

**THE SOCIAL COST OF FARMER-HERDER CONFLICTS IN ISEYIN,
OYO STATE, NIGERIA**

BY

**Abiola Omowunmi AROYEWUN
Matric No.: 182368**

B.Sc. (Hons) Sociology (UNAND), M.Sc. Criminology (UI)

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CERTIFICATION

I certify that this study is original and was carried out by Abiola Omowunmi Aroyewun (182368) in the Department of Sociology, Faculty of the Social Sciences, University of Ibadan, under my supervision

Supervisor

R.A. Okunola
B.Sc. (Hons) Sokoto, M.Sc., Ph.D. (Ibadan)
Professor, Department of Sociology,
University of Ibadan, Nigeria

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my Maker, the Source of all potentials, knowledge and wisdom. The Lord God Almighty who gave me his protection, mercy and provision to pursue another degree in the field of Criminology in the Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan, Nigeria.

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ABSTRACT

Farmer-herder conflict is one of the most prevalent violent occurrences in West Africa with attendant social cost, which include livelihood and socio-relational consequences. There have been frequent farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria, which have resulted in massive destruction of lives and property. Most studies on farmer-herder conflicts have focused mainly on causes, damages and casualties, with little attention paid to the social cost. This study, therefore, examined the effects of the conflicts on farmer and herder livelihoods, family structure and their symbiotic relationship, as well as the management structure employed to curtail farmer-herder conflicts in Iseyin, Oyo State.

Group Conflict Theory was adopted as framework while the exploratory design was employed. Purposive sampling technique was used to select communities that experienced incessant farmer-herder conflicts at Iseyin. Snowball sampling technique was used to select the farmer and herder respondents. Two key informant interviews were conducted with leaders of farmers and herders. Sixty in-depth interviews were conducted with 30 farmers and 30 herders selected at Seraphim (6 farmers, 6 herders), Baale-sagbo (4 farmers, 5 herders), Awaye (6 farmers, 6 herders), Aba-paanu (5 farmers, 5 herders), Olugbade (4 farmers, 5 herders), Sangote (2 farmers, 2 herders) and Alagbe (3 farmers, 3 herders). Data were content-analysed.

The prevalence of farmer-herder conflicts had adversely affected four principal elements of farmer and herder livelihood – security, income, health and education. Farmers and herders lived in constant fear of attack and destruction of lives and property. Also, farmers had witnessed significant decrease in farm produce because of the incessant destruction of farms; and herders lost herds due to retaliatory rustling and poisoning. There was a reduction in the income of farmers and herders owing to low output. Loss of income resulted in farmers' failure to repay loans. Farmers accessed community healthcare, but herders had limited access to health facilities. The children of farmers and herders experienced disruption of their education as a result of their parents' inability to pay the required fees. The families of both farmers and herders lost male breadwinners and family members, and made unplanned relocation to other communities. Prior to remarriage, farmers' widows assumed the roles of family heads but the widows of herders were integrated into the extended family structure. Farmer-herder conflicts had made the symbiotic relationship of farmers and herders to degenerate into inter-community mistrust and discouragement of inter-communal marriages. It had also truncated intercommunity business relations. The conflict management strategies adopted by the herders and farmers included reporting incidence of conflict to group leaders and the police. That, in some instances, led to the compensation of aggrieved parties.

The social cost of the conflicts between farmers and herders in Iseyin had a debilitating impact on their livelihoods and inter-group relations. Reports to group leaders and state authorities had brought about some compensation and peace to the communities. Farmers and herders should adopt conciliatory strategies to manage disagreements in peace and conflict periods.

Keywords: Farmer-herder conflicts in Iseyin, Social cost of conflicts, Conflict management

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The nexus of increase in human populace, change in climate, desert encroachment, deforestation and drought which has reduced quality of lands for farming and for grazing in the northern region of Nigeria has compelled herders in pursuit of grazing lands for their livestock's (Abass, 2012; Odoh & Chigozie, 2012; Okoli, Enyinnia, Elijah, & Okoli, 2014). Evidently, series of unfolding events have occurred that involve environmental change, thereby affecting production of cattle in the southern and northern parts of Nigeria. Rather than keep to the transit bearings they have constantly been known for in most southern areas. For instance, herders have emerged and are becoming sedentary in the south. Hence, there is a propensity to set up a long-term or semi-permanent encampment over which they may come into conflict with their host farming communities.

As time evolves, a cordial relationship develops between the farmers and herders in the communities where they stopped over. During this period, they both benefit from each other. Particularly, the farmers collect manure from the herders in exchange for grains. Thus, the relationship that exists between the two groups is for economic trade of grains for dairy products, accessibility to neighbouring markets and providing manure for farming lands while the livestock consume crop residues (Blench, 2010).

The herders are now known to stay in a particular place for a long term these movements have been generating conflict over access and rights to farmlands due to the destruction of farm products on farmlands along these cattle paths which have become pervasive and seem to have defied solutions (Abass, 2012). Therefore, the interdependent bond among the herders and the host communities has increasingly shown reduction in farming and grazing due to the conflicts. Substantively, the relationship between these groups has deteriorated due to abuse

of land resources, which has brought herders and host farming communities into contest for the availability of land thereby resulting in regular conflict, which has led to violent behaviour. Hence, the increase in human population, herds' and population size has caused a growing pressure on available natural resources. This has compelled herders to move further than their limited range in search of pasture for their livestock (Breusers, Nederlof, & van Rheenen, 1998; Bello, 2013).

While a number of studies have sought to identify factors that culminated into conflicts among the herders and their host farming communities; it is palpable that the relationship between the herdsman and host farming communities have become cutthroat over abuse of land and other resources (Homer-Dixon, 1999). Also, it was observed by Adisa (2012) that the farmer-herder clashes have continued to be mainly preponderant resource use conflicts in Nigeria. As a result, the conflicts between these two groups had led to violence in rural areas, due to abuse of lands like cattle invading the farmlands, attack on women in the community by herdsman, pollution of water, cattle stealing, excretion on watercourses, overgrazing on fallow lands and climate change (Folami, 2009; Ofuoku & Isife, 2009; Adekunle & Adisa, 2010; Blench R., 2010; Odoh & Chigozie, 2012; Solagberu, 2012; Audu, 2013; Bello, 2013; McGregor, 2014).

In addition, Blench (1994) observed that the extent of agreement between herders and host farming communities in Nigeria had caused different opinions; in the way the clashes had taken place, which leads to the unavoidability of collapse of law and order. The federal government of Nigeria, local government and state Government employ diverse means so as to put an end to the rate of the persistent clashes among the farmers and herders in the country by making policies. However, implementation of the policies has not been forth coming. The official report of the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources in 2009, for instance, Nigeria has officially demarcated 4125 grazing reserved or routes in order to curb farmer-pastoralist clashes. Although all this was meant to fortify the bond among the two groups the relationship keeps on worsening it was never implemented. These conflicts have been linked to abuses of resource uses such as land and water (Blench R., 2004). Several studies also allied these crises to the premise of eco-violence (Okoli & Atelhe, 2004), where ecological reasons and utilisation of scarce resources led to conflicts and violence. This may

explain the deteriorating grazing resources and poor running of existing grazing reserves as culpable (Adisa R., 2012). Conflicts between the two groups take place mostly in places where there is solid contest for lands for agriculture and grazing but the level of intensity differs from one area to another (Okoli, Enyinnia, Elijah, & Okoli, 2014).

Thus, conflicts in these areas have constituted severe pressure and shared burden on the source of income for the herders and farmers and what they are grimly protecting. Against this backdrop, this study therefore seeks to evaluate the social cost that may have arisen due to breakdown in the symbiotic relationship that once existed between the herders and host farming communities in Nigeria.

1.2 Statement of the problem

The inevitability of conflict, as well as the costs it imposes on humans and society as a whole, is one of humanity's greatest challenges. In addition to the deaths of at least one million people per year that could have been avoided, the cost of conflicts in terms of squandered developmental possibilities is enormous (Ball, 2002). There are several studies on conflict as a barrier to global development, and this is due to the fact that every violent conflict results in the destruction of immense human, material, and environmental resources that could have been used to make life easier for man (Albert, 2012). According to Nnoli (2003) conflicts have frequently shifted people's emphasis away from creative output and toward creative destruction. Conflict-related expenses, according to empirical studies, are a worldwide phenomenon that affects all states in some way. Also, conflict-related costs are a global phenomenon that impacts all states in some way. Conflicts generate food shortages, brain drain, and human development stagnation by having a negative impact and hindering education (Furle 1995).

In several places in sub-Saharan Africa, herdsman and host farming communities' conflicts have intensified into prevalent ferocity leading to damage of properties, loss of lives and dislodgment of people from their homes (Okeke, 2014). Particularly, in the western part of Africa, herders and host farming communities' conflict are not merely seen as a usual trend in time past but also a common trait of their economic source of income (Moritz, 2010; Turner, Ayantunde, Patterson, 2011; Tonah, 2006).

The source of the conflict between the host community farmers and herders is mainly due to abuse of land resources. Prior to independence, the population of Nigeria was about 35 million people (Nana & Tanko 2017) 58 years later it has leaped over to 180 million people and the growth is expected to persist in the near future (Abah, Roland clement, Petja Mareme 2015). According to Moritz (2012) ethnicity, religious and tribal differences among herders and agricultural groups cause conflicts. It creates confusions, doubt, resentment and preferences in most places in West Africa, where the herders are seen as strangers. Also, the neglect of the host-stranger relationship has heightened the conflicts, particularly when herdsman start requesting for the same privileges of tenure (Seddon & Sumberg, 1997). Also, the refusal of herdsman activities in some communities has been viewed as the cause of conflicts.

More succinctly, other factors that have caused herders' and host farming communities' conflicts include farmers and herders involvement in social vices, such as theft of livestock, robbery on the highway, provocation and rape of women (Abubakari & Longi, 2014; Ofuoku & Isife, 2009; Tonah, 2000), water pollution by cattle (Ofuoku & Isife, 2009; Tonah, 2003), zero grazing lands (Ofuoku & Isife, 2009), herdsman's violent behaviours (Abubakari & Longi, 2014), ignoring traditional authorities, host communities harassing herders, bush burning, insufficient grazing lands, uncertainty of land tenure and shady practices (Mwamfupe, 2015). Others are politics and waning of mutually dependent relationship among herdsman and farmers (Tonah, 2000). Hitherto, little has been done to investigate patterns of relationship that exist between nomads and their sedentary Yoruba communities. Due to this, it would be hard to alleviate the problem of farmer-herder violence in Nigeria.

Quite a number of studies on this subject matter had focused on economic implications of farmers-herders conflicts in host communities, causes, casualties and damages (Adisa & Adekunle, 2010; Davis, 2015; Ibrahim et. al., 2015; Stanley et. al., 2017). It is imperative to state that the social cost of these conflicts meted on both parties cannot be over emphasised due to the far-reaching dimensions and implications of the conflict. For instance, in a study carried out in Kwara State Nigeria, 22 persons reported loss of farm standing crops and produce, 41 persons reported loss of domestic animals and households. Persons from both

sides that reported loss of lives was 8 out of about 150 households interviewed (Fiki & Lee, 2004).

Although, further studies show that barns, stores, residences and properties were ruined in many of the fierce clashes, the costs of these conflicts to the society go beyond these economic implications of the conflicts alone. The aftermath of the conflict may also result in social costs on both parties, which constitutes the conflict milieu that affects the activities of man. This conflict milieu includes family break-ups, social unity (social relationship), intermarriage relationship, schooling of children, water contamination, etc. Also, the cost and the effects of the conflict are widely varied, some are short-term while others last a lifetime, and the ultimate cost is loss of life. Therefore, to examine the social cost of host farming community-herdsmen conflicts, an attempt was made in this study to distinguish between the long-term social costs and immediate social costs among the host community and the herders in Iseyin because it is the major stopping point and cattle market on the Ilorin-ogbomosho-oyo-ibadan trade cattle route also, cattle camp ground.

1.3 Research questions

1. How has the conflict affected the livelihood (farming and grazing) of farmers-herders in Iseyin Oyo State?
2. What are the ways in which the conflict has disrupted the structure of farmers-herders' family in Iseyin Oyo state?
3. What are the ways in which conflicts between the herdsman and farming communities of Iseyin, Oyo State affected the social relations among the parties involved?
4. What are the strategies put in place to cope or manage the aftermath of the conflict by the herders and host farming community in Iseyin, Oyo state?

1.4 Research objectives

The research objectives are to;

1. Establish the effects of the conflicts on farmers and herders livelihoods in Iseyin, Oyo State.
2. Investigate the effects of the conflicts on the family structure of farmers and herders in Iseyin, Oyo State.
3. Examine the effects of conflict on farmers and herders symbiotic relationship in Iseyin, Oyo State.
4. Identify the management structure employed to curtail farmer-herder conflicts in Iseyin, Oyo State.

1.5 Significance of the study

The need for empirical conflict costing and functional management as part of conflict transformation is critical to social development and should not be overlooked. The rising number of reports of violence at work-related boundaries involving the farmers and host farming community, despite the government's efforts to eradicate it, makes understanding these conflicts an urgent task. While studies have revealed economic implication of these incessant conflicts, there is the need to understand the social implication of these conflicts such as the social cost between the farmers and herders. These should be looked at more closely and solutions proffered. The costs of the conflict have direct or indirect impact on the people, families, friends and neighbors, the society and the general community at large. It can also lead to trauma; displacement of people from their homes also, affects human relationship. The outcome of conflict cannot be predicted. It is also important to know how the state, herders and farmers have viewed the conflict and the methods put in place to resolve them. It is vital to note that if the social factors sustaining the conflicts are not plainly recognised, understood, managed and resolved, such incidences will persist. Therefore, conflict between the herdsmen and farming community might be abridged or prevented when government plans that are clearly formulated and implementation framework designed for the purpose of creating a guiding principle on future of mutual aid among the two opposing groups are established.

The view of the two different groups on the usage of land and accessibility to natural resources (livelihood induced conflict), which were basically the main causes of the conflict, were examined so as to enable additional understanding of the subject from the viewpoint of the conflict actors. This will therefore create a kind of communication platform that will make possible a bottom to top flow of information from the masses to the general community and the government. While scholars had carried out a research on land resource conflict and considerable number of studies has been devoted to farmer-herder conflict in particular (Adebayo & Olaniyi, 2008; Ofuoku & Isife, 2009), the most recent security challenges that have led to the escalation of violence of different dimensions across the country has prompted the need for a fresh investigation. This will complement the efforts of the other researchers.

This being the case, it is hoped that the study will offer the government, non-governmental organisations and the general public, relevant and latest information on underlined factors and social realities generating, sustaining and escalating the conflict between herders and host farming communities; and various institutions' efforts towards the resolutions of conflicts between them. It will also make available the necessary information on the recent status of herders and host farming communities' conflict. Most importantly, it will examine the social cost of the conflict on both groups and the society as a whole as well as help to make contribution to the existing literature on conflicts globally. Finally, this study will attempt to recommend the best ways to improve the relationship between these important groups. While compensation always comes inform of economic relief. None comes as relief for social cost and it is indeed almost impossible to evaluate. The more reason such conflict be mitigated at the outset.

1.6 Scope of the study

The scope of the study gives the boundary within which the study was operated. The study was delimited to Iseyin, Oyo State, Nigeria which comprises of seven communities; Seraphim, Baale-sagbo , Awaye, Aba-paanu, Olugbade, Sangote and Alagbe. The participants included Farmers, Herders, farmers' leader and herders' leader. Data were content-analysed. However, the study operated within the broad objective of investigating the social costs of conflicts among herders and hosts farming community.

1.7 Definition of Terms

Social cost: Conflict effect or costs refers to the consequences and repercussions of conflict on society and people. The cost of the conflicts which have direct and indirect impact on the lives on those involved. It can be expressed in terms of social capital, intergroup social relationships, poverty, and the economy as a result of de-industrialization, among other things. People that bear the cost of the conflicts include victims/survivors, perpetrators, children, friends, and family, the three levels of government, and the rest of the society. Costs of conflict may include pain, suffering and premature mortality, among others. Social costs in the context of this study are taken to be the direct and indirect losses sustained by herdsmen/farmers family as a result of unrestrained clashes between them whereby it affects their livelihood, education of their children, social integration in the host community, loss of family members, disruption of the family structure and breakdown of intergroup relations and how it threatens the development and sustainability of the host communities.

Conflict: Conflict may be described as an unrestrained communication between people who are interdependent and who observe that their interests are incompatible, conflicting, or in tension. It is perceived as the communication of mutually dependent people who see incompatible goals and interfere with each other to achieve these goals (Folger, poole & stuntman 2009). In this study, it is stipulated as the vocationally induced conflict between the herdsmen and host farming community.

Herdsmen/herders: This refers to the people who breed, rear or care for cattle.

Farmer: A person who operate a farm or cultivate crops, either commercially or to sustain himself or his family.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This section examines literatures on the research topic, while pointing to the gaps identified as the new areas of the study. Review of literature comprises different sub-headings relating to the objectives of the study. This section also contains the theoretical and conceptual framework on which the research is anchored.

2.1 Historical background of farmers and herders conflicts

For centuries, sedentary farming and pastoralism have co-existed in many communities in Nigeria. Undoubtedly, this has often lead to unvarying strife for scarce resources between both parties, most notably, land for grazing or farming and water. Nomadic pastoralism refers to a form of animal husbandry where people who rear animals especially cattle move from one place to another to find grassland and water for the cattle. This human and animal migration depends on the weather conditions as the pastoralists often move during period of drought or arid period to the southern part of the country while they move back to the northern part of the country and the Sahel during the rainy season. However, due to climate change which results in drought, less rainfall, and increasing population, this leads to less availability of pasture and water for the pastoralists hence they often stay more than expected in the southern part, leading to conflict and in most cases, a violent struggle between farmers and herdsmen/pastoralists.

The focus of this section is to critically discuss existing literature on farmers and herders' conflicts, the causes of these conflicts, and the social costs and consequences of these conflicts.

2.2 Overview of nomadic pastoralism

Pastoralism as an occupation or means of livelihood is not a recent phenomenon. Historically, there are several societies in the world that specialised on the rearing of livestock and can be seen as herdsman by nature. In the Americas, there exist the Andean herders who rear the Llama and Alpaca in Bolivia and Peru. In the Middle East, there exists the Bedouin Arab tribes rearing cattle, in the Gobi Desert region; there exists the Mongolian herders rearing cattle and horses. In East Africa, there exist the Masai herders while the West African Savanna there is the Touregs and the Fulanis (Akejir, 2018). Unlike other resources which are immobile, livestock can move; hence herders move about with these livestock looking for forage and water to sustain these animals. Hence, pastoralism refers to the movement of livestock and herders from one place to another in pursuit of grassland. These movements can also be as an effect of climatic change, rising temperature and spread of diseases that affect the livestock.

