Department of Agricultural research memo, Number.31. Ibadan

⁵⁰ Agboola, S.A. 1979. *An Atlas of Agricultural history of Nigeria*...p.55

Hinderer, owing to the availability of slave labour during the period, important chiefs and warriors had extensive farms devoted for the cultivation of yams.⁵¹

Cassava was one of the commonest foodstuffs in Nigeria. Prior to 1913, cassava was almost unknown in many parts of Western Nigeria. There were existing studies on the evolution of cassava cultivation in Nigeria. Agboola argues that cassava was probably known in Western Nigeria before the 1850s. His argument was hinged on the basis that the crop was already cultivated in Fernando Po and mainland Warri, towards the end of the seventeenth century.⁵² Faluyi explains that although cassava had been introduced by the Portuguese into West Africa (Nigeria inclusive), it does not appear to have penetrated into the hinterland until after 1800.⁵³ Cassava cultivation was introduced and promoted in Western Nigeria in particular via two major routes: Badagry-Abeokuta and Lagos. The Badagry-Abeokuta route was initially used by the missionaries since the 1840s, and later by large numbers of repatriates from Sierra Leone and Brazil. The second area through which the crop came into the interior was Lagos. Evidence showed that ex-slaves from Brazil and Sierra Leone contributed to the emergence of the crop into Nigeria via the Lagos route.⁵⁴ Cassava was already one of the most important crops farmed in the Lagos area by 1881.⁵⁵ It was from these two routes that the crop spread to other parts of Nigeria.

Oil palm (*Elaeis guineensis*) constituted one among the most important indigenous tree crops cultivated in the pre-colonial Nigeria. Palm oil, a major foodstuff derives from a tree crop (oil palm). The products of the crop (palm oil and palm kernel) were major items of trade during the era of legitimate trade. Oil palm contributed immensely to the socio-economic needs of the people of the forest region of Nigerian, notably the Yoruba, Urhobo, and Isoko. In fact, the Yoruba people refer to oil palm as “the tree of life”.⁵⁶ This was due to the fact that it served so many purposes. Palm fruit, for example, is utilized in the production of palm oil,

⁵¹Hinderer, Rev. D. 1872. *Seventeen years in the Yoruba country*. Secley, Jackson and Halliday, London.

⁵²Agboola, S.A. 1980. Agricultural Changes in Western Nigeria, 1850-1910. A.I Akinjogbin and S.O Osoba. Eds. *Topics on Nigerian Economic and Social History*. Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press Limited (pp 128-145), p.138.

⁵³Faluyi, E.K. 1994. *A History of Agriculture in Western Nigeria, 1900-1960*. Unpublished PhD thesis. Department of Lagos, University of Lagos, p.330.

⁵⁴Agboola, S.A. 1980. Agricultural Changes in Western Nigeria, 1850-1910. A.I Akinjogbin and S.O Osoba. Eds. *Topics on Nigerian Economic and Social History*. Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press Limited (pp 128-145), p.138.

⁵⁵Agboola, S.A. 1980. Agricultural Changes in Western Nigeria, 1850-1910....

⁵⁶Ogen, O. 2003. Urhobo migrants and the Ikale Palm oil industry. *The Nigerian Journal of Economic History*, Numbers 5&6,p.3

while palm kernel is used in the production of soap in the Niger Delta and Yorubaland.⁵⁷ Palm oil was processed to meet domestic consumption demands as well as societal duties such as dowry payments, the purchase of necessary products like as salt, and the purchase of luxury items such as gin and gun powder.⁵⁸ The palm's trunk was used to construct dwellings. Its fiber was used to make fish traps, and its fronds were utilized to make thatched fences surrounding compounds. Brooms were made from the reins of palm fronds. Although palm oil is mostly used for cooking, the Urhobo and Isoko peoples of the Niger Delta utilize it to make particular specialties such as 'banga' and 'owo' soups.⁵⁹

Dudgeon demonstrates that edible oil palm goods, particularly palm kernels, were in high demand during the First World War, as the war necessitated a significantly greater use of margarine and similar materials.⁶⁰ When a large new source of edible oil became available, the perfecting of techniques for improved extraction of palm oil from the fruits, which had virtually reached success at the onset of the war, needed completion. Meanwhile, he claims that the experimental cultivation of this palm in other nations has been a great success, with the extension of the palm plantations being completely satisfied and yielding oil yields that are superior to those of the wild palm in West Africa.

He suggested that the Dutch East Indies, where huge plantations had been established, and British Malaya, where comparable venture had been demonstrated, could soon become strong competitors to West Africa in the production of palm kernels and palm oil. The neglect of wild trees in West Africa, the ineffective methods used to extract palm oil, and the large number of palms left unutilized were all issues that demanded renewed attention, and the entire subject of the development of the palm-oil industry in West Africa demanded a thorough examination in all aspects if the industry was not in good enough shape to be supplanted by foreign enterprise. The proposed solutions included the acquisition of new expertise, as well as the extension and better remuneration of members of the staff of the Agricultural Departments in West Africa. In addition to this step, and possibly equally essential, the focused increased attention and activity of those merchants and manufacturers

⁵⁷Adesote, S.A. 2016. *Plantation agriculture and the growth of migrant settlements in Ondo Division, South Western Nigeria, 1947-1986*. Unpublished PhD Thesis. Dept of History, University of Ibadan, pp47-48.

⁵⁸Aghaliho, S.O. 2000. *Urhobo migrants and the Ikale Palm oil industry*, History; Nos. 5&6, pp 1-17.

⁵⁹Otite, O. 1973. *Autonomy and Dependents: The Urhobo Kingdom of Okpe: in modern Nigeria*. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press.

⁶⁰Dudgeon, Gerald C., 1922. *The Agricultural and Forest Products of British West Africa*. London: John Murray. Albemarle Street, W.

who will use the country's raw materials, and to whom West Africa's commercial success had due so much up to that point.

2.4 Foodstuffs production in the early phase of British Colonial Rule in Nigeria, 1900-1913

The formal installation of British colonial power over all of Nigeria began in the year 1900. Foodstuffs production during this early phase of British administration in Nigeria was characterized by several developments. First, since there was no food scarcity in the country up to this period, official emphasis was on the production and promotion of export crops. This was in agreement with the British colonial economic policy. Therefore, for the purpose of enhancing rapid expansion of exports, the colonial government established the Botanical Garden at Ebute-Metta in 1887, and other experimental stations and farms in many parts of Nigeria.⁶¹ The main functions of the centres were to find the cash crop most suited to Nigerian soil on the one hand and at a subsidiary level crop or crops suited to a particular environment on the other. The centres were also set up to give practical instructions to Nigerian farmers on the growing and distribution of seedlings, and serve as the centre for the first appearance of new trees.⁶² Experimental stations were set up in different parts of Nigeria such as Olokomeji Moore plantation, Ibadan; Calabar garden in 1903 .. Model agricultural plots and nurseries were established in Osogbo, Ijebu-Ode, Awka, Benin, Sapele, Ugwashi-uku and Aba with some success.⁶³ The colonial government constructed all of these agricultural stations with the goal of nurturing and giving plants, trees, and seeds to Nigerian farmers in order to achieve their colonial economic goal of export promotion in the country. Between 1887 and 1910 a number of seedlings of varieties of crops were bred and distributed from the Ebute Metta Botanical garden into some provinces in Nigeria.⁶⁴

Because food was plentiful, it was assumed that Africans would continue to cultivate enough food to feed themselves. Owing to the confidence based on mere assumption, the British attitude on food production during this period was that of near total neglect.⁶⁵ Faluyi further observes that since food was always available, and not required by the British public and their

⁶¹Denneth, R.E., 1919. Agricultural progress in Nigeria. *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 18, No.72, July, P.267.

⁶²Adesote, S.A. 2016. *Plantation agriculture and the growth of migrant settlements in Ondo Division, South Western Nigeria, 1947-1986*. Unpublished PhD Thesis. Dept of History, University of Ibadan, pp.47-48.

⁶³Denneth, R.E. 1919. Agricultural progress in Nigeria. *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 18, No.72,, p.267.

⁶⁴Denneth, R.E. 1919. Agricultural progress in Nigeria....pp.268-269

⁶⁵Faluyi, E.K. 1994. *A History of Agriculture in Western Nigeria, 1900-1960...p.205*

industries during this period, the question of food production and supply was often taken for granted, unless the administration was faced with a situation which called for a general mobilization of the colonial peoples for greater food supply. It was expected that because food was plentiful, Africans would continue to plant enough food to support themselves.⁶⁶ Despite the British government's hostile attitude toward the promotion of food production at this time, major crops such as maize, rice, and cassava, among others, were nevertheless grown. They were cultivated alongside with other cash crops to the extent that they were not only exported to other countries in West Africa, but also demanded in Europe like Germany.

One major development with respect to foodstuffs production during this period was in the vicinity of foodstuffs exportation. Maize, which initially was a domestic trade, became export trade during colonial rule. Agboola observes that this main development appeared to have stimulated the export of maize from Western Nigeria. First development was the challenge of famines in neighbouring territories like the Gold Coast (now Ghana), which had been their initial main source in West Africa. Second, some enlightened farmers in Agege area sent samples of maize produced there to England for testing in 1905 and eventually received very favourable reports. Thus, from the early 1900s, maize became major export crop in Nigeria.⁶⁷ For example, maize appeared for the first time as an export crop in 1900 when an unspecified quantity of maize valued at £194 was exported from Nigeria. Export rose to 41,013cwt valued at £2,215 in 1903, and by 1906 there was phenomenal expansion with an export of 261,480cwt reaching an all-time peak in 1908 when the 310,580 cwt valued at £51,695 were exported.⁶⁸ Although export fell sharply from 310,580 cwt in 1908 to 17,3777 in 1911 because of the outbreak of weevil which caused considerable damage to maize that year, it again rose in 1912 thus leading to great increase to 236,822 cwt and the upward trend production continued until 1914 when the outbreak of the First World War disrupted the trade.⁶⁹ The table below shows maize export of Nigeria between 1900 and 1913.

⁶⁶ Faluyi, E.K. 1994. *A History of Agriculture in Western Nigeria, 1900-1960*...p.205

⁶⁷ Agboola, S.A. 1980. *Agricultural Changes in Western Nigeria, 1850-1910*. p.119

⁶⁸Faluyi, E.K. 1994. *A History of Agriculture in Western Nigeria, 1900-1960*...p221

⁶⁹ Faluyi, E.K. 1994. *A History of Agriculture in Western Nigeria, 1900-1960*...p221

Table 2.1: Maize Export of Nigeria, 1900-1913

Year	Quantity Exported (cwt)	Value (£)
1900	-	194
1901	-	320
1902	-	161
1903	41,013	2,215
1904	93,364	16,115
1905	189,680	32,504
1906	261,480	73,385
1907	187,820	28,385
1908	310,580	51,695
1909	203,260	34,335
1910	101,917	16,689
1911	17,327	3,128
1912	157,979	28,713
1913	236,822	40,348

Source: Nigeria Handbook, 1931.

Table 2.2: Maize Export of Nigeria to Germany and other Countries 1900-1915

Year	Total Export	Export to other countries	Export to Germany
1900-1905	57,010	36,257	20,759
1906-1910	215,011	86,831	53,276
1911-1915	90,336	28,738	30,517

Source: Table based on Nigeria's maize export, 1900-1928 compiled from Nigeria Handbook, 1933

Prior to the outbreak of the First World War, there was discouragement with respect to the exportation of foodstuffs in Nigeria. This development came up as a consequence of food shortages occasioned by emphasis on cash crop production, which diverted many Nigerian peasant farmers away from food crop production, their traditional economy. With special reference to Western Nigeria, there was strong opposition to the exportation of yams and maize from the region. For instance, in the year 1906, the then Alaafin of Oyo, Oba Lawani Agogoija issued an order prohibiting export of food, particularly yams and maize from his area of jurisdiction.⁷⁰ Faluyi explains that the Alaafin took the action when it was reported that there were Nigerians residing in the Gold Coast and the fear that the Nigerians might import large quantities of yams into the territory.⁷¹ Thus, as many Nigerians residing there made application daily for export of food, the Alaafin tried to forestall large export by giving the directive which stated in part, that:

No one shall sell or dispose yams and other foodstuffs for export anywhere in Oyo or Oyo farms.⁷²

In defending the action of the *Alaafin*, the British Resident in Oyo said:

Alafin was concerned that his people would not consume all of their food, as there appeared to be a shortage in many regions of the kingdom, and he wanted to avoid the risk of famine, especially since the season had been dry.⁷³

The ban on export of foodstuffs also received approval of the colonial government during this period. For instance, according to the Chief Secretary to the Government (Lagos):

Because foodstuffs are scarce in the Gold Coast colony, the comptroller of customs was given the authority to prevent the export of locally produced foodstuffs from Nigeria. If unrestricted export were allowed in Nigeria, prices would be forced up.⁷⁴

⁷⁰Agboola, S.A. 1968. *Introduction of cassava and spread in Western Nigeria...*p.372

⁷¹Faluyi, E.K. 1994. *A History of Agriculture in Western Nigeria, 1900-1960...*

⁷²Agboola, S.A. 1968. *Introduction of cassava and spread in Western Nigeria...*p.372

⁷³ Henry Grant Foote. n.d. *Reflections of Central America and the West coast of Africa*. T. Cautley, Newby publication, p.216

⁷⁴Pierre Verger. 1976. *Trade Relations between the Bahia and the Bight of Benin 17th-19th centuries*, Ibadan: University of Ibadan Press, p.552

Faluyi observes that such an order was not confined to Oyo alone. He emphasises that the people of Lagos had equally had cause to complain of a sharp rise in prices of foodstuffs like gari and others because of their export to French territory. They, therefore, sought to prohibit their export. He concludes that whether the fear of food shortage was real or not, restriction on export of foodstuffs remained in force until the 1930s, despite incessant complaints and pleas from individuals for its removal and total abrogation.⁷⁵

It is significant to point out here that up till 1900, the cultivation of cassava was not yet pronounced. It's widespread in the Western and Eastern Nigeria occurred between 1900 and 1940.⁷⁶ According to Faluyi, with respect to Western Nigeria,

Before the First World War in 1914, cassava was nearly unknown in many regions of Western Nigeria.... In fact, in the 1920s, it was already a significant food crop in the area.⁷⁷

He concluded that cassava production witnessed a phenomenal expansion in Western Nigeria after the First World War.⁷⁸ This development was attributed to some fundamental factors, which would be interrogated later in this work. Meanwhile, up till 1913, cassava involved mainly domestic trade, which served as either *gaari*, *fufu*, *lafun*, *pupuru* in Yorubaland other parts of the world such as *apu* in Eastern Nigeria.⁷⁹ Cassava became an export commodity in colonial Nigeria from 1914 onwards, thanks to the colonial government's promotion of the crop.

The colonial government decided to establish the Department of Agriculture in Southern Nigeria in 1910 and Northern Nigeria in 1912 in order to support the development of cash and food crop production at this time. The Department of Agriculture's policy objectives were:

to increase the production of economic crops, foodstuffs, and livestock, to introduce and establish suitable new crops, livestock, and economic plants; to improve cultivation

⁷⁵Faluyi, E.K. 1994. *A History of Agriculture in Western Nigeria, 1900-1960*....p.199

⁷⁶Faluyi, E.K. 1994. *A History of Agriculture in Western Nigeria, 1900-1960*. Unpublished PhD thesis. Department of History, University of Lagos, p.330.

⁷⁷Faluyi, E.K. 1994. *A History of Agriculture in Western Nigeria, 1900-1960*....pp.333-340

⁷⁸Faluyi, E.K. 1994. *A History of Agriculture in Western Nigeria, 1900-1960*....p.340

⁷⁹Abimbola, J.O and Adesote, S.A. 2014. Boosting Food Security in Sub-Saharan African through Cassava Production; A case study of Nigeria. *The Nigerian Journal of Economic History, Nos 11&12* (pp 160-176).

methods, to achieve a balanced diversity of crops and livestock; to introduce and establish suitable new crops, livestock, and economic plants; to improve cultivation methods, to achieve a balanced diversity of crops and livestock; survey and open up additional sections of land that can be used for farming; Controlling pests and illnesses of crops and animals, as well as conducting research into all aspects of local agriculture and animal husbandry in order to gain knowledge and information on which to base future development.⁸⁰

Following the setting up of the Department of Agriculture, Botanical Garden, Lagos, other experimental stations were put under it. It was through the department that the programme of colonial government towards the development of food crop production in Nigeria was carried out. The department was pre-occupied with an attempt to encourage the growing of both newly introduced cash and food crops in different parts of the country.⁸¹ Several steps taken by the department towards achieving this objective would be examined subsequently in the work.

Between 1900 and 1914, the colonial government promoted palm oil as one of the most important traditional crops. This harvest was traded both domestically and internationally. Although palm oil exports began during the period of lawful trade, they were boosted once colonial rule was established. Palm oil was principal export of Nigeria from the colonial period. The expansion of palm oil production was facilitated during colonial rule through the introduction of modern techniques of extraction. The introduction of mechanical processing techniques was geared towards improving extraction efficiently and increasing palm oil production. These techniques included the screw press, the pioneer mill and the hydraulic press.⁸² Lagos was the main trading port during this period. It was from there that the European merchants and traders mainly from Britain and Germany did purchase the product. The palm oil, which was the most important item of export in Nigeria was averaged 75% annually. For example, while Nigerian palm oil found a rising market in Europe until the

⁸⁰Afolabi, A. B. 1996. *A Historical Analysis of Agricultural Research in Nigeria, 1945-1980*. Unpublished PhD Thesis. Department of History, University of Ilorin, p.53.

⁸¹Adesote, S.A. 2016. *Plantation agriculture and the growth of migrant settlements in Ondo Division, South Western Nigeria, 1947-1986*. Unpublished PhD Thesis. Dept of History, University of Ibadan, p.63

⁸²Agboola, S.A. 1979. *Agricultural Changes in Western Nigeria, 1850-1910*. A.I. Akinjogbin and S.O. Osoba. Eds. *Topics on Nigerian Economic and Social History*. Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press Limited, p.118.

1860s, the majority of Nigerian palm kernels were transported to Germany, with an average yearly export of more than 70% between 1862 and 1899.⁸³ From 1881 to 1890, the table below shows total volume as exports and average prices for palm oil and palm kernels in Lagos. For the early purchase of Nigerian products, the European commercial houses were set up in Lagos.⁸⁴

⁸³Ekundare, R.O. 1973. *An Economic history of Nigeria, 1860-1960*. London: Methuen

⁸⁴Falola, T. 1984. *The Political economy of pre-colonial African State: Ibadan, 1830-1900*. Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press, p.169

Table 2.3: Total volume of Exports and average prices for Palm Oil and Palm Kernel, Lagos 1881-1890

Year	Palm oil		Palm Kernels	
	Total Export in Tons	Price Per Ton (to nearest £)	Total Ton	Price Per Ton (to nearest £)
1881	6,024	30	20,801	12
1882	8,791	33	28,591	12
1883	6,571	39	25,820	15
1884	7,942	35	29,802	14
1885	8,859	28	30,805	12
1886	10,322	22	34,812	10
1887	8,354	22	35,784	10
1888	8,225	20	43,524	10
1889	7,830	23	32,715	10
1890	10,669	25	38,829	12

Source: Ekundare, R.O. 1973. *An Economic History of Nigeria, 1860-1960*. London: Methuen, p.94

It is clear from the table that Nigerian foreign trade fluctuated. Internal civil conflicts, the comparatively primitive circumstances of transportation and communications, the lack of an acknowledged coin/currency, and economic swings in Europe were all blamed for this development.⁸⁵ For example, the value of Lagos' entire foreign commerce declined from £1.1 million in 1862 to £0.8 million in 1881, before rising to £1.1 million in 1890.⁸⁶

⁸⁵Ekundare, R.O. 1973. *An Economic history of Nigeria, 1860-1960*. London: Methuen, p.93

⁸⁶Ekundare, R.O. 1973. *An Economic history of Nigeria, 1860-1960*...p.93

Table 2.4: Statistics of Palm produce Export of Lagos, 1893-1900

Year	Palm Kernels in tons	Palm oil in tons	Total value of both in E
1893	51,456	13,576	-
1894	53,534	11,311	628,393
1895	46,501	12,754	525,987
1896	47,649	10,514	502,357
1897	41,299	6,196	404,425
1898	42,775	6,277	459,876
1899	49,501	10,976	581,274
1900	48,514	9,926	593,779

Source: Falola, T. 1984. *The Political Economy of Pre-Colonial African State: Ibadan, 1830-1900*. Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press, p.170

The table above equally reveals total exports of palm produces from Lagos between 1893 and 1900. There was equally fluctuation in the exportation, especially between 1895 and 1898.

These produce came mainly from the southern Nigeria. There were evidences that some came from the Middle Belt of the country notably Igalaland.⁸⁷ While the Niger Delta region constituted the largest producing area of palm oil and palm kernel in Southern Nigeria, it was immediately followed by the southwestern Nigeria. In Yorubaland, for example, Ibadan was a single of leading suppliers of palm oil, ⁸⁸ others included Ikaleland, Ijebuland ..⁸⁹

Nigeria's entire international trade value grew between 1900 and 1913. This was ascribed to a variety of factors, including the development of infrastructure, such as railway and road transportation, communication, and British colonial economic policy, among others. Other agricultural goods, like as maize and groundnuts, were export crops demanded by the British in addition to palm production. Between 1900 and 1914, the table below displays palm oil production estimates as well as palm oil and palm kernel exports in Nigeria.

⁸⁷Boston, J.S. n.d. The Igala Oil Palm Industry. *Nigerian Institute of Economic and Research proceedings*, Vol. 62. Ibadan

⁸⁸ Ahazuem, J.O., & Falola, T. 1987. Production for the Metropolis; Agriculture and forest products. Falola. T. Ed. *Britain and Nigeria: Exploitation or Development?* New Jersey: Zeu Books Limited, (pp.80-90) pp.84-85.

⁸⁹ Ogen, O. 2003. Urhobo migrants and the Ikale Palm oil industry. *The Nigerian Journal of Economic History*, Nos. 5&6,pp.4

Table 2.5: Palm oil and Palm kernel production and export

Year	Total production (estimated palm oil)	Total Exports	
		Palm oil	Palm kernel
1900-1904	117,358	53,729	120, 778
1905-1909	115,770	65,177	130,241
1910-1914	154,876	77,771	174,236

Source: Ekundare, R.O. 1973. *An Economic History of Nigeria, 1860-1960*. London: Methuen, p.166

The above table reveals that there was increase in export of palm produce in Nigeria between 1910 and 1914.

To summarize, the preceding examined the growth and development of food crop production in Nigeria before to the commencement of the First World War in 1914. It proved that Nigerian society was effective and efficient in food production prior to the intrusion of colonial rule. To put it another way, there existed food security in the pre-colonial period. This aided indigenous or traditional agriculture in adapting successfully to the colonial economic policies of the twentieth century. The colonial government's efforts to build the country's food crop economy up until 1913 were also briefly discussed in this chapter. It claims that the colonial authorities' efforts were primarily focused on export promotion, necessitating the establishment of botanical gardens and other experimental stations, the department of agriculture. As a result, the chapter delves into the specifics of the colonial administration's efforts to cultivate certain foodstuffs during the First World War. Overall, the chapter has been able to show that Nigerian society made a substantial contribution to world food production up to 1913. This contribution, which began in the late 1800s, reached new heights in the twentieth century.

CHAPTER THREE

THE FOOD PROVISIONING OF THE BRITISH ARMED FORCES IN NIGERIA DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR, 1914-1918

The military formations in the British colonial territories (for example, the Nigeria Regiment) were parts and parcel of the British Armed Forces. During the First and Second World Wars, these colonial regiments also became part of the Allied Forces. The previous chapter has dealt with the pre-war establishment and provisioning of the Nigeria Regiment, which formed part of the West African Frontier Force, which in turn doubled as the Allied Forces in West Africa during the First World War. As a follow-up, this chapter examines the contributions of Nigeria to the food provisioning of the British Armed Forces (or Allied Forces) during the First World War, 1914-1918. By so doing, it reviews the world food regime before the Great War so as to appreciate the impact of the War on the pre-war global food order. It also deals with how the outbreak of the First World War disrupted and dislocated the international food flows, giving rise to all manners of restrictions and controls as well as hunger and starvation in many parts of the world. It also examines the war situation in West Africa and the supply of foodstuffs (rice, corn meal, guinea corn, livestock, palm oil, onions) to the Allied Forces in Nigeria and in the overseas service, such as the Togoland and Cameroon Expeditionary Forces and East African Campaign. It argues that, being the headquarters of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), Nigeria coordinated the West African campaigns in Togoland and Cameroons, erstwhile German territories in West Africa, and that the burden of the Allied forces on the Nigerian government led to the shortage of food for the civilian population and loss of finance to the Nigerian government.

3.1 The World Food Situation on the Eve of the First World War

Analysis on food situation or food order, known as food regime, has been a growing area of study, due to occasional world food crises. According to Philip McMichael, "The concept of a food regime can be used to reveal not only organized moments and changes in the history of capitalist food relations, but also the history of capitalism as a whole. It's not just about

food; it's about the relationships that produce it, as well as how capitalism is created and reproduced.”¹

In order to situate in proper perspective the impact of the First World War on the world food regime, there is the need to briefly review the world food situation before the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. Harriet Friedmann has described the food order before the First World War as the ‘diasporic food regime of 1870-1914,’² which resulted from working class movements in Europe and resulted in class of commercial family farmers. The diasporic food regime was a situation in which food was produced outside the domain of its consumption due to migration and the interconnectedness of the world system of 1870-1914.

In Great Britain and in other parts of the world, food supplies did not keep up with the growth in population in the second half of the 19th century. This led to the anxiety about food supplies for the world in general. In Britain, prices were so low that farmers were unable to compete, leading to depression in agriculture.³ This led to the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, which in turn led to the emergence of large-scale international wheat market with England as its centre.⁴ In the 1860s, European nations reached a series of trade agreements which spread free trade across the continent.⁵

Thus, from the late 19th century up to the eve of the First World War, Britain depended on imported foodstuffs. This was due to the growth of industry and population as well as new food producing areas overseas which made grain production at home uneconomic under free trade conditions.⁶

In Germany’s situation, the transition from a traditional agrarian to a modern industrial state led to a rise in urban population, which in turn necessitated increase demand for foodstuffs. The food requirements of the big German towns could no longer be met by local production from the surrounding areas. Thus, foodstuffs had to be imported from more distant German regions and from abroad. The German Empire’s imports of agricultural produce doubled

¹ McMichael, P. 2009. “A Food Regime Analysis of the ‘World Food Crisis’,” *Agriculture and Human Values* Vol. 26, Number 4, p.281

² Friedmann, H. 2005. “From Colonialism to Green Capitalism: Social Movements and Emergence of Food Regimes.” *New Directions in the Sociology of Global Development*, pp.222-264

³ Russell, E. J. 1954. *World Population and World Food Supplies*. London: George Allen and Unwin

⁴ Rothstein, M. 1960. “America in the International Rivalry for the British Wheat Market, 1860-1914.” *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* Vol. 47, Number 3, pp.401-418

⁵ Swinnen, J.F.M. 2009. “The Growth of Agricultural Protection in Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries.” *World Economy*, Vol. 32, Number 11, pp.1499-1537

⁶ Hammond, R. J. 1946. *British Food Supplies, 1914-1939. The Economic History Review*. Vol. XVI, Number, I, pp. 1-14.

between 1900 and 1912.⁷ What this means is that any alteration or dislocation of the international market in foodstuffs would affect German Empire very adversely. It was this realization that led the British to impose naval and trade blockade against Germany shortly after the declaration of hostility.

Rice was an "integral international market" among all the foods traded before to the First World War.⁸ Rice market variations were directly connected to those in the wheat market, which served as a substitute for rice. Prior to the First World War, "rice farming had centered on monsoon Asia: India, Burma, the Malayan Peninsula, Java, Siam, Indo-China, China, and Japan," according to Latham and Neal. The biggest rice exporter at the time, however, was British India. Bengal was the main rice exporting province in the early 1860s, through the port of Calcutta, and it wasn't until 1867-1868 that Burma overtook Bengal's loading capacity.⁹ From 1870 to 1914, Britain absorbed about half of the wheat and flour exported from the United States. This increased up to two thirds in subsequent years.¹⁰

On the whole, the situation of food in the world was already precarious. It was in the midst of this precarious, diasporic world food regime that the First World War broke out, with significant impact on the pre-war world food order.

3.2 The First World War and the Disruption of the Pre-War Global Food Regime

Due to its magnitude and scale, the First World War has attracted an avalanche of scholarly attention.¹¹ Debates around the Great War have focused on diverse areas, ranging from the deconstruction of the causes¹² to its effects and reverberating consequences,¹³ among others. The First World War has been described differently by various scholars. It was seen as the

⁷ Teuteberg, H. 2016. "Food Provisioning on the German Home Front, 1914-1918." *Food and War in Twentieth Century Europe*, 77-89

⁸ Latham, A. J. H. and Neal, L. 1983. "The International Market in Rice and Wheat, 1868-1914." *The Economic History Review*, Vol 36, Number 2, p.260

⁹ Latham, A. J. H. and Neal, L. 1983. The International Market in Rice and Wheat, 1868-1914, p.260

¹⁰ Rothstein, M. 1960. "America in the International Rivalry for the British Wheat Market, 1860-1914." *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* Vol. 47, Number 3, pp.401-418

¹¹ Stokesbury, J. L., and Lawenstein, R. 1981. *A Short History of the First World War*. New York, NY: Morrow; Marshall, S. L.A. 2001. *The First World War*. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Tucker, S. 2005. *The First World War: Encyclopedia* (Vol. 1). Abc-clio; Tucker, S. "The New History of The First World War and what it means for International Relations Theory." *International Security*, Vol. 32 Number 2, pp.155-191

¹² Hamilton, R. F., & Herwig, H. H. (Ed). 2003. *The Origins of The First World War*. Cambridge University Press; Joll, J., & Martel, G. 2013. *The origins of the First World War*. Routledge; Keiger, J. F. 1983. *France and the origins of the First World War*. Macmillan International Higher Education; Stephan Van Evera. 1984. "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War." *International Security* Vol. 9, Number, 1, pp.58-107; McMeekin, S. 2011. *The Russian Origins of the First World War*. Harvard University Press

¹³ Winter, J. M. 1988. *The Experience of the First World War*. Macmillan; Stevenson, D., & Stevenson, D. 1988. *The First World War and International Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.17

first war of globalisation, while others see it as the war of empires. The bottom line is that it took a different dimension from the previous wars, both in scope and methodology. It is unique in scope because it involved virtually all parts of the world. According to Samuel Marshall:

The sheer scale of the conflict proclaimed its historical uniqueness. The fighting engulfed all the principal states of the European continent in addition to Britain, Turkey, and Japan; spread to the British, French, and German imperial domains in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific island; raged on the high sea, sucked in colonial peoples from Australia and IndoChina to India and Canada; and eventually obliged even the distant and isolationist United States to shoulder arms.¹⁴

It was also unique in methodology because it employed technologies unknown during the previous wars. It was regarded as total war, because it was fought on all fronts, militarily, economically, psychologically and diplomatically.

Thus, scholars have noted the intersection of war and food.¹⁵ War cannot be fought and sustained without food. ¹⁶ Food shortages and blockade are also used as instrument of warfare. Wars are not only interruptions of normal life, but they provoke severe ruptures and breaks in food production, distribution and consumption, which can have long lasting effects on the economic structure of the food industry, government food policy in addition to the individual food habits.¹⁷ The control, production, and access to food can also be used as a weapon by protagonists in conflict.¹⁸ For instance, food blockade and scorch-earth tactics have been used by war parties to destabilise and de-provision the army of their enemies.

During the First World War, 1914-1918, a severe dislocation on food supply chain led to widespread hunger, starvation and diseases across the world. For instance, Helen McPhail has described how the rich agricultural and industrial areas of northern France were invaded,

¹⁴ Marshall, S. L.A. 2001. *The First World War*. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, p.vii

¹⁵ Trentman, F. and Just, F. *Food and Conflict in Europe in the Age of the Two World Wars*.

¹⁶ Duffett, R. 2011. *Food and War in Twentieth Century Europe*. London: Routledge,

¹⁷ Ina, Z., Duffett, R. and Alain, D. (Ed) 2012. *Food and War in Twentieth Century*. London: Ashgate Publishing Limited, pp.1.

¹⁸Collinson, P. and Macbeth, H. (Ed) 2014. *Food In Zones Of Conflict. Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives*. Berghahn Books, pp.1-2.

occupied, and exploited during the Great War.¹⁹ Consequently, among other things, food supplies were taken, the population was malnourished and maltreated. Starvation loomed large and contact with the outside world was disconnected until Herbert Hoover set up his scheme of aid that kept the population alive during the war.²⁰ Similarly, Thierry Bonzon has examined the acute food crisis in Paris and the role played by the ‘Halles Centrales’ in the distribution of food.²¹

In the Middle East, the Greater Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire were bedeviled with grain and flour shortages, in 1915, which culminated in a fully-fledged famine that claimed the lives of one-third the population by the time Allied troops occupied the region in October 1918.²² Until the intervention of the humanitarians, food scarcities were a matter of life and death in Beirut. In a different study, Tanielian notes “the distorting effects of food shortages, disease, wartime requisitioning, confiscations and conscriptions on everyday life as well on the efforts of the local municipality and civil society organizations to provision and care for civilians.”²³ Tanielian notes that the Ottoman Empire was a humanitarian disaster, as the population was being decimated by famine and hunger.²⁴

When it comes to Belgium, Antoon Vrints has noted that “hunger and dependence on aid among broad sections of the population are often used as a symbol of Belgium’s suffering during the First World War.”²⁵

The war contributed to straining further the already strained food supply to German Empire. According to Hans-Jurgen Teuteberg, few decades to the end of the nineteenth century, “Germany shifted from a traditional agrarian to a modern industrial state. A rapid rise of the urban population during this period increased not only the demand for foodstuffs, but at the same time led to a shift from vegetable to animal products. The food requirements of big towns could no longer be supplied from the surrounding area alone and additional foodstuffs

¹⁹ McPhail, H. 2001. *The Long Silence: Civilian Life under the German Occupation of Northern France, 1914-1918*. IB Tauris,

²⁰ McPhail, H. 2001. *The Long Silence*

²¹ Bonzon, T. 2006. “Consumption and Total Warfare in Paris (1914-1918),” *Food and Conflict in Europe in the Age of the Two World Wars*, pp.49-64

²² Tanielian, M. 2014. “Politics of Wartime Relief in Ottoman Beirut (1914-1918),” *First World War Studies*, Vol. 5, Number 1, pp. 69-82

²³ Tanielian, M. 2012. “The War of Famine: Everyday Life in Wartime Beirut and Mount Lebanon (1914-1918),” *UC Berkeley*

²⁴ Tanielian, M. S. 2014. Feeding the city: the Beirut municipality and the politics of food during The First World War. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 46 Number 4, pp.737-758

²⁵ Vrints, A. 2015. ‘Beyond victimization: Contentious food politics in Belgium during The First World War,’ *European History Quarterly* Vol. 45, Number, 1, pp. 83-107

had to be imported from more distant German regions or abroad. The German empire's imports of agricultural produce nearly doubled between 1900 and 1912. The volume of grain imports, including animal feed, accounted for 25 per cent of all German imports in the last decade before the First World War."²⁶ Similarly, Keith Allen has researched into the rationing of bread stuffs in Berlin during the First World War, arguing that "despite all documented difficulties, municipal rationing authorities were effective in calming tensions brought on by the world's first battle."²⁷

It was only in Britain that the impact of the war on food supply was not intense. It should be noted that the goal of Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare strategy was to put France, Italy, and especially Britain in the same food bind. These countries were severely reliant on imported grain and saw the submarine campaign as a potentially lethal danger. They strove to boost their own food production, but their primary achievement was the implementation of successful rationing systems. Rationing was first implemented in London in early 1918, and by the summer, it had been spread nationally. Furthermore, by tolerating this state intervention into their daily lives, British civilians defied German expectations.²⁸ According to studies by scholars such as Peter Dewey, the average level of nutrition did not fall very far below that of the pre-war period. Food rationing was not implemented until the final year of the war.²⁹

The United States of America's food administration's conservative efforts led to the abundance of food. The United States of America was assisting the allies through the supply of food.³⁰ However, food shortages and restrictions in war periods as a result of search for substitutes or new products.³¹

²⁶ Teuteberg, H. 2016. "Food Provisioning on the German Home Front, 1914-1918." *Food and War in Twentieth Century Europe*, 77-89

²⁷ Keith, A. 1998. Sharing Scarcity: Bread Rationing and the First World War in Berlin, 1914-1923". *Journal of Social History*, pp. 371-393

²⁸ Rationing and Food Shortages During The First World War. <https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/rationing-and-food-shortages-during-the-first-world-war>

²⁹ Dewey, P. 2005. "Nutrition and Living Standards in Wartime Britain," *The Upheaval of War: Family, Work and Welfare in Europe, 1914-1918*, Vol. 1, p.197

³⁰ Patterson, 2017. Food Conservation during the First World War: National to Local. Food Conservation During The First World War: *National to Local, History 499 Senior Seminar*, April 28, [https://www.utm.edu/worldwars/_pdfs/Patterson%20HIST_499_paper_\(1\).s17.pdf](https://www.utm.edu/worldwars/_pdfs/Patterson%20HIST_499_paper_(1).s17.pdf)

³¹ Ina, Z. et al (Ed) 2012. *Food and War*, p.2.

3.3 The Allied Forces and the Requirements for their Provisioning during the First World War

The First World War led to the massive mobilisation of the armed forces and the need for their provisioning. Given the global nature and dimension of the war, mobilisation was effected in various continents due to the interconnectedness of the world on the eve of the Great War. Thus, the First World War was fought on various fronts across the world. It was fought on the Western Front, comprising Belgium and France. Germany's plan was to send German forces through Belgium and to quickly knock France out of the war. This led to the battle of Marne and the Battle of Ypres in Belgium. However, there was a stalemate on the Western front. Apart from the Western front, the war was fought on other fronts, namely, the Eastern front or Russian Front, the Italian front, the Balkan campaigns and the Middle East campaigns. There were also the colonial campaigns which took place in Africa, aimed at liberating the German territories in Togoland, Cameroons, Tanzania and Namibia.

Thus, the British War Council mobilized armies from all her colonies and dominions. Jeffrey Greenhut has described the roles of the Indian Corps on the Western Front.³² On 27 August, 1914, The Lahore and Meerut Divisions of the Indian Corps were sent to Egypt to replace British troops needed in France to defend the western front against the German armies sent deep into France and Belgium.³³ Besides Egypt, the Indian corps also fought on the western front. George Morton-Jack has narrated the involvement of the India's Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium during the Great War.³⁴ In a different essay, Jack notes that the Indian Army sent five expeditionary forces abroad, A to Europe, B and C to East Africa, D to Iraq, and E to Egypt.³⁵

In addition to the Indians, Australians were mobilized and moved to fight in France on the Western Front.³⁶ The Allied soldiers were not confined to Europe during the war. They were located in all the British and French Empire. The idea of fighting war on the imperial territories is age-long. During the Napoleonic era, European war was taken to the Latin

³² Greenhut, J. 1983. The Imperial Reserve: The Indian Corps on the Western Front, 1914-15, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* Vol. 12, Number 1, pp.54-73

³³ Ibid

³⁴ Morton-Jack, G. 2014. *The Indian Army on the Western Front: India's Expeditionary Force to France and Belgium in the First World War*. Cambridge University Press

³⁵ Morton-Jack, G. 2006. The Indian Army on the Western Front, 1914-1915: A Portrait of Collaboration." *War in History* Vol. 13, Number 3, pp.329-362

³⁶ Neiberg, M. S. 2012. *The Western Front 1914-1916: The History of The First World War: From the Schlieffen Plan to Verdun and Somme*. Amber Books Ltd

America and in Africa. From this experiences, the British imperial government mobilized soldiers in all the colonies and protectorates.

When it comes to West Africa, the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) constituted the standing army of the British. As has been seen in the previous chapter, WAFF originated from the Nigeria Regiment formed in 1863. This was augmented by the second and third constabularies formed by the Royal Niger Company in 1886. It was from these three constabularies that John Hawley Glover, the Administrator of Government of Lagos, led detachment of soldiers to the Gold Coast to take part in the Ashanti war in 1873. In 1894-1897, the British Government raised a local force under the command of Colonel Fredrick Lugard. By 1900, the local force had become such a well-disciplined body to make Lord Lugard call it the West African Frontier Force. In 1906, the Lagos Battalion became part of the Southern Nigeria Regiment. There was also a Northern Nigeria Regiment. These two regiments took part in the last Ashanti war in 1900, among other wars. Following the amalgamation of the northern and southern Nigeria on 1 January, 1914, the two Regiments became one, known as the Nigeria Regiment.³⁷ Thus, the temporary Brigade Office at Lagos closed on 1 January, 1914, and the headquarters of the Nigeria Regiment WAFF was moved from Lagos to Kaduna the following day.³⁸ The full units of the Nigerian Regiment by 1914 were as follows:

No 1 Battery Artillery	Zaria ³⁹ .
No 2 Battery Artillery	Calabar
1 st Battalion Nigeria Regiment	Kaduna North
2 nd Battalion Nigeria Regiment	Lokoja
3 rd Battalion Nigeria Regiment	Calabar
4 th Battalion Nigeria Regiment	Lagos ⁴⁰

³⁷ Adedipe, G. A. K. 1965. "Introduction". *A Special List of Records on the Army in the Nigerian Secretariat Record Group*, National Archives, Ibadan

³⁸ NAI N.2093/1913, "Temporary Brigade Office at Lagos Closing of on 1/1/1914. Moving of the Headquarters of the Nigeria Regiment WAFF from Lagos to Kaduna on 2/1/1914 (1913)"

³⁹ NAI N.659/1917. "Detachment of West African Regiment at Zaria. Arrangement for Supply

⁴⁰ NAI N.1824/1919/ CSO 19/7/1148, 1"Army Orders 1919—Supply of –ask for. From Hqs. Nigeria Regiment, West African Frontier Force, Kaduna to Chief Secretary to the Government, Lagos dated 14 October 1920 NAE N.338/14, "Barrack at Udi; NAE N. 599/14, "Bush Barrack, Nigeria Regiment Owerri, repair and renewal of"; NAE. 979/15, "Soldiers Barracks Onitsha—Report

While training Centres at Zungeru and Kaduna were disbanded after the Great War as from January 1919⁴¹, in 1921 the formation of two new units to the Regiment was effected, namely, Machine Gun Platoon, Nigeria Regiment, Kaduna North, and Signaling School, Nigeria Regiment, Kaduna North, Northern Nigeria.⁴²

There were German territories in Africa and they were to be liberated from the control of Germany as a part of the war effort. Thus, the Allied Forces in Africa were to be mobilized and provisioned for the purpose of fighting on the front of the German territories. In West Africa, Togoland and Cameroon belonged to Germany. Thus, the West African Frontier Force was mobilized to make an effort for the liberation of those German territories. In a two-week campaign, the British and French troops overwhelmed Togo in August, 1914. This could be due to the stance of the natives to the war effort. According to W. Apoh, many natives in German Togoland were aware of the conflict but uninterested. According to Kpando Oral sources, several Togoland chiefs and people who were armed by the Germans to fight on Germany's behalf hid their guns and ammunition and deserted their duty posts.⁴³ It is, however, interesting to note that soldiers from the Nigeria Regiment participated in this Togoland Expedition. A letter from the Chief Paymaster, Lome, Captain H. Read, to the Treasurer, Accra dated 26 October, 1914, contained a request for the payment of field and ration allowances to the officers of the Nigeria Regiment who were attached to the Togoland Expeditionary Force. These officers included Major Sheffield, Dr. Moorhead, Lt. Burke, Lt. Brown, and Col. Sergt. Halliday.⁴⁴

Similarly, soldiers from the West African Frontier Force were mobilized for Cameroon Expedition.⁴⁵ According to Adedipe, "It was immediately after the declaration of the 1914-1918 war that the Nigeria Regiment joined Expeditionary Force which went to Cameroons."⁴⁶ Among the Cameroons Expeditionary Forces, there were three major columns: one operating from Duala under the command of General Dobell, two operating

⁴¹ NAI N.1824/1919/ CSO 19/7/1148, 1"Army Orders 1919—Supply of —ask for. From Hqs. Nigeria Regiment, West African Frontier Force, Kaduna to Chief Secretary to the Government, Lagos dated 14 October 1920

⁴² NAI N.1824/1919/ CSO 19/7/1148, 1"Army Orders 1919—Supply of —ask for. From Hqs. Nigeria Regiment, West African Frontier Force, Kaduna to Chief Secretary to the Government, Lagos dated 1 June 1921

⁴³ Apoh, W. 2003. *The Archaeology of German and British Colonial Entanglements in Kpando-Ghana.* *International Journal of Historical Archaeology.*

⁴⁴ NAI N. 24/15, "Nigeria Officers attached to Togoland Expeditionary Force, payment of Field and Ration Allowance to (1914)"

⁴⁵ NAI N. 1171. 'Cameroon Expedition Casualties, Native Ranks, Nigerian Regiment'

⁴⁶ Adedipe, G. A. K. 1965. "Introduction".

from the frontier under Colonel Sutcliffe's command⁴⁷; and three, the larger column in the inside of the Cameroons in the vicinity of France, cooperating with the French troops under the command of the French.⁴⁸

In August, the force consisted of 92 officers and soldiers from the United Kingdom and non-commissioned officers and 2,040 rank and file. In September 1914, Nigeria furnished to the Cameroon expeditionary force a contingent of 65 officers and soldiers from the United Kingdom and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and 1,260 rank and file with 4 guns, 8 maxims and large reserves of ammunition and warlike stores.⁴⁹ In addition, 79 European in the civil service of Nigeria, 57 as officers and 22 as NCOs were attached to the force, some as combatants and some as officials for civil work of various kinds (Railways, political and station work at Duala). A flotilla was also fitted out consisting of 40 marine officers and 250 trained native crews, with 18 vessels.⁵⁰ By the end of the year 1914, an average number of 100 civilians drawn from departments and of un-officials engaged and paid from revenue had been attached to the force to increase the proportion of Europeans to native. Most of the regular officers serving in Nigeria in a civil capacity (for example, the Royal Engineers officers and non-commissioned officers of the Survey) were attached to General Dobell's column which might be said to have had first choice. In a telegram from General Dobell dated 5 December 1915, he requested for 100 recruits by first ship fully armed and equipped.⁵¹

However, the larger colony of Cameroons fought and held out until January 1916.⁵² This, according to Killingray, was because the Cameroons required more effort involving naval and military forces against much stiffer German resistance.⁵³ Thus, by February 1916, Anglo-French troops jointly defeated the German troops in Cameroon. In March 1916, Brigadier-General Charles M. Dobell and General Joseph Aymerich partitioned the territory into British and French spheres.⁵⁴

⁴⁷ NAI N. 1035/1915, "Nigeria-Cameroons Frontier Force Operating on. Returns of Material and Stores supplied to." From D. C. Cameron, Central Secretary to the Director of Marine & the Resident Engineer, Lagos Harbour Works dated 18 March 1915

⁴⁸ NAI 3793/1914, "War Expenses—Method of Accounts"

⁴⁹ NAI 3793/1914, "War Expenses—Method of Accounts"

⁵⁰ NAI 3793/1914, "War Expenses—Method of Accounts"

⁵¹ NAI NC 124/15, "Recruits for the Cameroons."

⁵² Koller, C. "The Recruitment of Colonial Troops"

⁵³ Killingray, D. 1998. *The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War: New Edition* (2 Ed). Oxford: Oxford University Press. . p.92

⁵⁴ Mbaku, J.M. 2005. *Culture and Customs of Cameroon*, Greenwood; Illustrated Edition p.x

Beyond the Cameroon expedition, the officers of the Nigeria Regiment also participated in the East African campaign. Records show that certain officers and British non-commissioned officers (BNCOs) of the Nigeria Regiment of West African Frontier Force left for East Africa by a government transport on 25 October, 1916. They were to participate in the East African campaign against the Germans in German East Africa. These officers included Captain C. E. Bareley, Lieutenants L. Haygate, N. S. V. Raby, W. R. Rumbold, Sergeants R. Short, W. J. Seldon, T. R. Jones, E. Sharp, E. Millwood, J. Pearce, J. Duggan, H. J. Empringham, C. Care, W. E. Evans, and Armourer Staff Sergeants J. Bailie and R. Trickett.⁵⁵

All these formations of the Allied Forces scattered all over the world were to be provisioned, namely: supplying them with clothing and equipment as well as food and medicine. Provision was made for the supply of foodstuffs for overseas contingent.⁵⁶

However, although the United States and Britain had enough food for their population, as a collective, the Allied faced growing shortage of meat during the war. Consumers in Britain and overseas were affected by the decision to divert increasing amounts to feed the British, French and even the Italian army.⁵⁷

3.4 The Contribution of Nigeria to the Provisioning of the Allied Forces during the First World War

The provisioning of the Allied Forces in Nigeria with stores and materials during the war was effected by the Department of Public Works. As has been noted earlier, the provisioning of the armed forces cut across the supply of clothing and equipment as well as food and medicine. This study focuses more on food provisioning. Although the supply of some certain foodstuffs to the Allied Forces in the colonial territories was centralised, and coordinated in London by the Ministry of Food, payments were effected by the local administration of the territory where the armed forces were stationed within the imperial domain. The Nigerian government was, therefore, to bear the cost of all supplies made to the West African Frontier Force in Nigerian regions. Those who left West Africa for overseas expedition were also catered for by Nigeria. Basic foodstuffs like rice, onions, palm oil, corn- or maize-meal, wheat and guinea corn, and livestock were made available to the Allied

⁵⁵ NAI N. 903/1918, "Certain Officers and BNCO's of the Nigeria Regiment—Embarkation of for East Africa by Government Transport".

⁵⁶ NAI CSO 19/5/848; N. 1176/1919, "Foodstuff for Overseas Contingent."

⁵⁷ Perren, R. 2005. "Farmers and Consumers under strain: Allied meat supplies in the First World War", *The Agricultural History Review*, pp.212-228

Forces. These foodstuffs will be discussed consecutively for the purpose of seeing the dynamics of the need for them during the war by as well as the military procurement and supply.

Rice

Archival materials of July 1914, a month before the outbreak of the First World War, contain evidence that there had been a great shortage of food in the northern provinces of Nigeria, such that it was cheaper to import rice than to attempt to buy guinea corn locally.⁵⁸ It was under this situation that the Great War broke out. What this means is that before the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, rice in Nigeria had been derived through coordinated import from the British Empire, most especially from Burma. It was also procured through requisitioning. These two modes of rice procurement for the army will be examined consecutively.

Coordinated Import

The first mention of rice in the list of crops in the reports from the colony of Lagos was in 1897.⁵⁹ In the Lagos Annual Reports for the year 1901-1902, it was reported that “rice (*oryza sativa*) is at present very little grown. It grows well in the places where it has been planted. It is planted February to March as a wet season crop in moist hollows and in the beds of streams. Irrigation is an unknown art and considering the great efforts now being made to get rid of mosquitos it appears doubtful if rice cultivation with its bunded fields is to be encouraged.”⁶⁰

Annual Reports of the colony of southern Nigeria for the year 1907 listed rice in the table of chief imports arranged in their relative order of cost value. Out of the thirty-seven items listed, rice was number eleven with the value of import amounting £49,406 in 1906 and £61,493 in 1907.⁶¹ This report shows an increase in rice importation into Nigeria in 1907 relative to 1906.

Records show that prior to the war in August 1914, the supply of rice to the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) had been ongoing. A copy of telegram from secretary Zungeru to Central Secretary, Lagos, dated 14 May, 1914 indicates that the headquarters of WAFF in

⁵⁸ NAI N.1930/CSO 19/2/1414. “1. 16 Tons of Rice Required for Headquarters Kaduna, 2. Monthly supply of 16 tons rice to Kaduna, 3. Enquiring if procurable at Lagos”, letter dated 14-7-1914

⁵⁹ Lagos Blue Book for the year 1897, p.103

⁶⁰ Lagos Annual Reports for the year 1901-02, p.179

⁶¹ Annual Reports of the Colony of Southern Nigeria for the Year 1907, p.91

Kaduna required at once sixteen tons of rice and four further lots of sixteen tons at intervals of four weeks, and asked if it could be procured in Lagos in quantities required.⁶² In another telegram from the WAFF headquarters, Kaduna to the central secretary, Lagos, inquiry was made whether English rice could be purchased in Lagos in large quantities and the price per ton. The central secretary noted that the request should be forwarded to the Officer Commanding (O. C.) 4th Battalion in Lagos to make necessary arrangements. But the secretary, Zungeru noted that the Commandant at the army headquarters considered that the work should not be thrown on O.C. 4th Battalion who was about to proceed on inspection tour. The central secretary then sent the request to the Adjutant, 4th Battalion, Lagos, for his attention. On 6 and 15 June, 1914, a new telegram from Kaduna to Lagos noted that the secretary, northern provinces, Zungeru, had requested crown agent to supply the rice and therefore no further action was needed by Lagos regarding the local purchase of rice. The rice in question was being paid for out of the current West African Frontier Force estimate, considering that all requisitions for such expenditure should pass through the office. According to Staff Captain, Nigeria Regiment Kaduna, C. R. Savile, "As in the former years when rice has had to be supplied from England, the cost including incidental expenses, is chargeable against the item 'subsistence' native ranks. In the present instance, the cost will be debited to items 151 of the current West African Frontier Force estimate."⁶³

On 25 July, 1914, few weeks before the outbreak of the First World War, the acting secretary, northern provinces, was directed to forward to the central secretary for transmitting to the crown agent an indent for rice which had been ordered by cable for the Officer Commanding 2nd Nigeria Regiment Lokoja. On 13 August, 1914, few days after the outbreak of the First World War, a letter from the crown agent to the Governor of Nigeria, Colonel Sir Frederick Lugard, noted that the Crown had ordered 200 tons of rice for shipment by the s. s. "Elmina" on 19 August, 1914. The rice would be packed in 2 cwt. Double bags addressed, "Resident, Kano, via Iddo".

The point is that priority was given to the armed forces. In 1914, there was a certain amount of local shortage of rice. Yet the military formations had surplus ready to be disposed of for the purpose of avoiding deterioration. For instance, the secretary northern provinces noted in his letter to the central secretary Lagos that roughly 300 bags of rice at Kano were not

⁶² NAI N.1930/CSO 19/2/1414. "1. 16 Tons of Rice Required for Headquarters Kaduna, 2. Monthly supply of 16 tons rice to Kaduna, 3. Enquiring if procurable at Lagos"

⁶³ NAI N.1930/CSO 19/2/1414. "1. 16 Tons of Rice Required for Headquarters Kaduna

required, asking if Lagos wanted any of the tons. There was also a surplus in Lagos which was due to get rid of. A telegram was sent to General Gobell in Dualla, Cameroon, asking if he required this rice, otherwise it might be issued to the troops formations in lieu of money. If the rice was not disposed of it was bound to deteriorate. The fair cost of the 300 tons was about £3800. If there was no troops formation that required it, that Gold Coast might take some or a local firm might purchase. After all there was a certain amount of local shortage of rice. In all these considerations, the well-being of the local civilian population came last.

Records also show the returns of materials and stores, including rice, supplied to the Nigeria-Cameroons Frontier Force in 1915 by the Department of Public Works, Kaduna station. On 1 August, 1914, 1120 lbs of white rice valued at £9. 6. 8 were supplied to the Adjutant Northern Regiment, while on 26 September 1914, 105952 lbs of white rice valued at £529. 15. 2 were supplied to Staff Quartermaster, Northern Regiment. In March 1915, 1000 bags of rice were supplied to the Cameroon Expeditionary force operating from Duala.⁶⁴

Archival records of 1918 contain request for rice for 100 men, motor drivers, proceeding from Nigeria to East Africa through Sierra Leone.⁶⁵ The estimate was that they would require for each 150 lbs for seven days to take them to Sierra Leone.

In the second half of 1918, food shortage most especially in northern provinces became pronounced. The cost of foodstuffs, therefore, soared high and rice became one of the most expensive foods.⁶⁶

In a letter to the central secretary from the headquarters, Ist (Nigerian) WAFF Service Brigade, Lagos, dated 6 November, 1918, it was noted that on the 24 October, 1918, O. C. Troops Zungeru wire stating that the food situation was very acute and asked for six tons of rice per week to be sent for three weeks. The strength of the garrison was 2224 soldiers and 149 carriers. The secretary northern provinces was immediately wired to and requested to assist to the above extent. He thereupon instructed the residents Nupe and Kontagora to send in meat, rice and corn, but as O. C. troops reported on 28 October that the matter was extremely urgent, six tons of rice were ordered to be sent to Zungeru from Messrs. the Lagos Stores Ltd, Kano.