Akejir (2018) noted that nomadic pastoralism can be seen as a social strategy with economic benefits for the herders. This is based on seasonal migration and management of livestock to ensure survival of these animals. Societies that practice nomadic pastoralism as a means of livelihood see livestock as the means to everything. The existence and survival of these societies is tied to the existence and survival of these livestock. The word "nomadic" is used when someone travels from place to place and do not live in any permanent place for very long. The word, 'transhumance' is used when there are irregular movements, that is when the location of these nomads is relatively fixed. In such situations, they usually settle and live in the same place. Although the source of income of these communities is affected by the change in environment, irregularities in the global markets, increase in population, high competition of terrain and natural resources, proper management of pastoralism remains feasible and the significance and dynamics is the key component to alleviate poverty (Antonio & Silvia, 2009).

However, the approach connected with herding and nomadic life is constantly changing due to modern trends, risks and opportunities made possible by social and economic interactions between the host communities and pastoralists. These interactions often result into violent conflicts between the host communities and the pastoralists. Salzman (2018) identified two

types of nomadic pastoralists based on their social organisation. There are the peasant pastoralists who live in the society as members of sedentary communities and are loyal to the tribe. There are also the tribal pastoralists who see the tribe as the primary political unit, a collective responsibility and provide protection for each member of the tribe. On other hand, Nkwede, Nkwankwo, Aro and Dauda (2018) identified three categories of pastoralists in Nigeria, namely: Core-nomadic pastoralists who provide foliage for their herds and do not have permanent settlement; Semi-nomadic pastoralists who also herd or rear animals but do not move about regularly and often establish semi-permanent settlements; and Agro-pastoralists who rear dairy animals or own them but settle permanently in a place. They rear animals by building ranches.

2.3 Ethnographic background to pastoralism in Nigeria

According to history, the origin of the Fulani seems to be linked to the people of Berber who lived in North Africa during the 8th or 11th century AD. They moved from North Africa and mixed with the Senegalese in the Western Africa region. Thus, the Fulani tribe came into existence. For more than a thousand years, during the period between 900-1900 AD, they continued to spread. A good number of the Fulani spread to Africa especially in the West and some areas in the central African region. They settled among diverse African tribes as they migrated to other African countries. Pastoralists are groups of people that dwell in areas that are isolated and arid. The livelihood of the Fulani people depends on information of the surrounding environment and the safety of their herds (Antonio & Silvia, 2009).

According to Blench (2010) the herders and farmers could have a mutual cooperation in exchanging dairy yield for grain. Herders are also required to sell their animals periodically. If these animals are bought by members of the host community, it could provide finance for herders' personal use. However, if herders do not create a friendly relationship with the farming communities in exchange of goods and services; they can only survive by becoming sedentary (Blench, 2010). This involves flexible movement patterns and exploitation of new communities that are suitable for growing crops every year. The herders undoubtedly are an important part in the Nigerian market. Eniola (2007) viewed that they are the main rearers of livestock, the key sources of meat, and the largest and cheapest suppliers of animal proteins

consumed by the citizens of Nigeria. The core source of animal protein is the livestock which are in the hands of Pastoral Fulani's (Ingawa 1989; Kubkomawa 2015). Thousands of people on a daily basis make their revenues from sales, processing and selling of domestic animal products which include; meat, milk, skin, and others.

Cattle rearing have been the livelihood of the Fulani in the northern part of Nigeria. It has been a northern area of expertise, and this is evident in the prices of their livestock across Nigeria. In Yobe State a cow costs N35, 000. However, in southern cities like Port Harcourt, the same cow could be sold for N100, 000 (Mohammed, 2010). This shows that the Northern part of the country is well placed in the production of livestock. Pantuliano and Elhawary (2009), estimates that they add to the gross domestic product across Africa which is about 20 to 25%. To a large extent, Northern part of Nigeria produced 97% of cattle (National Open University of Nigeria, 2004). The Fulani are also the main core of milk and meat production, resulting to just about 90% of cattle herd possession, which makes up 3.2% of the GDP (Koster & Wolff, 2012; Abass, 2012).

They nurture diverse kinds of livestock, such as the Kuri, Muturu, and Keteku. However, Zebu is seen as the most common breed (Awogbade, 1987; Iro, 1994). More than 4,000 livestock are delivered by the Fulani and slaughtered on a daily basis in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) (Okello, Majekodunmi, Malala, Welburn, & Smith, 2014). Nkwede et. al. (2018) identified two main transhuman pastoral corridors or routes into Nigeria used by the Fulani herdsmen. They include - Northwest corridor running from the Northern part of Benin Republic and Niger passing through Sokoto, Zamfara, Kebbi, Niger and Kwara states ending in the south western and western Niger Delta states. The second corridor enters the country from Chad, Niger and Cameroon passing through Bornu, Adamawa, Yobe, Taraba Jigawa, Kano, Plateau, Nassarwa states and through the Niger-Benue basin states; and from there to the south eastern and eastern Niger Delta states.

In the pastoral system, young men cater for their livestock whereas the women deal with the cooking and selling of cattle products in the marketplace. The elders are involved with the development and managing of resources both at the domestic and community levels (Awogbade, 1987; Iro, 1994). Despite the state's development and civilization, which can be

dated to the colonial era, the mechanisms of governance have served as the foundation for comprehending the difficulties faced by pastoralists while interacting with farmers, explaining their social standing and the nature of their labor (Dyson-Hudson, 1980; Bradburd, 1996; Okello, 2014). Furthermore, 12 arable crops provide 75% of the world's food (Lambrou & Laub 2006). That is, lands suitable for growing crops and five different kinds of animals, with three arable crops—rice, maize, and wheat—making up around 60% of the total. So, the majority of the calories and proteins come from plants. Land has significant global dominance. This is crucial for growing crops and has a significant impact on how people in urban and rural regions prosper socioeconomically. Arable crop production has long been a significant component of Nigerian agricultural endeavors.

In addition, Nigeria's agricultural produce is dominated by the people in the rural area with small lands used for planting of crops which is about 80% of the total food necessity also, farmers grow more than one arable crops for food with earnings, (Fayinka, 2004; Adisa, 2012). Majority of the arable crop farmers depend on rain for farming and planting does not start until raining season begins. Apart from this, land is the actual source of earnings for farmers. Land is also used for construction of other valuable things like industrial and household structures. Therefore, conflict between these two parties may be traced to cattle grazing of farmland during the farming season (Adekunle and Adisa, 2010).

Olayoku (2014) noted that apart from dry season that necessitated herdsmen to travel from the north to the south, the introduction of colonialism which heralded the collapse of the Sokoto Caliphate and the introduction of cattle tax (Jangali) by Northern colonial authorities pushed the herders to the southern part of the country. This also coincided with introduction of anti-tsetse drugs for cattle (tsetse fly is the vector of one the major diseases of cattle) and provided opportunities for herdsmen to settle more or less permanently in the southern part (the southern part of the country, due to its heavy humidity and rainfall, is riddled with tse-tse fly).

The lip service paid to these conflicts by government and the failure of the government to set up mediating or negotiating mechanisms between the dueling parties led to the decision by farmers to defend themselves by taking up arms. Nonetheless, early attempt by the government to tackle these problems include the commencement of the National Livestock

Development Project (NDLP) by the federal government in 1962 also the ratification of a grazing law by the Northern government in 1962. These were attempts to push the pastoral herdsmen to become sedentary (Awogbade, 1987). The federal government also worked with International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) to set up 4, 125 grazing settlements and ranches totaling 4.3 million hectares equipped with vital amenities for the sustenance of the pastoralists and the cattle.

However, it was not successfully implemented, due to the fact that these settlements were created in a way that they will be individually owned instead of being controlled by cooperatives or herdsmen associations. In 2009, grazing routes were also mapped out in some states which include Plateau, Nassarawa, Kaduna, Taraba, Benue, FCT, Sokoto, Bauchi and Adamawa. However, only 270 of these routes are functional (Olayoku, 2014). Recently, there have been talks of a revitalisation of the grazing settlements under the Rural Grazing Area (RUGA) programme, however, this was shut down due to vehement protests by a vast section of people in the southern part of the country who view it as forceful appropriation of indigenous land to the Fulani herdsmen who are strangers. The main beneficiaries equally rejected the programme as well because they assume it will lead to the death of pastoralism which to them is cultural.

2.4 Overview and trends of conflict between Farmers and herdsmen in Nigeria

Farmers and herders have had a long history of conflict. The abuse of land for cultivation and grazing is the main source of conflict between herders and farmers. Although the conflicts is not new, the introduction of terrorist activities by the Islamic extremist group Boko Haram coincides with a spike in violent and destructive actions that cause the loss of life and property as well as retaliation by both parties. This perhaps give credence to various statements made by politicians and the Military between 2010 and 2015 that the tenacious clashes between farmers and herders and wanton destruction of farmland is due to the infiltration of the Fulani herdsmen by Boko Haram apologists (McGregor, 2014; Olayoku, 2014). Olayoku (2014) noted that the increasing use of sophisticated weapons and communication devices by herdsmen took the conflict to another dimension with farming communities arming themselves and forming vigilante groups in order to defend themselves. These acts have

exacerbated the issue, resulting in needless deaths and property destruction. According to existing studies and statistics, conflicts between herders and farmers were limited to specific locations between 1994 and 2011, particularly in the North-Central states of Benue, Nassarawa, and Plateau (Olayoku, 2014; Akejilr, 2018), with isolated occurrences in other states (Olayoku, 2014; Akejilr, 2018). However, from 2012, it spread to other parts of the country like Iseyin, Oke-Ogun, Ogun State, Ekiti State, Adamawa state etc..

In Plateau state, including the Angas and Berom, conflicts between Fulani herdsmen and indigenous tribes have raged for decades. The issue of land ownership between herders settlers and the state's natives is at the heart of the state's long-running dispute. In 2010, conflicts between supposed farmers and herders that took over three settlements in the state's Jos South and Barakin Ladi local governments resulted in around 500 fatalities (Higazi, 2016). Nonetheless, Adekunle and Adisa (2010) found that disputes between farming indigenous communities and herdsmen were responsible for 35 percent of Nigerian conflicts and crises between 1991 and 2005.

In Nigeria, ongoing conflicts between farmers and herders have fast gotten worse since 2015. After Boko Haram, ISIS, and al-Shabaab, Fulani militant herdsmen were ranked as the fourth most dangerous terrorist organization in the world due to the severity and scope of their offensives (Global Terrorism Index, 2015). The International Crisis Group (2017) said that the number of fatalities between 2011 and 2016 averaged over 2,000 per year, greatly exceeding the toll from the Boko Haram fight. Similarly, according to the Assessment Capacities Project's (2017) estimation, armed herders carried out a series of premeditated attacks on farming communities across the nation in 2016, killing 2,500 people. At a great cost to the local and state economy, tens of thousands of people have been forcibly evacuated, and homes, crops, and animals worth billions of naira have been destroyed.

Agricultural and property destruction, rape, robbery, kidnapping, and internal population displacement of peasant farmers are all hallmarks of these aggressive pastoralists' offensives. Pastoralists are regularly found with pump action rifles, cartridge Dane rifles, cartridge ammo, cutlasses, jack knives, sticks, torch lights, various charms, and hard drugs, claim Soriwei, Adetayo, and Egwu (2016). Although herders claim to carry firearms to defend themselves

and their herds in rural areas from heavily armed rustlers and other criminal organizations, the expanding presence of illegal firearms has increased concerns about human security.

According to Thisday (2017) on September 21, 2015, seven herders kidnapped Chief Olu Falae from his field in Ondo State. Falae was a former minister of finance and a chieftain of the Pan-Yoruba socio-cultural organization Afenifere. Other significant incidents committed by armed pastoralists include the attacks on ten villages in Benue State's Agatu LGA in February 2016, the Ukpabi Nimbo Massacre in Enugu State on April 25, 2017, the gangrape of a 72-year-old grandmother named Victoria Akinseye on her farm in Ore, Odigbo LGA of Ondo State in August 2017, and the attacks in Adamawa State's Numan District on November 20, 2017 (Thisday 2017). Huge economic, social, and humanitarian costs have been associated with the protracted attacks.

According to Mercy Corps (2015) herder-farmer disputes in the states of Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa, and the Plateau cost Nigeria \$13.7 billion in annual revenue. Additionally, these states see a 47% average annual loss in internally generated revenue. According to the Federal Government, Nigeria loses over US\$14 billion annually as a result of the conflict between herders and farmers (Adeyemo, 2018). According to Benue State's Governor Samuel Ortom, between 2012 and 2014, attacks by herders from further northern states and surrounding nations including Cameroon, Chad, and Niger cost his state US\$634 million. (Uja & Ehikioya, 2017; Agabi, 2017) Except for the economic costs, the social cost was not considered. Someone who lost their husband or family members cannot be compensated, and families that have become estranged as a result of the disagreements.

According to The Nigerian Watch (2014) 615 of the 61,314 violent deaths that occurred between June 2006 and May 2014 were caused by disputes between farmers and herders. Seven occurrences were reported in 2006, and nine events were reported in 2007, according to Nigerian Watch (2014) and Olayoku (2014) in 2008, six instances were reported; in 2009, thirteen; and in 2010, nine. In 2011, fifteen instances were reported; in 2012, seventeen; in 2013, twenty-seven; and in may 2014, eight. Olayoku (2014) reported that between July and December 2006, 22 deaths due to violent conflicts based on attitudinal behavior on land have been reported to have occurred in different locations in the country. In 2007, 54 deaths were

reported due conflicts with herdsmen and indigent communities; some were between security agencies, armed gangs and herdsmen as in the case of Delta state with 17 deaths and Osun states with 8 fatalities. Fatalities reported in 2008 were 31 and this involved herders who invaded farmland of indigent communities. 2009 witnessed 83 deaths, with Nassarawa state having the largest number of casualties (47). The 2010 fatalities were 39. However, there were other violent conflicts like the Plateau Massacre in which over 500 people were killed. The conflict was between settlers especially Hausa/Fulani and indigent communities.

The year 2011 saw an increase of fatalities to 116, with Benue having the highest casualties in February, 38 and June, 27. Violence was being sustained for as long as 3 days in Nassarawa and 5 days in Benue state. There was a total casualty of 128 in 2012 with Benue and Cross Rivers states having the highest fatalities of 40 and 30 respectively. There were reported casualties of 115 in 2013; the deadliest fatalities took place in Benue in May, 17 and September, 20. Also, between January and May 2014, there were reported casualties of 40, with Taraba state having the highest number of casualties of 10. An analysis of the trends in the herders-farmers conflicts between 2006 and 2014 reveal that the highest number of incidents of 83 happened in the northern part of the country with Benue, Plateau, Taraba, Kogi, Nassarawa and Kaduna states having the highest casualties and incidents (Olayoku, 2014; Ojomah, Idakwoji, Usman & Orokpo, 2019; Tanimu & Akujuru, 2018). These states are dominated mainly by people whose ethnicity and religion differ from that of the Fulani herdsmen.

These have led to ethno-religious dimension to the conflict. Newspaper reports during this period indicate that the indigenous communities often perceive the conflict to be an attempt at domination by the Fulani/Hausa Muslims oligarchy. This is encapsulated by the actions of the Benue state government which conveyed that the herders' assailants report directly to the Sultan of Sokoto (Olayoku, 2014). These incessant conflicts had been exploited by politicians who manipulate the parties involved to invoke sentiments during electioneering periods. According to Alu, (2017) Senator Gyang Dantong, the former majority leader of the Plateau state house of Assembly, perished in a stampede in 2012 at the mass burial of 50 victims of a herdsmen attack in the region.

Olayoku (2014) equally noted that there is high level of incidents and casualties during the rainy season especially between June and December. However, Adekunle and Abass, (2010) revealed that seasonal movements are not determinants of farmer-herders conflicts. This is because sedentary lifestyle is no longer based on seasonal movements; rather it is based on abuse of land and their attitudinal behavior. Farmer-herder attacks especially reprisal attacks which take place mostly in the nights or at dawn when the other parties are not vigilant.

The wanton destruction of lives and property during disputes between Fulani herders and poor farmers/communities, according to Tanimu and Akujumu (2018) may be the result of actions and counteractions committed by both parties as well as retaliatory attacks. When cattle graze on farms, eating and destroying cultivated crops, farmers register their displeasures and grievances take measures such as restricting grazing of cattle and movement of herdsmen, chasing them out the farms etc. the herdsmen retaliate by arming themselves and attacking the farmers degenerating into communal conflict. The villagers fight back by killing cows that stray into the farmers. They set up and arm vigilantes to monitor herdsmen and cattle movement, arresting defaulters. The herdsmen retaliate by becoming more aggressive and they attack host communities especially at nights or during church service catching villagers unaware, resulting to violent properties loss and loss of lives.

The Global Terrorism Index (GTI, 2015) noted that by the end of 2014 the casualties had increased to 1229 from 27 casualties as at May 2014. Akajir (2018) revealed that between January and March 2016, 360 casualties were recorded. Also, 11 casualties, 15 fatalities and 80 deaths were recorded in April, May and July of the same year (Akinwotu, 2016; Stein, 2016; Vanguard, 2016). The increase in the number of casualties from 2014 can be linked to decline in Boko Haram attacks and recovery of territory previously under Boko Haram. This is perhaps the reason why the Ministry of Defense noted that the Fulani herdsmen are Boko Haram agents in disguise who hide under the guise of herdsmen to attack and kill people (GTI, 2015). The increasing sophistication of weapons used and combat readiness of these armed herdsmen coupled with the high increase in fatalities and their preparedness to attack government authorities as exemplified by the attack on the then governor of Benue state (Gabriel Suswam) in 2014 on his way from the village destroyed by herdsmen lay credence to this assertion.

Tanimu and Akujumu (2018) argue that the increasing attacks of armed herdsmen on communities' farmers in Benue State in 2014 resulted to the death of over 5000 casualties, destruction of over 100 communities and thousands of people are being displaced into IDP camps in the state capital of Makurdi. In March 2016, Agatu local government, in Benue state ten communities were attacked by herders leading to more than 500 casualties (Alu, 2017; Tanimu and Akujumu, 2018). The massive loss of lives led the then Senate President David Mark who is from the state to term the incessant conflict a "genocide". During 2010 and 2016 The Human Rights Watch (2016), estimated that 3000 lives were lost due to assaults by armed herders' in the state.

Equally, Rasaq (2018) reveal that conflicts amongst herders and Agatu people in Benue state left hundreds of people dead with destruction of properties worth millions in 2017. In October, 2017 the Punch newspaper (2017) reported the death of 75 people as a result of supposed Fulani herders in Nkiedonwhro village of Bassa local government, Plateau state. The herdsmen were said to have defied a sundown to dawn restriction imposed in the state by the Governor of the state, Solomon Lalong. More than 50 people were killed in conflicts between Fulani herdsmen and some villages in Benue state's Logo and Guma local government areas on January 1st, according to the national media. Also, Godwin (2018) reported that armed herdsmen invaded Omosu village in Okpolowu local government in Benue state leaving ten people dead in March 2018. On March 3, 2018, two farmers were attacked by alleged herdsmen in Rotsu village, Bassa local government, Plateau state. March 3 through March 14, 74 casualties were reported in series of conflicts amid the Fulani herdsmen and local vigilant groups in Bokko and Bassa local government areas of the same state. Among the fatalities were security operatives who were sent to restore peace in the restive areas.