⁶⁴ NAI N. 1035/1915, "Nigeria-Cameroons Frontier Force Operating on. Returns of Material and Stores supplied to."

⁶⁵ NAI N.1184/1918, "Rice for Motor Drivers Proceeding to East Africa via Sierra Leone."

⁶⁶ ⁶⁶ NAI N. 2564/1918, "Purchases of Rice for Troops at Zungeru at a price in excess of their subsistence Allowance"

A telegram from WAFF headquarters, Kaduna to secretary, Zungeru, dated 30 October, 1918, enquired if the Residents, Nupe, could send them rice, noting that corn was costing five shilling per load transport extra to price of corn. He noted that the request required a sense of urgency because the troops at Zungeru were convalescent after influenza.⁶⁷ In a telegram from Mr. Anderson, Ilorin to Secretary, Kaduna, dated 1 November, 1918, Anderson noted that WAFF officers came to Ilorin to buy foodstuffs. On 30 October, 1918, the Secretary Northern Provinces reported that rice was unobtainable except in small quantities and that it was being sent into Zungeru with difficulty owing to the villagers wishing to avoid infected areas. In respect of this, a further supply of six tons of rice was sent to Zungeru from Lagos, and with this it was hoped that the troops at Zungeru would be able to carry on until the influenza epidemic cleared and larger and more frequent supplies were available from villagers. The cost of the rice purchased amounted to £609. 0. 4.

By 1918, rice and corn were unprocurable in Bida Emirate. In a letter from resident Nupe to Secretary Kaduna, it was reported that the Emir stated shortage largely due to the fact that trading firms had bought up all they could and that for months past, corn and rice had been continuously shipped by rail and canoe to Lagos, Lokoja, and Onitsha. Now he had appealed to trading firms and native traders offering any price for supplies. All reply was that they were unable to obtain even smallest quantity. Assistance was thus sought from Kano and Nassarawa. Even fowls were very scarce to obtain, and message was sent to Zungeru and Baro for help. ⁶⁸ Application for rice was made at the worst season of the year that is, when supplies were at their lowest ebb. The epidemic also led to difficulty which beset all the large stations. For instance, by 1918, there were 14,000 lbs of rice in Lagos in the factories for distribution across the empire.

Requisitioning

Beyond the coordinated import of rice from Britain, the West African Frontier Force in Nigeria also obtained rice during the First World War through requisitioning: the act by which armies have to take possession of civilian property for their own uses. It was an age-long practice. The armies of revolutionary France often lived off the land. Such practice

⁶⁷ NAI N. 2564/1918, "Purchases of Rice for Troops at Zungeru at a price in excess of their subsistence Allowance"

⁶⁸ NAI N. 2564/1918, "Purchases of Rice for Troops at Zungeru at a price in excess of their subsistence Allowance"

sometimes degenerated into pillage and brutality.⁶⁹ Thus, on 21 August, 1914, 70 (28lbs) bags of rice and 6 (48 tins each) cases of salmon were taken from the stores of German factories (namely, German West African Trading Company and Prospect Beach) in Ikang, Calabar.

The story is that on 5 August, 1914, a day after the outbreak of hostilities between Britain and Germany, all German factories in Nigeria were closed down by the Police. Acting under instruction from Lagos, they took possession of all the keys of the factories, until 1 December, 1914, when the keys were handed over to Mr. Evans, the Assistant Receiver's Office in Calabar. Office of the receiver was created during the Great War to represent German estates in Nigeria, just as Office of the custodian of enemy property was responsible for the property owned by the enemy subjects. The formation of these offices was in line with the principle of the inviolability of enemy private property. Thus, the inviolability of the enemy private property during the war had been in existence before the First World War. Seymour J. Rubin puts it in a more comprehensive way and arrives at the same conclusion:

No norm of international law was probably more firmly established in 1914 than the rule that private property belonging to inhabitants of an enemy state inside the authority of the enemy state is inviolable. The rule did not emerge from a flash of humanitarian enthusiasm, but rather from millennia of evolution. It is based on a sound development in political and legal theory that was regarded as natural and incidental to the evolution of modern civilization, namely, a conviction of the essential difference between private property and public property, between enemy-owned private property in one's own jurisdiction and enemy territory, and between non-combatants and combatants, accompanied by the growing realization that confiscation was reciprocally unwisely despised.⁷⁰

However, due to the need for food by the expeditionary forces in Calabar, rice and fresh foodstuffs were removed from the stores of the German factories in Calabar for military

⁶⁹ Craig G. 2003. *The British Army, French Farmers and the War on the Western Front, 1914-1918*. Past Present, pp. 175-239

⁷⁰ Seymour J. R. 1945. *Inviolability of Enemy Private Property*, 11 *Law and Contemporary Problems Scholarship Respository*, Vol. 11, Number, 1, pp. 166-182

provisioning. Captain Lenke took from German West African Trading Company's factories at Ikang:-

70 bags each 28lbs rice at 4/6	£15. 15. 0
6 cases each 48 tins salmon at £1	£ 6. 0. 0

	£21. 15. 0

Source: NAIN. 1310/1915. "German Factories at Calabar—Foodstuffs removed from by military authorities.

Similarly, 16, 828lbs of rice from Prospect Beach Calabar was commandeered by Colonel Haywood. These foodstuffs were taken to Marine Transport Store for shipment to Ikom for the consumption of the troops stationed in the Calabar Division. Unfortunately, transport of rice up the Cross River had been stopped and this was affecting the condition of rice in the area. For instance, there was also rice purchased from Messrs. Miller Brothers Ltd: Millerio immediate transported to Ikom and 1300 (14lb) bags which were present in the Marine store owing to shipment orders having been cancelled. The rice was removed from Millerio to the store on showery day and would probably deteriorate if kept. Since the rice removed from the German factories could not be shipped up the Cross River, it became necessary that rice from Prospect Beach should be disposed of as early as possible by public auction. This was because before removal, it was, according to the military reports, found to be full of weevils and also to have some maggots in it. Consequently, the Officer Commanding Troops, Calabar, Lieutenant Colonel A. H. W. Haywood, proposed that arrangement be made by the Supply Committee to have all the rice stock of the German factories at Calabar inspected as to its condition and the condition of store in which it was being kept. The rice of the German Factories at Oron, Ikang, and Esuk Mba should also be inspected and reported upon.⁷¹ Haywood sought for permit from the Commissioner of Police, Calabar, who was the Chairman of Victualling Committee (Committee of Control), to sell the rice at once to avoid deterioration. The Commissioner of Police, Calabar, authorized Mr. Evans (Supt. of

⁷¹ NAIN. 1310/1915. "German Factories at Calabar—Foodstuffs removed from by military authorities. Enquiry relating to." From the Officer Commanding Troops, Calabar, Lieutenant Colonel A. H. W. Haywood, to Mr. Bedwell, the Commissioner, Calabar Province, dated 22 August 1914.

Agriculture, Eastern Provinces, and Secretary Victualling Committee) to sell perishable goods and foodstuffs. After the sale, Mr. Evans paid in a large sum of money amounting to something like eight or nine thousand pounds for foodstuffs and perishable goods he sold. The investigation and intrigues that attended this requisitioning are not within the scope of this essay and should therefore be omitted. The supply of rice to the military during the war was supplemented by maize meal. Abeokuta could supply excellent corn meal in large quantities at ½ d per lb.

Maize or Corn-Meal and Guinea Corn

Unlike rice, the production of corn preceded the colonial rule. Lagos Blue Book of 1894 listed corn as one of the crops produced by the local population.⁷² In 1902, attempts were made to introduce a variety of maize which would produce a better grain than native corn. With this object, a quantity of Cuzco maize was obtained and part of it distributed in the colony. The remainder had been sown on the land of Olokomeji. There were seven plots, each half an acre, and an eight plot sown with native maize, so that the results from both kinds might be compared.⁷³ The Annual Reports of the colony of southern Nigeria for the year 1907 contains information of the total shipments from all provinces, including maize.

⁷² NAI Lagos Blue Book for the Year 1894, p.89

⁷³ NAI Lagos Annual Reports for 1902, p.73

Table 3.1: Value of Maize shipped from Colony of Southern Nigeria, 1900-1907

Year	Quantity (Tons)	Value £
1900		193
1901		320
1902		161
1903		2,215
1904	4,688	16,114
1905	9,384	32,503
1906	13,074	37,386
1907	9,891	28,521

Source: Annual Reports of the Colony of Southern Nigeria for the year 1907, pp. 99 and 101

According to the 1914 Annual Report of the department of agriculture⁷⁴, in 1911, experiments were commenced to decide whether it was more profitable for the native farmer to plant maize intended for export during the early or the late rains. The yields recorded up to 1914 in lb. of grain per acre were as follows:

⁷⁴ NAE Nigeria. Annual Report on the Agricultural Department for the year 1914, pp.22-23

Table 3.2: Yield recorded between 1911 - 1914

Year	1911	1912	1913	1914	Average for 4 Years
Early planted	755	879.2	1,043	570	811.8
Late planted	1,029	84.4	593	109	453.9

Source: Annual Report of the Dept. of Agriculture 1914, pp. 22-23

What this means is that by 1914 when the First World War broke out, the production of maize and its processing into corn flour for corn meal had become perfected and maintained. This was why it became very handy for military provisioning during the Great War. However, due to the urgent need for cereals in the United Kingdom both for human and animal food, there was a call for the increase of cereals grown within the Empire in 1917. The Royal Commission on wheat supplies anticipated obtaining about 2,000 tons during the first year. As a result, an assessment was made of the possibility of increasing the production of maize in Nigeria for export to the United Kingdom. In order to encourage farmers, a price at Lagos of £8 a ton for 2 years was guaranteed by His Majesty's Government.⁷⁵

The resident Abeokuta was asked to arrange for the grinders of corn in the Abeokuta mill. The local population was asked to economise in every way in the use of wheat flour, in order to assist in a small way in the conduct of the War, it was not too much to ask that where a Native Authority had corn mills maize flour to meet requirement locally might be milled, even if money had to be advanced to buy corn.⁷⁶ However, the Food Controller advised that owing to the shortage of flour in Lagos, the admiralty agent would not be permitted to purchase flour locally. Again, there was the question of maize flour for the European crews of vessels. The maize flour of a quality suitable for consumption by Europeans was milled by the Government at Abeokuta, but there was difficulty in making arrangements with the resident for supplying any orders sent up from Lagos. It was most essential that the European crews of the vessels sent out here to load should be supplied with flour fit for consumptions and as white flour was not available, the Director of Marines had arranged with Messrs. Elder Dempster & Co. for their ships' handlers to always keep a stock of about 5 cwts of the best quality maize flour available for sale to the masters of the vessel.⁷⁷

In practice, the motor drivers who proceeded from Nigeria to East Africa via Sierra Leone were not only supplied with rice, but with corn meal derived from Abeokuta. In a priority letter to the resident Abeokuta dated 22 June, 1918, he was required to send by train 6 cwt. of maize meal consigned to Elder Dempster, require for the Elmina which would leave on Saturday.⁷⁸ The food shortage of 1918 also affected the corn. It was difficult to obtain and forward corn rapidly in the then existent conditions. Corn was practicably untouchable at the

⁷⁵ NAI N. 1264/1917, "Cereal: Question of Increasing the Production of within the Empire."

⁷⁶ NAI N.1428/1918, "Maize Flour: Arrangements for the Supply of. For European Crew of Vessels—requirements"

⁷⁷ NAI N.1428/1918, "Maize Flour: Arrangements for the Supply of. For European Crew of Vessels—requirements", From Director Marine, Lagos, Nigeria to the Central Secretary, Lagos, dated 11 June 1918

⁷⁸ NAI N.1184/1918, "Rice for Motor Drivers Proceeding to East Africa via Sierra Leone."

time as the crop of the previous harvest was exhausted and what little there was could not be brought in owing to the epidemic.

Corn was unprocurable, and if procurable in very small quantities.⁷⁹ E. G. M. Dupigny, resident Nupe noted that when the troops first came to Zungeru, he foresaw that there would be food shortage at the end of October (i.e. the period just before the new harvest came in) and for that reason, he supplied Zungeru with 40 lbs of guinea corn to form a reserve.⁸⁰

Concerning Guinea corn, an extract from Lt. Peele's letter to the central secretary, dated 14 April, 1915, noted that the General Officer Commanding had instructed Peel to obtain and send with the livestock, five tons of guinea corn for the forces in Duala. It also noted that Ibadan and Ilorin would be the nearest place to obtain the corn.⁸¹ The central secretary, Lagos, therefore wrote to the resident Ilorin and Ibadan inquiring if they could supply and at approximately what price. In response, Sydney Smith, Ilorin, noted that corn could be supplied, bagged and loaded on railway inclusive at ten pound per ton.

On 20 April, 1915, 52 bags (weight 4 tons 5 cwt 3qrs 8lbs) was sent to Lagos from Ilorin-Kabba by train "Kola special" for onward shipment to Duala for the Cameroon Expeditionary forces.

Livestock

Lagos Annual Report for the year 1901-1902 contains information on livestock, noting that "some few horses and cattle are kept in Abeokuta, but on the eastern side of the Egba country towards the forest land there are none. A considerable number of cattle pass through Abeokuta coming from Borgu and Ilorin."⁸² It also noted that sheep were of three distinct kinds, namely, the native sheep, the Ilorin sheep and the Hausa. They were nearly as tender as cattle. All attempts to establish grand canary for sheep or goats had been unsuccessful, and the natives knew well that even the Ilorin and Hausa sheep from the north were hard to keep. Goats did well without much attention. Pigs were found in nearly every village. Poultry was very small but was easily improved with care and good feeding. The natives as a rule thought that fowls should feed themselves.⁸³ This is evidence that livestock industry was already

⁷⁹ ⁷⁹ NAI N. 2564/1918, "Purchases of Rice for Troops at Zungeru at a price in excess of their subsistence Allowance"

⁸⁰ NAI N. 2564/1918, "Purchases of Rice for Troops at Zungeru at a price in excess of their subsistence Allowance" dated 3 December 1918

⁸¹ 1128/1915. "Cameroons Expeditionary Force— Livestock supply for."

⁸² Lagos Annual Reports for the year 1901-02, p.186

⁸³ Lagos Annual Reports for the year 1901-02, p.186

thriving in Nigeria before the Great War and thus became important supply to the Allied Forces during the war. In 1914, three veterinary officers were added to the department of agriculture, Zaria, Northern provinces.⁸⁴

Because of the growing shortage of meat in Europe during the war, Nigeria played a major role in the supply of meat. Cattle, goats and sheep were shipped from Nigeria to other parts of the British Empire and to the Allied Forces on the battlefield. For instance, in March 1915, the Expeditionary Force was badly in need of fresh meat and it was suggested that procuring at once 500 goats and sheep and shipping them. Due to the urgency, Lieutenant H. J. J. Peel proceeded from the Cameroons to Lagos for the purpose of making arrangements for the supply of cattle, for the use of the Expeditionary Force.⁸⁵ The cattle, goats and sheep were obtained from northern Nigeria, railed to Iddo and then shipped to Duala. The General Officer Commanding the Expeditionary Force in Cameroons was of the opinion that it would be satisfactory of a monthly contract for so many animals (say 50 head of cattle and 200 sheep) could be arranged through a responsible European Trading Firm.

Part of the reason for the urgent need of fresh meat by the Expeditionary Force was because of the high mortality on board ship amongst the sheep that were dispatched to Duala. According to J. J. Peel, "I do not know where the last consignment of sheep that were dispatched to Duala were bought, but the mortality on board ship among them was great and I should like to secure this consignment from Kano province."⁸⁶

In order to prevent the high mortality of the sheep on board, the assistance of the resident, Kano, was sought, coupled with the services of one of the government veterinary officer to see that animals left the north free of disease.

Arising from the visit, the following arrangements were made.

1. Seven high sided wagons to be attached to the Kola Special {train} of the 25 to bring down the stock from Kano to Iddo.
2. One wagon full of forage
3. Twenty herd boys that would travel down with the stock

⁸⁴ NAE Nigeria. Annual Report on the Agricultural Departments for the year 1914, p.1

⁸⁵ NAI CSO 19/5/848; N. 1176/1919, "Foodstuff for Overseas Contingent." From General Headquarters, Duala to Central Secretary, Lagos, 12 March 1915.

⁸⁶ NAI N.1128/1915. "Cameroons Expeditionary Force— Livestock supply for." From J. J. Peel to Central Secretary Lagos, dated 6 April 1915

4. The contractor was paying the freight on the livestock. The freight on the forage was to be charged to Cameroons Expeditionary accounts.
5. Five tons of guinea corn obtained from Ilorin

In addition, from 7 August, 1914 to 28 February, 1915, the Public Works Department station at Zungeru supplied to the Maiduguri column of the Nigeria-Cameroon Frontier Force 21 horses, 111 slaughter cattle valued at £249. 15. 0 and £141.0. 0 respectively. In April 1915, 60 slaughter cattle valued at £80. 5. 0 were also supplied to the Maiduguri column.⁸⁷

Palm Oil and Onions

Palm oil was an important foodstuff in Nigeria. According to Northrup, the oil palm has attained a natural density in south-eastern part of Nigeria which was unsurpassed in any part of the continent and all over the world.⁸⁸ The palm trees were seldom planted. They grew freely from self-sown seeds everywhere from the sea-coast up to about the ninth parallel of latitude. Some little cultivation was bestowed on them to the extent of clearing the ground and cutting off the leaf basis of old leaves. However, it is also found in some parts of south-western Nigeria such as Ondo. It is rarely seen north of Zungeru.⁸⁹ Palm oil and other foodstuffs (yams, livestock) were exported to Europe during the era of slave trade.⁹⁰ For instance, in 1699, James Barbot bought 50,000 yams at Bonny which had been brought down from the hinterland, as well as livestock, palm wine, firewood, and water.⁹¹ In the 1770s, oil was bought from Old Calabar, and Antera Duke apparently noted two ships taking away oil in 1765-1766.⁹² But these items were bought for provisioning, for food on the middle passage, not for expansion of capitalist development. Therefore the volume and magnitude was small compared to the volume of the slaves which were by then the major commodity.⁹³

So during the war, it became handy for the provisioning of the British Armed Forces. In a telegram from the Secretary of State London to Governor General, Lagos, dated 31 January,

⁸⁷ NAI N. 1035/1915, "Nigeria-Cameroons Frontier Force Operating on. Returns of Material and Stores supplied to."

⁸⁸ Northrup, D. 1978. *Trade Without Rulers, Pre-Colonial Economic Development in South-Eastern Nigeria*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p.185

⁸⁹ Dungeon, G. C. 1911. *The Agricultural and Forest Products of British West Africa*. London: John Murray. p.126

⁹⁰ Muojama, O. 2013. *The Nigeria Cocoa Exports and Global Capitalism, 1914-1960*. A PhD thesis submitted to the Department of History, Faculty of Arts, University of Ibadan, pp. 25-26

⁹¹ Northrup, D. 1978. *Trade without Rulers, Pre-Colonial Economic Development in South-Eastern Nigeria*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p.179

⁹² Latham, A.J.H. 1973. *Old Calabar 1600-1891*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p.55

⁹³ Northrup, D. 1978. *Trade without Rulers, Pre-Colonial Economic Development in South-Eastern Nigeria*. p.185

1917 required the Nigerian government to make arrangements for voyage to accompany all troops and carriers proceeding to East Africa. In a letter to the Comptroller of Customs Lagos, T. F. Burrowes, dated 28 April, 1917, a trading company, S. Thomas & Co, enclosed an account for the 55 casks of palm oil supplied for the troops operating in East Africa. The transaction was put through at £23 per ton as against the prices £26, £25, and £24 per ton which were ruling as the time of supply, noting that “we did it as an earnest of our desire to assist Government in every possible way in the gigantic Empire struggle for breaking down the forces which have brought about this terrible war now raging everywhere.”⁹⁴

Similarly, in a memo dated 21 May, 1917, the central secretary, D. C. Cameron, informed the secretary Southern provinces, Lagos, that about 1900 native troops would be proceeding to East Africa about the third week in June and to request that arrangements might be made to obtain the requisite supply of palm oil for the voyage out and for six months after arrival.⁹⁵

In addition to palm oil, the troops for overseas contingent were also supplied with onions. On 1 May, 1917, there was a request for arrangements to be made for putting 2000 lbs (or as much as was available) of onions on board the *Persic*. On 17 May, O.C. troops acknowledged the receipt of 20 bags of onions for the consumption of the Nigerian carriers in the transport.

3.5 The Impact of the War and Military Provisioning on Nigeria

The First World War occasioned economic and social dislocations across the world. Nigeria, being a major player in the war, most especially on the West African Fronts, was heavily affected by the war. These effects manifested in various ways, which are examined consecutively below.

Shortage of Food and Rise in Prices of Foodstuffs: The prioritization of the military food provisioning led to the shortage of food for the civilian population. This shortage was experienced throughout the war period and the post-war period. By 1914, there was a great shortage of food in the Northern provinces of Nigeria, such that it was cheaper to import rice than to attempt to buy guinea corn locally.⁹⁶ In 1918, the food situation was very acute. Rice was unobtainable except in small quantities. The food shortage of 1918 also affected corn. It was difficult to obtain and forward corn rapidly in the then existent conditions. Corn was

⁹⁴ NAI N. 418/17, “Palm Oil for Troops and Carriers Proceeding to East Africa—Arrangement for to be made for six months’ supply of—re (1917)”

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ NAI N.1930/CSO 19/2/1414. “1. 16 Tons of Rice Required for Headquarters Kaduna, 2. Monthly supply of 16 tons rice to Kaduna, 3. Enquiring if procurable at Lagos”, letter dated 14-7-1914

practicably untouchable at the time. The local population was asked to economise in every way in the use of wheat flour, in order to assist in a small way in the conduct of the War.⁹⁷

In 1919, a year after the end of the war, the shortage of food lingered on. For instance, a telegram from Secretary of State dated 10 November, 1919 noted that there was the danger of shortage of local foodstuffs; and that merchants were pressing for permission to export further supply of rice to West Africa for their native employees.⁹⁸ Due to this acute shortage of local foodstuffs in Nigeria arising from the effect of the First World War, rules were made by Oyo Native Authority preventing the exportation of yams and foodstuffs from Oyo. The offenders were liable to £5 fine or three months imprisonment.⁹⁹

As has been seen, the price of garri in Lagos rose from 2/6d to 2/9 a measure, of which the pre-war price was 6d. The white-capped Chiefs expressed a wish that Government should control the price and fix it at 1/-. Due to this high cost of garri, its export and transportation into French territories was prohibited.¹⁰⁰ As a result, permissions were required to take foodstuffs out of Nigeria. Archival materials contain such requests for permission to take certain foodstuffs (beans, corn, egwusi, garri, sheep, rams) to Accra, Ghana and other parts of West Africa.¹⁰¹

Loss of Revenue: The withdrawal of Europeans in the civil service for the Cameroon Expedition had in some cases involved a considerable loss of revenue. The actual cost of their salaries up to December 1914 is estimated at £11, 636. Again, practically every vessel which could be of service was taken, involving the abandonment of the reclamation work, so that an expensive plant had been lying idle, and the prospective returns in wharfage dues were of course differed, while the ordinary receipts from transport service, which had had to be abandoned, was a loss to Revenue.

⁹⁷ NAI N.1428/1918, "Maize Flour: Arrangements for the Supply of. For European Crew of Vessels— requirements"

⁹⁸ NAI B.1969/19, "Shortage of Local Foodstuffs re—"

⁹⁹ NAI A 1695/1919, "Rules made by Oyo Native Authority preventing the Exportation of Yams and Foodstuffs from Oyo."

¹⁰⁰ NAI B.561/1920, "Garri (a) Fixing of the price of, at 1/- a pan (b) Non-transportation of, to the French Territory."

¹⁰¹ NAI A 198/1921, "Application for the permissions to ship Foodstuffs, to British Ports and the Cameroons, 1921"; NAI A 176/1920, "Application for Permission to ship petrol, Kerosene, Foodstuffs to British Ports & the Cameroons—1920" NAI A. 1184, "Applications for Permission to Ship Foodstuffs, to Foreign Countries. 1921"

Shortage of Troops: Nigeria was denuded of troops and the result was a series of uprisings covering large areas and in some cases very serious.¹⁰² The total trained effectives in Nigeria were about 1300. The strength of the Nigeria Regiment was 5930 or 933 over establishment.¹⁰³ But as a result of the drafting of the men for the Cameroon Expedition, the total military strength in Nigeria including recruits became 1510. The number was 90 below the strength of the local garrison agreed upon by His Excellency and Generals Dobell and Cunliffe. To cope with these, Police were used to assist such military Forces as remained, and more civilians including a few un-officials had to be attached to the Forces to assist in suppressing disorder.¹⁰⁴

Huge Cost to Nigeria: The Expeditionary Force was a huge cost to Nigeria. The troops detached to the Cameroons on the Nigerian frontier were of course an integral part of the Allied Forces operating in the country. Their cost till the conclusion of 1914 might be put down at £47, 292 and for the first quarter of 1915 at £30, 476 including the cost of attached civilians. Under the instructions from the Secretary of State, the Expeditionary Forces were to be financed in the first instance by Nigeria. Exclusive of the charge enumerated, advances had been made to the Expeditionary Force under General Dobell amounting to £61, 945 in 1914 and £44, 000 in the first quarter of 1915. Of this total £40, 850 was advanced in the form of remittances of specie. To the end of December, 1914 a sum estimated at £20, 000 not provided on the estimates was expended on transport for the troops detached to the Cameroons, and it was estimated that a further sum of £16, 000 had been expended on the same account for the quarter ending 31 March, 1915.

This chapter has examined Nigeria's contributions to the food provisioning of the British Armed Forces (or Allied Forces) during the First World War, 1914-1918. It reviewed the world food regime before the War. This was done to understand the influence of the war on the global food order prior to the war. It has also revealed how the outbreak of the First World War disrupted and dislocated the international food flows, which enabled different kinds of restrictions and controls as well as hunger and starvation in many parts of the world. In West Africa, it is established that foodstuffs were supplied to the Allied Forces in Nigeria and in the overseas service, such as the Togoland and Cameroon Expeditionary Forces and

¹⁰² NAI N. 1035/1915, "Nigeria-Cameroons Frontier Force Operating on. Returns of Material and Stores supplied to."

¹⁰³ NAI NC124, "Recruits for the Cameroons." From the Headquarters Nigeria Regiment dated 1 December 1915

¹⁰⁴ NAI N. 1035/1915, "Nigeria-Cameroons Frontier Force Operating on. Returns of Material and Stores supplied to."

East African Campaign. Moreover, it is pointed out that Nigeria spearheaded the West African campaigns in Togoland and Cameroons, erstwhile German territories in West Africa, being the headquarters of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), and that the burden of the Allied forces on the Nigerian government led to the shortage of food for the civilian population and loss of finance to the Nigerian government.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE NIGERIAN ARMED FORCES AND FOOD PROVISIONING DURING THE INTER-WAR YEARS, 1919-1939

In the previous chapter, the effects of the First World War on global flow of foodstuffs and how food blockade was used as an instrument of warfare, were examined. It also discussed the provisioning of the Armed Forces in Nigeria and the impact of these on the local communities. For instance, the First World War occasioned economic and social dislocations across the world. Nigeria, being a major player in the war, most especially on the West African fronts, was heavily affected by the war. These effects manifested in various ways, including shortage of food and rise in prices of foodstuffs, loss of revenue, shortage of troops and huge cost to Nigeria.

In 1918, the war ended, and peace agreements with the defeated countries set in, starting with the Treaty of Versailles signed in 1919 between the Allies and Germany to those of Sevres (1920) and Lausanne (1923) signed with Turkey. The acceptance of the terms of the Treaty by Weimer Germany (albeit reluctantly) as well as the formation of the League of Nations once again created a peaceful atmosphere in the post war international environment. For instance, the Covenant of the League required it to encourage members to cooperate in the areas of commerce and trade.¹

This new state of affairs had palpable implications for the international economy. Bottlenecks to trade engendered by the war such as shipping shortages and other restrictions on overseas demand were being removed. In the case of Nigeria, various war time policies of the government were revisited, amended, modified and relaxed. For instance, Aliens Restriction Ordinance, 1914, which proscribed all aliens, including persons naturalized as British citizens in British Possessions, was abrogated in 1919. Trading with the Enemy Act, 1914 and Trading with the Enemy (Extension of Power) Act, 1915 which prohibited trade with firms of enemy nationality or association with them in non-enemy countries were also

¹ Muojama, O. 2013. *Nigerian Cocoa Export and Global Capitalism, 1914-1960*, Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of Ibadan, pp.72-73

relaxed. Receivers Offices were established in order to consider claims made against enemy firms liquidated during the war.² All these Post-War developments had implications for the movement of foodstuffs across the global market. This chapter deals with the food provisioning of the Armed Forces in Nigeria during the Inter-War years. By so doing, it looks at the Nigeria Regiment, its post-war structure and engagements. It also deals with world food situation after the First World War and throughout the Inter-War period. This will be interspersed with the Nigerian case study. Information on the food provisioning of the Armed Forces in the Inter-War years is very scarce and scrappy. This could be due to the relaxation that attended the Post-War period. Although there was periodic shortage of food in the Inter-War years, it did not attract the same magnitude of attention and organisation that was the case during the war.

4.1 The Nigeria Regiment in the Inter-War Years

The full units of the Nigerian Regiment during the war were as follows:

No 1 Battery Artillery	Zaria ³ .
No 2 Battery Artillery	Calabar
1 st Battalion Nigeria Regiment	Kaduna North
2 nd Battalion Nigeria Regiment	Lokoja
3 rd Battalion Nigeria Regiment	Calabar
4 th Battalion Nigeria Regiment	Lagos ⁴

While training Centres at Zungeru and Kaduna were disbanded after the Great War as from January 1919⁵, in 1921, the formation of two new units to the Regiment was effected, namely, Machine Gun Platoon, Nigeria Regiment, Kaduna North, and Signaling School, Nigeria Regiment, Kaduna North, Northern Nigeria.⁶

² Muojama, O. 2013. *Nigerian Cocoa Export and Global Capitalism, 1914-1960*, Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of Ibadan, p.73

³ NAI N.659/1917. "Detachment of West African Regiment at Zaria. Arrangement for Supply

⁴ NAI N.1824/1919/ CSO 19/7/1148, 1"Army Orders 1919—Supply of –ask for. From Hqs. Nigeria Regiment, West African Frontier Force, Kaduna to Chief Secretary to the Government, Lagos dated 14 October 1920 NAE N.338/14, "Barrack at Udi; NAE N. 599/14, "Bush Barrack, Nigeria Regiment Owerri, repair and renewal of"; NAE. 979/15, "Soldiers Barracks Onitsha—Report

⁵ NAI N.1824/1919/ CSO 19/7/1148, 1"Army Orders 1919—Supply of –ask for. From Hqs. Nigeria Regiment, West African Frontier Force, Kaduna to Chief Secretary to the Government, Lagos dated 14 October 1920

⁶ NAI N.1824/1919/ CSO 19/7/1148, 1"Army Orders 1919—Supply of –ask for. From Hqs. Nigeria Regiment, West African Frontier Force, Kaduna to Chief Secretary to the Government, Lagos dated 1 June 1921

Towards the end of the First World War in 1918, so many changes took place in the Nigeria Regiment. Lieutenant Colonel F. Jenkins C.M.G. was administering the Regiment as Acting Commandant. There was attention on winding up the overseas contingent in April 1918, the establishment of the Emergency Force in May 1918 and subsequently the formation and demolition of the Ist (Nigerian) West African Service Brigade.⁷

On January 1, 1919, General Cunliffe reassumed personal direction of the Regiment as Commandant. By 1919, the establishment remained the same as in 1917, so that duties and employment reduced the number available for training to approximately 1900. The number of rank and file employed on patrols or escorts, exclusive of specie and Small arm ammunition escorts were 1381. The provisional establishment of the Regiment was increased to 124 officers, 78 British non-Commissioned Officers and 3328 rank and file in July when the Service Brigade received orders for overseas and recruiting was opened. The strength of the garrison on 31 December, 1918, was 96 officers, 73 British non-commissioned officers and 2807 rank and file.⁸

After the war, there followed the demobilisation of the West African Service Brigade and the re-organization of the Nigeria Regiment so as to bring it up to its pre-war establishment.⁹ On 19 November, 1918, the secretary for the colonies telegraphed that the Regiment would revert to pre-war establishment (as broad basis) from Ist January, 1919.¹⁰ The question arose where the various units of the two Battalion allotted to the Southern provinces were to be stationed. As far as the 4th Battalion, Lagos, was concerned, the distribution was as follows:

Lagos—Headquarters, one Service Company, Depot Company

Ibadan—three Service Companies

Abeokuta—one Service Company (temporary)

Agbor—one Service Company

Source: NAI N.699/1919 or CSO 19/7/502, “Annual Report on Nigeria Regiment, 1918”, p.1

The redistribution of the 3rd Battalion with headquarters at Calabar proved less difficult and in the main the stations where troops had been retained during the War were adhered to. In those cases, quarters already exist. The garrison at Bamenda had been increased to two

⁷ NAI N.699/1919 or CSO 19/7/502, “Annual Report on Nigeria Regiment, 1918”, p.1

⁸ NAI N.699/1919 or CSO 19/7/502, “Annual Report on Nigeria Regiment, 1918”, p.1

⁹ NAI N. 1880/1919, “Distribution of 4th Battalion, Nigeria Regiment”

¹⁰ NAI N.699/1919 or CSO 19/7/502, “Annual Report on Nigeria Regiment, 1918”, p.1

Companies and provision of quarters was necessary. It was proposed to station one company at Enugu on the eastern railway as soon as quarters could be erected.¹¹

The outstanding feature of the year was the rising in the Egba District. Operations, so far as the Regiment was concerned, commenced with the dispatch of a company under Major Frazer Ist N. Regt., to Abeokuta on the 1st June. This company was subsequently reinforced by a further half company which brought the strength up to 155. About the middle of June the rising assumed such a grave appearance that the General Officer Commanding the Service Brigade assumed control and Major Frazer's company was placed under his orders and remained in the district throughout the operations and after they were over.

Excluding those operations, 9 patrols and 16 escorts were carried out, involving the employment of 36 officers, 15 British non-commissioned officers and 1381 rank and file Infantry, and 1 officer and 30 rank and file No. 2 Battery. These do not include specie and small arm ammunition escorts.

The more important were the Ekwi patrol in the Abakaliki District, and the Udi-Okigwe patrol. The latter had become a 'hardy annual'.

In 1921, a party of French native troops, consisting of fifty rank and file, in charge of one Officer, coming down from Zinder was to be accommodated at the West African Frontier Force barracks in Lagos from the evening of the 9th to the afternoon of the 11th of February.¹²

In 1922, there was a subject of a training grant to enable companies and other units of the West African Frontier Force to carry out a short period of collective training annually under service conditions. The training was to take place during the months of January, February, or March, 1924-25, and £2,000 was budgeted for it.¹³ Battalion concentrations were as follows¹⁴:

- (a) Three companies and headquarters, Ist Battalion, at Farnisau (5 miles from Kano). One company marched from Sokoto to Kano. The other two and Battalion headquarters marched from Kaduna to Kano.

¹¹ NAI N. 1880/1919, "Distribution of 4th Battalion, Nigeria Regiment"

¹² NAI N3092/21, "Detachment of French Troops arriving in Lagos from Zinder en route for Dahomey."

¹³ NAI CSO 26/ O6070, "Training Grant to the Nigeria Regiment", From J.F. Bacacham, Colonel, Commandant, Nigeria Regiment to the Chief Secretary dated 27 July 1922

¹⁴ NAI CSO 26/ O6070, "Training Grant to the Nigeria Regiment", From J.F. Bacacham, Colonel, Commandant, Nigeria Regiment to the Chief Secretary dated 13 February 1925

- (b) Three companies and headquarters, 2nd Battalion, at Keffi. headquarters and one company marching from Lokoja and proceeding to Kano after the camp. One company marching from Ankpa. The third company was stationed at Keffi.
- (c) Three companies and headquarters, 3rd Battalion, at Enugu. Headquarters and two companies from Calabar by march route from Aba. One company marching from Okigwe.
- (d) Headquarters and three companies, 4th Battalion, at Ede.
- (e) One company, 1st Battalion remained at Maiduguri;
- (f) One company, 2nd Battalion, at Yola, carrying out collective training at Song.
- (g) One company, 3rd Battalion, at Abakiliki, has two platoons on escort duty. The other two standing by if required.
- (h) Half company, 4th Battalion, at Agbor.
- (i) The Artillery marched from Zaria to Karre.

Royal West African Frontier Force by 1931.¹⁵ King's African Rifles (KAR)

Source: NAI 26771/II, RWAFF Pay of Officers and OWAND NC. p.10

4.2 World Food Situation in the Inter-War Years

The First World War destabilised the food supply chain across the world. In accordance with the reconstruction initiatives, the big scale food aid operation took place in 1919 when the US shipped more than six million tons of food commodities to Europe.¹⁶ It was aimed at alleviating the war affected European populace from hunger and malnutrition problems due to shortage of food production and supply. There was also high cost of living after the war, due to the scarcity of food and basic necessities of life, whose production was affected by the war.

However, as capacity grew faster than demand in the mid-1920s, both local and international agricultural prices dropped totally.¹⁷ Demand was slow to develop because agricultural product consumption was price and income inelastic, and the European population was growing at a far slower rate than before the war. Because of the excess production, which was

¹⁵ NAI 26771/II, RWAFF Pay of Officers and OWAND NC. p.10

¹⁶ Shaw, D. J. 2007. *A History of Food Security since 1945*. New York: Palgrave, pp.5-6

¹⁷ Lewis, W.A. 2005. Economic Survey. In G. Federico. Not Guilty? Agriculture in the 1920s and the Great Depression. *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 65, Number 4, p.951

either stored or financed with a short-term loan, and because of the poor elasticity of food demand, agricultural product prices fell well before the Great Depression.¹⁸

By the end of the First World War, Korea had seen Rice riots, and as a result of Japan's takeover of Korea, the country began to look to its colonies for food. Beginning in 1920, the Japanese government responded to the situation by launching a series of Rice Production Development Programs. These strategies attempted to increase rice output by introducing superior seed varieties, boosting fertilizer input, and ensuring a steady supply of water.¹⁹ As a result, Korean agricultural output increased by 1.6 percent every year from 1920 to 1930. Rice production, in particular, expanded at a quick rate of 2.1 percent each year, accounting for almost half of overall output in real terms.

The agricultural downturn that lasted two decades, from 1920 to the early 1940s, is notable for its low prices in most years.²⁰ The impact of global price volatility on the prices obtained by producers in developing nations has been demonstrated.²¹ 'Despite the fact that there was a boom in the mid-1925, it was predominately an industrial boom,' according to Lionel Robins. The increase in profitability of certain food production lines was modest. The relative fall of agriculture was causing considerable political strain around the world, as well as desperate attempts to avoid the repercussions of technological advancement through pools and restriction programs.²² Export prices declined by 69 percent between 1926 and 1927, while producer prices plummeted by 75 percent.²³

4.3 The Effects of the First World War on Nigerian Foodstuffs

In the specific case of Nigeria, there was shortage of food and rise in prices of foodstuffs. The prioritisation of the military food provisioning led to the shortage of food for the civilian population. This shortage was experienced throughout the war period and the post-war period. By 1914, there had been a great shortage of food in the northern provinces of Nigeria,

¹⁸ Federico, G. 2005. Not Guilty? Agriculture in the 1920s and the Great Depression. *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 65, Number 4, p.951

¹⁹ Ban et al., Rural Development. In S.O. Myung. 1998. Imperil Policy or World Price Shocks? Explaining Interwar Korean Consumption Trend. *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 58, Number 3, p.732

²⁰ Daniel, S., 'Recent Commodity Price Movements in Historical Perspective,' *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, Vol. 91, Number 5, pp.1250-1256

²¹ Brian, P., Hazell, R., Mauricio, J., and Amy W. 1968. 'The Relationship between World Price Instability and the Prices Farmers Receive in Developing Countries,' *Journal Agricultural Economics*, Vol. 50. Number 3, pp.702-719

²² Heinz W. A. 2014. *Economic Lessons of the 1930s*. Routledge, p.9

²³ Gunnarsson, C. 1978. *The Gold Coast Cocoa Industry. 1900-1939*, Volume 23 of Publications of the *Economic History Association in Lund*. California:

such that it was cheaper to import rice than to attempt to buy guinea corn locally.²⁴ In 1918, the food situation was very acute. Rice was unobtainable except in small quantities. The food shortage of 1918 also affected corn. It was difficult to obtain and forward corn rapidly in the then existent conditions. Corn was practicably untouchable at the time. The local population was asked to economise in every way in the use of wheat flour, in order to assist in a small way in the conduct of the War.²⁵

The food deficit persisted a year after the war ended, in 1919. For instance, a telegram from Secretary of State dated 10 November, 1919 noted that there was the danger of shortage of local foodstuffs; and that merchants were pressing for permission to export further supply of rice to West Africa for their native employees.²⁶ Because of the severe shortage of local foodstuffs in Nigeria as a result of the First World War, the Oyo Native Authority enacted restrictions prohibiting the shipment of yams and other commodities from Oyo. The offenders were liable to £5 fine or three months imprisonment.²⁷

As has been seen, the price of garri in Lagos rose from 2/6d to 2/9 a measure, of which the pre-war price was 6d. The white-capped chiefs expressed a wish that government should control the price and fix it at 1/-. Due to this high cost of garri, its export and transportation into French Territories was prohibited.²⁸ As a result, permissions were required to take foodstuffs out of Nigeria. Archival materials contain such requests for permission to take certain foodstuffs (beans, corn, egwusi, garri, sheep, rams) to Accra, Ghana and other parts of West Africa.²⁹

In the case of rice, there was the danger of shortage of local foodstuffs. Merchants were pressing for permission to export further supply of rice to West Africa for their native employee. Annual rice ration almost exhaust additional supplies from United Kingdom could

²⁴ NAI N.1930/CSO 19/2/1414. "1. 16 Tons of Rice Required for Headquarters Kaduna, 2. Monthly supply of 16 tons rice to Kaduna, 3. Enquiring if procurable at Lagos", letter dated 14-7-1914

²⁵ NAI N.1428/1918, "Maize Flour: Arrangements for the Supply of. For European Crew of Vessels— requirements"

²⁶ NAI B.1969/19, "Shortage of Local Foodstuffs re—"

²⁷ NAI A 1695/1919, "Rules made by Oyo Native Authority preventing the Exportation of Yams and Foodstuffs from Oyo."

²⁸ NAI B.561/1920, "Garri (a) Fixing of the price of, at 1/- a pan (b) Non-transportation of, to the French Territory."

²⁹ NAI A 198/1921, "Application for the permissions to ship Foodstuffs, to British Ports and the Cameroons, 1921"; NAI A 176/1920, "Application for Permission to ship petrol, Kerosene, Foodstuffs to British Ports & the Cameroons—1920" NAI A. 1184, "Applications for Permission to Ship Foodstuffs, to Foreign Countries. 1921"

be allowed only in case of necessity telegram minimum requirements in 1920 for colony.³⁰ In April 1920, the Central Secretary Lagos circulated information to the Port Harcourt Chamber of Commerce, noting that rice, other than Burma rice, would be shipped to Nigeria from the United Kingdom up to a maximum of 35,000 cwts.³¹ Similarly, on 8 May, 1920, the Imports and Exports Licensing Section of the Board of Trade, London, noted, contrary to the April message, that the Ministry of Food had now agreed to the export of a maximum quantity of 20,000 tons of Burma rice to the West African colonies, the British West Africa and Liberia in respect of the 1920 requirements.

Lord Milner had received representation to the effect that the supply of locally grown foodstuffs in the West African colonies might be deficient and that more rice might, therefore, be required for consumption. However, supply from the United Kingdom could not be increased except in case of necessity, but if the reports of the shortage of local foodstuffs were substantiated, it might be necessary to revise the allocation.

The Royal Commission on wheat supplies and the Secretary of State for India were now prepared to agree to the shipment of 10,000 tons. The requirements of the West African colonies have been revised owing to local scarcity in the Gambia and the Gold Coast, as follows:

Gambia	2,800 tons (in addition to rice being obtained from other sources)
Sierra Leone	1,000 tons
Gold Coast	6,000 tons
Nigeria	1,750 tons

Source: NAI N121/1920 OR CSO 19/8/7, "Rice Supply for Nigeria",

The Governor of Nigeria, Hugh Clifford, wanted to know how much of the 10,000 tons of Burma rice would be allotted to Nigeria, noting that no efficient means of controlling retail

³⁰ NAIN121/1920 OR CSO 19/8/7, "Rice Supply for Nigeria",

³¹ Ibid.

price in Nigeria. He suggested that the allocation to firms should be made in England with stipulation attached providing details of allocation.³²

In 1919, there was a modification of Order in Council made under the Customs Ordinance of 1916 with respect to exports from Nigeria to foreign destinations. The modification Order came as a consequence of relaxation of war-time restrictions on exports. This development occasioned an open general license issued which allowed for the free exportation of some certain foodstuffs by freight from Nigeria to Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland and Switzerland. This permission was allowed on the following grounds. For Norway and Sweden, individual guarantees in respect of exports were no longer required but the goods must be consigned to appropriate imports association. Shippers were expected to forward to the Custom shipping bills or specifications and if the guarantee had previously sent to this department, the reference number of the relative papers should be furnished.³³

In the case of Denmark, the usual certificates form of the Danish Associations must be produced to the customs at the time of shipment. Where goods covered by one certificate were to be shipped in instalments, special arrangement had to be made with the custom at the time of shipment. For Holland, all goods might be consigned to the Netherlands Overseas Trust for account of the sub-consignee without the prior production of an N.O.T certificate, through exporters who actually had certificates were ordered to hand them over to the customs at the time of shipment. The procedure was applied to other outstanding licenses. Lastly, for Switzerland, all consignable goods must be consigned to the Societe Suisse de Surveillance Economique for account of the sub-consignee without prior production of any form of certificate, through exporters who actually held certificates were instructed to hand over to the customs at the time of shipment.³⁴

By 1926, there was the introduction of ‘produce export regulation’ for principal export products from Nigeria. This was to apply to all produce exported from the port of Lagos. All palm oil inspected and graded should forthwith be displayed in casks or other suitable

³² NAIN121/1920 OR CSO 19/8/7, “Rice Supply for Nigeria”,

³³ NAI CSO/N.1275/1919, “Exports from Nigeria to Foreign Destinations—Modifications of: Order in Council made under the Custom Ordinance, 1916. Also see Chukwuebuka Omeje. “Nigeria and the World Food Crisis, 1946-1948.” A Master’s Degree Dissertation submitted to the Department of History, University of Ibadan, 2019, p.28

³⁴ NAI CSO/N.1275/1919, “Exports from Nigeria to Foreign Destinations—Modifications of: Order in Council made under the Custom Ordinance, 1916. Also see Chukwuebuka Omeje. “Nigeria and the World Food Crisis, 1946-1948.” A Master’s Degree Dissertation submitted to the Department of History, University of Ibadan, 2019, p.28

receptacles which would be effectively closed to the satisfaction of an inspector or examiner. The amount of 1 d. per ton was to be collected by the customs department on the palm produce exported to cover the cost of the inspection of produce. As a result of pot-war adulteration of produce by producers, a rigorous inspection of produce was started. Equally, any person who was to ship or attempt to ship export produce which was not inspected or graded was liable to pay a fine of £50 or imprisonment for 3 months. The inspection of the produce must take place before the sale irrespective of the quantity offered or purchased. In the event not reaching the standard of purity at least 10% for oil, it would not be removed until when cleaned and brought up to the standard.³⁵

With the approval of the Honourable Treasurer, the Lieutenant Governor of Northern Provinces opened and administered 'Grain Accounts' in Jos and Bukuru in 1927. This development was started as a result of the good grain harvest in the Northern Provinces during this time period, and for the benefit of the public workers. This was also intended for the acquisition of grain stocks to be sold to Public Works Department employees. For these accounts, the maximum advance authorized increased from £250 in 1920 to £500 in 1926. The 'Jos Grain Account' increased the maximum advance amount from £500 to £800 in 1927. Furthermore, under the direction of the Director of Public Works, grain consumption altered by the end of 1927.

Furthermore, from the end of 1926-1927 until 1930, over 400 tons of paddy rice from the northern provinces were brought in at 42d per pounds. Due to unavoidable delays in the production of the parboiled rice plant, the milling and selling of the 1920-1930 purchases had to be postponed until the dry weather of 1929-1930. Unfortunately, the extremely bad weather affected the selling of rice in Zaria and Kano. There were products which were difficult to sell, for instance, forty tons of rice was sold at Zaria and Kano at 2d, instead of per pound, a price which only covered overhead expenses, depreciation .. But the sales demanded that the prices had to be reduced to 1½ d. per pound. By implication, this only covered out-of-pocket expenses.

The world-wide fall in the prices of goods began to make itself felt in 1929 and became intensified during the 1930s. The markets registered prices which had never been so low for decades even prior to this period. This adverse condition affected Nigeria trade severely. In

³⁵ NAI CSO 26/33698/S.1 Vol. I, "Produce Exports Regulations, dated 1926 and 1928. Also see Chukwuebuka Omeje. 2019 "*Nigeria and the World Food Crisis, 1946-1948.*" A Master's Degree Dissertation submitted to the Department of History, University of Ibadan, p.29

1929, overall imports amounted to £12,007,301 and in 1930; it decreased to £11,691,949 (as compared to £14,062,194 in 1928).³⁶ It should be noted, however, that the validity of these data for comparison purposes was heavily influenced by the steady decline in prices of practically all goods (including groceries) that began in 1924. Therefore, the comparisons could not be true of the volume of imports.

³⁶ NAI Blue Book 1930, Annual Report on the Agricultural Department of Nigeria, 1930.

Table 4.1: Foods and Drinks

Food	1927	1928	1929	Total
Beer	1,043,306	1,126,235	867,063	3,036,640
Wines	182,047	163,387	109,106	454,540
Bread & Biscuits	34,041	42,310	55,598	131,949
Flour	65,531	83,844	80,719	230,094
Fish	301,075	358,529	352,511	1,012,115
Rice	184,873	186,390	221,145	592,408
Salt	1,113,591	1,066,149	1,048,719	3,228,459

Sources: Blue Book 1930, Annual Report on the Agricultural Department of Nigeria 1930

The table above showcases the quantity of irregular importation of foodstuffs into Nigeria during the period of 1927 to 1929. Such irregular importations were quite negligible. Precisely in 1930, Nigeria imported various food items from different countries of the world. The quantities of food items Nigeria imported in the year 1930 from different countries included: biscuits, bread, cake, confectionery, cheese, rice, corn meal tea, sugar, egg, fish, milk, butter. The total quantity of food items imported into Nigeria at this period amounted to 6,855,692 tons, while the total value amounted to £557,106.³⁷

Nigeria, on the other hand, exported a variety of foods to other countries in the world in 1930. The food items exported by Nigeria were groundnuts, palm oil, palm kernels, benniseeds, potatoes, rice and millets.

In 1936, some parts of Nigeria, especially the southern provinces witnessed shortage of food due to poor rainfall (drought). These provinces were Ogoja, Owerri, Benin, Warri, and Onitsha. In Onitsha province, there was an estimation of low harvest that was beyond normal harvest during this period. Yam crop was adversely affected. This situation was the same in Abakaliki Division, Owerri, Ogoja and Calabar. The same was the situation in Oyo and Abeokuta provinces. The residents of Ijebu province also experienced food shortage with exorbitant prices as a result of lack of rainfall. Abeokuta rainfall in 1935 and in 1936 was 27 and 21 inches, respectively. This brought about poor production of maize, rice and yams with 50 to 100 per cent price increase. In Ondo and Benin provinces, rain shortage generally caused crops backwardness. The poor rain negatively affected crop yields and caused increase in prices of food.³⁸

In the northern provinces, there was severe drought in 1935 and 1936 between the early rains and general rains. This affected crops yield in some areas. The drought, however, broke in good time and some food crops yielded very satisfactory as far as one could envisage. This was witnessed in Zaria, Sokoto, Ilorin, Bauchi, and Kano provinces. In 1936, 1937 and 1938 Nigeria imported several foodstuffs from various countries.³⁹

Food supply was not at all satisfactory; prices being very high and almost out of reach of the pocket of the soldier. The position in the northern provinces was very acute at the moment

³⁷ NAI Blue Book 1930, Annual Report on the Agricultural Department of Nigeria, 1930. General Imports into the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, dated December, 1930.

³⁸ NAI C90 26/10904/S2, Rainfall and Effects on Crops: Forthnight Report dated 1936

³⁹ NAI C90 26/10904/S2, Rainfall and Effects on Crops: Forthnight Report dated 1936

and the Commandant asked for the immediate increase in the per diem as a temporary relief. It was known that prices also reigned very high comparatively in the southern provinces.⁴⁰

The focus of this chapter was with the food provisioning of the Armed Forces in Nigeria during the Inter-War years. It looked at the Nigeria Regiment, its Post-War structure and engagements. The world food situation after the First World War and throughout the Inter-War period was closely monitored and interspersed with Nigeria as the case study. It was averred that although there was periodic shortage of food in the Inter-War years, yet, it did not attract the same magnitude of attention and organisation that was the case during the war.

⁴⁰ NAI N.699/1919 or CSO 19/7/502, “Annual Report on Nigeria Regiment, 1918”

CHAPTER FIVE

PROVISIONING THE TROOPS IN NIGERIA DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1939-1945 AND POST-WAR PERIOD, 1946-1960

This chapter deals with the provisioning of the Allied Troops in West Africa, with a special emphasis on Nigeria. By so doing, it makes a quick review of the formation of the Allied Forces in West Africa during the Second World War. It also examines how the Second World War disrupted the international system, politically and economically, and the concomitant restrictions and control of trade, food and prices. It interrogates the food requirements of the military and the supply of foodstuff to the armed forces in Nigeria during the Second World War. Apart from the general systems analysis, the study looks at the nuances of production, requirements and supplies of various crops, such as rice, yam, palm oil, guinea corn.