Oladele (2018) also reported that armed herdsmen invaded some farming settlements in Ketu local council development Ogun state on the February 5, leading to closure schools and destruction of farmlands in these settlements. Similarly, it was reported in ThisDay newspaper (2018) that clashes between armed Fulani herdsmen and indigene communities in Demsa local government Adamawa state on the February 17, 2018 left 30 people dead. Olokor (2018) reported that on October 8, 2018, 19 persons perished in Ariri village, Bassa local

government, Plateau state. On November 22, 2018, a conflict between farmers and suspected herders in Safana local government, Kastina state, resulted in 10 fatalities, according to Vanguard (2018).

These attacks are not limited to the Middle-belt regions alone. Akinyemi (2017) reveal that a clash between farmers and herdsmen left 4 people dead in Yakira village, Baruten local government, Kwara state on April 19, 2017. Equally in Delta state, three people were killed and eight people kidnapped by suspected herdsmen in Okpanam village near Asaba and Obiaruku village in Ukwani local government in the month of December 2017 (Alu, 2017; Punch, 2017).

The table in appendix I revealed that between 2014 and 2021, more than 5000 persons had been killed, with about 60 percent of the casualties happening between 2018 and 2021 as results of the clashes between farmers and herders in Nigeria due to abuse of land use. These conflicts have gravely affected Iseyin, Oyo state, and have resulted in negative impacts such as loss of lives, property and environmental degradation (Niemella et.al.2005). On 22nd of January 2021 in Igangan Ibarapa North local government area of Oyo state, there was an incident conflict between farmers and herders who were accused of being the perpetrators of incessant killings and kidnappings that have instilled fear in the people living in the communities. A resultant effect of the conflicts was the uproar among the youth of the town headed by Sunday Igboho who is a renowned Ibadan- based politician and youth leader. Sunday Igboho mobilized the youths and the entire town to come out in mass and during this protest they demanded for the herders to leave their communities. They gave a mandate of seven days' ultimatum for the herdsmen to leave the community or be forcefully evicted. This resulted in conflicts that destroyed lives and millions of properties (Daily trust newspaper, 2021).

Amnesty International (2018) observed that some of the main causes of the high number of casualties during this period include government inaction, porous borders, the development of ethnic militias, and the proliferation of small guns. Amnesty International studies in the hotspots of violent conflicts reveal a number of villages that have been abandoned and their farmlands damaged. Amnesty international (2018) also reported cases where security forces

attached to the violence prone areas didn't intervene despite the fact they have received intelligence reports about these attacks. The organisation gave instances of such attacks - the clashes among herders' and farmers' in Benue state local government areas of Guma and Logo on 1st January 2018 which left more than 50 people dead. There was an invasion of Omosu village in Okpolowu local government in Benue state after security forces left leaving ten people dead in March 2018. Statistics and records on trends and dimensions of herdsman-farmers' conflicts do not adequately capture the totality of the conflict; neither are there signs of the total nature of the conflict. Attacks against Fulani herdsmen whether preemptive or reprisal are grossly underreported or often ignored by media. This was noted by Abubakar (2018) and Abubakar and Dano (2018) who reveal that the Nigerian media are biased or skewed in favour of the farmers, thereby leading to less reported cases of farmers or ethnic militia attacks on Fulani herdsmen. The above table is an indication of this fact. Less than 10 cases were reported as results of farmers/ethnic militia attack on Fulani herdsmen. The December massacre of over 700 herdsmen and their families in the Mambila Plateau, Taraba state by Bachama militia went unreported until Fulani leaders in the state cried out in grievance. This is in comparison with the 73 villagers killed during the same period in Benue that received wider media coverage. The killing of seven herdsmen on the January 31, 2018 was reported in the media as "Bandits killed burnt 7 travelers to ashes". One only discovers that the victims were herdsmen after the story has been read.

Another bias by the media against reporting attacks on Fulani herdsmen is to hide the identity of the attackers under the term, 'bandits'. While these incessant media which seem bias in nature do not diminish the roles Fulani herdsmen play in spurring these conflicts, nonetheless, the frequent representation of bandits' and herdsmen's attacks on farmers as 'Fulanis' as reported by many media ultimately create the notion that these attacks are perpetrated by the Fulani and the perception that they are all lawless.

This media reportage creates the stereotypes that 'all herdsmen are Fulanis; all Fulani's are herdsmen or cattle rearers and they are all criminals bent on destruction of lives, farmlands and properties along their path'. Adisa and Adekunle (2010) noted that these bias and unbalanced reporting's cannot only create negative stereotypes, they can influence victims and evoke negative emotions thereby furthering occurrences of more conflicts. This is based on

fact that the media play vital roles in shaping and swaying public opinions; this according to Abdulbaqi and Aremu (2017) can invoke an image of public enemy as the media assign blame on assumed perpetrators without proper in-depth study of the conflicts.

According to the Global Terrorism Index (2018) Fulani extremists have been the fourth deadliest terrorist organization since 2014, attacking villages and terrorizing farmers with machine guns. Conflicts between farmers and herders are widespread in many parts of Nigeria, according to Akinkuolie (2018). The Global Terrorism Index (2018) Report states that in 2018, herdsmen killed six times as many people as Boko Haram. The survey names Benue, Plateau, Adamawa, Kaduna, and Taraba as the five deadliest states in Nigeria, where internal displacement is a common occurrence.

According to Egbas, (2018) violence between ranchers and farmers claimed the lives of 121 people between 1996 and 2006 in the states of Bauchi and Gombe. Many villages have recently been victim to serious attacks purportedly carried out by Fulani herdsmen, particularly in the northern central and southern areas. Since January 2016, men posing as Fulani herdsmen have brutally oppressed about 10 Agatu communities in the state of Benue. The ranchers are thought to have killed 500 or so Agatu locals.

According to reports, Fulani herders stormed the Ukpabi Nimbo Community in Enugu State's Uzo Uwani L.G.A. in April 2016 and massacred many residents. It's thought that more than a hundred herders who were equipped with guns, bows, arrows, machetes, and swords broke into the sleepy town early on Monday morning. Farmers in Lagun, Iyana Offia, Offia, Atagba, Lapata, and surrounding communities in Lagelu L.G.A. of Ibadan, Oyo State, claim Fulani armed men raided their communities and looted their belongings, according to Egbas (2018). Herdsmen killed around 1,700 people between January and September 2018 according to the Global Terrorism Index Report. Conflicts between farmers and herdsmen have claimed thousands of lives and forced tens of thousands more from their homes since the fourth Nigerian Republic was founded in 1999.

According to a breakdown of a study on farmer-herder conflicts published by Thisday 2020, there were 99 attacks in 2017, with 202 people killed and 12 others kidnapped. In 2018, there were 245 attacks, resulting in a massacre that claimed the lives of 1,478 people. There were

29 kidnappings in 2019, with 169 attacks, 524 fatalities, and three verified abductions. There were 141 attacks, 335 murders, and 137 kidnappings in 2020. The bombs, deaths, and kidnappings, according to sources, were largely aimed against Christian farmers. Farmers make up the majority of the casualties, but Fulani Muslims have also targeted cops, soldiers, and others. In a report titled "Working Document — Fulani Militias' Terror: Compilation of News (2017-2020)," which was released by ThisDay newspapers in 2020, statistics regarding the herdsmen's vicious attacks, killings, and kidnappings were revealed. In Nigeria, Fulani herders carried out 654 attacks between 2017 and May 2, 2020, killing 2,539 people and kidnapping 253.

The attacks by the Fulani militias are consistent with the commonly accepted definition of terrorism, which is defined as the foreign and illegal use of violence or threat of violence to threaten a wide swath of society in pursuit of political, religious, ideological, or social goals, as well as with UN Security Council Resolution (2004), which outlines terrorist acts. In north-west Nigeria, there has been an increase in violence since the start of 2021 as a result of conflict between herders and farmers, according to a UN Refugee Agency report dated 15 March 2021. Murders, kidnappings, and theft have been recorded by those who managed to flee the battle.

The Fulani militia attacks are in line with the commonly accepted definition of terrorism, which is the use of foreign and illegal violence or threat of violence to threaten a wide swath of society in the pursuit of political, religious, ideological, or social goals, as well as UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004), which defines terrorist acts. According to a UN Refugee Agency report dated March 15, 2021, fighting between herders and farmers has resulted in an increase in violence in north-west Nigeria since the beginning of 2021. Those escaping the turmoil have reported a number of murders, kidnappings, and looting.

2.5 Causes of cattle herders and crop farmers' conflicts

Agriculture has an important role in the growth of Third World economies, including Nigeria's. In the Nigerian Savanna Pastoral and agrarian lands are common food resources. However, when the two groups remain deprived of resources, conflict arises. The farmers and herders draw from inadequate resources. Also, differences in culture, language, customs and

practices, prevent both groups from developing good relationship. Agricultural activities are dependent on the seasons. They are busier during the rainy season (April to September), whereas during the desert season (October to March), farming activity is limited unless farmers have access to water for irrigation. Nevertheless, herdsmen are always moving from one locality to the other in search of grazing lands for their herds. The host communities see them as invaders because they barely ask for consent to move or stay around in the community. This view forms a priori division among them and the host communities.

Resource conflicts are unfavorable to food security, livelihood, and co-existence of the people (Adisa & Adekunle, 2010; Daramola A., 2005; Fasona & Omojola, 2005). This is a terrible threat to human safety as well as natural resources. Natural resource conflicts are triggered and exacerbated when there is an unhealthy competition for scarce natural resources, differing views and attitudes, and weak institutions (Hellström, 2001). Scarcity of Resource, whether apparent or specific, is a serious factor of ecological conflicts. The right to environmental means is vital for the occupation of rural communities in Africa. Environmental resources on which the poor rely to create their livelihood strategies are likely to be taken away from them (Pasteur, 2011). However, stable and long-term sustainable livelihoods are ensured through competent management of natural resources. The livelihoods of these actors are also safeguarded when natural resources are preserved.

Farmer-herder conflict sometimes is merely not seen as a resource conflict but at times viewed as tribal differences concerning the two groups. Farmers and herders have dissimilar principles, norms, cultural and physical characteristics, thus disputes among them are often categorised as tribal conflicts (Tonah, 2006). The herdsmen being marginalised in the host farming community have strong distinctive custom and harmony. They are mostly secluded from the farmers' populace. Conflict amidst herders' and farmers' in Nigeria do result to a great loss of human lives, material and agricultural resources. In an ideal world, herders' arrival would result in official involvement with host communities before the herders could settle in the host communities, they had to get permission. Traditional methods governed dealings in the host communities, and if conflicts arose, they were peacefully addressed. Grazing and water usage were done with respect for local values and customs. Grazing took place on designated routes and in fields where it was authorized.

This apparent order appears to have been disrupted by a variety of causes, including population growth, government attention to pastoralist farming difficulties, environmental concerns, and a dramatic surge in firearms (small and light arms). The issue of livestock rustling and rural violence is defined by broader identity issues, such as ethnic disparities (minority/majority divide), religious divides, and indigene/settler divisions. These conflicts are intertwined with those over water and land. Also, conflict and tension are honed by clear-cut livelihood and ethno-cultural discrepancies among grazers and farmers. The root of the conflict itself can be found in the scarceness of natural resources.

The tendency for diverse livelihood groups to compete for limited resources adds to the stress. Such conflict has a tendency to put diverse shared groups against one another, especially where livelihood and communal boundaries collide. Farmers have shown remarkable adaptability and zeal in the face of prolonged hardship, and the necessity to manage ethnic diversity has strained social relations to control land acquisition and labor regulation on occasion (Baker, 1991). These realities, on the other hand, have greatly reduced the accessibility of areas for grazing and agriculture reasons. Conflicts between the two groups have been driven by differences in cultural notions and knowledge of land use.

Dearth of flexibility for farmers inclines them to clash with cattle rearers, farmers have greater flexibility and a smaller risk of exposure. Agriculturalists, unlike herders, are tethered to their lands and output, and suffer production failure and famine as a result of a lack of similar options (Dyson-Hudson, 1980; Kandagor, 2005). The scarcity of grazing lands is a result of population growth and the opening up of more land for farming and cultivation, resulting in massive infringements on grazing areas such as tropical (designated grazing areas around towns and villages), migratory routes, watering points, and dry season fadama grazing areas. Social unity, social trust, insufficient social capital, hospitality ideals, and a sense of belonging have all been harmed as a result of the nasty fights. Inter-group resentments are also exacerbated by the social context, as indicated by public expressions along religious or ethnic lines. Following the confluence of ethnicity, religion, and politics, the situation has assumed a more perilous character in recent times. Furthermore, the conflicts are characterized as co-extensive indigeneity disputes between farming groups and herders (Okeke, 2014).

The causes of farmer-herdsman conflicts are virtually always plausible. However, neither party appears to be able to agree on what is generating their mutual disagreement. Ingawa, Ega, and Erhabor (1999) identified the following as the primary root causes of farmer-herder conflict in Nigeria:

- i. The customary access rights to communal grazing and water supplies are being hampered by private tenureship held by arable farmers. This is particularly true along ancient trip routes, which have developed into desirable farming regions due to the increased soil fertility brought on by the buildup of animal waste from the herds' travels. This is made worse by the dispersed layout of the agricultural plots within the fadama zones, which makes it impossible to forbid animal straying into the crop plots.
- ii. A lack of grazing capital as a result of poor grazing reserve management and increased crop production (and increased crop residue commercialization). The amount of readily available cow feed supplies significantly decreased as a result, especially in the Northern States, according to the International Journal of Health and Social Inquiry, Vol. 3, No. 1, November 2017:160. Additionally, the high-value crops introduced by the NFDP (onions and tomatoes) nearly never result in agricultural leftovers for cattle feed. This is made worse by the dispersed layout of the agricultural plots within the fadama zones, which makes it impossible to forbid animal straying into the crop plots.
- iii. As traditional grazing cycles are broken and traditional rulers' authority is weakened, internal discipline and societal stability deteriorate.
- iv. The obligation in the 1988 National Agricultural Policy to set aside 20% of the fadama for grazing has not been met.
- v. In order to take advantage of opportunistic resource use, cattle herders must frequently move about since grazing resources, such as grass and water, are found in different

locations at different times of the year. They consequently interact with "settled" farmers, which spark competition and conflict (Abubakar, 2012).

Farmers/herders disputes, according to Tonah (2006), are brought on by pastoral herds migrating south into humid and sub-humid regions, which is encouraged by disease control, the widespread availability of veterinary medicine, and the growth of farming operations onto formerly utilised pastureland. The farmers' crops are afterwards destroyed by the herdsmen on their fields. Farmers and nomads may occasionally disagree over government policy. For instance, conflict arises as the size of the existing reserve decreases as a result of encroachment and government-approved farmed development, according to Aliyu (2015).

As a result, water points and stock roads are converted into farmland. A cow once strayed and ruined farm products in Delta state, according to Ofuoku and Isife (2009), and the offended party slaughtered it as a result. The host farming groups and the nomads clashed as a result. They also noted that the pollution of streams that the host communities depend on, as well as the nomads' abuse of community children, contribute to and exacerbate the conflict.

These are some of the issues that contributed to host farming communities and herders' conflicts:

a) Migration

In modern realities, people migrate for one reason or the other. People move from one locality to another to seek for better lives. Also, wars and unrest displace people from their places of settlement where they try to make a living for themselves. In addition, people migrate or relocate to another place in search of jobs (occupational migration), as an attempt to showcase their skills, talents and capability for reasonable income and better living conditions. Additional reasons could be that people migrate for geological closeness, cultural and religion affinities and climate change (Ladan, 2012). For Stivatchis (2008) migration could be voluntary or forceful.

Nigeria is made up of different ethnicities. According to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance International (IDEA) (2000), Nigeria has roughly 374 ethnic tribes. For that reason, tribal uniqueness in relation to migration cannot be over-

emphasised in observing ethnicity crisis in the country (Alubo, 2006). Identity means semblance and disparity at the same time (Jenkins, 1996). According to Castells (2004), identity is defined through relationships of supremacy. Power relations can create a legitimate identity (Anderson, 1983), an opposition identity (Calhoun, 1994), or a project identity (Stivatchis, 2008), depending on whose side of power the migrants are on or which community they belong to.

The most important source of recognition and prejudice in many countries is ethnic identity (Stivatchis, 2008). The implication of this can be very severe in a country like Nigeria, where the rate at which people migrate internally is very high and where there are diverse cultures, religion, etc. Another factor is how the Nigerian state perceives and deals with migration and conflict. A country that has identical or uniform identity might put a great importance on preserving its culture and political uniqueness than a country who does not (Stivatchis, 2008). A country like Nigeria has not appropriately arbitrated ethnic relations in the country. The rights and privileges that an individual who migrates to Nigeria from another country should enjoy have not been specified. However, it has been debated that the more an immigrant seeks to incorporate himself/herself into the host community and make an effort to adjust to their ways of life, the less antagonistic the migrant is perceived to be.

On the other hand, when the migrant does not integrate him/herself into the host community and shows less regards for their ideals and principles, culture, interest, and security, the host community is perceived as threatening to the migrants. One cause of conflict between host farming communities and herders and is disobedience by the migrant community of the rules and regulations within which the host communities operate. Also, when the two groups struggle for the use and distribution of economic sustenance, such as water, lands, among others, there is conflict. According to the Association for the Development of Education in Africa (2005), Nigeria's population is over 140 million people, with nomads accounting for roughly 9.3 million people and Fulani accounting for the most. Herders' lives revolve mostly around the growing of cattle and the constant movement of their herds to where there is enough pasture, water, and markets for their animals. Tsetse flies, hard weather, and people who would assault their animals are all avoided by Fulani herdsman (Stenning, 1959).

The nomads are vulnerable to high health risks due to seclusion and impassiveness from the society as a whole. On the average, the nomads do not profit from available and appropriate health education services, which are needed to reduce high-risk of sexual diseases, like HIV/AIDS (Morton, 2003). The herders' movement within West Africa has promoted political trade and industrial ties among other ethnic groups. The Fulanis' ways of life make it possible for the tsetse fly to thrive for a long period.

The World Health Organisation (2003) and (NEST) Nigerian Environmental Study/Action Team (2004), view that there are chances when there is a change in climate; it causes circulation of parasites diseases such as African trypanosomiasis. This is acknowledged by Laveissiere & Hervouet (1991) who observe that the circulation limits of tsetse-fly and trypanosomiasis is getting to about 50 to 100 kilometers. These changes have led to shortage of food or vegetative habitations ensuing from anthropogenic interventions. The effect of ecological change and contest for lands between the diverse native and settler (herders) populations across the state bring about conflict. Bande (2003) observes that increase in the size of herds generates concern and contest for the availability of natural resources.