5.1 The Allied Troops in Nigeria during the Second World War

During the Second World War, the Allied Troops in West Africa comprised the British Army that is, the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF); the Royal Air Force (RAF); the Royal Navy; and the United States Army. The headquarters were at Achimota, Accra, in Gold Coast. Each of the British colonies in West Africa had its own commands, but all were coordinated from Achimota by the Resident Minister (Resmin). From the basis of the 1943 estimate for the food requirements of the United States Army, it can be deduced that by 1943, the American Army in West Africa were as follows:

Table 5.1: Food Control

Station	Strength
Takoradi	150
Accra	5,000
Lagos	100
Kano	450
Maidiguri	300

Source: NAS 37909/S14/C1 Food Control: West African War Council, p.44

As has been seen in Chapter Three, the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) constituted the standing army of the British in West Africa. WAFF originated from the Nigeria Regiment formed in 1863. This was augmented by the second and third constabularies formed by the Royal Niger Company in 1886. In 1894-1897, the British Government raised a local force under the command of Colonel Fredrick Lugard. By 1900, the local force had become such a well-disciplined body to make Lord Lugard call it the West African Frontier Force. In 1906, the Lagos Battalion became part of the Southern Nigeria Regiment. There was also a Northern Nigeria Regiment. According to Osuntokun, by the end of 1913 the armed forces of both Southern and Northern Nigeria were merged into one single brigade of five battalions known as the Nigeria Regiment. Three of these battalions (including the only mounted infantry battalion) were stationed in the north and the remaining two in the south.¹

Following the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Nigeria on 1 January, 1914, the two Regiments became one, known as the Nigeria Regiment.² Thus, the temporary Brigade Office at Lagos closed on 1 January 1914 and the Headquarters of the Nigerian Regiment WAFF was moved from Lagos to Kaduna the following day.³ The full units of the Nigerian Regiment by 1914 were as follows:

No 1 Battery Artillery	Zaria ⁴ .
No 2 Battery Artillery	Calabar
1 st Battalion Nigeria Regiment	Kaduna North
2 nd Battalion Nigeria Regiment	Lokoja
3 rd Battalion Nigeria Regiment	Calabar
4 th Battalion Nigeria Regiment	Lagos ⁵

¹ Osuntokun, A. 1979. *Nigeria in the First World War*. London: Longman.p.169

² Adedipe, G. A. K. 1965. "Introduction". *A Special List of Records on the Army in the Nigerian Secretariat Record Group*, National Archives, Ibadan

³NAI N.2093/1913, "Temporary Brigade Office at Lagos Closing of on 1/1/1914. Moving of the Headquarters of the Nigeria Regiment WAFF from Lagos to Kaduna on 2/1/1914 (1913)"

⁴NAI N.659/1917. "Detachment of West African Regiment at Zaria. Arrangement for Supply

⁵ NAI N.1824/1919/ CSO 19/7/1148, 1"Army Orders 1919—Supply of –ask for. From Hqs. Nigeria Regiment, West African Frontier Force, Kaduna to Chief Secretary to the Government, Lagos dated 14 October 1920 NAE N.338/14, "Barrack at Udi; NAE N. 599/14, "Bush Barrack, Nigeria Regiment Owerri, repair and renewal of"; NAE. 979/15, "Soldiers Barracks Onitsha—Report

The headquarters of the infantry battalions were Kaduna, Lokoja, Calabar and Lagos, while the mounted infantry battalion had its headquarters in Kano. The first battalion in Kaduna had eight companies, three of which were stationed in Kaduna, and one each in Sokoto, Kano, Bauchi-Pankshin, Birnin Kebbi and Katagum. The second battalion based at Lokoja also consisted of eight companies, with two companies stationed in Lokoja, one each in Womba, Yola-Pirambi, Maiduguri, Ankpa-Boje, Zunferu-Zuru and Nafada. The third battalion based at Calabar consisted of eight companies, two of them at Calabar and one each in Ukpo, Owerri, Obudu, Ogoja, Okigwe and Abinsi-Katsena-Allah. The fourth battalion in Lagos had seven companies, two of which always remained in Lagos, and one each in Okwoga, Onitsha, Udi, Agbor and Ibadan. The fifth mounted infantry battalion based in Kano had just three companies, one each stationed in Kano, Sokoto and Geidam.⁶

While training centres at Zungeru and Kaduna were disbanded after the Great War as from January 1919⁷, in 1921, the formation of two new units to the Regiment was effected, namely, Machine Gun Platoon, Nigerian Regiment, Kaduna North, and Signaling School, Nigerian Regiment, Kaduna North, Northern Nigeria.⁸

Shortly before the outbreak of the war, there was a reorganisation of the army in Nigeria. This reorganisation involved the movement of Regimental Headquarters as well as various units of the Brigade from Kaduna to Lagos, commencing from 26 September, 1939.⁹

The new organisation of the Regiment involved the evacuation of troops from Calabar and Okigwe, and the disposal of buildings occupied by troops at Calabar and Okigwe. The two of the RWAFF buildings at Okigwe should be taken over by the provincial administration for use as rent houses, and that a third house be allocated to the medical department for nursing sisters who were to be posted to Okigwe. The remaining RWAFF building at Okigwe be put to no suitable use and the Commandant be permitted to dismantle these and salvage whatever useful materials could be profitably transferred to Enugu.¹⁰

⁶ Osuntokun, A. 1979. *Nigeria in the First World War*, p.170

⁷ NAI N.1824/1919/ CSO 19/7/1148, 1“Army Orders 1919—Supply of –ask for. From Hqs. Nigeria Regiment, West African Frontier Force, Kaduna to Chief Secretary to the Government, Lagos dated 14 October 1920

⁸ NAI N.1824/1919/ CSO 19/7/1148, 1“Army Orders 1919—Supply of –ask for. From Hqs. Nigeria Regiment, West African Frontier Force, Kaduna to Chief Secretary to the Government, Lagos dated 1 June 1921

⁹ NAI 36194, “Move of Regimental Headquarters to Lagos: Stations of the various units of the Brigade.”

¹⁰ NAI CSO 26/ 06108/S.1, “RWAFF: Reorganisation: Building Programme

With the introduction of the new organisation of the Nigeria Regiment, it was desirable to complete the new building required at Kano, Kaduna, and Enugu before the end of September, 1937.¹¹

5.2 The Second World War and Food/Price Control in Nigeria

Trade restrictions and control have been ubiquitous interventions in the world economic system. Although it runs counter to the principle of free trade upon which capitalism and world economy rest, there have been occasional resort to these mechanisms by various national governments. For instance, during the First World War, 1914-1918, various countries restricted trade such that the subjects of the belligerent countries were excluded from trade within the national boundaries. There was also control of the movement of goods so as to prevent the goods from entering the enemy territories. This was relaxed as soon as the war ended.

During the Great Depression of the 1930s, trade restrictions were also imposed by various national governments in order to fight against the fluctuations in the prices of commodities. The Second World War broke out in 1939, in the middle of this environment of frequent changes in commodities prices. The war gave rise to trade and shipping dislocations and disruptions. It involved the disappearance of the important central European market. There were grave fears that the loss of markets in enemy countries might worsen the situation.¹² As a reaction to this situation, the British Government declared import and export controls. This enabled it to control the trade of its dependencies and prevent supply to the enemy countries.

Circular dispatch Secret (2) of 23 August, 1939 regarding import and export restrictions was drafted at the time when war was not regarded as imminent though possible. Therefore, so far as import control was concerned, two-stage procedure was contemplated, firstly that the field of import should be reviewed and the possibilities of limitation reported; and then that the policy should be provisionally settled in the light of this survey. Quicker machinery must be devised as the outbreak of hostilities rendered this programme impossible.¹³

¹¹ NAI CSO 26/ 06108/S.1, "RWAFF: Reorganisation: Building Programme

¹² *The Nigerian Daily Times*, Thursday, 30 May 1940, p.16

¹³ NAI DCI/4036. "Imports of Foodstuff Control of"

Food Control

In a letter dated 2 November, 1939, the Secretary of State for Colonies transmitted to the Governor of Nigeria a description of the method which it was proposed to adopt for controlling the export of essential foodstuffs from the United Kingdom to the dependencies and to describe the measures which should be put into effect in the territory concerned for operating this control. The general aim was to ensure that each dependency received its fair share of the available supplies of its essential food requirements and at the same time, provided this condition was available, to interfere as little as possible with normal trade practice. Full control was exercised by the Ministry of Food in the UK over the supply of the majority of essential foodstuffs. Commodities which were completely controlled were: sugar, all forms of cereals other than rice, all forms of feeding stuffs, all forms of meat including canned meat. In the first place, the essential minimum requirements of the dependencies, which would be fixed on the basis of approved monthly requirements, must be fixed with the agreement of the colonial governments and of the food controlling authorities in the UK. The principal responsibility for keeping a check upon orders for the import of foodstuffs into a dependency from the UK must obviously rest with the government of the dependency concerned.¹⁴

In the specific case of Nigeria, Gazette 85, Government Notice No. 178, noted that a scheme for the control of food supplies from the United Kingdom to British Dependencies would be put into force in Nigeria on 1 April, 1940. Under this scheme all orders for foodstuffs from the UK would be submitted by recognized retailers to the Food Controller of the dependency concerned, who would endorse only such orders that come within the approved monthly quota of the commodity allotted to the dependency. All orders so endorsed would receive priority of treatment by the Export Licensing Department in the UK, though anyone whether commercial firm, society or private consumer, was at liberty to submit unendorsed orders to the Export Licensing Department on the chance that ample supplies of a particular commodity might be available in which case license might be granted.

The attention of the public was also invited to the Defence (Control of Imports) Regulations, No.67 of 29 December, 1937, under which the importation of foodstuffs from foreign countries was prohibited, with the following exceptions: beer, beef, fish (dried), fish (canned), flour, meat (canned), oil (edible), spirits (potable) other than rum and whisky,

¹⁴ NAI DCI/4036. "Imports of Foodstuff Control of"

sugar, tea, vegetables. It was essential that the public should recognize the urgent need for increasing local production of foodstuffs, and of vegetables in particular. It was noted that each individual who reduced his demands for imported foodstuffs by the substitution of local produce was materially assisting to relieve the increasing burden which, under wartime conditions, the British government, British shipping and the British community generally were called upon to bear.¹⁵

By 1941, there were restrictions on the movement of foodstuffs within Nigeria. This was to make sure that the country would be self-sufficient in foodstuffs and be able to supply both the troops and the civilian population. For instance, in June 1941, in exercise of the powers vested in the Competent Authority by Regulations 80 of the Nigeria Defence Regulations 1939 (No. 32 of 1939), the Farina (garri) Maize and Yams Movement Control Order 1941 was made. By so doing, the export of farina (garri), maize and yams from Abeokuta Province was prohibited except under permit signed by the Competent Authority, Abeokuta Province or by his Agent. This Order signed by A.P. Pullen, Resident Abeokuta Province, was to take effect on 11 June, 1941.¹⁶ This was followed by the Paddy and Clean Rice Movement and Control Order 1941, which prohibited the export of paddy and clean rice from Abeokuta province, with effect from 23 September, 1941.

As a result of these prohibitions, on 11 April, 1942, the resident, Abeokuta province wrote to the Food Controller, Lagos, requesting him to speak to the Commissioner of Police, Lagos, and urge the necessity of police posts to be arranged so as to examine permits for export of foodstuffs, especially, Colony/Abeokuta Boundary-Ijebu-Ode/Abeokuta Boundary, Abeokuta/Ibadan Boundary, against the only post proposed to be erected within a mile of Abeokuta.

In his letter to the Commissioner of Police, Lagos, dated 15 April, 1942, the Food Controller, R.J. Hook, noted that the resident, Abeokuta, was requesting grain (rice and maize) to meet Military and other requirements outside the province, and was naturally anxious that there should be no exports in defiance of the 'Prohibition of Movement' Orders. In his response, dated 17 April 1942, the Commissioner of Police noted that while he appreciated the anxiety of the resident to prevent export of grain in defiance of the order, he must point out that he could not suddenly produce 'police posts' at the request of individual Residents. He noted

¹⁵ NAI DCI/ 4036 "Imports of Foodstuff Control of", Gazette 85, Govt. Notice No.176, 'Importation of Foodstuffs from the UK'. J.J. Emberton, Food Controller, 27/2/1940

¹⁶ DCI/1/1/4038/Vol. I, "Restrictions on Movement of Foodstuffs."

that he had received instructions from Government (Nigeria Supply Board) to establish eight traffic control posts in the Western provinces as soon as possible on sites selected by the Transport Control Officer appointed by the Board. This involved the selection of 16 trained non-commissioned officers and 48 men, the building of quarters, posts, erection of barriers and many other aspects not readily apparent to those who did not deal with these matters. He considered it a waste of trained Nigerian Police personnel to establish posts merely for the purpose of examining permits. In his opinion, the work could equally be done by Native Authority Police, with some supervision.¹⁷

From Abeokuta, the wave of prohibition of the movement of foodstuffs spread like a wild fire across other provinces of Nigeria in 1942. For instance, Public Notice No. 83 of 1942, Gazette No. 22 of 16/4/1942, noted that an Order of 31 March, 1942, by the resident, Sokoto province, John H. Carrow, prohibited the removal of rice from Sokoto province. In that case, no person should move out of Sokoto province any rice in excess of 11lb in weight without the written permission of a Competent Authority. This was supposed to go into effect on April 1, 1942.¹⁸

In May 1942, Kano province also followed suit, prohibiting the removal of maize from the Province, which was also adopted by A. R. A. Dickins, Acting Resident, Oyo province, which also prohibited the removal of Maize from the province with effect from 1 September, 1942.

Worried by the frenzy with which the issue of restriction was pursued by various provinces, the Food Controller, Lagos, R.J. Hook wrote a letter, dated 10 June, 1942, to the Assistant Food Controllers of Northern, Eastern, and Western provinces as well as the colony, requesting that before the issue of any order restricting the movement of foodstuffs from their provinces, residents of other provinces which might possibly be affected by such an order might be notified of the intention.¹⁹

Thus, on 16 June, 1942, the food controller wrote to the resident, Abeokuta province, directing that all export restriction be removed temporarily in Abeokuta province. Also on 20 June, 1942, the food controller wrote to the resident, Oyo province, stating that there had

¹⁷ DCI/1/1/4038/Vol. I, "Restrictions on Movement of Foodstuffs."

¹⁸ DCI/1/1/4038/Vol. I, "Restrictions on Movement of Foodstuffs."

¹⁹ DCI/1/1/4038/Vol. I, "Restrictions on Movement of Foodstuffs."

been a rise in price of maize at Badagry from 2 ½ d to 9d per Olodu, and, therefore, asked the resident to suspend the order prohibiting the movement of grain, most especially maize.²⁰

The suspension of prohibition which took place in the South did not affect the Northern Provinces. By Public Notice No. 227 Gazette No 51 of 3.9.42, the Guinea Corn and Millet (Prohibition of Removal from Sokoto Province) Order 1942 was made on 25 July, 1942 by John H. Carrow, resident, Sokoto province with effect from 1 August, 1942.

In August 1942, there was movement orders, requesting residents of all Western provinces concerned to place movement orders on maize and rice and to prohibit export from the provinces unless under permit or instructions from the Director of Supplies.²¹ It was suggested by the Grain Controller, Abeokuta, that an order prohibiting the export of maize and rice from Ijebu province would greatly assist control in the Abeokuta province from which there must always be some leakage. The resident, Ijebu province, noted that he was quite willing to make such an order provided that the Association of West African Merchants were instructed to buy all the maize and rice brought to them in Ijebu province on the same terms as had been agreed for Abeokuta. In view of the fact that government had undertaken to buy the whole of the rice crop, the export of rice from Ijebu province should be prohibited. The quantity of maize exported from Ijebu was very small, but any order made to prohibit the export would be mainly directed to prevent the re-export of maize smuggled in from the Abeokuta povince.²² Thus, by Public Notice No. 234 Gazette No. 51 of 3.9.42, the Ijebu Province (Prohibition of Removal of Foodstuffs) Order 1942 was made with effect from 1 September, 1942.

By Public Notice No. 246 of 1942 Gazette No. 54 of 17.9.42, the yam, yam flour, rice and guinea corn (Prohibition of Removal from Oyo Province) Order 1942 was also made with effect from 15 September, 1942.

This was followed by the prohibition of removal of dried fish and onions from Sokoto province; maize, yams, rice and guinea corn from Ondo province; corn from Kabba; guinea corn and rice from Adamawa province and prohibition of the movement of yams from Onitsha province made by D.P.J O'Conner, the resident of Onitsha province.

²⁰ DCI/1/1/4038/Vol. I, "Restrictions on Movement of Foodstuffs."

²¹ DCI/1/1/4038/Vol. I, "Restrictions on Movement of Foodstuffs." Extracted from Minutes of Meeting held at Abeokuta on the 19 August 1942.

²² DCI/1/1/4038/Vol. I, "Restrictions on Movement of Foodstuffs." From Resident Ijebu Province, E.V. Thomas, to the Food Controller, Lagos, 28 August 1942

A component of food control scheme was the rationing of commodities. One of the measures which the emergency of war made inevitable was the ration system. Owing to the fact that production of articles in ordinary use in peacetime and not absolutely essential for the maintenance of life in the average household had to be strictly restricted in order to give freer scope for the production of essential articles, especially those necessary for the prosecution of the war, it necessarily followed that some system of rationing should be instituted in order to ensure fair distribution of available supplies.²³

These rationed commodities included milk, flour and whisky. In this case, individuals were issued ration cards which would enable them to obtain the specified quantity of the rationed commodities. The only exemptions to this rule were the Chief Secretary and Chief Commissioners who were not subject to rationing. The manager of the Kingsway Stores was advised that supplies of rationed commodities should be made available to the mentioned officers without producing ration cards or permits. A record was kept of the supplies issued and forwarded periodically to the Commissioner of the Colony in order to obviate difficulties when stocks were being checked.²⁴ In 1946, it was also decided that the provision of ration order should be waived in respect of the Chief Justice's establishment, and in 1947, the Commissioner of the Colony was also exempted from the provisions of the Order. By 1948, the Official Members of Executive Council were free from the ration list of controlled goods.

Price Control

Purchases, both for civilian needs and civil reserves, were closely bound up with effective form of Price Control. In the past, when the army had entered the market in competition with civilian needs, crops had been withheld and purchasers played off against each other. At the first meeting of the Supply Centre Committee, Governments agreed to give consideration to the appointment of a price controller and advisor on military contracts. It was not known how far this policy had been implemented, but it was thought that price control in West Africa to the period of the Second World War had been primarily concerned with the control of imported articles. Price fixing of local foodstuffs, when attempted, had been largely ineffective owing to the impossibility of adequate supervision, but it would appear within the

²³ NAI DCI 4037/S.32/C.5, Food Control: Registration and Rationed Commodities, Exemptions Form”

²⁴ NAI DCI 4037/S.32/C.5, Food Control: Registration and Rationed Commodities, Exemptions Form” From Director of Supplies to the General Manager, United Africa Company Ltd., Lagos dated 16 June 1945

production areas and restricting movement of produce outside those areas until requirements for the army and civilian reserves were met.²⁵

Price control was largely ineffective unless there was supervision with a view to its enforcement. A great deal had been done in Nigeria in the matter of price-fixing of local foodstuffs. The prices of grain had been controlled by residents concerned, and most provinces had a controlled price list of the more important local foodstuffs, which was amended from time to time. Four price inspectors were appointed in Lagos and, it was expected that there would be further such appointments in other parts of the country. Prohibition of Movement Orders had been in force in many provinces in order to obtain military requirements.²⁶

5.3 Military Food Requirements in Nigeria during the Second World War

There were fluctuations in military requirement and demands. In order to make appropriate plans for the military supply, annual estimates were made by the Supply Centre on the subject of Military Food requirements. This was done in consultation with the West African War Council (WAWC).

For instance, at the meeting of the War Council at Accra on Friday morning, 14 August, 1942, the agenda included important paper stock on food requirements of the army in 1943 in each colony and supply programmes, attainment of 1942 targets, among other things. As the subject to be discussed affected every colony and service, it was essential each colony and service should be represented.²⁷ The estimates of 1942 showed colony by colony requirements and deficiencies, and in the case of Nigeria, the balance which the country was being called upon to make up.

Most Secret Memorandum No. CRWA/4415/AQ of the 7th September, 1942, from General Headquarters, with three attachments, gave the requirements in foodstuffs of The Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF), the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the American Army.²⁸ The military food requirements in 1943 for garrisons of the Army, the R.A.F., and the U.S. Army

²⁵ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council" Memorandum Submitted by the Supply Centre to the Resident Minister on the Subject of Military Food Requirements. P.2

²⁶ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council" Memorandum Submitted by the Supply Centre to the Resident Minister on the Subject of Military Food Requirements. Appendix C

²⁷ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council" From Resident Minister, Accra to Governors of Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Gambia.

²⁸ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council" From Resident Minister's Office, Achimota, Accra to the Chief Secretary, Nigeria, Lagos dated 16 September 1942

stationed in the West African colonies were also contained in 'Appendix A' of the Memorandum submitted by the Supply Centre to the Resident Minister on the Subject of Military Food Requirements.²⁹ The Memorandum also contained a statement of the quantities of various commodities which it was hoped the Nigerian Government would be able to provide to meet requirements within their territory and also deficiencies in other colonies. This was prepared in the Resident Minister's Office and was based on the information contained in the three annexure to the memorandum from general headquarters. The tables supplied by general headquarters showed only requirements in the first and last months of 1943. To take the average of the two sets of figures and to multiply it by twelve might give a misleading result, and so the Statistician had calculated the progressive monthly increases in order to arrive at the total requirements for the year. The military authorities were unable to foretell what changes in personnel would take place in consequences of reinforcements and transfers, and were therefore not disposed to give an estimate of their total requirements for 1943 in the different colonies. But realizing that the governments would need such an estimate in order to plan the planting programme, one was drawn up by the method mentioned.³⁰

It should be noted that the figures used to estimate the deficiencies in other colonies were provided by the government before they were aware of the General Officer Commanding in Chief's readiness to release men with the necessary experience to assist in the production drive and form part of the purchasing organizations that would be established in Nigeria, the Gold Coast, and Sierra Leone. It was hoped that this measure of assistance would enable the three other governments to satisfy a greater part of the military requirements in respect of their colonies than they considered would be possible, and in the case of the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone to have a surplus in certain commodities to make up deficiencies elsewhere.³¹

This estimate, which included requirements for Air Force personnel, was divided into three parts, namely: (a) entirely firm (b) likely but not firm (c) possible but not likely. The estimate was submitted in this form in response to a request by the Supply Centre Committee to give government an indication of all likely contingencies to enable them to frame their planting programmes accordingly. It was based on the following estimated strength:

²⁹ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council"

³⁰ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council" From Resident Minister's Office, Achimota, Accra to the Chief Secretary, Nigeria, Lagos dated 16 September 1942

³¹ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council" From Resident Minister's Office, Achimota, Accra to the Chief Secretary, Nigeria, Lagos dated 16 September 1942

	Firms	Likely	Possible
Europeans	27,474	36, 727	39,774
Africans	126,100	171,570	193,468

Source: NAS 37909/S14/C1 Food Control: West African War Council, p.3

Requirements for 1943 vastly complicated the difficulties due to so many factors. First, there had been an increase, even as an entirely firm estimate by approximately 100%, and might go much higher. For instance, in terms of meat, estimated military requirements of cattle for British West Africa increased from 36,900 head in 1942 to 118, 014 head in 1943. Supplies available to the army in the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and the Gambia were small but Nigeria would have no difficulty in meeting local requirements, and provided an efficient purchasing organization was set up and shipping was available, a fairly large export was possible. Similarly, requirements of fresh vegetables and fruit in 1943 were estimated at 12,407 and 6,811 tons respectively as compared with 7,980 tons and 4,403 tons in 1942. In the case of salt, there was an increase from 392 tons in 1942 to 1,101 tons in 1943. The requirements of rice also increased from 6,470 tons in 1942 to 9,479 tons in 1943; while the requirements of yam increased from tons 15,434 in 1942 to 15,857 tons in 1943. There was also an increase in the requirements of palm oil from 2,777 tons in 1942 to 4,057 tons in 1943. The same trend of increase was recorded for other foodstuffs such as cassava garri, guinea corn and millet, eggs, onions, maize flour, cooking oil, sugar, cigarettes, among others.³²

Second, military requirements were also beginning to compete with requirements for the production drive; for in the field of mineral production, large bodies of labour must be fed from available local resources. Difficulties had already arisen in the Nigerian tin industry. Added to these problems was that of feeding large bodies of employees on constructional work of a military nature in some colonies, whose employees would otherwise be engaged in food production.

Thus, it was asked if government might be given an indication whether or not military requirements were to be given preference over all other forms of production. It was suggested

³² NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council" Memorandum Submitted by the Supply Centre to the Resident Minister on the Subject of Military Food Requirements. pp. 4-9

that an early decision on this point was necessary because the military authorities were most anxious to know the following: (a) How far their requirements could be met locally; (b) What proportion must be obtained from outside sources, mainly the United Kingdom; (c) If shipping would be available to transport requirements obtained from outside sources.

This proposal would necessitate consideration being given to some form of civilian rationing by block release of the more important cereals, and to a rough and ready rationing of meat supplies. The latter was considered practicable by setting up controls on the cattle routes.

It was proposed to forward the estimate of 1943 requirements to governments with a request that they should indicate the maximum quantity of each item which was available, and that they should not as in the past content themselves with a statement that this or that quantity was available, when they might in fact have a surplus for export. This information was sought to enable the supply centre to allocate quotas to the four colonies

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The military requirements of locally produced foodstuffs in 1944 was enclosed in a secret statement from the Resident Minister's Office, Achimota, Accra to the Chief Secretary, Lagos, and to the Colonial Secretary, Accra, Freetown and Bathurst. The statement which had been submitted by General Headquarters contained the estimated requirements of locally produced foodstuffs in 1944 of the British Army, and the Royal Air Force. These statistics do not include the requirements of the Royal Navy and the United States Army.

In submitting the estimates, it was emphasised that in as much as it was predicted that the civil import of maize and rice from overseas into British West Africa would not be possible in 1944, it was more than ever necessary to ensure that the food requirements of the civil population, more especially of those sections of it engaged on essential war production, were safeguarded.³⁴

Also in submitting these estimates, the Resident Minister (Resmin) wanted the Chief Secretary and the Colonial Secretaries to forward to his office, as soon as possible, a statement in three columns, showing the following for maize, rice, garri, yams, millet, guinea

NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council" Memorandum Submitted by the Supply Centre to the Resident Minister on the Subject of Military Food Requirements. P.3

³⁴ NAI 37909/S.14/II, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944 Requirements," From Resident Minister's Office, Achimota, Accra, 28 October, 1943

corn, palm oil, fresh meat, groundnut oil, groundnuts, kola nuts, dried fish/meat and local salt:

- i. The total military demand for consumption in their territories
- ii. The surplus quantity over and above that demand which they estimated that their territories would, if desired, be able to make available for export for consumption by Army or Royal Air Force in other territories
- iii. Alternatively to the second column, the deficiency below the demand which it would be necessary for the Army or Royal Air Force to import from another territory or from overseas.³⁵

In a report from the Chief Supply Officer, Ibadan, Nigeria would be able to meet its military requirements in every case, but in most cases there would be no surplus for export. This was the case in respect of maize, rice, millet, guinea corn. Indeed, Nigeria had to import 8000 tons of French maize (from Dahomey) to make ends meet. Nigeria could supply the tonnage of garri for internal consumption. As regards export, the supply board had restricted garri production for internal civil consumption in order to stimulate palm kernel production. Either or not garri was produced for export depended on Government policy on this matter. Palm oil, groundnut oil, and groundnuts were controlled by Government for export to the United Kingdom, and it depended on Government policy whether or not these were made available for Military export. Concerning yams and yam flour, the Resmin figure of 7690 tons was above current consumption rates. Every year, the military in Nigeria took about 5000 tons of grain. They also took 400 tons of yam flour to get them through the months when fresh yams were scarce. On this premise, a minor tonnage of perhaps 1000 tons from Benue and Benin provinces could be expected between September and April. It should be highlighted that this export supply was not planned, and Nigeria may face challenges in getting it up and running. It was also noted that yam losses in weight because the drying out in rail transit were high, running up to 10 per cent in Nigeria. Overseas shipments would suffer further losses in weight due to drying and other losses associated with decay. Therefore, if any attempt was made to ship fresh yams, the Coast high losses must be anticipated. No supplies of dried fish

³⁵ NAI 37909//S.14/II, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944 Requirements," From Resident Minister's Office, Achimota, Accra, 28 October, 1943

were available for export. In the case of local salt produced in Nigeria, the country could not even supply internal demand.³⁶

It appeared unlikely that there would be any exportable surplus of yams. There was likely to be a deficiency in the Gold Coast.

³⁶ NAI 37909//S.14/II, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944 Requirements," From Chief Supply Office, Ibadan, to the Director of Supplies, Lagos dated 2/12/1943

Table 5.2: Local Produce—Estimated Requirements 1944

Commodity	Nigeria	Surplus For Export	Deficiency
Maize	1,640	Nil	Nil
Rice	2,758	Nil	Nil
Garri	1,540	Nil	Nil
Yams	7,690	1000	Nil
Millet	2,300	Nil	Nil
Guinea Corn	1,935	Nil	Nil
Palm Oil	1,540	Nil	Nil
Fresh Meat	4,580	1250	Nil
European Veg.	415	Nil	Nil
African Veg.	4,300	Nil	Nil
Onions	180	50	Nil
Potatoes	470	Nil	Nil
Eggs	1,400,000	Nil	Nil
Fruits	28,264,000	Nil	Nil
Groundnut Oil	46	Nil	Nil
Local Peppers	316	Nil	Nil
Groundnuts	1,410	Nil	Nil
Coffee	300	Nil	Nil
Native Beans	400	Nil	Nil
Kola Nuts	160	97	Nil
Dried Fish	360	Nil	Nil
Local Salt	360	Nil	Nil

Source: NAI 37909/S14/11, Military Requirement of Local Foodstuffs 1944 Req.p.1

The military requirements of locally produced foodstuffs in 1944 shows that, with the notable exceptions of maize and rice in the Gold Coast, these demands represented a general and fairly considerable reduction on those of 1943.

Table 5.3: Estimated Requirements of West African Produce, 1945

Commodity	Nigeria
Maize	1600
Rice	1,490
Garri	890
Yams	4507
Millet	1,070
Guinea Corn	890
Palm Oil	1,664
Fresh Meat	2,060
European Veg.	260
African Veg	2,500
Onions	80
Potatoes	
Eggs, number	1,642,500
Fruits (European)	470
Fruits (African)	1,560
Groundnut Oil	40
Local Peppers	175
Groundnuts	710
Coffee	-
Native Beans	310
Kola Nuts	90
Dried Fish	89
Local Salt	250

Source: NAI 37909/S14/11, Military Requirement of Local Foodstuffs 1944 Req.p.7

5.4 Military Supplies in Nigeria during the Second World War

Early in 1939, the signs of hostility in European continent were very visible. By so doing, preparation for military measures to be taken in peace, during precautionary period and on the outbreak of war was encapsulated in the Defence Scheme. Section G of Chapter IV of the Defence Scheme dealt with “Supplies and Stores”.