The cattle rearing with its susceptibility to tsetse-fly have not disheartened the herdsman from their customary movement of their large herds into other parts of the country. This usually happens during the dry season. At such times, arid condition drives pests and insects around. One of the key features of Nigeria's conventional production system is the periodic movement of herders migrating from one location to another, to seek for grazing lands, yield residues, water and environment free from diseases; and to evade conflict with the host farmers (Bobalobi, Ogundipe, & Esuruoso, 2000).

Apart from seasonal issues, Monimart (2008) claims that other variables can influence transhumance migration, including:

- i. Circular movement from north to south;
- ii. movement to find grass and water for their herds on a daily basis, returning to the same camp at night;
- iii. Periodic herd movements to address short-term issues such a scarcity of pastures brought by late rains or disease outbreaks;

- iv. Animals roam around according to the seasons in search of pastures;
- v. Extreme herd migration brought on by environmental crime, hostility, or drought;
- vi. As a last resort in the face of severe sociopolitical or environmental constraints, such as war, diseases, etc., migration may occur.

The movement of the nomadic from one area to another has created an opportunity for administrative development in rural communities. For instance, in Sudan the movement of grazers has created an idea of exhibiting a model for the improvement of infrastructural importance and services in rural communities, such as dams, natural gloominess and bore holes (Sulieman, 2015). Also, it also serves as proficient means to moderate links among the cattle rearers and host farming communities in an effort to alleviate conflicts. It has been observed that the routes are being used as grazing lands and routes which the herders use to travel their herds from one place to another in order to avoid conflict with the farmers (Sulieman & Ahmed, 2013).

According to Flintan (2012) nomadism/pastoralism practices are part of measures to allow wet season grazing regions to rest, as well as providing crucial grazing when resources are depleting. It's also necessary for animal husbandry and stopping parasite cycles in animals. It's also utilized for minerals and medical herbs, which are important for livestock's natural health and vigor. It also helps to fertilize the soil with organic fertilizer. Cattle headers and host farming communities are in constant conflict amongst themselves. Transhumant pastoralists are seen as sadistic and intentionally carrying weapons to deal with unwary farmers also, the farmers alleged intentional crop damage by animals. Meanwhile, the herders perceive themselves as victims of political marginalization, with no voice in the Nigerian state. Conflicts between cattle grazers and farmers have been reported in over 20 Nigerian villages, including Ago Kekere, Idi Ope Kekere, Olukore, Apena, Akeeran, Alagigo, Ago Nla, Aaaro, Temidire, Iya Ibadan, Ideto, Apapa, Akele, Agwo, Jaramosan, Bodija, Olufayo, OkoTeku, Oloku (Okoli, Enyinnia, Elijah, & Okoli, 2014).

b) Land resources conflicts

Conflicts over resources, whether over ownership or use, have a direct and indirect impact on the magnitude of conflicts. Of all resources, lands have been seen as an immense basis of conflicts among various land users including those at differing thresholds. Clashes involving farming communities and herdsmen in the usage of land for agricultural purpose and foraging are becoming more and more prevalent in Nigeria, mostly as a result of upsurge in production needs due to increase in human populace (Fasona & Omojola, 2005; Gefu & Kolawole, 2002). Increase in the struggle for lands, has regularly led to severe demonstration of hostility and resistance amid the two parties involved in the state.

The conflict between these two groups has resulted to the increase in the level of insecurity, and is likely to intensify food crisis in Nigeria when farmers and herders are killed, animals are killed, crops and important possessions are damaged (Cotula et. al., 2004). In Darfur region of Sudan, the conflict between the two land users started as a resource conflict before migrating into warfare that killed above 200,000 people and more than a million citizens on the streets (FEWS-NET, 2007). Fasona & Omojola (2005) in a newspaper research on the conflict between the two groups in Nigeria between 1991 and 2005 reported that 35% of the most critical conflicts were reported by few preferred newspapers. Furthermore, in a study conducted by Nyong & Fiki (2005) in 27 villages in Central Nigeria, it was discovered that over 40% of the family units studied had been victims of land conflict. Another study in Benue state revealed that land conflict accounts for the highest percentage which is 43% followed by political which is 32% and chieftaincy which is 28%, in that order. Disputes over grazing pastures between herders and host farming groups account for a large portion of land-related conflicts. The exacerbation of susceptibility of crisis in Nigeria among herders and farming communities is not only seen as land resource conflict but a mixture of other factors.

For instance, with population increase, the velocity in production of food will definitely rise and for the farmers to assemble the required demands due to increase in population, they will have to trespass beyond their usual lands used for cultivating and come in contact with the normal routes for the herders and their herds. This further contributes to the continuous rise of conflicts among farmers and herders (Nyong, 2010). Thus, with human population increasing, more land is being used for farming and this makes it difficult to access lands for grazing, thus

the herdsmen are forced to drift and destroy crops cultivated by farmers. The greatest threat faced by the pastoralists is the inaccessibility to grazing lands and water points for their herds. The pastoral system has shown that the pastoralists are faced by insecurity, lack of security of their animals and lack of accessibility to lands, water, market and politics which have trivial impacts on their sources of income and the host communities (Brujin & Dijk, 1995).

Ecological dilapidation also contributes to extreme decline in the ecosystem of the surroundings of different localities. The improvement in the condition of societal needs in towns, such as schools, health centers, and economic opportunities has made the herder migrants to settle around such towns (Haro & Doyo, 2005). Reasonably, viable lands are seen to be the main origin of conflict amid communities in Nigeria (Gbehe, 2007). Otite & Albert (1999) view that people seek to access variety of inadequate resources such as chieftaincy positions, power and authority, status, grazing lands, markets, water, leadership positions, etc. Inability to attain any of these categories leads to conflicts. The various conflicts that occurred between herdsmen and host farming communities were caused by damage of farmlands by the herds. The federal government, including the local and state governments has not really addressed the issue faced by the herdsmen's inadequate provision of lands for grazing.

The livelihood of the farmers and the herders are synced around lands thus; land matters can easily turn out to be conflictual. Prior to the adoption of dry farming system by farmers, there are agreements between farmers and herdsmen over the period of farming and cattle grazing. In most cases, farming activities take place during late period of the raining season, while grazing takes place during early raining season and dry season. However, with the introduction of dry farming, this reduces grazing areas for herdsmen leading to clashes that are often violent between farmers and herdsmen. This is further worsened when farming communities begin to rear cattle leading to competition between the traditional pastoralists whose means of sustenance gradually become threatened; and farming communities who are deemed to be encroaching on pastoralists means of sustenance. Equally, with an increasing population, novel farming practices which include dry irrigation and other large-scale development activities in the Middle-Belt region, an encroachment into pre-designated grazing routes and reserves is observed, hence reducing access to grazing for herdsmen.

Furthermore, a vital problem that is allied to ownership of lands in Nigeria is indigeneship. In Benue, among the Tiv people, land has a emblematic meaning. It is seen as sacred and considered as a family and chronological orb of influence (Gbehe, 2007). An effort to cut off the people from their birthright usually leads to vicious conflicts. Egwu (2009) views the Nigerian Constitution of 1999 as missing the requirements of addressing the indigeneship/settler occurrence. Egwu (2009) provided that the government should review the constitution with detailed consideration for the wellbeing of immigrants, ensuring they enjoy constitutional privileges and rights as the host communities. The reason for this is that, the practice has produced severe scarcity of agricultural lands thus causing disputes over the little that is available. While in many other epicenters of the conflicts, issues of grazing and farming have been the major crux of the crises, in Mambila plateau, Taraba state, investigations by Amnesty international (2018) revealed a different reason. The herdsmen who are predominantly Fulani are not pastoralists; they are mainly ranchers who rear cattle in a specific location. The major reason for conflict between these ranchers and the indigenous people is basically the struggle for land ownership. The ranchers claim to have bought the land for ranching from the leaders in the community, while the communities claimed it should be renewable, hence the crux of the conflict.

In order to make certain valuable use of agricultural lands in the country, development in agricultural agencies such as Agricultural Development Projects (ADP), River Basin, National Agricultural Land Development Agencies (NALDA), Directorate of Food Road and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI), etc. were introduced to improve agricultural projects. The government has also contributed to the role of conflicts over lands by not addressing the issue of indigeneship in the Constitution of Nigeria and failing to address problems on lands used for grazing and water spot for the herds of herders.

Nonetheless, review of existing literature on this section has dwelt more on economic factors as the major factors responsible for the recurring conflicts amongst farming communities and herders. There is significant gap in literature on social issues such as breakdown of social relationship between both parties fostered due to centuries of social interaction between both parties and suspicion or high level of distrust between both parties as some of the immediate causes of the recurring conflicts.

c) Climate Change

Nature has always been a source of sustenance for human cultures, and all parts of existence, including food, water, electricity, and shelter, are derived from it. Furthermore, humans have been subject to a variety of environmental and climatic factors for millennia. Droughts, excessive precipitation, wildfires, and cyclones have all posed a threat to human civilization as a result of changing climatic circumstances. Several studies have identified climate change as a major driver of migration, (UNCHR, 2001; Reuveny, 2007; Black et al., 2011; Kniverton, Smith and Wood, 2011; Warner 2010; Scheffram, Marmer & Sow, 2012). Mortreux & Barnett (2009), Williams and Pradhan (2009), and Warner (2009) all highlight fear of personal safety, individual circumstances, experiences, anticipated danger, migration cost-benefit analysis, and other variables such as religion, culture, and predicted outcomes (2011). Human culture affects and coexists with environmental degradation and climate change. We are currently observing a change in the extent and pace of this climatic transition as a result of human activities impacting the earth's climate system (Mobjörk et al., 2016).

Anthropogenic warming has affected both the physiological and biological systems, according to a global review of data dating back to 1970 (IPCC, 2007). This source is cited by Mohamed Salih (2009). Rising temperatures in particular are having an impact on many ecological systems as a result of regional climate change. In some locations, increasing temperatures also lead to greater precipitation, which restricts access to drinking water, the study finds (Mohamed Salih, 2009). In addition to having an impact on other fundamental aspects of human life, such food security, access to safe and clean water is crucial for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.

According to the Synthesis Report of the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), climate change would reduce renewable surface and groundwater resources, particularly in arid and subtropical countries. According to the paper, this will have an impact on and exacerbate sectoral competition for water. The World Food Program (2014) claims that climate-related calamities and change have the potential to harm crops, negatively affect livelihoods and food security, and make poverty worse. These calamities include drought, unpredictable rainfall, and floods. Existing food security vulnerabilities, such as reduced agricultural yields and decreased productivity in sensitive

places, will be made worse by climate change, which would also escalate conflicts over scarce resources.

Additionally, this will lead to an expansion of population displacement and a fresh humanitarian crisis (IPCC, 2007). Homer-Dixon (1999), who focuses on how social outcomes are impacted by climate change and the scarcity of renewable resources like water. He contends that the use of renewable energy in conjunction with other societal elements can result in large-scale conflict like insurrections and racial tensions. Homer-Dixon emphasizes the marginalization of the ecological system as a result of a confluence of social and environmental elements frequently. It occurs when entrenched discrepancies in access to finite resources collide with rapid population increase.

According to Homer-Dixon, environmental scarcities are already causing violent conflicts in many parts of the developing globe. He continues by asserting that in the future, scarcity will cause or aggravate these disputes, as well as their violent presence. His research primarily focuses on intra-state conflicts, which are more likely than inter-state conflicts to be influenced by environmental change. Barnett (2003) claims that prior studies on conflicts involving the environment have concurred that there is a link between environmental change and violent conflict. According to Mobjörk et al. (2016), changes in climate have affected pastoral livelihoods, which have modified movement patterns. driving pastoralists out from their customary herding areas, which is bad for their economic and social well-being. According to Mobjörk et al. (2016), pastoral conflicts have been impacted by climatic conditions, particularly drought, in East Africa.

These conflicts, which arose as a result of modifications to pastoral routes, were frequently settled through mediation between pastoralists and other populations impacted by the routes. Water is an essential resource for pastoral lifestyles because it determines where and when people and animals settle, according to Omosa's (2005) research, which supports this conclusion. This study suggests that conflicts arise when there are too many pastoralists in one area, which leads to rivalry for few water resources. This may ultimately result in conflict. Brown (2007), Blench (2005), and UNEP (2011) all found evidence of herders moving from dry to lush green areas in Africa as a result of the hard climatic circumstances. Nigeria has a long history of herder migration, albeit it has recently intensified. For a very long time, the

north and south experienced different climates. The deep forests of the south are excellent for crop production but out of grazers' reach due to significant tsetsefly infestation, despite the presence of a savannah forest area suited for cattle rearing in the northern region.

Trypanocides' development allowed for widespread cow breeding that went far beyond the region's grazing capacity and resulted in a dramatic drop in the number of tsetse flies. More than any other cause, the movement of cattle herders to the southern region of the nation, first on an annual transhumance basis and then permanently, has had an impact (Blench, 2005). There was a significant grazing movement coming from the north at that time. In quest of better grazing and more lucrative markets for their cattle, herders in Nigeria are moving south. Rafael Reuveny's three-choice theoretical reasoning states that those confronting significant climate change challenges have three choices:

- a. Stay put and do nothing;
- b. Stay put and try to reduce the impacts; and
- c. Completely abandon the afflicted area. The nature of the state and its ability to intervene frequently has an impact on the final choice.

Therefore, less developed countries frequently struggle to effectively control migration from areas susceptible to the harsh effects of climate change because of a lack of technological and institutional resources, while developed nations strive to mitigate such issues through technical and institutional capabilities (Reuveny, 2007). Reuveny disagrees with Kniverton, Smith, and Wood (2011), who said that one way for mankind to address climate change issues is through migration. He brought up the prospect of places being absorbed that gain from migration. Reuveny (2007) claimed that depending on the quantity of migrants and the size of the group, there is no tendency for migration to result in conflict (Warner, 2010, Oliver-Smith, 2009). As a result, there is a good likelihood that host communities will be able to readily and seamlessly integrate a small and gradual influx of migrants.

Although migration was identified as one of the most important factors by Kniverton, Smith, & Wood (2011); Ofunku & Sife (2009) and Olayoku (2014) claim that climate change is the main cause of the herdsman-farmers conflict that drives the Fulani and their cattle south. The

herdsmen-farmers conflict in Nigeria had its roots in the deserts and drought caused by inadequate yearly rainfall. Reuveny (2017) differs from Reuveny in regards to how humanity might be able to handle the problems caused by climate change. Long dry seasons are common in the northeast and northwest's semi-arid and arid states (Ibe, 2017). In response to the rising desert and drought in the Sahel region, nomadic cattle rearers were compelled to move south, "outside their typical grazing pattern," according to a special report published by the United Nations Institute of Peace (Sayne, 2018). A number of weather-related reasons, the report claims, "have driven farmers to crop additional land each year, leaving wanderers with fewer spaces to water and watch their cattle" (Muhammed, Ismaila, & Bibi, 2015).

According to National Metrological Agency data from 2008, the yearly rainy season has shrunk over the previous three decades from an average of 150 to 120 days. These northern states have been desert or semi-arid for the previous 60 years, covering close to 350 000 square kilometers. The data shows that the desert is advancing south at a rate of 0.6 kilometers per year. In four northeastern and six northwest states, where it appears that these pastoralists historically resided, between 50 and 75 percent of the land is converting into desert, according to an FAO Country Programming Framework (CPF) (2013-2017) study. The states under question include Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara. Environmental degradation has a significant impact on agricultural production and the amount of water available for human and animal consumption, forcing pastoralists to relocate south in quest of more fertile territory.

Loss of Grazing Reserve

The planting of crops on grazing areas and grasslands is another element contributing to the conflict between farmers and herders in Nigeria (Adisa, 2012). After the nation obtained independence in 1960, the government of the Northern Region approved a law defining grazing reserves and transhumance routes in the former Northern Region. According to a Crisis Group research released in 2017, the grazing reserves and animal routes had been badly encroached upon. According to some academics, this was caused by the government's failure to pass the grazing reserves Act of 1968, which sparked the emergence of catastrophic crises. Adeoyo (2017) claims that the nation has 4125 grazing reserves, but that only a third of them

are really used, and that the remaining 270 have been developed on or turned into farms, which has displeased the herders and may be one of the causes of the issue.

Through the development of a plan for a bountiful crop and the expansion of pastoralist households' infrastructure, this act encourages sedentarization and settles disputes. However, this will address the issue of a shortage of livestock markets and livestock fairs as well as disease prevention. However, this will address the issue of a shortage of livestock markets and livestock fairs as well as disease prevention. Sadly, not all of this legislation's requirements were implemented, which may be one of the reasons why the problem remains (Tenuche, and Hatimehim, 2009).

In close proximity to metropolitan areas, business constructions like gas stations and mansions have displaced cow pathways (Tuckman.1999). In order to prepare for the following farming season, farmers clean their farms during the dry season and burn the grassy stubble that ranchers used to feed their cattle. This is when the crisis usually arises. Nomadic people are forced to over the line and enter farmers' territory due to grass burning and a lack of water, causing the issue (Abubakar 2017). Farouk (2002), on the other hand, argues that responsibility should be shared: Farmers do not wish to surrender their farms in a timely manner following the harvest of the rainy season, allowing herders to feed their caws farm remnants at the beginning of the dry season.

This was mostly caused by the planting of slow-ripening crops including cotton, sorghum, and sweet potatoes. These crops are exposed to the animals because the farmer left them unfenced. The herders will be responsible for paying farmers for the residue if this happens. He continues by saying that most nomads, on the other side, attribute the situation to Nigeria's unbalanced state policy, which has placed a higher priority on crop farming than livestock raising. According to Abbass (2012), land grabbing or acquisition by the wealthy people of the country is to blame for the recurrence of disputes because the herdsmen lack both a location to move their animals and a place to stay. Traditional community ownership has been supplanted by private ownership (Farouk, 2018).

Rural Banditry and Cattle Rustling

The tension between Nigerian farmers and herders is exacerbated by cattle rustling and rural banditry. The attacks, which have mainly taken place in Nigeria's north central, north east, and north western regions, have been linked to livestock thefts. What do you expect from us when our source of life is threatened? said Hame Saidu, a Pastoralist, Wuse, 2009-IRIN, 2009, in Abbass (2012). "Our herd is our life According to this claim made by heders, all nomads will go to war if their cattle are stolen. The stability of the country has been threatened because so many lives and valuable resources have been lost as a result of the crime's recurrence (Olayoku, 2014). It's bad that livestock thieves have organized armies that are roaming around rural areas and harassing locals in response to the theft of their cattle.