So long as the collection of indigenous food supplies was assured, Nigeria could be said to be self-supporting. The stocks of European provisions held by local firms were probably efficient for three months. The staple food supplies of the country might be divided into the following categories:

- a. Grain: Grown throughout the Northern provinces, the chief area being North of the Rivers Niger and Benue, but small quantities of maize were raised in the Southern Provinces.
- b. Yams: Grown throughout the Southern provinces and as far North as Zungeru in the Northern provinces.
- c. Cattle: Northern provinces, chiefly in Sokoto province, Borno province, Adamawa province, and in transit through Kano province.³⁷

The category in which a shortage was most likely to occur and which would lead to the greatest hardship was undoubtedly the first. Shortage in the remainder would lead to less serious results.

However, with almost every staple product, the main difficulty was to obtain physical acquisition of the crop from the hands of the peasant producer and to induce him to grow in excess of his subsistence requirements. Except in certain limited areas requisitioning (the act by which armies have to seize control of civilian property for their own uses), and even orders to prevent movement of produce from one province to another, could be effectively operated and might only serve to drive the products from the market. Nevertheless, it was suggested that by local planning It ought to be possible to devise some machinery to overcome these difficulties, and, quite apart from military requirements, it would appear that the time had come when full consideration must be given to the building of large civil reserves of foodstuffs regardless of cost, storage difficulties, and the decided possibility of a

³⁷ NAI DCI 1/1 4037 Vol. I, “Maintenance of Supplies: Foodstuffs” p.2

high percentage depreciation in such stocks. The Director of Production, Nigeria, was contemplating such a policy.³⁸

The issue of local food supply was initially brought up by the Director of Agriculture, Mackie, to General Giffard on his first visit to Nigeria after his appointment, just after the Second World War broke out on September 3, 1939. Mackie was also interested in learning how the Department of Agriculture could assist with military supply. General Giffard stated that all supply issues would be handled by the Royal Army Supply Council (R.A.S.C.) units on their way out of England, and that the Department of Agriculture's only contribution would be to plant a few vegetables for the European forces.³⁹

There was no civil purchasing organization in any West African colony at the time of its founding (until 1942), as mentioned in the next section on supply organization. The Army bought its supplies directly or through contractors, depending on annual military requirements estimates. The Army had developed moderate reserve herds of cattle in Nigeria, with civilian support, and was taking moves to establish pig and vegetable farms.⁴⁰ In terms of Army Farms, several had previously been constructed with the goal of providing particular consumables for the troops that were unavailable in West Africa. Production had been mainly concentrated on 'European-type' vegetables and pigs, though some poultry and African vegetables had also been raised. Experience had shown that the Army did not possess the skilled personnel and could not spare the administrative member of staff necessary to continue extensive farming operations. Small unit vegetable gardens were all that could really be undertaken. Provision was, however, more than ever needed on account of the increasing numbers of Europeans in the Command who had to be provided for both in the Army and in the R.A.F. and U.S. Army. It was imperative that production should not only be maintained, but in most cases increased. In particular, additional fresh vegetables were urgently required in the Gambia and Sierra Leone as well as in the vicinity of Accra. The Army has expended very substantial sums of money in initiating these projects.⁴¹

³⁸ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council" Memorandum Submitted by the Supply Centre to the Resident Minister on the Subject of Military Food Requirements. P.2

³⁹ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council", Notes of Military Supplies, from Director of Agriculture to Chief Secretary

⁴⁰ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council" Memorandum Submitted by the Supply Centre to the Resident Minister on the Subject of Military Food Requirements.

⁴¹ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council", Military Food Requirements, from Brigadier, D.A. & Q.M.G., Q.H.Q, West Africa to the Deputy Chairman, Resident Minister's Office, Achimota, dated 7 September 1942

The main principles governing the farms' programme were the same as the case of reserve herds of cattle. Production should be grown as near as possible to the military station where it would be consumed, for instance production of fresh vegetables should be close to the big consuming areas, and must be increased in the smaller colonies as well as in the larger since perishables could not be shipped. Farms should be large enough to justify European supervision. The number of European staff must however be kept to the absolute minimum. Every effort should be taken, via irrigation and other means, to ensure consistent production throughout the year, to the extent that this is climatically practicable. The Army would guarantee to purchase all foodstuffs produced on these farms up to the limit of the target figures notified separately to Governments through the Supply Centre.⁴²

Not minding this supply arrangement by the military, the Director of Agriculture decided to detail one of his officers to act as Supply Officer in the Northern provinces and instructed the Marketing Officer to act in the same capacity in the Southern Provinces. The officers enquired into the standing of every possible contractor and supplied the military with a list of suitable men. The Marketing Officer, for example, investigated no less than 100 such men. The supply officers had also assisted the military in such matters as prices, quality, and source of supply.⁴³

In paragraph 11 of the Memorandum submitted to the Resident Minister, Accra, on the subject of military requirements in West Africa, Governments were asked to establish a civil purchasing organization for the purpose of ease off the difficulties associated with military supplies.⁴⁴ In this case, the Force Headquarters would indicate to the Resident Minister's Secretariat the quantities of foodstuffs required for consumption in each area. These demands would be regarded as completely firm and would only be varied by official notification from Force Headquarters through the Resident Minister's Secretariat. Areas would however endeavour to assist their respective civil governments by indicating the percentage distribution of the Force Headquarters demand by centres of consumption within the Areas. It was suggested that civil authorities should undertake the construction of storage and supervision of any large stores of grain which might be necessary in connection therewith.

⁴² NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council", Military Food Requirements, from Brigadier, D.A. & Q.M.G., Q.H.Q, West Africa to the Deputy Chairman, Resident Minister's Office, Achimota, dated 7 September 1942

⁴³ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council", Notes of Military Supplies, from Director of Agriculture to Chief Secretary

⁴⁴ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council", Notes of Military Supplies, from Director of Agriculture to Chief Secretary

This suggestion was put forward as it was felt that, in many cases, the native African methods of storage would be cheapest and best, and that the civil authorities had the necessary specialized knowledge for dealing with the problem. As in the case of reserve herds of cattle and extensions to farms, it was appreciated that it would be necessary for the Army to reimburse civil governments for expenditure incurred on storage specially erected on their behalf. The proposal refers only to large stocks which might be accumulated by bulk purchases at harvest time. The Army would naturally continue to be responsible for the storage and supervision of normal stocks of grain held by Supply Depots of the West Africa Army Supply Council (W.A.A.S.C.).

By November 1940, however, the situation of the difficulties of military supply was getting out of hand, due to the absence of an institutionalised purchasing organization. In an interview with the Chief Secretary to the Government, the Director of Agriculture raised the question of setting up a military supply organisation. As a result, a series of meetings with the D.A.D.S.T. were held in the Secretariat, at which the Director of Agriculture undertook to “produce a scheme by which the Agricultural Department would obtain for the military authorities the supplies and reserves of the main articles required.”

In Nigeria, purchases were made for the military during most of 1942 by native administrations or commercial undertakings with relation to the more important commodities, e.g. grain. The military authorities obtained the more perishable commodities e.g. yams, fresh fruit and vegetables through their own contractors, but since they first came to Nigeria the services and advice of the D.F.P. & S., the Chief Marketing Officer, and latterly the Director of Agriculture had always been available. In the Northern provinces the D.F.P. & S. had set aside the services of one of his officers to act as Supply Officer to them.⁴⁵ Local production during 1942 appeared to be adequate for 1942 requirements, taking West Africa as a whole. Government encouraged production of types of foodstuffs required through their Agricultural departments, and, in certain instances endeavoured to make the food available by orders preventing movement of crops outside specified areas (e.g. rice and maize in Nigeria). In Sierra Leone, Government undertook the hulling of rice, which made possible releases to military requirements.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, “Food Control: West African War Council” Memorandum Submitted by the Supply Centre to the Resident Minister on the Subject of Military Food Requirements. Appendix C

⁴⁶ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, “Food Control: West African War Council” Memorandum Submitted by the Supply Centre to the Resident Minister on the Subject of Military Food Requirements. P.1

In readiness for 1943 requirements, Dr. Bryce paid visit to every province and had reported on the state of crops, probable yields, storage facilities, transport facilities, price to be offered, so that the department had for the first time a complete picture of the supply position on which plans for the future could be based.⁴⁷ Appendix “A” of the Memorandum submitted by the Supply Centre to the Resident Minister on the subject of Military Food Requirements gave a brief appreciation of the military food supply position. The extent to which requirements for 1943 could be met from local production would in due course be supplied by governments, but in the meantime the Supply Centre had attempted, as far as possible, to present a picture of the supply position as gleaned from official documents and from other sources.⁴⁸

In connection with the military requirements in 1943, it was also suggested that government be asked to reconsider their decision:

- (a) that the establishment of a civil purchasing organization in each colony was not possible if additional staff could be made available. In the beginning, its activity can be confined to cereal purchases.
- (b) that such an organization should combine purchases for both military and civilian needs (i.e. civilian reserves).
- (c) that the existing commercial organization be used as the nucleus of the new organization, at present firms confine their activities almost entirely to the purchase of export crops. It was it is recognized that AWAM was fully prepared to co-operate.
- (d) that until such an organization as suggested at (a) above could be established consideration should be given to the appointment of a full-time senior civil official in each colony (possibly two in Nigeria) to act as a liaison officer between the civil government and the military purchasing authority. It was felt that such officers would be able to explore new sources of supply and so advice on purchases and prices. At the time of the first Supply Centre Committee Meeting, the Nigerian Government was contemplating the appointment of a ‘production officer’. Since that time, a Director of Production had been appointed, but it was now suggested that there was scope for somewhat junior official to concentrate on production to meet military requirements.

⁴⁷ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, “Food Control: West African War Council” Civil Purchasing Organization for Military Supplies, from Director of Agriculture, Mackie, to Chief Secretary, dated 10/8/1942.

⁴⁸ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, “Food Control: West African War Council” Appendix “A”, Military Food Requirements in 1943, Memorandum Submitted by the Supply Centre to the Resident Minister on the Subject of Military Food Requirements, p.4

He could also usefully assist in the work of building up civilian reserves of foodstuffs.⁴⁹ If the military authorities would assist with the provision of adequate transport it should be possible to obtain large supplies from areas hitherto untapped.

- (e) That Government should be pressed to place greater emphasis on the production of local foodstuffs to replace certain crops as cocoa, the importance of which had declined as export crops.
- (f) That Supply Board in consultation with Area Commands plan zone requirements which could be met within each colony. G.H.Q. were unable to do this.
- (g) The military authorities be asked if some relaxation could not be obtained in the rule that they must not carry more than 90 days reserve of supplies, particularly in foodstuffs which were not liable to rapid deterioration.
- (h) An early enumeration of cattle in all colonies be undertaken as early as possible. This suggestion was made because the meat supply was by far the biggest single item and the most difficult. It was impossible to state at present whether in Nigeria some form of meat rationing was or was not essential. It was considered quite possible that increased spending power might have increased consumption to a dangerous level making the provision of full military requirements almost impossible.

Government was prepared to establish a supply organisation, which would be operated throughout the country. Details were being worked out by Captain Mackie. There appeared to be no reason why its activities should be limited to the purchase of cereals. It was agreed with the addition that contracts might also be placed with producers or with reliable African contractors and in certain circumstance Government or Native Authorities might purchase direct. The matter of contractors particularly applied to such commodities as yams, garri, fresh fruit, and vegetable, which incidentally, the firms preferred not to handle.

Supplies available to the army in Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and the Gambia were small, but Nigeria would have no difficulty in meeting local requirements and, provided an efficient purchasing organization was set up and shipping was available, a fairly large export was possible. In the past, the army's needs in the Gambia had been covered by barter trading with Senegal, and given that the army's demands had only increased by 5,000 head—requiring an additional 70,000 yards of cloth per month—procuring the army's local needs in 1943 should be simple. The Gold Coast proposed to adopt a similar method of supplementing local

⁴⁹ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council" Memorandum Submitted by the Supply Centre to the Resident Minister on the Subject of Military Food Requirements. P .3

supplies from Vichy Territory. Imports from Nigeria and the French Cameroons had previously fulfilled a substantial portion of the country's deficiencies. The cattle population in Sierra Leone was small, numbering between 80,000 and 100,000 herd. The maximum which the army might expect from this source in 1943 was, therefore, 8,000 herd or just over 20% of requirements. The importation of the balance of military requirements (28,000 herd) would present almost inseparable difficulties not only on account of shipping but also due to port congestion at Freetown. Previously, the majority of Sierra Leone's meat was procured from French Guinea, but the Vichy authorities ceased such shipments. However, it was thought to be quite desirable to look into the possibility of purchasing cattle from this source using the barter method that had proven so effective in Gambia. It appears that cattle supply in West Africa as a whole would be sufficient for the army's needs if the following criteria were taken into consideration:

- (a) The barter system as operating in the Gambia must also be employed energetically in the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone. In this connection, it should be pointed out that the military had made provision for sufficient cloth for the purchase of only 1,700 herd of cattle in the Gold Coast and 5,000 herd in Sierra Leone while requirements were 27,000 and 36,000 herd respectively.
- (b) Each colony should take stock of its cattle population with a view to setting up a purchasing organisation for both civil and military requirements. There was little doubt that the acquisition of military meat supplies should be the responsibility of civil law administrations as the establishment of two separate organisations was naturally inductive to price competition and results in the producer playing off one purchaser against the other.
- (c) The question of cold storage facilities at the main ports should be investigated as the shipping of carcasses presented less difficulty than the movement of live cattle.
- (d) Gold Coast and Sierra Leone: When an estimate of the numbers of cattle which it was thought could be obtained locally and through the medium of the barter system was made by each government, the purchasing organisation in Nigeria (as recommended in (b) above) should then be informed of the deficiencies in other colonies after due allowance was made for supplies from the French Cameroons.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council" Appendix "A", Military Food Requirements in 1943, Memorandum Submitted by the Supply Centre to the Resident Minister on the Subject of Military Food Requirements, pp.4-5

5.5 The Supply Organisation

The organisation of supply system for war was complicated by the following factors:

- a. No supply system existed in peace for the Nigeria Regiment. Troops were not rationed by the government, but were given a subsistence allowance in cash.
- b. No reserves of food in bulk existed.
- c. No organisation similar to the R.A.S.C. or R.O.A.C. existed.⁵¹

However, it was decided that in the current strategic situation, it would not be necessary to establish a supply organization because the troops remaining in Nigeria would continue to receive an allowance in lieu of rations, with the exception of the European members of the Lagos Defence Force, who would be rationed according to the Officer Commanding's arrangements. Should minor actions take place in Nigeria, Europeans and Africans will be granted rations, which will be supplied by Headquarters.⁵²

Thus, in the inception, there was no civil purchasing organization in any colony in West Africa (until 1942). The Army purchased its supplies direct or through contractors, based on the annual estimates of the military requirements.

In Nigeria, the Department of Agriculture went quite a long way towards meeting the wishes of the military in the matter of obtaining supplies. The military now wanted the Government to take a further step and be completely responsible for all their supplies. It would be noted that in November 1940, the Director of Agriculture undertook to produce a scheme by which the agricultural department would obtain for the military authorities the supplies and reserves of the main articles required.⁵³ Thus, the Director of Agriculture set out his views on the organization of a civil authority for the provision of supplies to the military.

According to his proposal, there must be a central organization controlled by one person who might well be called Chief Supply Officer. He would require staff of not less than 7 supply officers and at least 3 clerks and 2 typists. He would also require much assistance from the specialist officers of the agricultural department especially the entomologist and from agricultural officers. For this reason, he would wish that he and his organization should be a branch of the agricultural department rather than an entirely independent department,

⁵¹ NAI DCI 1/1/ 4037 Vol. I, "Maintenance of Supplies: Foodstuffs"

⁵² NAI DCI 1/1/ 4037 Vol. I, "Maintenance of Supplies: Foodstuffs"

⁵³ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council" Civil Purchasing Organization for Military Supplies, from Director of Agriculture, Mackie, to Chief Secretary, dated 10/8/1942.

although there was no objection to the latter except that production and supply in a country like Nigeria were so interwoven that it was difficult to say where one began and the other ended.⁵⁴

The Chief Supply Officer would be responsible for ensuring that the supplies required by the military were obtained and delivered in the correct quantity at the correct time. (The military was however required to give more assistance with transport than they had hitherto done). The Chief Supply Officer would also be responsible for supplies to certain civil undertakings, e.g. the minesfield, labour camps. It would be his duty to arrange for supplies to be purchased at the most suitable moment of the year and if necessary for their storage until they were required. He would advise as to the necessity for reserves and would obtain the supplies for such reserves as might be set up. It would be for him to decide how best his supplies were to be purchased and handled. He (Chief Supply Officer) would be at liberty to arrange for purchases to be made through the Association of West African Merchants (AWAM) acting as his agents, through controlled contractors, through the native authorities or by direct government purchase. He would need a necessary account to enable him to intervene directly when necessary and to meet the cost of stocks which might be temporarily in excess of requirement. It was essential that he should have authority to communicate direct with Residents and make agreements with them, and that they should have authority to take action in accordance with such agreements.

It was essential that the Chief Supply Officer should be in very close contact with both Residents and agricultural officers and had firsthand knowledge of the whereabouts of supplies. He must, therefore, do a considerable amount of touring. One of his supply officers would be stationed at each of the main military supply centres, for example, Lagos, Kaduna, Enugu, and Ibadan, and would be responsible for such supplies as could be obtained locally. The other three would tour the production areas in the same way as Dr. Bryce had recently done and would be present in areas where large scale buying was actually taking place. The supply officers would also supervise reserves and stocks, act as intelligence officers. They would in fact relieve the Agricultural officers who had to some extent been performing these duties for the last two years.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council" Civil Purchasing Organization for Military Supplies, from Director of Agriculture, Mackie, to Chief Secretary, dated 10/8/1942.

⁵⁵ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council" Civil Purchasing Organization for Military Supplies, from Director of Agriculture, Mackie, to Chief Secretary, dated 10/8/1942.

The Chief Supply Officer would make his headquarters at Lagos or possibly Ibadan and would be a member of the Supply board. The Supply Board would let the Chief Supply Officer have a full list of military and civil requirements. The Chief Supply Officer would then discuss with Residents, and as a result for these discussions definite agreement made. Agreement would also be reached as to the necessity or otherwise for stop orders, requisitioning. It was presumed that powers to impose stop orders and to requisition would remain with residents, not the Chief Supply Officer. With regard to cattle supplies in the first instance the Chief Supply Officer would be responsible for day to day requirements which he would undoubtedly obtain through contractors as at present. But once the reserve herds have been finally established, whether they were run by the military or the government, they would be the chief if not the only source of all supplies.⁵⁶

There were two points that were important. The first is that the Chief Supply Officer should be an executive member of the Supply Board and secondly that he should be stationed in Lagos and should have officers with the existing Supply Board organization. This point was important because if he were to continue to be a member of the agricultural department and live at Ibadan, he would merely be another bottle neck. It was also necessary for him to be in Lagos owing to the fact that the military headquarters were there and he must be in very close touch with them.

All military requirements would be notified to him, in particular he would have to be informed where the supplies were required and it would be his function to allocate those requirements to be met by the various supply officers in charge of areas. It was immaterial how the supply officers arranged for the necessary food stocks to be purchased, but whatever method was adopted whether by contractors or native administrations, it was essential that every military contract should be scrutinized and approved by the profiteering which had been going on in the recent months.⁵⁷

Given the current situation, on hand experience which Dr. Bryce had had recently of assessing the potentialities of various parts of Nigeria to furnish supplies for the military he seemed to be the obvious choice for the Chief Supply Officer; or the administration officer

⁵⁶ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council" Civil Purchasing Organization for Military Supplies, from Director of Agriculture, Mackie, to Chief Secretary, dated 10/8/1942.

⁵⁷ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council" Civil Purchasing Organization for Military Supplies, from Director of Agriculture, Mackie, to Chief Secretary, dated 10/8/1942.

should be appointed in lieu. If the Army wished such an organization to be set up they must release the necessary officers to staff it.⁵⁸

The Supply Organisation thus set up would deal not only with military requirements, but with civil requirements for other West African colonies and for the civil requirements of Nigeria. There had previously been a need in recent months to have an organization of this nature in order to be in a position to keep prices down. For example, if eggs and chickens were arranged in Lagos for supply, prices could be kept down a great deal.

The Chief Supply Officer would deal directly with Residents and his own supply officers and the proposed organization would obviate the need for a Grain Board in the agreement to this. In most cases it should be possible to arrange for the particular R.A.S.C. officer concerned to make direct payments, but in certain cases the supply officers would almost certainly have to be provided with funds.

However, (until the September 1942 meeting of the War Council) this proposal did not find favour with the military which preferred to work with contractors. They did, however, agree to establish a reserve of 2000 tons of guinea corn to be drawn upon when supplies were short and costly. Mackie undertook that the department of agriculture would build the necessary rumbus and supervise the stored corn. This had been a success and had been expanded. The department of agriculture had in the past purchased the corn direct for this scheme. The department had also purchased and delivered supplies of such commodities as onions, potatoes, sugar and consignments of yams. It had also arranged with contractors for the supply of palm oil, fruit.⁵⁹

The supply organisation, in which the Army purchased its supplies directly or through contractors, worked fairly smoothly until January 1942, when the military submitted demands which were much greater than anything they had previously asked for. It should be noted that these demands which reached the department in January had to be supplied from the yield of crops which were or had already been harvested. As these military demands also coincided with a poor harvest in the Northern provinces and a very demand for foodstuffs from the minesfield there had naturally been difficulties.

⁵⁸ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council" Civil Purchasing Organization for Military Supplies, from Director of Agriculture, Mackie, to Chief Secretary, dated 10/8/1942

⁵⁹ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council", Notes of Military Supplies, from Director of Agriculture to Chief Secretary

In January 1942, a similar proposal for the establishment of a civil purchasing organization was made, and the Nigerian government responded by establishing the Supply Board in January 1942 and arranging for the A.W.A.M. to operate as purchasing agents for the more vital commodities. The military agreed that supplies of yams and certain small items could best be obtained by utilizing local contractors or through the Agricultural Department. The military set up their own organization for the purchase of their supplies of cattle.⁶⁰ In the northern provinces a complication arose due to competition between the military and the mines for corn supplies. As a result, a grain board was established, whose role was to receive a declaration of requirements from the Supply Board and make arrangements to obtain them. The Board, however, dealt only with corn. So far it had not dealt with rice, or yams.⁶¹ The government declined this proposal due to the unavailability of staff and capacity.

It could not be said that this organization as such had having the ability to assist very much in that matter of supplies of local produce.⁶² There were regular meetings of the Supply Boards and representatives of local commands discussed supply problems. At the first Supply Center Committee Meeting in March 1942, it was rather vaguely agreed in response to military request that “in case of emergency, military requirements in local foodstuffs would be given a measure of preference over the requirements of the civil population, even though it might involve a reduction in the standard of living of the latter”. Government also agreed in a general way to exercise their executive authority, including the power to requisition, to ensure that adequate supplies were made available to accredited military purchasers.⁶³ At the meeting of the Supply Board, it was felt that the Army was by no means satisfied with the results achieved but that they were disposed to giving the present system a further trial. On the other hand, it had been found that requirements as originally framed by G.H.Q. were not always accurate, and that additional requests for supplies had been submitted by Area Commands to Supply Boards apparently without reference to G.H.Q. From the military stand point, the most satisfactory scheme would be for the civil authorities in each colony to set up a central purchasing organisation from whom the Army could obtain its supplies. It had been

⁶⁰ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, “Food Control: West African War Council” Civil Purchasing Organization for Military Supplies, from Director of Agriculture, Mackie, to Chief Secretary, dated 10/8/1942.

⁶¹ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, “Food Control: West African War Council” Civil Purchasing Organization for Military Supplies, from Director of Agriculture, Mackie, to Chief Secretary, dated 10/8/1942.

⁶² NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, “Food Control: West African War Council” Civil Purchasing Organization for Military Supplies, from Director of Agriculture, Mackie, to Chief Secretary, dated 10/8/1942.

⁶³ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, “Food Control: West African War Council” Memorandum Submitted by the Supply Centre to the Resident Minister on the Subject of Military Food Requirements.

stated by governments that this was impracticable, as they had neither the staff nor the organisation.⁶⁴

At a meeting held at Government House on 7 August, 1942, it was agreed that such an organisation could be established if adequate staff could be made available. The Director of Agriculture was asked to draw up and submit a scheme.⁶⁵

At the second meeting of the West African War Council held on 7 September, 1942, it was agreed that all governments, with the exception of the Gambia, would establish purchasing organisations, the detailed planning of which would be worked out with Area Commanders, on the understanding that the G.O.C.-in-C would release or loan personnel and assist where practicable in the provision of transport.⁶⁶ The first step was to obtain the release of seven selected administrative officers from the Army. These officers would be posted to the following centres, at each of which there was at present a Military Supply Officer: Bukuru, Kaduna, Kano, and Zaria in the North, and Abeokuta, Enugu, Ibadan, and Lagos in the South.⁶⁷

Provisional appointment was made and Dr. Bryce, C.B.E., Assistant Director of Agriculture, was appointed Chief Supply Officer. On matters concerning the purchases and supply of foodstuffs, he would deal with the military authorities through the Food Controller to the Director of Supplies; from the production aspect Dr. Bryce would remain under the Director of Food Production as at present. The civil supply officers in co-operation with the Military Supply Officers would be responsible under the guidance of the Chief Supply Officer for ascertaining, in conjunction with the production side of the organization, the areas in which purchases would be made. They would be concerned about with the placing of contracts through agents or specially selected contractors. A special form of contract would be prepared in due course. They would keep in close touch with Resident, District Officers, Officers of the agricultural department and any other officer concerned, in the areas in which they were operating. They would also keep in touch with the representatives of the firms

⁶⁴ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council" Memorandum Submitted by the Supply Centre to the Resident Minister on the Subject of Military Food Requirements.p.2

⁶⁵ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council" Civil Purchasing Organization for Military Supplies, from Director of Agriculture, Mackie, to Chief Secretary, dated 10/8/1942.

⁶⁶ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council", Military Food Requirements, from Brigadier, D.A. & Q.M.G., Q.H.Q, West Africa to the Deputy Chairman, Resident Minister's Office, Achimota, dated 7 September 1942

⁶⁷ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council", Military Food Requirements: Supply and Purchasing Organization, from A.G. Grantham, Chief Secretary to the Government to D.F.P. &S., Dr. Bryce, C.S.O., and the Secretary, Resident Minister's Office, Achimota, dated 21 September 1942

making purchase. Delivery of the foodstuffs within the terms of the contracts would be made direct to the several military supply depots and the military authorities would be responsible for the settlement of accounts.

In terms of personnel, the under-mentioned officers were suggested:

Name	Date of first Appointment	Language
R. E. Alford	11.7.28	L.S. Hausa
F. Humphreys	18.7.28	L.S. Munshi (Tiv)
D. A. Pott	29.7.36	Int. S. Hausa
B. G. Smith	28.7.37	Int. S. Hausa
J.M. Cruddas	28.7.29	L.S. Ibo
M. N. H. Milne	26.7.39	L.S. Yoruba
P. Coryndon	19.7.40	L.S. Ibo

Source: NAI 37909/S14/11, Military Requirement of Local Foodstuffs 1944 Req.p.54

As a result of discussion with Major Kerk, three officers might be enough to cover the following areas:

Headquarters Suggested	Area Provinces	Principal Commodities
Zaria (Senior Admin. Officer)	Kano	Guinea Corn
	Katsina	Millet
	Sokoto	Rice
	Zaria	Potatoes
	Niger	Beans
	Bauchi	
	Plateau	
	Borno	

Ibadan	Western Provinces	Rice
	Including Colony and Ilorin	Maize
		Yams
		Gari
		Kola

Enugu Eastern Provinces and Benue and Adamawa Provinces

Source: NAI 37909/S14/11, Military Requirement of Local Foodstuffs 1944 Req.p.55

Pending the full introduction of the scheme, existing arrangements would continue subject to the application of the procedure indicated below. The schedule attached to this circular set out the target figures of foodstuffs to be purchased in bulk in each Province. The allocation of the totals as between the army, the mines, government departments and the government reserve would be indicated to residents by the Chief Supply Officer. It was directed that the totals in the schedule (which as regards the northern provinces were understood to have been agreed to by residents) were to be adopted as target figures. Should it prove impossible to purchase any commodity on the scale laid down owing to failure of crops or difficulties in regard to transport, bags, residents should communicate direct with the Chief Supply Officer. Should the situation arise that the quantities given, although obtainable, were considered by residents to constitute an undue hardship on the people, or as likely to lead to political difficulties, the residents should address their provincial secretariats on the matter. The purchase and storage of the government reserves should be carried out as far as possible by purchasing firms, the disposal of the reserves being under the direction of residents. Existing arrangements and prices should continue, but new prices including remuneration to the firms, should not be agreed to by residents without prior consultation with the Chief Supply Officer.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council", Military Food Requirements: Supply and Purchasing Organization, from A.G. Grantham, Chief Secretary to the Government to D.F.P. &S., Dr. Bryce, C.S.O., and the Secretary, Resident Minister's Office, Achimota, dated 21 September 1942.

5.6 The Supply of Specific Foodstuffs to the Military in Nigeria during the Second World War

Having dealt with the general military requirements and supply, there is the need to examine the requirements and supply of some individual foodstuffs to the military. This will help to bring out the practical details of the subject matter. These foodstuffs include rice, yam, meat, fresh vegetables, and palm oil, among other.

Rice

Nigeria was a very large producer of rice. However, owing to the loss of Burma as a source of supply and the cessation of exports of rice from British India, Nigeria was now being called upon to meet the requirements of the Gold Coast and the Gambia, which total over 6,000 tons. In addition, military demands were increasing so that in spite of the great increase in rice production which had taken place in recent years, the demand was still greater than the supply. Likewise, in Sierra Leone, production had been stepped up considerably in recent years with the result that Sierra Leone was now more than self-supporting and the military requirements had been supplied to the Gambia. Requirements in Sierra Leone in 1942 were put by the military at 2,300 tons, all of which was met from local production, but it was estimated by the military that these requirements would rise to 4,032 tons in 1943. In view of the fact that Sierra Leone was able to build up reserves from last season's harvest, it was more than likely that military needs in 1943 would be satisfied but it was doubtful whether a surplus would be available for export.

Although there had been an increase in rice production in the Gold Coast, output still failed short of civil requirements by 4,000 tons per annum. Rice was not grown in the Gambia to any large extent and civil requirements were estimated at 2,400 tons.

It was evident, therefore, that in 1943 Nigeria would be called up to provide the deficiencies in the Gold Coast and the Gambia both for the military and the civil populations. It was estimated that these requirements would exceed 8,000 tons. During the past season Nigeria was able to meet military requirements in these colonies amounting to 2,670 tons. In addition 1,000 tons were being supplied to the Gambia for the civil population. It was obvious, therefore, that unless there was a substantial increase in production in Nigeria during 1942-1943 season, a shortage of rice in the Gold Coast and the Gambia might be anticipated in 1943. Military requirements would no doubt take precedence over civil requirements, and

supplies would also be available from the Congo. However, the probability of a shortage of rice in 1943 should be made known to the Gold Coast Government so as to spur them on to further efforts in their drive for increased production.⁶⁹

In 1944, the army in Nigeria held surplus stocks of rice partly due to the arrival of 1,500 tons of rice in Lagos: 500 tons of rice from Matadi (ex. Belgium Congo), 400 tons from Cameroons and 600 tons grown in Nigeria. After the rice had been shipped, it proved to be surplus to army requirements. The question of disposal of this surplus was immediately taken up by the office of the Director of Supply, Lagos, with the office of the Resident Minister and pending instructions it was necessary to hold this rice in Lagos and it was left in the transit shed as the military had no storage accommodation available and it appeared likely that it would have to be shipped to another colony.⁷⁰ The prices of the tons of rice were as follows:

(a) EX BELGIAN CONGO

500 tons @ Francs 2415 (£12.1.6d) per ton	£6,037.10.0
Freight Leopoldville – Matadi @ 7/4 ½	184. 7.6
Freight Matadi – Lagos @ 48/- per ton	1,200. 0.0
Handling Charge – Lagos @ 5/- per ton	125. 0.0
Handling Charge – Matadi @ 3/8.7 per ton	93. 2.6
Total	£7, 640.0.0

(b) EX CAMEROONS

400 tons (paddy) @ £27 per ton F.o.b.	£10, 800. 0.0
Freight and handling charges Duala/Lagos 45/6 per ton	910. 0.0
Total	£11, 710. 0.0.

⁶⁹ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, “Food Control: West African War Council” Appendix “A”, Military Food Requirements in 1943, Memorandum Submitted by the Supply Centre to the Resident Minister on the Subject of Military Food Requirements, p.8

⁷⁰ NAI E37909/S.13 Vol. II, “Supply of Rice to the military, 1944-45 Crop”, p.59, From Director of Supplies, Lagos, T.M. Shankland, to General Manager, Nigerian Railway, Ebute-Metta, Lagos, dated 15 July 1944.

(c) EX SOKOTO AND ABEOKUTA

600 tons @ £15 a ton to Lagos	£9,000. 0.0
Total (a), (b) & (c)	£28,350.0.0.

Source: NAI E37909/S.13 Vol. II, "Supply of Rice to the Military, 1944-45 Crop", pp.53-54

Average price per ton landed Lagos = £18.18.0. This price did not include £413. 2. 0d the storage rent due to the Nigeria Railway, but this could be waived.⁷¹

The Army was asked to confirm that it would deliver to civilian consumers 500 tons of rice at the price ex M.S.D. Apapa. The Deputy Food Controller, Native Foodstuffs, Lagos, who would take over the rice, had been asked to arrange details of transfer and payment direct with M.S.D.⁷² Again, contract purchase in Portuguese Guinea of 1,200 tons of rice required in Gambia had not finally been settled. This was because of their demand for payment in tyres and petrol for this rice.⁷³ So it might be necessary to allocate above quantities or part of them to Gambia and/or Gold Coast. However, this proposal to send the rice to Gambia was challenged in Nigeria on some grounds. First, by June 1944, rice buying had finished. The season was fairly satisfactory, but there were 250 tons short of the target in Ilorin and 300 tons short in Nigeria. The stock position of rice in Nigeria by June 1944 was as follows:

Lagos Market Store (Capt. Pullen)	854 tons
Lokoja	80
Ilorin & Niger	214
Total	1148

⁷¹ NAI E37909/S.13 Vol. II, "Supply of Rice to the Military, 1944-45 Crop", pp.53-54

⁷² NAI E37909/S.13 Vol. II, "Supply of Rice to the Military, 1944-45 Crop", From the Director of Supplies, Lagos to the Deputy Food Controller, Native Foodstuffs, Lagos.

⁷³ NAI E37909/S.13 Vol. II, "Supply of Rice to the Military, 1944-45 Crop", p.55

Second, it was up to six months ahead before the 1944 crop would be on the market. In view of military requirements, it had been anticipated a period when no rice would be available. This had been accepted as being unavoidable.

Third, in the season just closed, 3800 tons were supplied to military. This quantity was secured with great difficulty and depleted civilian stocks to low levels and caused widespread black marketing. In Lagos such black marketing had been successfully dealt with by Pullen Scheme but it was anticipated that owing to lack of supplies there would be a period of three months during which Pullen would have no rice.⁷⁴

Thus, it was also argued that if the military were not going to require all their rice, there was no reason why it should be exported to other colonies unless it was a unique experience of absolute necessity. It was suggested that all military surplus should be sold to the Nigerian Government for civilian consumption. This surplus amounted to 2648 ton (1148 available in the Lagos market store, Lokoja and Ilorin & Niger plus 1500 ex-Military). The allocation was suggested as follows:

Lagos Market 6 months @ 429 tons per month	2574 tons
Lokoja Asylum	7
Burutu Labour	67
Total	2648

Source: NAI E37909/S.13 Vol. II, "Supply of Rice to the military, 1944-45 Crop", p.34

Availability of 1500 tons ex-military surplus referred to above would make it possible to bridge the gap in rice supply and continue to make rice available without interruption. This would effectively kill black market in Lagos and would ensure there was no such thing as incentive to hoard Abeokuta crop next November. This should result in our obtaining Abeokuta crop without difficulty in 1945. The Governor of Nigeria most strongly urged that all military surplus should be handed over to the Government of Nigeria, because the country had born more than its fair share supplying West African Forces and this had only been

⁷⁴ NAI E37909/S.13 Vol. II, "Supply of Rice to the Military, 1944-45 Crop", p.34

possible at the expense of local shortages and rising prices which had adversely affected export production.⁷⁵

In addition, on 4 August, 1944, the Controller, Local Foodstuffs, Control Centres – Colony, noted in a letter to the Food Controller, Supply Branch, Nigeria Secretariat, Lagos, that he received a consignment of 89 bags of rice from Gwada which showed a considerable discrepancy in bag weights ranging from 1cwt.50 lbs. to 2cwt 7 ½ lbs gross. There was a total shortage of 162 lbs on the consignment and the U.A.C. Gwada had already been addressed in this connection. The railway warrant booking this consignment had now been received for payment and it would appear that the 89 bags were originally consigned from Gwada to the military, Apapa, by Captain R.C. Fox for O.C. A.D.S.T., Nigeria area and chargeable to the military vote on 10 December, 1943. If they had been on the rail from December 1943 to July 1944, a shortage was unavoidable.⁷⁶

From the telephone conversation between Major Heap and Mr. Shankland, it was understood that the rice stocks of which the Army wished to dispose were as follows:

520 tons rice ex Nigeria

55 tons rice ex Cameroons paddy

400 tons rice paddy ex Cameroons

The Director of Supplies wanted to know:

- a. What tonnage of rice would the army have on hand for current needs after disposal of the stocks referred to above?
- b. How long would these stocks last i.e. what was the army anticipated rate of issue?
- c. What was the earliest date at which the army would require deliveries of rice from the 1944-1945 crop and at what rate per month would the army require deliveries.⁷⁷

In response, Lt-Col RASC, CC WAASC Nigeria Area gave the following figures:

- a. Tonnage of rice held by the military excluding stocks for disposal, at 31 July 1944= 565 tons

⁷⁵ NAI E37909/S.13 Vol. II, "Supply of Rice to the Military, 1944-45 Crop", p.34

⁷⁶ NAI E37909/S.13 Vol. II, "Supply of Rice to the Military, 1944-45 Crop", p.63

⁷⁷ NAI E37909/S.13 Vol. II, "Supply of Rice to the Military, 1944-45 Crop", p.67, From Director of Supplies to WAASC, Nigeria Area, Lagos, dated 11 August 1944

b. Consumption Aug/Dec	440 tons
Special requirements	100
	540 tons

- c. Deliveries were required from 1 Nov. at the rate of 400 tons monthly in accordance with NA/4336/48/ST of 10 August, 1944.⁷⁸

In response, the G.F.T. Colby, the Acting Chief Secretary to the Government of Nigeria noted that deliveries of rice to the military at the rate of 400 tons per month from 1 November, 1944 could not be arranged. All supplies of rice for the military from the forthcoming crop would be drawn from the northern provinces where harvesting would not begin until January and deliveries could not therefore start before the end of January at the earliest.

After reviewing the rice situation, the Governor of Nigeria decided that none of the rice referred to could be exported from Nigeria. The army was therefore requested to make 200 tons of the cleaned rice ex Abeokuta available for the Lagos Market Scheme (Capt. Pullen) as soon as possible, retaining the balance against army requirements for 1944-45, thus bridging the gap between the final liquidation of the existing stocks and the start of deliveries from the new crop from January to February 1945. The financial details arising out of the revised arrangements could be settled between the Supply Branch and the Command Pay Office.⁷⁹

On the basis that the 1945 demand of the army for 1500 tons, that is, an average monthly consumption of 125 tons and accepting their statement that stocks on hand, apart from surplus repeat surplus would last them until March 31, 1945. Army would not have completely consumed their surplus repeat surplus of 485 tons until after end of June. This presumably meant that since the proportion of rice now held by army would have been in store for eighteen months before it was required, rice in paddy form would of course keep better than hulled rice. Both army and Gold Coast had had heavy losses on lengthy storage. If it was possible that Nigerian civilians would use army surplus within the next six months it would seem to be safer that this should be done.

⁷⁸ NAI E37909/S.13 Vol. II, "Supply of Rice to the Military, 1944-45 Crop", p.71

⁷⁹ NAI E37909/S.13 Vol. II, "Supply of Rice to the Military, 1944-45 Crop", p.87

Meat

At the second meeting of the West African War Council, it was agreed that governments would take over existing reserve herds of cattle and military farms, if the necessary personnel could be made available; and that all governments, with the exception of the Gambia, would establish purchasing organizations, the detailed planning of which would be worked out with Area Commanders, on the understanding that the G.O.C.-in-C would release or loan personnel and assist where practicable in the provision of transport.⁸⁰ A number of crucial problems developed that went beyond the specific arrangements that would be worked out between the local governments and the Area Commanders. These questions fell under four major headings, namely, reserve herds of cattle, army farms, purchasing organizations and personnel.

Concerning the question of reserve herds of cattle, it was appreciated that all reserve herds of cattle would require European supervision and that, where no arrangements existed, shelter and water must be provided for the beasts and, possibly, dip tanks and other facilities. It was considered that the leading principle in framing plans for reserve herds should be the strictest economy in the use of European personnel. To achieve this, herds should be large in size and few in number. It was suggested that civil governments should select the most suitable locality for their reserve herds in consultation with Area Commanders, and should then frame estimates of the expenditure which would be required to provide the necessary accommodation and equipment. These estimates would be submitted to Force Headquarters, and if agreed, the army would reimburse the government concerned for any expenditure in connection therewith incurred by the latter. The procedure for calculating the charge for the expense of herding and maintaining the cattle would be negotiated between local governments and area commanders.⁸¹

At the meeting held at the General Headquarters on 3 November, 1942, it was agreed that:

- a. That Nigeria should supply an average of 3,300 herds a month of which 500 herds would be for export to the Gold Coast.

⁸⁰ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council", Military Food Requirements, from Brigadier, D.A. & Q.M.G., Q.H.Q, West Africa to the Deputy Chairman, Resident Minister's Office, Achimota, dated 7 September 1942

⁸¹ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council", Military Food Requirements, from Brigadier, D.A. & Q.M.G., Q.H.Q, West Africa to the Deputy Chairman, Resident Minister's Office, Achimota, dated 7 September 1942

- b. That reserve herds to a total of 6,000 herds should be formed to be drawn upon in the dry season when cattle were difficult to buy, but that the reserves should never be allowed to fall below 3,000 herds, which was approximately one month's requirements.
- c. That the reserves should, in the first instance, be established in the northern provinces but that as soon as mosquito gauze could be obtained, fly-proof byres should be built in the southern provinces to permit of the fattening there of 1,500 herds to meet the demands of the Lagos, Abeokuta, Ibadan, and Enugu areas.
- d. That the Nigerian government should take over the management of the existing reserves as from the 1st of January, 1943.
- e. That the army would lend to the government the officers who were now engaged in the supervision of the reserve herds, and would at once provide an additional four officers, one of whom was to have some knowledge of accounting. These officers would be entirely under the government. From the army point of view, they would be regarded as forming "a Reserve of Officers". They would continue to be paid by the army.
- f. That the Nigeria area should be requested to allow the government to retain, as long as they were required, the two pioneer companies working on the reserves.
- g. That the General Headquarters should arrange for three kit cars and two lorries to be provided for use in connection with the purchase of cattle and the maintenance of the bills.
- h. Cattle payments should not be made at the time they are delivered to the army, but that all expenditures on purchase and maintenance should be refunded by the army annually or at the end of whatever period it might be decided to adopt. If officers of the agricultural department had to be employed for the purpose of arranging supplies of cattle, their salaries, or the appropriate proportion of them would be included in the expenses.⁸²

Fresh Vegetables and Fruit

Fresh Fruit: With the exception of Sierra Leone, all colonies would likely be able to meet the new fruit requirements if transportation could be established. In Sierra Leone, considerable quantities of fruit were required for the victualling of ships. Early in the year,

⁸² NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council" WAWC (57) 20 November 1942

Sierra Leone government stated that only 50 percentage of military requirements in 1942 could be met and in view of the fact that these requirements would, it was estimated, increase by 610 tons in 1943, the deficiency was likely to be at least 1,000 tons. This quantity could be supplied in part from Nigeria and the Gold Coast, but difficulties might arise over shipping as fruit did not carry well.

Fresh Vegetables: A serious shortage of vegetables in 1943 was a very real possibility, based on information provided by governments earlier in the year and the greatly increased Military requirements. It was estimated that requirements in West Africa as a whole would increase from 7,980 tons in 1942 to 12,407 in 1943. However, all colonies were making strenuous efforts to increase production and the military authorities were also undertaking vegetable production in the Gold Coast. The main obstacle to increased production appeared to be the scarcity of good vegetable seeds. It was understood that attempts had been made by Nigeria to obtain seed from California by plane. The military authorities had placed orders in South Africa and had asked for confirmation as to whether these could be supplied. Mr B.G. Owen, a civil officer in Nigeria, was at present in Kenya studying dried vegetable production with a view to the establishment of a plant in Nigeria.⁸³

Salt

The supply of salt to the military in Nigeria, the Gold Coast and the Gambia presented no difficulty. Sierra Leone had previously struggled to import enough salt for its civilian population and Nigeria and the Gold Coast had from time to time been called upon to assist. In view of the small quantity required by the army in Sierra Leone (424 tons per annum) there should be no difficulty in obtaining this quantity from the Gold Coast where there was a salt industry with a small exportable surplus.⁸⁴

In retrospect, this section has examined the provisioning of the Allied Troops in West Africa, with Nigeria in focus. The thesis reviewed the formation of the Allied Forces in West Africa during the Second World War. It therefore pointed out how the Second World War disrupted the international system, politically and economically, and the concomitant restrictions and control of trade, food and prices. The issue of food requirements of the military and the

⁸³ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council" Appendix "A", Military Food Requirements in 1943, Memorandum Submitted by the Supply Centre to the Resident Minister on the Subject of Military Food Requirements, p.5-6

⁸⁴ NAI 37909/S.14/C.1, "Food Control: West African War Council" Appendix "A", Military Food Requirements in 1943, Memorandum Submitted by the Supply Centre to the Resident Minister on the Subject of Military Food Requirements, p.6

supply of foodstuff to the armed forces in Nigeria during the Second World War was adequately cross examined. More importantly, the study appraised the nuances of production, requirements and supplies of various crops needed during the war.

5:7 The Provisioning Of The Armed Forces In Nigeria In The Post-War Period, 1946-1960

The Second World War (1939-1945) was disastrous in all dimensions, including food production and distributions, as demonstrated in the previous section. As the fighting became more intense, it had an impact on the life of the colony's residents as a whole. Imported commodity prices climbed, and the community's richer members had to pay a higher tax. The war also led to some restrictions and control on the movement of the foodstuffs.

However, after the war, it was expected that some of the wartime restrictions and rationing should cease. But that was not the case. The restrictions on the movement of foodstuffs continued, including the rationing of essential commodities. This was due to the world food crisis, which set shortly after the Second World War. It was not until the end of the 1940s and the early 1950s that stability in food supply began to return.

This section examines the politics of the food provisioning of the Armed Forces in Nigeria in the post-war period. It deals with the world food situation in the post-war period and its implications for Nigerian populace and the armed forces.

5.8 World Food Situation after the Second World War

In 1945, the Second World War came to a conclusion. The international community hoped that the havoc caused by the conflict would fade away as soon as hostilities ceased. This was the case in several areas, such as military formation, where the combatant nations were still demobilizing. However, in the area of food production and supply, normalcy did not return immediately due to some post-war developments.

For instance, in 1946, a year after the end of the Second World War, the World Food Crisis occurred and continued to the end of the 1940s. The issue was encapsulated in a variety of ways. There was a major food shortage in almost every country on the planet. The bulk of mankind was living in conditions of famine. Millions of people were threatened with starvation and death.

In Europe, the Emergency Economic Committee revealed in early 1946 that the diet of 140 million people will be less than 2,000 calories per day on average over the next six months. Only the population of Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Ireland, and Sweden consumed 95 percent or more of their Pre-War quantities, according to the United Nations' Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). The severe food shortage also resulted in low levels of consumption, which led to a rise in diseases and a fall in per capita work output, which slowed industrial and general recovery.

The Post-War World Food Crisis resulted in the continuation of Post-War food rationing, as was addressed in the preceding chapter. There was continued controlled distribution of food due to its scarcity. This situation became worse in February 1946. In the British zone of Germany, as the normal consumers' ration was cut to 1,014 calories at the end of February as against the same period in 1945, and was only being kept at this level by heroic efforts on the part of the British authorities. In the USA, people consumed about 3,300 calories per person per day. The ration in the American zone was reduced in the middle of May to 1,180 calories. In contrast, more than 125 million people in Europe subsisted on less than 2,000 calories per day; over 28 million got less than 1,500 calories a day. In some parts of Europe, some people received as little as 1,000 calories. The rations in some parts of India came down to 1,000 calories, and even 800.

Food production was also low, with tonnage and output falling far below Pre-War levels. Only 31 million tons of bread grains were produced in Europe in 1945-1946, according to estimates. There was also rise in prices, hoarding, black marketing, speculation and inflation. In Punjab, this situation caused discontent among the disbanded soldiers and acute deprivation among the masses, especially the wage earners and salaried classes in both rural and urban areas.

The World Food Crisis was occasioned by many factors including damage caused by war and the dislocation of agricultural production. These resulted in shortage and dislocation of labour, removal of drought animal. And other circumstance connected to the war caused a serious fall in world production of food in 1946. Asia used to ship food to Europe before the war. However, throughout the war, Asia's surplus-producing countries were unable to provide any food to Europe or Asia as a whole. Furthermore, compared to Pre-War years, shipments from Argentina, one of the greatest pre-war grain exporters to Europe, fell by nearly five million tons in 1947. Another two million tons were lost because of a poor crop year in

Australia. As a result of the loss of the continental European market during the war, changes in production occurred. In addition, a large number of countries, including some of those which were normally the largest producers of food, particularly grain, suffered serious droughts and therefore reaped abnormally small crop. The war brought about interruptions of the normal movement of supply between producers and consumers.⁸⁵ In Europe, there was withdrawal of labour from land, either temporary or for several years. The crisis was also led by shortage of good quality seed, lack of adequate draft power for preparation of seed beds and the scarcity of pesticides.

In the specific case of Nigeria, there was an acute shortage of staple foodstuffs in Nigeria caused by the exceptional October 1944 to May 1945 drought. This shortage, combined with an inflationary rise in staple food prices exacerbated by the requisition and purchase of foodstuffs for the services over the previous five years, has resulted in a situation in which the Services' requirements for rice and maize from Nigeria for 1946 could not be met without exacerbating the hardships experienced by the civilian population. This hardship had already caused resentment among workers, with the danger of a general strike looming. Consequently, the Nigeria government had decided that the whole of the autumn 1945 and spring 1946 harvest of rice and maize must be reserved for the civil market. It will not be possible until May 1946 to gauge whether or not any allocation can be made to the Services out of the harvest of autumn 1946.⁸⁶

The control of food movement, rationing, and price fixing that occurred during the Second World War did not end with the war, but continued into the Post-War period as a result of the World Food Crisis ⁸⁷ (1946-1948) that followed immediately after the Second World War was over, leading to editorials against this extension.

But the army was not affected by the food shortage due to demobilisation, leading to surplus in some stocks of foodstuffs, which were exported to other parts of West Africa for the provisioning of the British Armed Forces in those territories. The Nigeria deficiency for 1946 should be made up from imports from overseas.

⁸⁵ <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1946/apr/04/world-food-shortage-> HC Deb 04 April 1946 Vol. 421 cc1402-504

⁸⁶ CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol. II, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944 Requirements, p.78

⁸⁷ National Archives Ibadan (NAI) DCI 1-5/4037/S.65, 'World Food Crisis 1946'

5.9 Army Surplus and Inter-Colonial Shipment

The end of the Second World War in 1945 gave rise to demobilisation and reduction in manpower. Estimate of 1946 and 1947 were made amidst the war 1945, with no inkling that the war would have ended before 1946. Thus, these estimates of 1946 and 1947 made during the war time did not factor the reduction of manpower by 1946 into consideration. As a result, there were surplus supplies of several products available to the military.

Owing to shortage of rice for consumption by military personnel in Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast, the military authorities propose to ship 250,000 lbs to Gold Coast and 100,000 lbs to Sierra Leone, while 216,000 lbs have already been shipped to Gold Coast.

Owing to increased demands for inter-colonial shipment and the cancellation of outstanding dues, this amount would not now be available for disposal as Surplus Supplies.⁸⁸

⁸⁸ CSO 26/ 37909/S.14/ Vol. III, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs—1944-1947, Requirements 1948, 1949", p168

Table 5.4: Schedule of Military (British Army, R. A. F. and African Naval Ratings) Requirements (Revised) of Locally Produced Foodstuffs in 1946, with Provisional Allocation of Supply by Colonies:

Commodity	Requirement for consumption in Nigeria	To be supplied by Nigeria	To be exported
Meat, fresh	1,330	1,330	Nil
Biltong, goat	60	89	Nil
Biltong, beef	60	89	Nil
Fish, dried		1000	Nil
Maize	950	-	Nil
Rice	1,000	-	Nil
Millet	700	826	Nil
Guinea Corn	600	860	Nil
Garri	600	662	Nil
Yams	2,800	2,800	Nil
Salt	160	160	Nil
Chilis	150	160	Nil
Vegetable, European	160	160	Nil
Vegetable, African	1, 640	1,640	
Fruits, Europeans	240	240	Nil
Fruits, African	1,030	1,030	
Beans, Native	150	150	
Groundnuts, undecorticated	750	750	Nil
Kola nuts	60	60	Nil
Onions	40	40	Nil
Groundnut Oil	12	12	Nil
Sugar	270	270	Nil
Palm Oil	775	1,067	Nil
Coffee	120	120	Nil
Eggs (Nos.)	800,000	800,000	Nil

Source: National Archives Ibadan (NAI) DCI 1-5/4037/S.65, 'World Food Crisis 1946'

All military requirements from Nigeria for 1946 might be met as far as can be predicted at this time, subject to the exceptions and revisions listed below:

A. Maize and Rice: No supplies will be available from the 1945-1946 crops. In mid-1946, the situation with relation to supply from the 1946-1947 crops will be assessed.

B. Garri and Yams: While every effort will be made to meet requirements notified it cannot be definitely stated at present that it will be possible to supply in full quantities asked for. If this proves to be impossible, you will be notified as soon as feasible.

Sugar: It is improbable that more than 160 tons of sugar are therefore being included in the foodstuffs programme for 1946.⁸⁹

The following items in addition to those reported as surplus to military requirements by August 1946 are available for disposal by local purchase:

Millet 550 tons

Guinea Corn 400 tons

Source: CSO 26/ 37909/S.14, Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs—1944-1947, p.83

The Director of Supplies in Lagos decided that the Army should handle the millet disposal on their own.⁹⁰

Jos native administration were not willing to accept millet of this type as there was no sale for it and the native authority would be involved in loss. Kano native administration which was also in urgent need of corn for Kano market refused an offer of this corn as unsaleable.

It was clear, therefore, that this millet would only find a sale where famine conditions existed and to move it to Kano to permanent storage till this contingency occurs, would only add considerably to its price and reduce the possibility of its ultimate disposal without loss.

It was, therefore, suggested that these Army supplies should not be taken over for the government reserve but that the military should make their own arrangements for its disposal

⁸⁹ CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol.II, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944 Requirements

⁹⁰ CSO 26/ 37909/S.14, Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs—1944-1947, Requirements 1948, 1949", p.175, From Director of Supplies, Lagos, to the Secretary, Northern Provinces, Kaduna 21 Nov. 1946

to local contractors or others. In this connection an offer had been received from the Amalgamated Tin Mines of Nigeria who were prepared to take over 200 tons of it at the price preferred to.

Recent reports from the Middle Belt indicated improved prospects for the harvest since September 1946 and the loss of this 550 tons of millet was not likely to have an impact on the adequacy of the government reserve to meet all needs.⁹¹

General Headquarters advised that the Army in Nigeria had sufficient stores of rice and corn to endure until the end of 1945, when just the basic 60-day reserve would remain. As a result, the Army's request to forego further supplies this year can be granted. It was further stated that it will be appreciated if it could be confirmed that no difficulty was foreseen at present in the supply of the army's requirements for delivery in 1946. The quantities required for export to Sierra Leone and the Gambia will be approximately the same as programmed for this year, that is, maize 570 tons, rice 450 tons. In Nigeria, the army would require 1, 439 tons of rice and 1, 242 tons of maize. In view of the suspension of supplies to the army during the remaining months of 1945 it will be necessary for deliveries to recommence without fail in January 1946.⁹²

General Headquarters advised that the army was now in a position to reduce its requirements of local foodstuffs for 1946 and that Major Batty of S. & T. Branch was visiting the four colonies to determine in consultation with Area Commands what reductions were possible. After that, the government will be notified of the Army's revised requirements.