It has been reported that Fulani pastoralists, particularly in the North-west and North-central zones, participate in cattle rustling and rural banditry. In the crises that occurred in the TalatanMafara, Shinkafi, and Dansadau Local Government Areas in Zamfara, the BirninGwari LGA in Kaduna, the Numan LGA in Adamawa, and the Gwer West LGA in Benue, over 500 people died, and some were kidnapped for ransom (Ahmed and Williams, 2018). According to Spotlight an international study for peace program (2016), the most affected regions are Zamfara, some rural Borno State areas, Taraba's northwestern and southeasterly Plateau regions. Another gang that steals cattle is Boko Haram, which has bases in isolated regions of Borno State. According to accounts, the cult kidnapped more than 227,000 animals and murdered around 1,900 Shuwa Arab pastoralists between 2011 and 2016. (Abass 2012).

d) Changing in Pastoralism and Farming Practice

In the past, herders traveled with their livestock wherever they went, living as complete nomads. The younger men or boys are left to carry on the tradition while some pastoralists nowadays gradually migrate to a "sedentary lifestyle." These younger generations lack the technical know-how to arbitrate disputes amicably and are unable to manage the caws if they do join the farms.

According to Haro and Dayo (2017), the Fulani nomads let their animals graze in the field during the wet season without paying them enough care, which led to the animals eating and killing the farmers' crops. This behavior would make farmers more anxious and, if not

handled appropriately, may result in a crisis. De Hann (2017) asserts that both sides hold divergent views on what precipitated the conflict: Farmers attributed it to cows destroying their crops, while pastoralists attributed it to land burning and the government's Fadama initiative..

e) Depleting Space for Farming

As a result of ongoing urbanization and demographic changes, farmers are more likely to relocate further away for farming activities in the modern world. Over 35 million people were thought to live in Nigeria at the time of its independence in 1960. (Mbachu, Ozoemenam 2008). But 58 years later, there are more than 180 million people in the country, and the trend is expected to continue for the foreseeable future (Tanko, Nana 2017). This level of population expansion also suggests that the requirement for food, a fundamental human need, would rise geometrically. Additionally, additional farmland will be sought after by farmers. On the other side, industrialization and urbanization have continued to encroach on all arable land, leaving farmers with little to no room to subsist. As herdsmen continue to migrate south in search of grass for their cattle, farmers and herdsmen have been set against one another, causing conflict and destruction. For instance, the Benue River region's agriculture generates about 20,000 tons of grain annually (Roland Clement Abah and Mareme Petja 2015). This same region is also useful for herdsmen to feed their livestock. As a result, the migration of herders has a greater impact on farmlands near river banks, leading to numerous conflicts.

2.6 Social Factors of Herders' and Farmers' Conflict in the Host Communities

Blench (2010) revealed that interaction among herdsmen and host farmers' communities' in the southwestern region of Nigeria have been ongoing for more than three hundred years. These constant interactions have led to the existence of mutual cooperation and social relationship between both parties for trade exchange, introduction of Islam and intermarriage. However, the recurring conflicts between both parties have bred distrust and led to a breakdown of the social relationship both parties share. Conflict is caused as a result of individual desires or wants. Contest for insufficient resources is the principal reason for conflict in communities and inter-group conflicts, which is mainly the common predicament for farmers and grazers who need the lands for their various livelihoods. Conflict also, is

related to inter-dependence. When people depend on one another, there is tendency for conflicts to happen among them (Nzeh, 2015; Walton, 1991).

Adebayo & Olaniyi (2008) record that the clashes between herdsmen and crop farmers had been in existence since the introduction of agriculture. However, until the twentieth century, the occurrence of low settlement densities and the tsetse fly plague kept the prevalence of conflicts at minimal (Blench R., 1999). Therefore, with cheap trypanocides in West Africa and other veterinary drugs greater than before, the number of herds increased and this made herdsmen to seek pastures outside their normal routine (Adebayo & Olaniyi, 2008). The association between herders and host farming communities is changing and constantly developing from one form to another. In the past, it is not unusual for researchers to perceive the association between the farmers and herders to be initially symbiotic (Azeez & Ufo, 2015; Moritz, 2010; Tonah, 2006; Bassett, 1986).

The reciprocal relationship displayed in Adamawa by Mboror herders and Gbaya farmers in the province of Cameroon involves exchange of gifts and substance amongst the group members for the many years they lived together (Moritz, 2008). This exchange not only fosters strong sense of cooperation between both parties but also engenders trust and a sense of security/peace between both parties. Blench (2010) also analyses the relationship as trade by batter of grains for dairy produce. Local market places were accessible and manure on arable lands was provided in exchange for grains for livestock. However, the reoccurrences of the conflict amongst the herders and host farming communities and lack of solution have degenerated the relationship they once had, due to accessibility to scares resources, loss of trust and love.

Overtime, the stay of herders and their herds in host communities has aggravated aggressive disparity in some rural communities. The major basis for this is frequent intrusion into cultivated lands by herders and their cows. In the same vein, the culture and language barriers typically identify the herders as people who are not members of the community. The way they guide their flocks to scrape on foliage that is available on their path has overtime raised complaints from the communities. This situation has caused harmful contention among herders and farmers and this has led to hostility, loss of lives and belongings. This situation

most often than not, had caused tribal, ethnic, national, political and religious sentiments which threaten the survival of the country. Consequently, it has become difficult for the herders and farming communities to relate with one another without it resulting into conflicts. The reason for this is that, while the herders are concerned with looking after their herds and making a living from the sales of their herds, the farming community is concerned with guard their farms which the herders use for grazing.

The cost of this conflict has an impact on the host community. The dynamics of the relationship between hosts/settlers and the social cost of the conflict frequently results in strained relationships, loss of properties and loss of lives, loss of religious ties, loss of educational ties/cooperation, health care services challenges, marital relationship, loss of farm produce, loss of water resources etc. Disagreement occurs when there is disparity of views among groups. According to Ekong (2003) personality conflict may result in clash of groups and separation of people or communities into different factions. Furthermore, the effects of some losses may affect only small group of individuals. The real losses may be enormous, but they may be spread out among a large number of people. Each person merely suffers a relatively minor loss or harm. Thus, the word "social costs" means that the damaging costs and consequences which other people or the community face as a result of the conflicts.

Social cost of conflict has negative effects on the family, friends, community and the society at large. Ranges from family breakup, post trauma disorder (PTSD), depression, anxiety related diseases, medical expenses, traumatic impacts on friends and family, expenses of moving to a new neighborhood, loss of school days/no school at all, lower quality of life etc. and behaviour can forever change and shaped due to the costs or effects of the conflicts. In time past, the herders and host community have a sense of belonging where they co-exist. The nomads give the farmer manure in exchange for grains for their herds, and when there is a strain in their relationship it probably results in loss of belongings and violence, inter-group anxiety, etc. Also, the settlement of herders in the host communities had steered to the increasing numbers of conflicts. The herders find it hard to abandon their grazing activities and the settlers claim the right for the ownership of lands.

During the occurrence of clashes among the two groups, the herdsmen and the host farmers go through social effects, physical and material damages. Conflict may erupt when the farmers cause harm to their cattle and the herders' herds eat their farm produce. Open altercation leads to rural insecurity and makes people migrate from such communities (Ngoufo, 1992). The social cost of the conflicts is being affected at the social levels. When there is confrontation between farmers and herders, it creates doubt, nervousness and argument among the groups involved, and herders are blamed for refusing to abide by the rules guiding the host farming communities.

The rising demand on resources, which is caused by increase in populace and number of livestock sizes, often induces the herders to travel further than their limited range (Bello, 2013; Breusers et. al., 1998). The cost of the conflict between the Fulanis and a host community leads to collapse of social relationship between the herdsmen and the host farming community, to victims/survivors of the conflict and accessibility to health system. There is also the production related cost whereby farmers will be terrified to go to their farmland so as not to be assaulted by the herdsmen. This may affect production process and result in damaged property. The cost of moving to another community as a result of the conflicts is also incurred. Social cost is also termed as indirect cost and psychological cost replacing damaged property, farm product, loss of lives, availability of schools, quality of life, etc.

According to Uhemba & Ahar Clement (2015) the following problems are created by conflict between the herdsmen and farmers;

- 1) Acute shortage of food due to inability to farm.
- 2) Food hoarding
- 3) Poverty
- 4) Unemployment
- 5) Population migration
- 6) Excessive use of the social facilities in the town.
- 7) Increase in crime rate
- 8) Failure of agricultural transformation programme

According to Schmid (1998) you can't place a price on conflict since it's impossible to define it precisely. He emphasizes that conflict cost estimations are notoriously difficult to make and tend to be limited to direct material and human losses. However, Albert (2001) claims that “conflict cost” can be estimated by contrasting and juxtaposing the post-conflict and pre-conflict environments.

In a similar spirit, Lund (1997) outlined eight characteristics to consider when trying conflict costing, they include:

- a. Human toll: Death and other factors have an impact on families, reducing their ability to provide fundamental requirements, particularly for children.
- b. The impact on communities: That is the breakdown of social structures and coping systems.
- c. The impact on national economies as resource bases are depleted and resources are diverted from production to military needs.
- d. When traditional institutions and power relations are altered, it has repercussions within national political institutions.
- e. If national political problems spill over into neighboring countries, regional stability and security are jeopardized.
- f. Costs of humanitarian and rebuilding help incurred in the reconstruction of war-torn societies.
- g. The cost of maintaining peace
- h. As the economy deteriorates and precious humanitarian aid and finance are diverted to emergency relief, prospects for development, commerce, and investment are lost. However, People that bear the cost of the conflicts include victims/survivors, perpetrators, children, friends, and family, the three levels of government, and the rest of the society.

2.7 Effects of the Conflicts between Herders and host Farming Communities

The crises had caused social, socioeconomic, economic, and humanitarian consequences which have strategic ramifications for Nigeria's national security. As Okoli and Atelhe (2004) pointed out, occupational crises and security have terrorized the afflicted population's community survival. There are other factors, such as a decrease in agricultural output and a

decrease in domestic resources that do not bode well for society or the nation's long-term viability. It, therefore, suffices to say that herders and host farming communities' conflict in some states in Nigeria is hostile to human and national security. The average herders are typically obstinate and confident. In their temporary settlements in different areas of the host communities, the nomads take along the nitty-gritties of their civilisation. Instead of conforming to the conventional traditions and customs of the host communities, they would rather stick to their own cultural legacy.

The hosts' communities see this in the way that precipitates inter-group tensions and rifts. In recent years, the watershed's ostensible dynamism of deterioration has progressively established a tendency of ethno-communal barriers. A surge of inter-communal conflagrations has accompanied this growth, posing a threat to the population's collective well-being. According to Sulaimon & Ja'afar, in a research carried out in Bauchi state Nigeria, between 2003 to 2007 determined that the economic effects of the conflict in the state, it was revealed that the domestic animals that went missing were 11 sheep/goats and 34 cattle, valued at about N1.8 million. 6 human lives were lost and the number of persons injured during this period was 45, among whom 15 persons were debilitated. The cost connotation for those who were injured was about N2.64 million (Sulaiman & Ja'afar, 2010). Fiki & Lee (2004) also carried out a study in Kwara state Nigeria, which shows that 22 persons reported the loss of farm produce, 41 persons reported the loss of domestic animals, 8 persons reported the loss of human lives from about 150 households interviewed from both groups. Also, properties were destroyed in many of the vicious clashes.

The consequences cast doubt on the Nigerian government's prediction of a 10% growth rate in the agricultural sector. Negedu (2005) in a study conducted in Kwara state, on cassava production, established that more than 90 percent of the host farmers that were interviewed specified that their utmost problem in the production of cassava is an encroachment on their farms by cattle rearers. Also, the Fulani herders acknowledged that the problem being faced in their occupation is the availability of lands for grazing. In Nigeria, there are a number of humanitarian, social, economic, socioeconomic, and security issues as a result of the conflict between herders and the host farmers/communities.

- **Humanitarian Effects:** Herdsmen and host farming community clashes have resulted in human loss, human injury, and occupational crisis. The battles have also caused people to become depressed, homeless, displaced, and impoverished. Conflicts have psychologically produced a climate that threatens the state's safety and tranquility. The killings have significantly reduced farming activities in such areas.
- **Social Effects:** The clashes have steered into edgy and unpredictable inter-group relationships between the different people in the state. The herders perceive the host farming communities as foes of their communal survival, likewise the farmers. This forms an atmosphere of joint mistrust and continuous strain that threatens the safety and solidity of the state. The conflict between the two groups had caused a direct and indirect effects on the lives of those involved, such as the victims, children, friends and family, local government, state government, the federal government, and the rest of the society. The cost ranges from damaged or lost household items, destruction of farmlands, loss of friends and family members, family break-ups, disruption in the schooling of children, water contamination, insecurity, and inability to access medical facilities and treatments.
- **Economic Effects:** The economic effect of the clashes can be perceived or identified with losses allied with farmlands destruction, properties, and destruction of homes. It is also related to the thinning fortunes of productivity of agriculture in Nigeria. When herders attack during the farming season, many farmers will avoid going to the farm out of concern for being attacked by the herders. The conflicts have led to the mutilation of lands used for farming and a large number of crops to be cultivated. Also, it has resulted in the killing of herders and their herds. All these costs result in tangible and quantifiable losses. This conflict has caused a decline in productivity and the proceeds of agriculturalists due to damages of yields and the burning of bushes.
- **Socio-Economic Effects:** The consequence of the conflict is obvious at the rural level and evident in the hardship and penury in the vicinities of some host communities in the state. The violence has caused starvation, insecurity, and fear of being attacked in such communities. This is not advantageous for maintainable socio-economy and the

comfort of the people. Additionally, farmers are compelled to leave their homes as a result of it. Farmers were scared of being attacked by the herders in the bushes, so they avoided going to farms or isolated themselves from them.

- **The Cumulative Effects:** in total, the conflict between these two groups has caused horrible consequences, which have obstructed peace in society and growth. It also has negative costs on social and economic developments.

Similar to other regions of the world, Nigeria's violent crisis has frayed relationships and posed a serious threat to peace, unity, and food security, among other things (Basil, 2015). As long as we coexist, there will be issues, particularly in a multiethnic, multicultural, and religious nation like Nigeria. Numerous types of retardation and underdevelopment take place as a result of the loss of lives, farmland, and property brought on by abuse. In many Nigerian cities, the threat of violent conflict has escalated over the last two decades (Ilufeye, 2009).

Most of these crises are related to animosity and intolerance of an ethno religious nature. Kassam (2014) and Basil (2015) contend that the majority of the crises in Nigeria, particularly those involving herders and farmers, are largely unwarranted. Due to Fulani herdsmen, farmers were unable to farm quietly. As a result of the herders and farmers dispute, Christians and Muslims have been pitted against one another. Particularly in Nasarawa Egor in Nasarawa State and Agatu Local Government Area in Benue State, the problem has a negative impact on intergroup relations. In addition to the loss of lives, farmland, food, and property, it has a profound effect on inter-personal relationships, which fuels new patterns of polarization in the community. Ajibefun (2017) emphasized both the social and economic effects of the crisis as evidence for the aforementioned claims. He listed the subsequent social repercussions:

- Women's sexual assault
- Weapons/arms acquisition
- Quality of social interactions deterioration
- social care deterioration
- Human life loss

- High rates of rape

The subsequent economic implication was noted by Ajibefun (2017):

- Produce loss during storage
- farmers being Displaced
- Reduced farming and nomads' revenue and output
- Lack of agricultural products and;
- Loss of homes and other possessions

The Nigerian Working Group, a coalition of public policy experts, examined the historical context of the crisis and suggested solutions in a paper on Peace Building and Governance that was released on January 7, 2018. The paper suggested ways to resolve the ongoing conflict in Nigeria's livestock farming sector. This included everything from developing new grazing options to using technology to track livestock, such as an electronic chip (animal tracking could help solve the problem of cattle rustling and crises, which has become so pervasive). Katsina State is one example of how this is done (Premium times, 2018).

2.8 General cost of the conflicts' trajectory to the security of the state

The herdsmen and farming communities' struggles in the state, has significant implications for the development of the country. The conflict has a negative impact on maintainable harmony and growth in the state. Given the level of the fierceness of clashes between these two groups, it is obvious that such a condition is detrimental to maintainable progress in the communities that are affected as well as the entire state. National security and a nation's development cannot be achieved or become persistent under the ambience of crisis (McNamara, 1978; 2013; Herbet & Hussaini, 2018). The increase in movement of herders from the North towards other parts of Nigeria has led to some sort of tension among the herders and host farming communities.

The failing eco-system of the region and the rising incidence of insecurity among the herding and farming groups have made this condition problematic. The scenario has had severe humanitarian, social, economic, and socio-political repercussions, leading to frenzied, violent

attempts to acquire and control inadequate environmental freedom and resources. These are discussed subsequently.

Humanitarian consequences of the farming/herdsmen conflicts

The incessant conflicts had created spillover consequences increasing the number of people who are displaced since the start of the terrorist actions by Boko Haram. The increases in the attacks and casualties since 2014 have led to an increasing number of internal refugees. Ugwumba (2018) revealed that due to the increasing attacks in Benue state during the festive season from December 2017 and January 2018 led to the displacement of 18000 people to more than 11 IDP camps in neighboring Nassarawa state. This does not include others who settled in IDP camps at the outskirts of Makurdi, the Benue state capital. The widespread use of light weapons and ammunition is a significant contributing factor in this. While the herdsmen have always been armed, however with farming communities get access to these weapons, disagreements that are relatively small in nature often resulted in violent clashes which eventually degenerates to high human casualties and widespread destruction of properties.

Conflicts between farmers and herders have tremendous humanitarian consequences. Native-nomadic conflict, according to Okoli & Atelhe (2014), resulted in deaths, population displacements, human injuries, and livelihood difficulties. As a result of the battle, people are not only dead, but also made homeless, displaced, and poor. In this aspect, conflict causes not only the deaths of civilians, but also the displacement, displacement, and poverty of civilians. According to Ofem & Inyang (2014), violence conflict often results in people becoming widows, widowers, orphans, handicapped, or injured in addition to nomad killings and native revenge.

They further contend that because of the violence, many people are forced to flee their homes, especially women who are afraid to go to the distant farm for fear of being attacked by nomads. Farmer deaths, resource destruction, and displacement are the results of farmer-herder conflicts, according to Ofuoku & Isife (2009). They claim that nomad and host community attacks and retaliation during such disputes result in many deaths. As a result of their injuries, some people also become victims or suffer from disabilities. As a result, a number of women farmers and their kids end up being orphaned or widowed. By March 2018,

the Benue State Emergency Agency (SEMA) estimated about 90000 people including 80,450 children as internally displaced persons across 8 camps in the state. The state government founded it to provide to the needs of victims whose homes and farmlands have been destroyed by the continuous clashes among herders' and farmers' in the state.

In the same vein, the increasing violence has also resulted to massive loss of lives. Amnesty International report (2021) reveals that more than 3,494 died in inter-communal violence and bandit attacks in 2021 and thousands of displacements. Consequently, the clashes have generated an atmosphere of insecurity in the affected states. They have also resulted in fear and hatred of herdsmen thereby having the potential to cause more conflicts and harm for innocent people. In the states and areas of the country affected by the conflict, there is a problem with human insecurity.

Social consequences of the conflict

The incessant conflicts amongst farmers' and herders' have repercussive consequences on the inter-group relationship between the two conflicting parties. Adekunle and Adisa (2010) noted that before the recent incessant conflicts among herders and host community farmers, there seems to be a sort of cooperation and agreement between the two parties. They gave a vivid description of how negotiation between both parties leads to beneficial mutual agreement between both parties. Prior to recent climate changes that result in encroach desertification in the north leading to drier grazing land; herdsmen migrate to the Middle Belt and Southern region mainly during the dry/Harmattan season. When the herdsmen arrive at a farming settlement, the leader of the herdsmen visits the leaders of the community and seeks permission to graze in the farmlands. Since the herdsmen usually arrive during the off-planting season, the leaders see this as an opportunity to get manure cheaply to re-fertilise in preparation for the new planting season while the herdsmen get need pasture for the cattle. Amnesty international report (2018) reveals that some herdsmen often buy land in places with good pasture and water supply to establish ranch instead of being nomadic. Examples of many Fulani herdsmen who bought land to settle and build ranches in the Mambilla plateau region, Taraba state in the early 80s was given in the report.

However, the encroaching desertification and loss of valuable water holes in the North pushed more herdsmen into the Middle belt and Southern regions, especially during the planting season. These incoming herdsmen broke the relationship that exists between them and the farming communities by using farm produce as fodder for the livestock. This leads to the emergence of the incessant conflicts among both parties that have continued till the present. One major consequence of this is the high level of distrust and fear between both parties. Okoro (2018) reveals that farmers now perceive that herdsmen are intruders and destroyers bent on destroying the means of livelihood of the farmers. In the same vein, Burton (2016) also reveals that even the peaceful sedentary Fulani's that are not herdsmen are treated with suspicion and anger by farming communities that have suffered from continuous attacks from violent Fulani herdsmen.

Fulani settlements, even if they are peaceful and innocent are often the victims of violent reprisal attacks. A typical example is the reprisal attack on Shelewol village, Mambila plateau, Taraba state, a Fulani settlement, by Bachama militia on November 20, 2017 which resulted to the casualty of over 70 people (Amnesty International, 2018). Even innocents who are suspected to be Fulani are killed by the vengeful communities: an example is the killing of seven travelers suspected to be Fulani's in a Motor park in Gboko, Benue state by vengeful Tiv youths on February 1, 2018, in revenge for the carnage of 25 people by herders in two local governments in the state some days earlier (Punch, 2018).

The incessant conflicts have also led to severe social imbalance as the way of life of the people has been tampered with and their community lives disorganised. The frequent nature and scope of the conflict have also contributed to hunger and general human insecurity, both of which are harmful to the population's overall wellbeing. In a similar vein, due to the government's passivity and tardy response in resolving the issue, residents of the impacted communities have poor impressions of the government and feel that it has neglected them (Okoro, 2018).

Equally, the International Crises Group report (2018) and Amnesty international (2018) reveal that affected communities are reluctant to report herdsmen attacks in their communities to

security agencies due to lack of trust and inaction by security agencies during attacks. They are also of the opinion that many security agents are in collusion with or sympathetic to the cause of the rampaging herdsmen, hence they (members of farming communities) resort to self-defense to protect themselves and their communities by forming militia and vigilantes (Okoro, 2018). Farmers-pastoralist conflict has social consequences that threaten peace and tranquility among different groups. Herder/farmer disputes, according to Okoli and Atelhe (2014), create stressful and volatile inter-group ties among the many persons involved in herder/farmer conflicts. This manifests as mistaken mutual suspicion and hostility. As a result, both the nomads and the indigenous people see one other as dangers to their shared existence and future. They go on to claim that the conflict jeopardizes stable cooperation, societal welfare, and stability by cultivating a climate of mistrust and constant tension (Okoli and Atelhe 2014). In turn, the herdsmen perceive indigenous people as threats to their own existence and future, and the indigenous people perceive the herdsmen in the same way. They continue by asserting that the conflict endangers tranquil cohabitation, society security, and stability by fostering mistrust and constant tension (Okoli and Atelhe 2014).

Economic Consequences of the farmers'/herdsmen conflicts

Nigeria's economy is based on agricultural activities. 30% of the workforce is employed in agricultural operations, which generate one-third of the nation's GDP (National Bureau Statistics, 2019). It plays a significant part in the rural-urban interaction, with Okoro (2018) estimating that 90 percent of rural residents are engaged in agricultural activities. However, the violence unleashed by both parties in the last decade has led to the destruction of crops, farmlands, and cattle which have dire economic consequences on the country. It has limited farmers from going to farms, thereby destroying their means of livelihood. According to Osumah (2018), many farmers have left their properties out of concern that they may be attacked or killed by herdsmen. As a result, more people are moving from the countryside to cities or IDP camps in quest of better possibilities. Its ripple effects include a rise in unemployment and a decline in the nation's rate of food production (Okoro, 2018).

Osumah (2018) equally reveals that it resulted in an increase in poverty in the location where violent clashes occur frequently. Chukwuma (2016) also asserted that the shortage of farm produce in the markets can be attributed to the frequent damage of farmland and produces by herdsmen and this result in an increase of available food supply in the markets. This assertion is far-fetched since most of the troubled regions are the primary producers of agricultural goods in the nation. This poses negative consequences on food security in the country. Pastoralists and farmers' dispute has disastrous economic implications for production and agriculture. According to Okoli & Atelhe (2014), losses brought on by the destruction of homes, farms, community assets, and household resources have an impact on the economy. They claim that a lot of people stay away from farms out of fear of being attacked, which lowers agricultural output during the harvest season. Numerous farmlands, a significant amount of agricultural produce, and hundreds of animals are also lost. Ofuoku & Isife (2009) elaborate on the economic implications, stating that conflict reduces agricultural production and income for farmers and nomads. They assert that farmers lose some or all of their lands and crops due to grazing, cattle devastation, and uncontrolled bush burning.

On the other side, the dispute results in the destruction of nomads' cows due to indiscriminate killing Farmers' and nomads' yields are decreased as a result of this, which results in lower wages. Their capacity to save, pay off loans, secure their food, and maintain their economic well-being deteriorates as a result. Furthermore, the violence has a severe influence on agricultural production. Because farmers are unable to get the services of cattle necessary for weeding fields, plow fields, and transport gathered crops, claims Tonah (2006). Therefore, farmers and the output of rural agriculture are discouraged.

Insecurity challenges

Increased farmer-herder conflict in Nigeria has had disastrous effects on society as a whole. Numerous people have died as a result of confrontations brought on by a wave of pastoralist attacks. Human Rights Watch estimates that between December 2013 and mid-April 2014, a particularly brutal time period, about 1000 people perished. In addition to the growing number of deaths, the slaughter has exacerbated Nigeria's internal displacement situation. Nigeria's insecurity has been exacerbated by the conflicts. Many people have organized self-defense

forces in response to the rising insecurity. Despite the fact that they were formed to protect vulnerable populations, these organizations often pose a security threat to Nigeria.

Human insecurity is a major worry in the development process. Findings from HRW (2013) indicate that societal unrest and persistent development problems in a nation with extreme poverty and concomitant hunger crises drive the animosity that fuels recurrent violent confrontations between Fulani herdsmen and local farmers. Simply put, Fulani farmers and herders in rural areas are victims of extreme poverty since they cannot afford to eat enough to survive, have access to possibilities for education, or even help themselves. Insecurity seriously jeopardizes the viability of rural and urban livelihoods because the majority of those impacted by the horrific wars in the North-Central region are members of dominant and determined minority ethnic groups (Idegu, 2015). Concerns regarding the need for social support in the impacted rural communities are also expressed by security specialists. Additionally, the development of social infrastructure is frequently necessitated by diverting funds from profitable enterprises due to the growing demand for social services (Kabir 2016). If funds are not appropriately diverted to infrastructural development, people will experience social instability, extreme poverty, an increase in herdsmen and farmers clashes, as well as other violent crimes.

Poor maintenance grazing and farming cultures, insufficient means of supporting human capital and participation in development design, as well as social unrest and the spread of extreme poverty in the region's residents have all been linked to persistent developmental challenges in Nigeria (Majekodunmi, Fajinmi, Dongkum, Shaw, and Welburn 2014). Marietu and Olarewaju (2009) cautioned that "the breakdown of a state can hardly come spontaneously, or all at once." Violent encounters will undoubtedly be the starting point for processes of degradation, decline, and erosion of functions, if and when they happen. Nigeria has developed into a more conducive climate for insecurity as a result of the nature of the society and the federal and state governments' failure to adequately address requirements based on ethnicity. Nigeria's national security and existence are unquestionably threatened by conflicts between herders and farmers. Spending enormous sums of money on military equipment will not be sufficient to confront Nigeria's growing security threat, particularly in the area of concern.

The best method for addressing Nigeria's security issues is social security. Federal and state governments can be responsible and sincere in fighting corruption in order to show that they are willing to offer herders grazing areas and local farmers adequate resources. Strong hopes that some of the country's problems, chief among them government corruption, would be rectified were expressed in response to the return of democracy. However, in contrast to predictions, the new democratic system is more corrupt than it was during the military rule (Odoh and Chigozie 2012).

The Nigerian state's glaring underdevelopment, economic instability, violence, a lack of effective administration, Nigerians' poverty, and a threat to the nation's fledgling democracy are some consequences of such failure. There were high expectations that the restoration of democracy would help the nation's problems, the most significant of which was official corruption. Contrary to predictions, the new democratic government has struggled with corruption on a par with the previous predecessor (Odoh and Chigozie 2012). The Nigerian state's glaring underdevelopment, economic instability, violence, a lack of respectable governance, the people's poverty, and a threat to the nation's fledgling democracy are some consequences of this failure.

According to Adelakun, Adurogbangba and Akinbile (2015) note that farmers in Oyo state are often heavily hit by the violence and they are often reluctant to go back to farms after each conflict resulting to a decrease of food output and loss of income. A study conducted by Isife and Ofuoku (2009) reveals that food produce worth 40 million is lost yearly in the Niger-Delta region due to herdsmen/farmers' conflicts. Equally, Aliyu (2015) revealed that farmers in Katsina state are getting poorer due to the inability to go back to their farms as a result of the conflicts.

According to estimates, 1.3 million cows are butchered annually in Nigeria, or around 90,000 every day. Since the recurrence of violent conflict between herdsmen and farmers 10 years ago, the price of beef has steadily increased by between 15 and 20 percent, culminating in a 25 percent increase in 2018 (Akinfenwa, 2018). While there have been various studies on the economic consequences of the continuous conflict on farmers, there is a dearth in the literature on the economic consequences of herdsmen and cattle rearers. This is not farfetched, since there are other alternatives to beef in comparison to farm produce despite this, beef is

thought to account for roughly 30% of the nation's meat consumption, making it vital to Nigeria's food security. Nevertheless, Akinfenwa (2018) foresees scarcity in the supply of beef and an added increase in the price. He attributed the reasons for these dire consequences to the attendant conflicts that erupt as a result of the strained relationship among host communities' farmers' and cattle rearers'.

Socio-economic consequences of herdsmen/farmers conflict

The volatile situation has dire socio-political consequences not just on those involved and their victims but also on the country as a whole. The unstable situation has detrimental implications on the state's security. According to Ojomah et al. (2019), one of the main causes of the nation's security problems is the ongoing conflict. This has stretched the available security forces leading to more impunity by criminals to commit crimes in the country, which leads to more instability in the country. The rise of small light weapons and ammunition (SLAW) and the creation of armed vigilante groups in impacted communities to defend themselves in the absence of state protection are two significant effects of this (Herbert & Hussiani, 2018; Ojomah et-al, 2019). The proliferation of SLAW has been attributed to the Libyan crises and the fall of Gadaffi's regime coupled with a porous border and corrupt practices of the Nigerian Customs Service (Ogbette, Attama, & Okoh, 2018). Ojomah et. al. (2019) noted that the widespread availability of SLAW contributes in no small way to what In many of the impacted parts of the country, a "culture of violence" that Ginnifer and Ismail (2005) described as spreading quickly has led to an increase in the loss of lives and property. According to Ginnifer and Ismail (2005), a culture of violence exists when people adopt or accept the use of violence to resolve conflicts as the norm rather than an unusual event.

Furthermore, the pastoral/farmer conflict is a threat to peace anywhere it occurs. With retaliation and reprisal attacks, we could have a huge security problem in our hands if the trend is not halted. Also, the absence of peace is a necessity for the breakdown of law and order. This creates a bad environment for investment and development of infrastructures by government or international partners. Commerce is generally affected in affected states. Biased Media reports have led to polarisation between the general populace, thereby further aggravating the security tension in the country. Another consequence is the infiltration of both

perpetrators by foreign elements; Barometer (2016), Femi (2016) and Ojomah et.al. (2019) believe that many of those arrested by security forces during the violence are from outside the country; most of them mercenaries brought in by both parties. This can be seen in the attacks on Gashaka local government by suspected Fulani herdsmen on April 12, 2016 which left 15 people dead. Many of those arrested were herdsmen from the Neighbouring country, Cameroon. Less explored consequence by scholars is the divisive tendency of the conflict which is also one of the major driver of the incessant violence associated with the conflict. Since both parties involved belong to ethnic and religious groups, it has created suspicion, fear, and aggression by members of those involved in the conflicts.

This has led to segregation, allegations of ethnic cleansing, and genocide carried out by the parties involved in the conflicts (Okoro, 2018; Nwankwo 2019). The herders declined to pay compensation for damage caused by their cattle overgrazing on farmland. This will prompt farmers to retaliate by killing the herdsmen's cattle, resulting in increased tension and violence in the host communities.

2.9 Responses and strategies to tackle farmers-herdsmen conflicts

In an attempt to deal with the incessant farmers-herdsmen conflicts, various dimensions of responses have been espoused in literature. These dimensions will be discussed subsequently.

Government efforts/policies to tackle the conflicts

Over the years, successive governments have enacted various strategies, policies, and attempts to resolve the violent clashes between farmers and nomads. These policies include the enactment of grazing routes during the colonial period. The inability of the government to implement these routes especially in farming settlements is one of the main causes of the conflicts' intensification as noted by Amnesty International (2018) in its study in which it was revealed farmers are not often aware that their farmlands pass through the pre-designed grazing routes which is one of the claims of the herdsmen after destroying the farms. While the present grazing routes are outdated due to urbanisation efforts in many of these routes, in 2008, the National Assembly initiated a 2008 Grazing Commission Bill. The bill attempts to create and empower a body with the power to procure land in any part of the states for grazing activities.

However, the efforts were opposed by social-cultural groups such as Afenifere in the southern parts of the country. Guilbert (2016) also noted that this bill is a violation of the Land Use Act of 1978 and could be against the traditional landholding system if passed into law. An attempt in 2018 to align this plan for the RUGA settlement by the Federal government was equally opposed by the people particularly those in the southern part as a forceful attempt to take away their ancestral land and give it to foreigners. In 1989, the then Military government of Nigeria led by General Ibrahim Babangida initiated Nomadic Education for herdsmen by establishing the National Commission for Nomadic Education (NCNE) to provide valuable education for herdsmen. The main aim of the programme is to integrate herdsmen into society through the provision of basic education and skill acquisition.

Another policy employed by the government is the Land use act of 1978, which is the present legislation matter on land in Nigeria. The act eliminated the prior land tenure and freehold systems that were widespread in the nation and placed the governor in charge of all land in the state. Anyone who wishes to utilize the land must obtain permission from the governor by obtaining a certificate of occupancy from the governor. The land use statute permits the governor to hold land on behalf of the people through a trusteeship system (Mabogunje, 2009).

Under this act, it implies that the governor can use any land without any form of compensation except in the case of economic activities occurring in the land. The act made it stress-free for state managements to acquire land without any prolonged process of acquiring such land. However, it has been bedeviled with myriads of challenges since its inception. It removes the rights of individuals to own land. This allays residents' fears that their land will not be transferred to outsiders, particularly Fulani herdsmen, in the southern regions of the nation. The ability of the state government to revoke any right of possession has historically been abused by many governments, which has reduced public confidence in the procedure. Another significant issue is the wait times for obtaining an occupancy certificate. In conclusion, since some of the obsolete sections of the act were what caused the farmers' and

herders' conflicts in the country, improper execution of the act continues to be a major contributing factor.

The deployment of security forces, in particular the military and armed anti-riot policemen, to conflict hotspots and zones across the nation, particularly in the core northern states and middle belt states where the conflicts are more prevalent, is one of the major actions taken by the Nigerian government. Hoffman (2014) reveals that security forces are deployed to contain a sudden occurrence of violent conflicts in areas where the safety of the civilians is in jeopardy. However, the International Crises Group (2017) reveals that these actions have been bedeviled by accusations and claims of overuse of force and extrajudicial executions, wanton destruction of lives and properties, and other human rights abuses. For instance, the International Crises Group report (2017) reveals that an attempt to stop series of reprisal violence that took place in Adamawa state between November and the first week of December 2017 in Numan and Demsa local government, led to the death of above 100 people killed or mostly allegedly killed by two Nigerian air force jets and helicopters deployed to break up the vengeful Fulani militia who had gathered for a reprisal attack on Numan town. However, the Air Force had debunked the allegations claiming to just fire “warning shots” to disperse the group.

A more worrisome development is alleged deliberate collusion with one party among warring parties by security forces or withdrawal of state security before attacks commence. There have been many accusations that security forces are bribed by one or both parties to provide information and leave the area for more attacks. Amnesty international 2018 reports reveal a series of incidences where the military allegedly collide with the invading force or did not take any actions despite being having information about the attack or had withdrawn before attacks took place. The reports reveal that such an incident took place before the attack on Dong village in Numan local government on December 4, 2017 as 50 mobile policemen that were attached to the village left 3 days before the attack which resulted to the death of above 86 people in Numan local government. On the 1st and 2nd days of May 2018, in Numan local government, Adamawa state, 33 villagers and more than 500 houses in five villages were burnt.

The reports revealed that this attack took place just 30 minutes after soldiers stationed in these villages withdrew despite receiving information about a planned attack. The reports also reveal that before the attacks on several villages in Lau local government, Taraba state on January 6 and 15, 2018 which left over 68 people dead, the people were misled by the military personnel in the area that Fulani gunmen were going after the neighbouring tribe- the Bachama people. This false information made them susceptible to violent attacks from the marauding Fulani gunmen coming back from reprisal attacks in Numan local government, Adamawa state. In the reports, the security forces were accused of collecting money for protection from the villagers but failing to protect them as they could not be found during the attacks. Several villages in Kokona local government who wrote petitions to the army chief of staff and the inspector general of police were told to pay the sum of 150000 naira for logistics purposes. However, only three policemen were sent to the villages and no arrests were made even though villagers revealed the perpetrators to the policemen.

Another issue is the inadequate number of security agents. The police are not adequate to be deployed in rural areas where these attacks mostly take place. They also lack proper surveillance to detect early convergence of warring or marauding parties. Also, the uneven geographical terrain and bad roads prevent security forces from swiftly responding to violent attacks (Alkejir, 2018). The late responses often push villagers to resort to self-help by organising vigilantes and ethnic militia.