A memo from the Resident Minister, Achimota, Gold Coast dated 9 August 1945, the schedule set out the revised military requirements of locally produced foodstuffs for 1946. It represented a substantial reduction compared with the original statement of June 1945. The War Office agreed to ship 1,000 tons of rice to the British Army in West Africa immediately. It was clear that this rice had only been made available because of its condition, since the War Office had advised that it should be consumed as soon as possible.

⁹¹ CSO 26/ 37909/S.14, Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs—1944-1947, Requirements 1948, 1949”, p.172, From Secretary Northern Provinces to the Director of Supplies, Nigerian Secretariat, Lagos 24 October 1946

⁹² CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol.II, “Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944 Requirements, dated 6 June 1945

The whole 1,000 tons was required to make up the 1946 deficiency of that quantity in Nigeria. The 1,000 tons could not, however, be sufficiently rapidly consumed in Nigeria, and therefore General Headquarters have had to request the War Office to ship it as follows:

Nigeria 400

Gold Coast 300

Sierra Leone 300

Source: CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol. II, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: From the Governor, Sierra Leone to the Chief Secretary, West African Council, dated 15 March 1946.p.122

Thus the army in Nigeria will still have a deficiency of 600 tons, whilst the armies in the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone will each have a surplus of 300 tons. In his telegram of the 9th August, 1945, the Resident Minister stated that the total quantity of rice required by the military authorities both in Sierra Leone and the Gambia during 1946 would be 1,120 tons. The local military authorities later agreed to reduce these requirements to 750 tons, and had recently requested permission to ship 200 tons of this to Apapa, Nigeria. There was no objection to this proposal provided that:

- a. The quantity to be exported could not be supplied from local sources in Nigeria.
- b. The quantity to be exported represents their essential requirements in that area. In forwarding their application to ship this rice, the military authorities stated that 200 tons of polished rice was being shipped from the UK to Sierra Leone for War Department use and this consignment has now arrived. This Government had received no previous notification of the Army's intention to import rice into Sierra Leone from the U.K. In view of the understanding previously given by this Government to supply all military requirements during 1946, the necessary for such imports is not apparent...This government is, in fact, at present examining the possibility of exporting any available surplus from existing stocks of rice (and other produce) to the U.K. For this reason, it was suggested that G.H.Q. should review and reduce to the minimum military requirements of rice and other exportable local foodstuffs to be drawn from Sierra Leone.⁹³

⁹³ CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol.II, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944 Requirements, dated 6 June 1945, p.122, From the Governor, Sierra Leone to the Chief Secretary, West African Council, dated 15 March 1946.

Arrangement had been made to ship 600 tons of rice ex Gold Coast and Sierra Leone to Nigeria during the next few months for use by the military. In view of the impending winding-up of the Lagos Market Scheme and the liquidation of its stocks it was possible to offer immediate delivery of 600 tons of rice to the military ex store Apapa/Lagos. All this rice came from the 1946 northern provinces crop and was in excellent condition. A firm price cannot be quoted at present but it was unlikely to exceed £21.10.0 per to at store.⁹⁴

Supply of Imported Maize to the Army

There was a conversation between Mr. Mallinson and Mr. Stapledon regarding the supply of imported maize to the British Army. It had been confirmed with the General Headquarters that the maize was required in Nigeria for consumption in 1946. It would be realized that the need arose from the fact that the Nigerian government had not been able to undertake to make available from local production the 950 tons of maize which was the requirement of the Army in Nigeria for 1946.⁹⁵ It will be convenient if 450 tons of imported maize could be made available to the Army in December of 1945 and the balance 500 tons in the course of the spring of 1946. Out of a cargo of 2,000 tons planned to arrive from Angola, it was conceivable to supply the 450 tons in December.⁹⁶

It was later preferred to allocate the 450 tons from the Argentine shipment for the following reasons:

1. It will relieve the present pressure on storage.
2. We will be spared the expense of re-bagging much of the 325 tons just arrived per S. S. Oksiwie.
3. Technical report on the maize says that further damage may readily occurred if stored for any length of time.
4. The Argentine will probably turn out more expensive than the Angola owing to higher handling charges.⁹⁷

⁹⁴ CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol.II, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944 Requirements, dated 6 June 1945, p 125 From Governor Nigeria to OFWAC, Accra dated 13 April 1946

⁹⁵ CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol.II, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944 Requirements, dated 6 June 1945, p.90

⁹⁶ CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol.II, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944 Requirements, dated 6 June 1945, p. 90, From Resident Minister's Office, Achimota, Accra to the Chief Secretary, Lagos, dated 11 September 1945.

⁹⁷ CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol.II, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944 Requirements, dated 6 June 1945, p.91

Onions

General Headquarters had enquired whether in addition to the 40 tons as the 1946 requirement of the Army in Nigeria, any quantity up to 80 tons of fresh onions could be made available to Officer Commanding, WAASC, Nigeria Area for export to Sierra Leone.⁹⁸

Chillies

In view of the global shortage of chillies, General Headquarters had ordered the reduction of the ration scale by 50%, with the result that the Army's 1946 requirement of chillies was as follows:

Nigeria	50 tons
Gold Coast	35 “
Sierra Leone	23 “
Gambia	3 “

Source: CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol.II, “Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944 Requirements, dated 6 June 1945, p.108,

General Headquarters had further stated that peppers, country condiments, dawadawa, egwusi, kuka and local ginger were to be acceptable against this requirement, provided that not more than 50% was supplied in the form of local ginger.

Millet and Guinea Corn

General Headquarters advised that the unpopularity of millet and guinea corn with the West African troops in Sierra Leone was such that recent shipments of these grains from Nigeria had been partly wasted. As a result, General Headquarters felt compelled to inquire as to whether it was possible to terminate the supply of millet and guinea corn from Nigeria to Sierra Leone in 1946 and replace it with yam flour and palm oil. In addition, there was, as a result of the inability of the Gold Coast to guarantee the supply of maize, a new requirement for yam flour and palm oil in the Gambia.

⁹⁸ CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol.II, “Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944 Requirements, dated 6 June 1945, p95 from Resmin to O.A.G. Nigeria dated 18 Sept 1945

However, the secretary, Western provinces, Ibadan, noted that the Chief Commissioner was unable (in view of the probable situation during the early part of 1946) to recommend the export of even this small quantity of yam flour from the Western provinces, unless this can be deferred until September or October 1946 when food crops might show an increase in production resulting from this season's shortages and high prices.⁹⁹

In a savingram from Chief Secretary, West African, Council, Accra to Chief Secretary, Lagos, dated 13 Nov. 1945, it was noted that General Headquarters had decided that the original estimates of 100 tons of millet and 260 tons of guinea corn to be exported from Nigeria to Sierra Leone should stand, and all mention of yam flour and additional palm oil be deleted.

Rice

600 tons of northern provinces rice from the stocks held by you have been offered to the military at a price unlikely to exceed £21.10.0 per former stock. They will take 400 tons immediately.

Army Surplus Supplies: due to reduction in manpower. The information states that "I have to inform you that the Department of Food Control has available for disposal the following commodities":

Rice	500 tons
Maize	200
Beef Biltong	40
Millet	550
Salt Native	80

Source: CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol.II, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944 Requirements, dated 6 June 1945 p.147, From Food Controller, Nigerian Secretariat, Lagos dated 23 August 1946.

It is anticipated that the price will be the same as paid by the War Department.¹⁰⁰ The need to dispose of these surplus stocks was as Kaduna and Enugu depots were closing, Army would like to dispose of them locally to avoid having to transfer to C.S.D. Lagos. Price would

⁹⁹ CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol.II, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944 Requirements, dated 6 June 1945, p.108, From The Secretary, Western Provinces, Ibadan, to the Hon. Chief Secretary to the Government, Lagos, dated 23 October 1945

¹⁰⁰ CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol.II, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944 Requirements, dated 6 June 1945 p.147, From Food Controller, Nigerian Secretariat, Lagos dated 23 August 1946

normally be purchased price plus freight to storage depot, but if that price plus freight to where we wished it to be sold brought the selling price above the local market price the Army would consider offers.

1947 Requirements

After allowing for stocks shown above being dispersed now, the following is their estimate of what they might require at the end of 1947:

It was anticipated that the commodities will be required for the Army purposes during 1947:

Garri	210 tons
Maize	200
Millet	150
Groundnuts	545
Palm Oil	260
Guinea Corn	210
Rice	100

Source: CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol.III, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944—1947 Requirements, p. 172

Major Lloyd seemed doubtful if they would even require these amounts. They were so small we need not worry about them but it will alter our corn purchasing plan in Nigeria Province. The following action was suggested:

Rice store Lagos. Army to sell to contractors as there were no organization now L.M.S. is closed. It will act as a useful stop-gap in Lagos till Abeokuta rice is on market.

Maize (Enugu). Ask S.E.P. if he wanted to control its disposal otherwise sell to local contractors.

Beef Biltong (Kaduna & Lagos). Ask S.N.P. if he wants it. If not Army to sell locally.

Millet. (Kaduna) Ask S.N.P. where he wants it.

Salt Native (Lagos) Local sales.¹⁰¹

There was the queries from the Food Controller if the figures quoted were based on the assumption that the army will continue to supply all units in Nigeria with their total requirements of the foodstuffs mentioned during 1947, or if these figures only refer to the requirements of personnel at Ibadan and Lagos after the supply depots at Enugu and Kaduna had been closed.

In response, the army noted that the figures were based on the assumption that all units in Nigeria will continue to be supplied with their total requirements of foodstuffs during 1847. It was also confirmed that, as far as could be estimated, no further supplies would be required in 1947 other than those listed in the estimate of August 23, 1946. In the case of rice, maize and millet, your assumption is correct.

The Director of Supplies, N.E. Whiting, sought to know the actual distribution of the Army food surplus earlier mentioned and the proposed selling price ex store. In response, the Army noted that only 400 tons of rice and 30 tons of native salt are now available as follows:

Commodity	Quantity	Place	
Rice	400 tons	Lagos	
Maize	200	Enugu	£21.8.1d ton
Beef Biltong	20	Lagos	
Beef Biltong	20	Kaduna	
Millet	550	Kaduna	£6. 11. 9 per ton
Salt	30	Lagos	

Source: CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol. III, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944—1947 Requirements, p. 172 Dated 23 August, 1946

Maize: The maize was Argentine and as it had been in Nigeria for nearly a year, its condition was doubtful. As the price of local maize was in the region of £3-£5 it was unlikely that the surplus Argentine maize would be sold at £21 ton.

Millet: Regarding millet, the secretary northern province was to enquire whether Jos native authority would be prepared to purchase these 550 tons. ¹⁰² After enquiries, it was noted that

¹⁰¹ CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol.II, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944 Requirements, dated 6 June 1945 p. 149

Jos native administration were not willing to accept millet of this type as there was no sale for it and the native authority would be involved in loss. Kano Native Administration which was also in urgent need of corn for Kano market refused an offer of this corn as unsaleable. It was, therefore, that this millet would only find a sale where famine conditions exist and to move it to Kano to permanent storage till this contingency occurs, would only add considerably to its price and reduce the possibility of its ultimate disposal without loss. It was, therefore, suggested that these Army Supplies should not be taken over for the government reserve but that the army should make their own arrangements for its disposal to local contractors or others. In this connection an offer has been received from the Amalgamated Tin Mines of Nigeria who were prepared to take over 200 tons of it at the price referred to. Recent reports from the Middle Belt indicated improved prospects for the harvest and the loss of this 550 tons of millet was not likely to affect the adequacy of the government reserve to meet all needs.¹⁰³

Rice

By October 1946, it was directed by the West African Army Supply Council (WAASC) that the 400 tons of rice quoted as surplus ready for disposal should be deleted from the list because owing to the increased demands for inter-colonial shipment and the cancellation of outstanding dues, this amount would not now be available for disposal as Surplus Supplies.¹⁰⁴

Guinea Corn

The secretary, northern provinces noted that the residents of the Plateau, Kano and Zaria provinces were being informed that the military authorities wished to dispose of 400 tons of guinea corn stored at Enugu but being transferred to Kaduna. It was suggested that the military authorities should inform these Residents direct of the age and condition of the corn on the possibility that the Deputy Director of Agriculture at Samaru or the Director of Veterinary Service at Vom might be able to place the military authorities in contact with possible purchases.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol.II, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944 Requirements, dated 18 Sept. 1946 p. 162

¹⁰³ CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol.III, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944—1947 Requirements, p. 172 Dated 24 October 1946

¹⁰⁴ CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol.III, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944—1947 Requirements, p.168

¹⁰⁵ CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol.III, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944—1947 Requirements, p. 183, Dated 28 December 1946

Inter-colonial Shipment

Owing to shortage of rice for consumption by military personnel in Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast, the military authorities propose to ship 250,000 lbs to Gold Coast and 100,000lbs to Sierra Leone.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol.III, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944—1947 Requirements, p. 170
Dated 19 October 1946

Table 5.5: Schedule—Estimated Requirements of West African Produce for the Year ending 31 Dec 1947¹⁰⁷

Commodity	Nigeria (in tons)	Sierra Leon	Gold Coast	Total
Meat, fresh	230	140	193	563
Fresh Veg	320	-	318	638
Fresh Fruit	330	120	230	680
Groundnuts	240	200	85	525
Native Beans	30	20	30	80
Kola Nuts	10	6	102	6
Native Cigarettes	-	-	1,500,0000 pcs	
Palm Oil	200	-	-	200
Garri	100	48	160	308
Guinea Corn, Maize, Millet	600	-	-	600
Native Peppers	20	-	-	20
Yams	560	-	510	1,070
Onions	13	-	9	22
Fresh Fish	-	30	20	50
Dried Fish	20	-	30	50
Bacon Fresh	12	-	12	24
Fruit Juice	2,000 Bots	-	-	2,000 Bots
Rice	200	-	140	340
Groundnut Oil	4	-	-	4
Potatoes Fresh	65	-	-	65
Bananas Dried	40	-	-	40
Biltong	15	-	-	15
Native Coffee	15	-	-	15

Source: CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol.II, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944-1947 Requirements, p.164

¹⁰⁷ CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol.II, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944 Requirements, p.164

All items may be supplied without difficulty with the following possible exceptions:

a. Native cigarettes: Messrs. Rogers & Bird were away and so no reply might be expected until Monday.

b. Rice: There is now no requisitioning so that the army may find it difficult or impossible to buy at a reasonable price.

c. Dried Banana: The plantations may be fully occupied with export orders.¹⁰⁸

It was noted that the above estimate was made without regard to the reductions in manpower. It was regretted that owing to amendments to calculations of supply demands, the following items would not now be required by the military during 1947:

Maize 550 tons

Guinea Corn 400 tons

Source: CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol.III, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944—1947 Requirements, p. 170

All items might be supplied without difficulties with the following exceptions. There was now no requisitioning so that the army might find it difficult or impossible to buy at a reasonable price. For dried bananas, the plantations might be fully occupied with exports orders.

With the exception of rice, sugar, groundnuts and palm oil, it was considered that the arrangements were sufficient, but not for export.

Owing to amendments to calculations of supply demands, the following items will not now be required by the military during 1947:

Maize 200 tons

Millet 150 tons

Guinea Corn 210 tons

Source: CSO 26/37090/S14/ Vol.III, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs: 1944—1947 Requirements, p. 170

¹⁰⁸ CSO 26/ 37909/S.14/ Vol. III, "Military Requirements of Local Foodstuffs—1944-1947, Requirements 1948, 1949", p.177

The focus of this chapter is the examination of the pattern which characterised the food provisioning of the Armed Forces in Nigeria in the Post-War period. It analyses the global food situation in the Post-War period and its implications for the armed forces, and the Nigerian populace.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

6.1 Summary

The study has interrogated the evolution and development of food crop production in Nigeria prior to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. The finding is that before the imposition of colonial rule, Nigerian society was effective and efficient in food production. In other words, there was the existence of food security in the pre-colonial period. This development in turn has aided the indigenous or traditional agriculture to respond positively to change and adaptation of the colonial economic policy of the 20th century. It further discovered that the efforts made by the colonial government towards the development of food crop economy in the country thereafter were mainly geared towards export promotion, which necessitated the establishment of botanical garden and other experimental station such as Department of Agriculture.

Due to its magnitude and scale, the First World War disrupted the Pre-war Global Food Regime. The study found out that the debates around the Great War focused on diverse areas, ranging from the deconstruction of the causes to its effects and reverberating consequences, among others. Accordingly, the First World War was seen as the first war of globalisation, while others believe it is the war of empires. The bottom line is that it took a different dimension from the previous wars, both in scope and methodology. It is unique in scope because it involved virtually all parts of the world. It was also unique in methodology because it employed technologies unknown during the previous wars. It was regarded as total war, because it was fought on all fronts, militarily, economically, psychologically and diplomatically.

The study reverberated the scholarly opinions, for example, the interrelationship between war and food, and that war cannot be fought and sustained without food provisioning. Furthermore, that food shortages and blockade are also used as instrument of warfare. Wars are not only interruptions of normal life, but they provoke severe ruptures and breaks in food

production, distribution and consumption, which can have long lasting effects on the economic structure of the food industry, government food policy as well as the individual food habits.

The study has identified the enormous contribution Nigeria made to the Provisioning of the Allied Forces during the First World War, despite its magnitude. The provisioning of the armed forces usually cut across the supply of clothing and equipment as well as food and medicine, though this study focuses more on food provisioning. It pointed out that although the supply of some certain foodstuffs to the Allied Forces in the colonial territories was centralised, and coordinated in London by the Ministry of Food, the germane development is that payments were effected by the local administration of the territory where the armed forces were stationed within the imperial domain. In essence, the Nigerian government, therefore, bore the cost of all supplies made to the West African Frontier Force in all parts of Nigeria and for those who left West Africa for overseas expedition. Such basic foodstuffs like rice, onions, palm oil, corn- or maize-meal, wheat and guinea corn, and livestock were made available to the Allied Forces.

As the study revealed, the First World War occasioned economic and social dislocations across the world. Nigeria, being a major player in the war, most especially on the West African Fronts, was heavily affected by the war. These effects manifested in various ways, such as shortage of food and rise in prices of foodstuffs, loss of revenue, shortage of troops, and huge cost to Nigeria.

Through the study, the fact emerged that after the War ended in 1918, various peace agreements with the defeated countries set in, and the acceptance of the terms of the Treaty by Weimer Germany and the formation of the League of Nations once again created a peaceful atmosphere in the post war international environment. For instance, the Covenant of the League required it to encourage members to cooperate in the areas of commerce and trade. This new state of affairs had palpable implications for the international economy. Bottlenecks to trade engendered by the war such as shipping shortages and other restrictions on overseas demand were being removed. In the case of Nigeria, various war time policies of the government were revisited, amended, modified and relaxed. All these post-war developments had implications for the movement of foodstuffs across the global market.

The study looked at the aspect of the food provisioning of the Armed Forces in Nigeria during the Inter-War years. It looked at the Nigeria Regiment, its Post-War structure and

engagements. It also dealt with world food situation after the First World War and throughout the Inter-War period. Information gathered on the food provisioning of the Armed Forces in the Inter-War years is very scarce and scrappy, probably this could be due to the relaxation that attended the post-war period. The study discovered that although there was periodic shortage of food in the Inter-war years, there was also high cost of living after the war, due to the scarcity of food and basic necessities of life, whose production was affected by the war, however, it did not attract the same magnitude of attention and organisation that was the case during the Great War. It is worthy of note that the prioritisation of the military food provisioning led to the shortage of food for the civilian population.

It was also discovered that, in the mid-1920s, both local and international agriculture prices essentially fell due to capacity growth outpacing demand. Demand was slow to develop because agricultural product consumption was price and income inelastic, and the European population was growing at a far slower rate than before the war. Because of the excess production, which was either stored or financed with a short-term loan, and because of the poor elasticity of food demand, agricultural product prices fell well before the Great Depression. The two decades long agricultural depression from 1920 through the early 1940s stands out, with low prices in most years.

Again, findings revealed that in the years of 1935 and 1936, some parts of Northern and Southern Provinces of Nigeria witnessed shortage of food due to poor rainfall (drought). In these provinces, there was an estimation of low harvest that was beyond normal harvest during this period. Yam crop was adversely affected. The poor rain negatively affected crop yields and caused increase in prices of food. The resultant effect is that agricultural output became low in Nigeria. Consequently, the quantities of food items Nigeria imported in the year 1930 from different countries included: biscuits, bread, cake, confectionery, cheese, rice, corn meal tea, sugar, egg, fish, milk, butter and others. The total quantity of food items imported into Nigeria at this period amounted to 6,855,692 tons, while the total value amounted to £557,106.

However, the drought broke in good time and some food crops yielded very satisfactory as far as could be envisaged. This was witnessed in Zaria, Sokoto, Ilorin, Bauchi, and Kano Provinces. In the years between 1936 and 1938, Nigeria imported several foodstuffs from various countries. The food items exported by Nigeria were groundnuts, palm oil, palm kernels, benniseeds, potatoes, rice and millets.

Through the study, it is learnt that the Second World War (1939-1945) was as devastating as the first one, most especially in the area of food production and distribution. As the warfare progressed, it affected the lives of the natives of the colony generally. Prices of imported commodities rose and this meant increased tax for wealthier members of the community. The war also led to some restrictions and control on the movement of the foodstuffs. This development continued even after the war. This was due to the world food crisis which set in shortly after the Second World War. There was reprieve in some sectors like military formation as demobilisation was on-going among the belligerent nations. However, in the area of food production and supply, normalcy did not return immediately due to some post-war developments.

For example, the World Food Crisis began in 1946, a year after the Second World War ended, and lasted until the end of the 1940s. The issue was encapsulated in a variety of ways. There was a major food shortage in almost every country on the planet. The bulk of mankind was living in conditions of famine. Millions of people were threatened with starvation and death. The severe shortage of food also resulted in low levels of consumption, which in turn increased diseases and decreased per capita work output which acted as one of the major causes in retarding industrial and general recovery.

The Post-War World Food Crisis resulted in the continuation of food rationing that had been implemented during the war. Due to the lack of food, it was distributed in a restricted manner. There was also low production of food and decline of tonnage and output far below pre-war levels. European production of bread grains in the period 1945 and 1946 was estimated to reach only some 31 million tons. There was also rise in prices, hoarding, black marketing, speculation and inflation. In some places, this situation caused discontent among the disbanded soldiers and acute deprivation among the masses, especially the wage earners and salaried classes in both rural and urban areas.

The study pointed it out that the Crisis was occasioned by many factors including damage caused by war and the dislocation of agricultural production. These resulted in shortage and dislocation of labour. Other circumstance connected to the war was a serious fall in world production of food in 1946. In addition, a large number of countries, including some of those which were normally the largest producers of food, particularly grain, suffered serious droughts and, therefore, reaped abnormally small crop. The war brought about interruptions of the normal movement of supply between producers and consumers.

In the specific case of Nigeria, it is discovered that there was an acute shortage of staple foodstuffs caused by the exceptional October 1944 to May 1945 drought. This shortage, combined with an inflationary rise in staple food prices exacerbated by the requisition and purchase of foodstuffs for the services over the previous five years, has created a situation in which the Services' requirements for rice and maize from Nigeria for 1946 could not be met without exacerbating the suffering of the civilian population. This hardship resulted in unrest among labour and the imminent threat of a general strike. Consequently, the Nigeria Government decided that the whole of the autumn 1945 and spring 1946 harvest of rice and maize must be reserved for the civil market. This means that by implication, it will not be possible until May 1946 to gauge whether or not any allocation can be made to the Services out of the harvest of autumn 1946. The control of food movement, rationing, and price fixing that occurred during the Second World War did not cease with the war, but continued into the Post-War period.

However, the army was unaffected by the food shortage due to orchestrated massive demobilisation, which resulted in a surplus in some food stocks, which were supplied to the contingents in Nigeria, while exportations were made to other parts of West Africa for the provisioning of the British Armed Forces in those territories.

6.2 Conclusion

It is bewildering, that Nigeria, whose foodstuffs were mobilized and exported to Europe and other colonial territories for the provisioning of His Majesty's Armed Forces in the colonial period, is a major importer of foodstuffs in the post-colonial period. Poverty, famine, and food insecurity have plagued post-colonial Nigeria, whose leadership and bureaucracy have failed to mobilize the country's rich resources to recreate colonial-era food production and exports.

At the 2018 World Food Day, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) strongly projected that Nigeria's efforts to achieve zero hunger by 2030 are being seriously undermined.¹ The agency warned of the dangers ahead, citing climate change and the ethno-religious conflicts plaguing the country. Prior to the FAO verdict, the United Nations, the African Development Bank and the former British Prime Minister, Theresa May, have described Nigeria as the global poverty capital.² May and the AfDB aver that 80 per cent of

¹ Punch Editorial, FAO Warning on Food Insecurity in Nigeria, Punch Newspaper, Published, October 21, 2018

² Punch Editorial, FAO Warning on Food Insecurity in Nigeria, Punch Newspaper, Published, October 21, 2018

the population are living in extreme poverty.³ An FAO report added that 2.3 million people in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe, the three states hardest hit by the Boko Haram insurgency, faced acute food shortages.⁴ Looking back, the report said that 13 million Nigerians suffered from hunger since 2016.⁵

There are obvious reasons why Nigeria cannot meet the obligations of feeding its citizens, for instance, poor coordination, reliance on oil income and misplacement of priorities. Nigeria's agriculture is characterised by low output, low technology and is labour intensive. Farmers lack safe water for irrigation and sanitation. Subsistence farmers in the rural areas employ outdated methods. The National Agricultural Seed Council says farmers lack certified seeds, which are critical in ensuring good yield.⁶ In addition, there are hundreds of kilometers of woeful rural roads network leading to high cost of transportation, sacks and baskets of harvests rot on the farms before getting to the intended markets. Furthermore, there are lack of adequate storage facilities, this makes yam, tomato, pepper, cassava, fruits, vegetables and grains to get spoilt before reaching the consumers. The effect is that they become expensive and thereby becomes unreachable for the vast majority who lack the financial capacity. Farmers, on the other hand, do not receive the requisite revenue due to high production costs and man hours, resulting in losses. The implication is that all efforts to have buoyant and bumper agricultural productivities annually have always failed.

The issues outlined above clearly prompted the FAO to classify Nigeria as one of the world's 37 countries in need of international food aid.⁷ This is a timely warning, and the government at all levels federal, state and local governments, all stakeholders, organizations, and well-meaning Nigerians ought to heed the warning and implement solutions to the impending spectre of food shortage.

³ Punch Editorial, FAO Warning on Food Insecurity in Nigeria, Punch Newspaper, Published, October 21, 2018; FAO: Urgent Efforts to Step Up Efforts to End Hunger and Malnutrition in all its Forms.

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Adeoti, E. O.	63	Associate Professor, Dept. of History and International Studies, Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos.	Lagos	25/09/2016
Adeyemi, G.	61	Brig. General, Retired Military Officer	Abuja	12/01/2020
Adeyeri, J. O.	51	Senior Lecturer, Dept. of History and International Studies, Lagos State University, Ojo. Lagos.	Lagos	11/12/2019
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N.4548/1914	War in Europe—notices regarding (a) Exchange of British and Austro-Hungarian civilian; and (b) Transmission of money and letters to individuals abroad—forwarding (1914-1917)
N.97/1915	Prize vessels captured in the Camaroons—Discharge of cargoes at Lagos. Exemption from Harbour dues (1915)
15607 Vol I and II	Transit of goods to French Territories through Nigeria (1912-1921)
N.2029/1916	Contributions from Nigeria towards the cost of war (1916)
N.1275/1919	Exports from Nigeria to foreign destinations-modification of (1919-1921)
19458	Purchase of foodstuffs by Public Works Department. 1927
38808/C.7/C.1	Food supplies rationing, Coupon Scheme: Registration. 1939
35565	Control of foodstuffs. 1939.
37205	Special War contribution by Nigerian Government (1940)
15607/S.1	Transit of French Military store through Nigeria (1940)
23229/S.100	Tenders for foodstuffs: Police Department. 1948.
23229/S.106	Tenders for foodstuffs: Government College, Umuahia. 1940/50
23229/S.107	Veterinary Department Vom School: Tender for Supply; for foodstuffs 1949/54
23229/S.82	Tenders for rations: boys' reformatory, Isheri. 1945/51
23229/S.218	Tenders for supply of foodstuffs to Government Trade Centre, Omer River Victoria. 1954
23229/S.259	Trade Centre food contract 1955/56. 1955.
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(ii) Applications by other firms to purchase 1944/46
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