There are instances where despite reports by victims, security agencies do not carry out arrest against the perpetrators leaving them to roam free, thereby committing more havoc. Due to the dysfunctional criminal justice system, many perpetrators go un-arrested and unprosecuted even if arrested. Amnesty International noted that the pursuit of justice has been truncated by many factors among which include political factors, arguing that sanctioning the offender may worsen the situation. This results into the creation of the notion that Fulani-herdsmen violent conflicts are deliberately supported by the government.

In the same vein, International Crises Group reports (2017) reveal that various commissions of inquiry established by both the state and federal governments sought to douse or ameliorate the tensions rather than provide justice for the victims and prosecute the perpetrators. This creates a notion of immunity for the perpetrators. Nevertheless, the military has organised several special operations in different hot zones of the conflicts such as Operation Accord in Kaduna state in 2016, Operation Hope in Benue and Nassarawa states in 2015, and several other operations in Adamawa and Taraba states since 2018. Yet, attacks continue to take place unrestrained and casualties mount on both sides.

The governments have also adopted peace mechanisms to solve the problems as well. These include setting up judicial commissions in the different states where violent conflicts have happened. It also includes mediation by people of reputation alongside violent response to douse tension. The incumbent president Muhammdu Buhari some years back was the leader of the delegation sent to the southwestern states in the early 2000s to douse tension between herdsmen and indigent communities.

The International Crises Group (2017) reveals the different commissions which were to put in place by the federal government to investigate conflicts and douse tensions between 2002 and 2010 in the middle belt states. These commissions include the Justice Okpene Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Communal Conflicts in the States of Benue, Nassarawa, Plateau, and Taraba in 2002, the Presidential Peace Initiative Committee on Plateau State Conflicts in 2004 under the direction of the then-Emir of Zazzau, the Federal Administrative Panel of Inquiry into Plateau State Crises in 2008 under the direction of Gen. Abisoye, and the Presidential Advisory Committee on the Jos Crises. However, as Aluko (2017) points out, the attempts to put these committees' recommendations into practice have been thwarted by a lack of political will.

In the same vein, in 2014 the former incumbent president Goodluck Jonathan set up an inter-ministerial committee to investigate farmers/herdsmen conflicts in the conflict-prone areas, initiating the process of setting up grazing reserves and proffering recommendations to end the conflicts. The governors' forum also inaugurated a committee presided by the then Benue

state governor, Sir Gabriel Suswam to investigate the conflict. The committee recommended setting up grazing reserves. The reports of both committees were adopted by the then government who ordered the central bank to release 100 billion naira to all the states in the country to set up grazing ranches.

Nonetheless, the change in government after the 2015 elections truncated the process and the implementation was stopped. The new government of Muhammadu Buhari directed the Ministry of agriculture and rural development to create a new livestock development plan to curb the incessant conflicts. The ministry set up a committee that formulated a plan of action that includes short term, medium, and long terms goals to deal with the problem. This plan of action titled the National Livestock Transformation Plan which is also known as RUGA settlement approved by the National Economic Council involves setting up or ranches or grazing settlements in different states of the country for herdsmen to conduct any activities related to cattle rearing instead of being nomadic. Shortly before the setting up of this settlement, grazing routes would be provided for herdsmen in locations where farming activities do not take place. However, the plan was opposed by the southern part of the country whose indigenes are mostly Christians and non-Hausa/Fulani and who see the plan as an agenda to forcefully take their land and give it to Fulanis; “an islamisation or Northern domination agenda” (WorldWatch Monitor, 2019).

The Legislative arm level had also waded into the matter by formulating laws aimed at seeking solutions to the conflict. Despite the enormous number of lives lost over the previous 20 years, a review of the literature finds that the National Assembly, which consists of the Senate and House of Representatives, has not engaged in any legislative activity targeted at addressing these violent conflicts. In the previous National Assembly, Zainab Kure, the senator who represented the central senatorial district of Niger state at the time, proposed a measure in 2011 to construct grazing routes or reserves and establish a National Grazing Reserves Commission, but it did not get past first reading. Other related bills passed in the present National Assembly were assented to or signed by the president. However, the International Crises Group (2017) and Amnesty International (2018) noted that several states have domesticated laws that are aimed at proffering solutions to the conflict by limiting

grazing activities and movement of herdsmen. Ekiti state and the FCT in 2016 formulated laws limiting grazing and preventing herdsmen from moving about without permission. Benue state in 2017 and Taraba state in 2018 passed laws preventing open grazing.

However, this has not reduced or stopped the increasing spate of violent conflicts between farmers and herdsmen in both states (Amnesty International, 2018). While Abia state government had not yet signed the Control of Nomadic Cattle Rearing and Prohibition of Grazing Routes/Reserve Bill, the government resuscitated the defunct vigilante group 'Bakassi Boys' in 2017, instructed and deployed them to rural communities to deal with any errant herdsmen bent on unleashing violence (Alkejir, 2018). Edo state made a proposition to provide fenced grazing areas with water for herdsmen while they (herdsmen) pay a token to use these places in the state. In response to the 2016 attack on the Nimbo community Uzo-Uwani local government, Enugu state inaugurated a Security and Peace Committee to investigate and proffer solutions to forestall future occurrences. One such solution was the training and arming of vigilantes in the local government and dusk to dawn curfew in the hot zones of the violence. Cross River state, on the other hand, formed a group called 'Homeland Security Service' and trained 3000 youths to forestall the occurrence of violence in the state. However, they were not armed but were instructed to monitor the movements of herdsmen in the state.

Southwestern states organised a regional security summit to establish a regional security outfit called 'Amotekun' (translated as Leopard) as a defense structure to assist the federal security agencies in protecting the people in the region from Fulani herdsmen attacks among other functions (The Punch, 2020). The different southwestern states are currently working to provide a legal/regulatory framework for the outfit. However, this has resulted to controversy among the Federal government and the southwestern states' governments. The Minister of Justice stated that such an outfit is not backed by the constitution, declaring it illegal. Nonetheless, the states' governors and the vice president are currently working together to solve the issue of its legal status.

Community/ethnic response to Fulani herdsmen/farmers' conflict

The lack of ability of the state to respond proactively and deal with the conflict has to the creation of communal or ethnic militia or army. The rise and prevalence of these groups can be attributed to the continuing insecurity in the hot zones of the conflicts despite the presence of the military and police force in these conflict-ridden areas. Nonetheless, Higazi (2016) identified two means by which these communal or ethnic militias may arise.

One means is through the formation and arming of group prominent individuals or “big men”. He noted that in the formation of militias in Plateau state in the mid-2000s crises in the state where prominent individuals in the warring ethnic groups: Berom and Fulani formed an armed group to fight for the interests of these individuals and the ethnic group leading to massive loss of lives. Coincidentally, it was also during this period that Fulani herdsmen began to carry small arms while moving to different places in pursuit of meadowland and water for cattle (Stivatchis, 2008). This also coincided with the increase of arms and ammunition in the states (Adisa and Adekunle, 2010; Okoli et. al., 2014; Olayoku, 2014; Ugwumba, 2018).

The other means is the setting of militia or vigilantes by the communities who have been ravaged by incessant violence between Fulani herdsmen and farmers. Some of the identified ethnic militias include the defunct Eggon boys and Ombatse group in Nassrawa state who were once active in the state until their demise in series of gun battles with security forces in 2017 (Amaza, 2018, Tade & Yikwabs, 2019), Tarok ethnic militia in Plateau state, the Jukun militia active in Benue, Taraba and Adamawa states, Tive militia in Benue state and the Bachama boys active in Taraba and Adamawa states.

As Higazi (2016) and Amaza (2018) note, some of these groups work hand in hand with security forces to apprehend errant perpetrators, for instance, the vigilante groups in Uzo-Uwani local government, Enugu state. Some are created or being empowered by the state apparatus to deal with occurrences of such conflicts and protects the indigent communities. An example is the reformed Bakassi boys in Abia state and the instance when the former governor of Ekiti Ayo Fayose charged local hunters to protect the people against herdsmen

attacks. This is due to the governors' limited or nonexistent control over the state's security agencies, despite their designation as the "person in charge of security officer" of the state, which accounts for the tardy reaction to conflict areas. Others work independently to commit havoc both on perpetrators and the innocents; many of the aforementioned ethnic militias fall in this category. For instance, the killing of seven people who were believed to be of Fulani extraction by Tiv youths in Gboko, Benue state on February 1, 2018 (The Punch, 2018) a few days after Fulani herdsmen attacks in Bassa and Guma local governments in the same state which left more than 25 people dead. The letdown of the state authorities to deal with or curb the incessant violence led to the emergence of these groups 'taking laws into their own hands to protect their citizens.

The rise in the number of casualties since 2015 can be attributed to the activities of the latter category. Amnesty International report (2018) reveals that between June 17-20, 2017, Bachama militia attacked seven villages in Mambilla plateau a Fulani enclave in Taraba state; and over 700 people were declared killed or missing before security operatives intervened. Likewise, attack on Shelewol village, Numan local government, Adamawa state, a Fulani enclave by Bachama ethnic militia on November 20, 2017 resulted to the demise of over 70 people. However, although the survivors identified the perpetrators to government authorities, there was no arrest or prosecution; this led to reprisal attacks in seven villages in Demsa and Numan local governments by Fulani militia which left 51 people dead. Several villages in Mayo- Belwa local government, Adamawa by gunmen suspected to be from Bile ethnic group on July 14, 2018, left more than 50 people dead, even though security agencies have been pre-informed of this attack. In the same vein, conflicts between Fulani herdsmen and local vigilantes in Iseyin local government, Oyo on February 13, 2018, led to the death of 12 herdsmen, an unknown number of cattle were taken away while 14 others were declared missing.

Conclusively, the systematic large-scale killings of indigent farming communities since 2015 have been attributed by media, religious and prominent individuals in the country particularly the southern part, to the existence of a Fulani media bent on 'genocide' particularly, in Nassarawa, Taraba, Plateau, Adamawa states and the Middle belt states of Benue (Higazi,

2016; Omilusi, 2016; Amnesty International report, 2018: Allison, 2018; Amaza 2018; Matfess, 2018).

International and regional agreements as responses to curb herdsmen/farmers conflicts

There have been several programmes and policies enunciated by regional and international bodies to regulate pastoral/farmer clashes in West Africa and beyond. The Jo-Ansie van Wyk and Donald, 2010 the Strategic structure for transhumance in Africa is a case in point. In 2010, a framework was designed by the international body created a framework with the goal of preserving, defending, and enhancing the rights, way of life, and lives of pastoralist communities. As projected in the policy framework, conferring with pastoral communities is vital to the progression of better security, as is integrating pastoral areas into mainstream improvement policies and plans (African Union 2010; Donald and Jo-Ansie van Wyk, 2010).

The Stock-Rearing Action Plan, which was adopted by ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) in 2011, also recognizes pastoralists' right to transport livestock from one area to another, safeguards their access to water in established agricultural areas, and facilitates cross-border trading (CTA Brief, 2012). A fundamental point by the Fulani herders for freely moving across Nigeria with their cattle is this provision of ECOWAS and the one guaranteed in the Nigerian constitution, section 41. However, there seems to be a misinterpretation of some content in the plan's document as the document reads: "stipulated' agricultural regions". Also, the Nigerian constitution envisages free movement of human beings and not animals.

2.10 Theoretical Framework

2.10.1 Group Conflict Theory by George B. Vold (1958)

George B. Vold (1958) submits, in theoretical criminology, approaching an understanding of the social nature of crime as a product of conflict between groups.

George B. Vold (1958), group conflict theory focused on the conflicts of interests (George, Thomas, & Jeffrey, 1998). Vold's theory is of the view that the nature of humans holds that,

people are grouped, who form a part of each other's lives as a result of their relationship. In a situation when members have mutual benefit and general needs that can be achieved through combined act or effort, groups are formed. However, conflict transpires when two or more persons oppose one another in social interactions, reciprocally, exerting social power to attain scarce resources or incompatible goals, and preventing the opponent from attaining them. The pursuit for control and power becomes the currency rather than consensus.

Groups' conflict tends to occur as the benefit and reasons they provide tend to overlap, impinge on one another, and develop into a social competition for things such as scarce resources, or a territory, recognition, group or social status, etc. Conflict among groups tends to grow and deepen when there is a loss of trust among group members who have previously shared interest. When there is competition over scarce resources conflict erupts which could lead to social factors like accessibility to health care, displacement, unemployment, ability to make healthy choices, community safety, and income. Implicitly, this social-psychological view of human nature sees society as an assembly of groups held mutually in an energetic symmetry of conflicting group benefits and needs. To a large extent, there is constant effort to sustain or develop the place of one's group in the relations of groups. Conflict is one of the primary and vital social processes in the nonstop and unending running of society. These social relations processes grind their way through a variety of uncomfortable changes to a more or less stable stability of reasonable forces, known as a social organization. The varying strengths and diverse interests of many groups are the core of society as a functioning reality.

The conflict between groups seeking their interests is a common factor in the society, which is mostly a matter of finding realistic compromises amid opposed groups' interests existing in the society before there is any legislative action. As one group is against another, together they may request the help of the state to assist them to defend their rights and protect their interests. There is a common cry between groups that there should be a law, which is the claim by one of the disagreeing groups, that the supremacy of the state should be used to assist them when they conflict with the other group. The other group, against whom the projected law is aimed, opposes its passage. The group that can organise the most number of votes will decide whether or not there will be a new law to impede and control the interests of

the rival group. Once the law has been passed, those who opposed it will not be taken lightly by law enforcement. However, they may perhaps defy the rules and regulations, since; their benefits and purposes are being denied. Meanwhile, the people who endorsed the law are likely to conform since the rules guard their interests and what they value.

To this point, criminal behaviour is likely to happen among the lesser power groups, because these groups do not have enough power to support and protect their welfares and purposes in the governmental process. Group conflict theory points to one of the fundamental conditions of life in organised political society and suggests that a substantial amount of misdeed is closely allied to group conflict situations.

2.10.2 Appropriateness of the theory

Group Conflict Theory was used for this study. This was used to highlight the conflict between the herdsmen and host farming communities. Group Conflict Theory is of the premise that people form groups because they have a common interest and humanity consists of diversity of constantly competing interest groups and that one of its vital elements is conflict (Vold, 1979) with more potent groups being able to have the governments make laws to their benefit. Competition is a constant phenomenon and, sometimes an intense factor in almost every human relationship and dealings. It also exists due to dearth of resources, property, dominance, commodities, money, and social status. Crime could be explained as a result of intergroup variance. The disagreement between these groups can lead to a conscious fight over the allocation of resources.

Conflicts are a main part of every human relation in the society. Its effect touches almost everybody to some extent. The effects and consequences are widely varied. It could be for a short period of time while it may last a lifetime. Meanwhile, loss of life is the ultimate cost. However, the effects to victims may include healthcare costs, property costs, property losses, and loss of earnings. Losses are incurred by both victims and non-victims. Substantial money is being used to avoid being victimised. Other types of expenditure might include a victim/person apprehensive of crime moving to a new locality, loss of school days, cost for funeral and legal fees. The effects of some crime are less substantial (not easily or precisely

identified). It could also be distressing impacts on friends, disruption of family, depression or anxiety-related illness (PSTD), and so on.

There are many theoretical explanations for the social effects of the clashes among herders and the Farmers in host communities in Nigeria. The difference is best understood as a collection of individuals with various benefits and desires who have access to resources that are insufficient to meet their needs. This causes inequalities that generate conflict. Conflicts happen when there is disagreement with each other in social interaction, exerting social power and reciprocally. This is the case of the herders and host community farmer/ farming communities where the farmers assert that they are the land's proprietors since it is the host farming community territory while the herders believe that land belongs to the government and government is for all irrespective of where you are from. Instead of seeking consensus, the quest of control and authority becomes the currency in order to achieve the scarce and inappropriate aims and prevent the opponent from reaching them. Based on this premise, local, state, and federal governments have not been able to resolve the conflicts between herders, and the host farming communities have also not been able to help them come to an agreement. The three levels of government haven't demonstrated the political will necessary to find lasting solutions to the disputes between farmers and herders' competing rights. Government officials have not enacted the necessary laws that would define rules and boundaries for the conflicting factions and be supported by action. Lack of political zeal continues to be a barrier.

The clashes among the herders' and host communities' farmers arise because these groups are dependent on each other. The farmers rely on the herders for organic manure from cow dung while the nomads rely on the farmers for crop residue for their herds. That is, the relationship between the two parties is for exchanges of grains for their herds and manures for their farms. This relationship is embedded in trust and mutual interaction between both parties. The trust is built on the agreement that the herdsmen would not destroy the crops in the farms in return for safe passage through the farms. On other hand, the farmer is expected not to attack either the cattle or the herdsmen while droppings from the herdsmen will be used as manure.

Conflicts among groups occur when the reasons and purposes they tend to share overlap and the available resources become competitive and the trust they previously shared is no longer there. It is thought that the tension between farming groups and herding communities is caused by competing livelihoods. Initially, the Fulani enjoy a cordial relationship. Their relationship becomes strong over time due to the mutual exchange of goods and services. These symbiotic dealings more often than not, aid disagreement resolution amid herdsman and host farming communities. Subsequently, the relationship degenerates, and trivial misunderstandings rocket into fatal brutality among communities whereby farmers continue to struggle with herdsman for lands for farming, pastures, water, and trees (Ofuoku & Isife, 2009). Consequently, when this cordial relationship is lost, conflict is likely to erupt resulting in loss of lives, properties, farm produce, family break-ups, inaccessibility to health care services and schools, etc.

The conflict between these two groups therefore, has regularly raised the struggle among livestock and farming production (economic livelihood) and resulted in an upshot in the rise of conflicts (Nyong, 2010). Hence, there is an increase in population, several lands are being used for farming and a smaller amount is accessible for grazing, making herders drift and tramp on cultivated crops. As one group comes in conflict with another, both may ask for the backing of the state to assist them to protect their civil rights and their interests. The herders will defend themselves against the farmers and from them killing their herds while the farmers will defend themselves against the herdsman and from their herds which can destroy their farmland. When farmers hurt their animals with weapons like cutlasses, spears, or guns or by poisoning the cattle, the herders sustain material harm. Meanwhile, open confrontation results in rural insecurity and migration (Ngoufo R., 1992). Also, the conflict between the two groups has resulted in social effects and the costs of these effects could either directly or indirectly include the society as a whole ranging from loss of farm produce, insecurity, family members, social unity, vaccines for their herds, affordable medical care, education, employment, community safety, etc.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Design

An exploratory design was adopted for the study. An exploratory study provides an understanding of the themes and patterns to be portrayed by the study participants; it enables the researcher to have a good grasp of the situation. Hence, to thoroughly investigate social costs of farmer-herder conflict among Iseyin host community farmers and the herdsmen in the study area, qualitative techniques of data collection method was employed to get the raw facts of the phenomenon under study.

3.2 Study area

The study was conducted in Iseyin, a town in Oyo State, southwest Nigeria with a population of over 200,000 according to the 2006 population census (National Population Commission, 2006). With an annual population growth rate of 3.51% per year (National Population Commission, 2006), Iseyin was estimated to have a population of 400,000 by 2020. It is approximately 100 kilometers north of Ibadan and the Latitude and Longitude of the town are 7.96667 / 3.6. The people of the town are mainly farmers, dye producers, and cotton-based textile producers. It is centrally located and accessible via road networks from Ibadan, Oyo, Abeokuta, and Ogbomoso. Iseyin is a major stopping point and cattle-marketing point on the Ilorin-Ogbomosho-Oyo-Ibadan cattle trade route. The surrounding country is of the forest-savanna mosaic type (Ajetunmobi, 2018). The forest-savanna mosaic consists of drier forests, often gallery forest, interspersed with savannas and open grasslands. Farmland comprises a considerable part of the sub-climax vegetation of the area, which enjoys a relatively dry but equable climate.

Iseyin's grassland is a highly populated and intensively cultivated area. It was historically free of tsetse flies and trypanosomiasis. The absence of trypanosomiasis and the presence of

abundant pasture attract a large number of cattle-keeping pastoralists. The area now holds a large number of cattle and plays an important role in the regional cattle industry. However, beginning in 1968, there have been increasing reports of tsetse flies and *Glossinamorsitans submorsitans* along the Ilorin-Ogbomosho-Oyo-Ibadan trade cattle route (Baldry, 1968). Iseyin shows high ethno-linguistic diversity, with large-scale Yoruba political units. In the early nineteenth century, low human populations, absence of tsetse flies and mosquitoes, and unlimited grassland made Iseyin one of the most attractive environments for cattle in southwestern Nigeria. These favourable conditions drew Fulani pastoralists from the semi-arid regions who established themselves across trade routes. Farmers of the Yoruba tribes mostly inhabit the rural Iseyin area with a significant minority of cattle herders' settlements (or *Gaas*).

There are 11 political wards within Iseyin and its environs and there exists herders' camps (*Gaas*) in some of these political wards. The basic settlement of the Fulani is *Wuro* (camp) that is composed of 12-20 house units and headed by *Jauro* or *Bulama*. Each *Wuro* is part of a cluster of several other *Wuro* in an area belonging to the same clan. A collection of *Wuro* is called the *Gure* over which the eldest among brothers is the *Ardo* or clan leader. The *Ardo* wields the greatest influence in the nomad leadership hierarchy. The *Ardo* has responsibility for coordinating movements and mediating disputes within the clan (Akogun, 2012).




Figure 3.1: Map of Iseyin showing Study Areas.

3.3 Study population

The targeted populations for this study was the Adult male/female cattle herders and host farmers in the rural communities of Iseyin. They are: Seraphim, Baale-Sagbo, Ado-awaye, Olugbade, Aba-paanu, sangote and Alagbe. The study population was made up of three categories of respondents:

1. Nomadic cattle herders;
2. Host communities' farmers; and
3. Significant others (host community farmers' and herders' leaders).

3.4 Sampling procedures and Techniques

The study made use of purposive sampling. Owing to the near impossibility of studying the entire population as a result of cost and time constraints, to ensure effective collection of data, and due to the nature of the phenomenon being investigated, a purposive sampling procedure was used at different levels of the sample selection. The first stage of sampling was purposively selecting Iseyin settlements because of its strategic location in the Ilorin-OgbomoshO-Oyo-Ibadan trade cattle route, and because cattle camps are found in rural areas of some local communities. The second stage was the purposive selection of settlements where there was occurrence(s) of herder-farmer conflicts within the rural communities of Iseyin. The third stage involved a purposive selection of herders and host community farmers. The fourth stage involved selecting 30 cattle herders (Adult male and female) and 30 host community farmers (Adult male and female) and two (2) leaders of farmers and herders through Snowball sampling.

Table 3.1.: Multi Stage Sampling Procedure

STAGES	SAMPLING TECHNIQUES
1ST	Purposive Selection of Iseyin, Oyo State, Nigeria.
2ND	Purposive selection of settlements where there were occurrence(s) of herder-farmer conflicts within the rural communities of Iseyin, Oyo State, Nigeria.
3RD	Purposive selection of herders and host community farmers.
4TH	Snowball selection of 30 cattle herders in their nomadic camp and 30 host communities' farmers, and significant others.

3.5 Sample size

The sample size is the minimum required number of population to be sampled in research to make a study that is statistically significant within a defined parameter known to the researcher. Consequently, this study utilized the qualitative sampling techniques to gather required information to fill gaps in the area of study. A purposive sampling technique was used. A homogeneous sample size of 62 participants was adopted until Saturation was attained after no new information was provided by the study participants.

The purposive data collection technique provided rich information for an in-depth study where individuals can contribute in real terms to what they perceived on the issue of farmers and herders conflicts. The size of the sample was controlled to minimise repeated information at the point of saturation, which means the point at which repetition or confirmation of previously collected data occurs. The design was also chosen because the researcher wanted to develop a rich or dense narrative of experiences regarding farmers'/herder's conflicts rather than use sampling techniques that support general data.

Table 3.2: Distribution of the IDI, KII participants of sample population

Study Sample Population (SSP)	Instruments	Population
Herders in the Rural enclaves of Iseyin	IDI	30
Host farmers' communities	IDI	30
Farmers' and herders' leaders	KII	2
Total number of population		62

3.6 Method of data collection

Qualitative research instruments were used for this study. These research tools of data collection were used because they suit the purpose and the intent of the study. In-depth Interviews (IDIs) and Key Informant Interview (KIIs) guides were used to gather relevant data for the study. Both IDI and KII guides were translated to both Yoruba and Fulfude/Hausa language. For the host community farmers, Yoruba was the language of instruction for the interviews while the language of instruction for the herdsmen was Fulfude/Hausa. Those not willing to participate in the study were excluded from this study.

In-depth interview

In-depth interview sessions were conducted among host farmers and cattle herdsmen in order to understand the factors that are sustaining the causes of conflicts between the two groups. Also, the cost of these conflicts to them as a community was solicited through the interview. Participants for IDIs were approached and after their consent was obtained, the interview was conducted at their convenience. Thirty (30) In-depth interviews was conducted to gather qualitative data from selected participants in the seven rural communities in Iseyin from the host farming communities; Seraphim (6), Baale-sagbo (4), Ado-awaye (6), Aba-paanu (5), Olugbade (4), Sangote (2), and Alagbe (3). Also, thirty (30) from the herders was conducted in the seven rural communities in Iseyin; Seraphim (6), Baale-sagbo (3), Ado-awaye (6), Aba-paanu (5), Olugbade (5), Sangote (2), and Alagbe (3).

Key informant interview

Key Informant Interview was used to gather qualitative data from the community leaders (host farmers' leaders and cattle herders' leaders) from selected communities, one (1) herder's leader in Seraphim and one (1) host farmer's leader in Seraphim. The findings of the KIIs were integrated into all the relevant sections of the research. Participants for KIIs were approached and after their consent was obtained, the interview was conducted at their convenience. Key informants provided cogent information on the research study.

3.7 Validity and reliability of research instrument

The researcher carried out a pilot empirical research study for the validity and reliability of the research instrument. According to Mugenda & Mugenda (1999) the usual procedure in assessing the validity of measure, a professional or expert in a particular field. Hence, to establish the validity of the research instrument, the researcher seeks the opinions of the research study supervisors.

Content validity was used to ascertain the study instruments measured exactly what it was designed to measure. The instruments were given to four eminent scholars/professional experts in the field of criminology and related discipline. Their views were used to modify and validate the contents of the instruments.

Training of relevant field Assistants

In the course of this study, six research field assistants were trained in line with the objectives of the study and sampling processes. The field assistants were people who could speak and understand English, Yoruba and Fulfude/Hausa language. They were trained on how to administer the study instrument, how to secure respondents informed consents and general interviewing skills. The six field assistants were involved in pretest of the instruments. This created opportunity for them (i.e the field assistants) to practice how they would go about the collection of the data. They were also supervised to ensure compliance.

3.8 Methods of data analysis

Qualitative data was transcribed verbatim and translated. NVIVO 12 Pro analysis was used in analysed and complementing the research study. The deductive method was adopted to seek themes from the interviews, which were derived from the research objectives. Given the qualitative data acquired through the IDI and KII, a system of content analysis was utilised where related and cross-cutting themes were identified and highlighted. Thus, coding and grouping based on these ideas and themes were used as reference points for the study. The data was analysed manually by adopting four basic steps to analysing qualitative data. The first step was to organise the data by transcribing notes from a tape recording of IDIs and KIIs; particular attention was paid to phrases with contextual or special connotations. It was

reviewed by a competent third person to avoid alterations in context and meaning. This gave an overall picture of the complete set of qualitative data. The second step was aimed at shaping the data information by assessing themes that emerge from the guides. This was done by sorting and noting the different categories of responses found under topic headings. The third step entails interpreting and summarising the information by looking at the range of views expressed. The fourth step was an explanation of findings from the qualitative data analysis.

Table3.3: Summary of Instruments by Objectives

Matrix showing objectives used in the study and data collection methods

S/N	Objective of the study	KII	IDI
1	To discuss how the conflict have affected the livelihood (Farming and Grazing) of farmers and herders in Iseyin, Oyo State.	✓	✓
2	To investigate the social factors of the conflicts and how it has disrupted the family structure of herder and farmer in Iseyin, Oyo State.	✓	✓
3	To probe how the conflict has affected the symbiotic relationship between farmers and herders in Iseyin, Oyo State.	✓	✓
4	To identify what methods are put in place by both groups to prevent and manage the conflict in Iseyin, Oyo State.	✓	✓

3.9 Ethical Consideration

This study adhered strictly to the international ethical standards for research so as to protect the research study population. Letter of Ethical approval was obtained from the University of Ibadan Social Science and Humanities Ethics committee, with Reference number: **UI/SSHREC/2021/0025**. The farmers in the community, herders, the famers' leaders, and herders' leaders were involved in the study, therefore, the tenet of ethics was considered. Informed consent was obtained from participants and respondents before partaking in the interviews while the use of a tape recorder will be in line with the agreement of the interviewees. Participants and respondents were briefed about the study and the expected outcomes. Participants were informed to withdraw from discussions if they experience any discomfort with the discussion. Data collected through all the instruments was confidentially handled. Participants had the right to decide whether or not to be a part of the study. No measure of force, mental or physical coercion, or force was allowed in the course of the study. However, the confidentiality of the respondents and participants was guaranteed, as any information that was received is for academic purposes only.

3.10 Limitation of the study

There was difficulty in administering the questions and locating the selected respondents in Iseyin, Oyo state Nigeria, due to the scattered nature of the participants (farmers and herders) especially the herders. However, the problem was surmounted by liaison with the leaders of the herders and farmers and some community members whose suggestions and support were useful and reliable.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This section discusses critically the data collected from the field work carried out on the social costs of herder-farmer conflict in Iseyin. In the study, a qualitative research method was adopted, which was derived from Key Informant Interview (KIIs) and In-depth Interview (IDIs); these provided insights for better understanding of the research study. Data was analysed using NVIVO 12 Pro and deductive analysis.

4.1 The effects of farmers and herders conflicts on livelihood

Land is a major use for the livelihood of herders and the host community's farmers, which have been seen as an immense basis of conflicts between the two groups (herders-farmers) by most of the respondent. Where there is unhealthy contest for land resources as well as poor institutions, this prompts and aggravates natural resource conflicts (Hellström, 2001). According to Van't Hooft, Millar & Django (2005) identified that conflict arising from abuse of land use is the major problem they faced in their occupation. The KIIs conducted agreed that both groups need land for their various livelihoods which is one of the reasons for the persistent cause of conflict. There is also no love and unity among the two groups.

A community leader among the herders said this:

Land is an important feature we need for our various livelihoods which is one of the reasons for the persistent cause of conflict, Also, no love and unity. Why I said this is that the host communities see us as strangers and do not see us as a part of them. If there is love and unity, they would not be thinking that way (**KIIs/Adult/Male/herders leader/2019**).

A community leader among the farmers had this to say:

We the farmers and herders need land for our livelihood however the persistent cause of conflict is that no love and unity amongst us aside that, this people have the spirit of

dominance they like to make themselves known, which is something we don't like. They ought to follow the norms and traditions of our community. They are also violent in nature they get angry easily and before we know it, they have started causing problems here and there **(KIIs/ Adult /Male/farmers leader /2019)**.

Hence, as a result, it has affected the livelihood of both groups. The study showed that from the farmers' perspective, farming is their core source of income. Also, the herders said their key source of income is rearing of herds and selling in order to provide for their family. The researcher gathered information from the participants on how the conflict has affected their livelihood. A respondent had this to say:

Both groups need land for their various livelihood which is one of the reason for the persistent cause of conflict, this conflict has affected me in such a way that I do not have rest of mind it has affected my daily routine in terms of business and my entire family also, making buying and selling difficult for me **(IDI/ Adult/ Male/herder/2019)**.

A similar response provided by another participant goes thus;

It has affected me in such a way that we are being careful of where we go to for the fear of been attacked by the host community farmers **(IDI/Adult/ Male/herder/2019)**.

Another participant gave his account thus,

It has affected me in such a way that we are been vigilant of our surroundings so as not to be attacked by the herders, which has affected my business in farming. Also, I cannot pay the loan I borrowed from the bank for farming on time **(IDI/Adult/ female/farmer/2019)**.

It was observed from the study that, the conflict among the farmers and herders had affected their income from the sales of their produce which had resulted into decrease in the patronage of customers who buy their goods; also security, schooling, and health care services have been affected due to the nature of farmers and herders' conflicts. A participant had this to say:

Production has reduced and it has affected my income and crime rate has increased **(IDI/Adult Male/farmer/2019)**.

Another famer participant had this to say:

Farming and cultivating has not been the way it used to be before for me. Productivity has drastically reduced and low business patronage that is the output will affect the amounts placed on the products **(IDI/Adult/Male/farmer/2019)**.

The responses given above shows how most of the participants expressed their plight on how the conflict has affected their livelihood; for the herders:

“There is no rest of mind for me and my family because I have lost most, if not all of my belongings, killed my cows” **(IDI/Adult/Male/herder/2019)**.

Farmers also complained:

“It has affected productivity and cultivation; and the expected income from the sales of the produced has reduced. **(IDI/Adult/Male/farmer/2019)**

This is in line with what Okoli & Atelhe (2004) observe; the conflict has affected the livelihood of herders and farmers in terms of reduced production and income flow; and there is a down-turn in domestic resources and security. These are detrimental to society and sustainability of the nation. However, similar to the above subject matter, the study carried out shows that majority of the herders and some of the farmers agreed that their patterns of livelihood affect each other because they both need land for their sources of livelihood while few of the herders’ and farmers’ respondents are of the views that it is the herders’ livelihood that affects them. The interviewee had this to say:

“Our pattern of livelihood affects each other because we both need land for our various source of livelihood. To the farmers the lands they planted crops on have been damaged by the herders’ herds. Likewise, the herdsman also said that farmers have planted crops on the route path for them to graze **(IDI/Adult/Male/herder/2019)**.

Another respondent gave his account thus,

“Our pattern interferes with one another and the reason is that we both need land for our various livelihoods the farmers are being accused of planting on routes to where herders search for food and the herders enter into farmers’ farmlands and destroy them when their herds are in search of food **(IDI/Adult/Male/herder/2019)**.”

Nonetheless, there were contrary views. Some participants argued that the pattern or means of livelihood utilised by both parties do not in any way interfere or affect the other. Rather, it the other party’s actions that causes problems which happens to be the herders.

Two farmers’ participants had this to say:

Farmers’ way of lives cannot affect the herders instead it’s the other way round. Due to the nature of their occupation, they move from one place to another; for instance, there is what we call advantages and disadvantages, disadvantages is what the herders is to the farmers and advantages is what the farmers are to the herders; for instance, during dry season where there are no bushes for the herds to eat, they crumbled on farmers’ lands which their herds tends to damage which lead to conflict **(IDI/Adult/Male/farmer/2019)**.

Farmers’ way of lives cannot affect the herders; we are the host community. They came to our land to disturb our peace causing serious conflict with us **(IDI/Adult/Male/farmer/2019)**.

A herdsman also revealed thus that:

Herders means of livelihood is different from that of the farmers, we are not doing the same thing, so why should there be a problem? **(IDI/Adult/Male/herder/2019)**.

In addition to the above findings, data gathered from the participants’ show location of the land as one of the causes of conflict among the herders and host community farmers. Both the leader of herders and farmers agreed that both groups need land for their various livelihoods

which is one of the reasons for the persistent cause of conflict; also there is no love and unity. Sometimes, location is the cause. Someone who wants to rear cow should live farther from where people live in a remote area/settlement due to development there is tendency for people to start buying lands and building or farming on the lands that herders use for grazing.

IDIs conducted with the headers revealed the following:

Sometimes, location is the cause, someone who wants to rear cow live further from where people live in a remote area/settlement due to development there is tendency for people to start buying lands and building or farming on the lands that herders use for grazing
(IDI/Adult/Male/farmer/2019).

KIIs conducted with herder's leaders revealed that:

Yes, location of the land also cause the conflict someone who want to rear cow has the right to stay where people are not many i.e. deep forest far from town so that it will not affect people in their surroundings that when the farmers will decide to come farm when they have seen pathway and also due to development and as we are not from their tribe people tends to come buy land there and build on the land we carve for ourselves to live and to use for grazing
(KII/Adult/Male/herders leader/2019).

Objective 2: The effects of conflicts on the disruption of family structure of herders and farmers

The raining season is a busy period for farmers and the herders have weeds to feed their herds. However, during arid season, farming activity is low unless farmers have access to water for irrigation while the herdsmen are always moving from one locality to the other in search of grazing lands for their herds. The vicious variance among herders and farmers is more severe during the dry season by the entire respondents because during dry season there is not enough grass, that is, dry land for their animals to eat unlike the rainy season. So, there are tendency for someone's animals to wander on farmers' lands especially when they see what they like to eat.

KIIs respondent has this to say:

Conflict can happen at any time or at any period of time but it is mostly during dry season when there are no grasses for the herder's herds to eat some of the time the herds wander on farmers' land in search for grazing land for food for their animals **(KIIs/Adult/Male/farmers' leader /2019).**

Majority of the farmers indicated that the nature of conflict was related to the destruction of their crops by herders, followed by other reason as shown by the chart. Similarly, a herder narrated "conflict over land. Farmers talked about how herders destroyed their farms and harassment of our females by their men. A respondent narrated the nature of the conflict between both groups:

Conflict over land and also water is not that accessible to the herdsmen we get water from the stream which the host community fights us that their herds contaminate their water, intimidation and harassment by the host community **(IDI/Adult/Male/herders/2019).**

Similarly, the above statement shows that the conflicts have direct or indirect impact on the lives of those involved. This includes the family, community and the society as a whole. The rift between herders and farmers has put Nigeria's political and economical growth, as well as its human development index, at jeopardy. Aside from the deaths that occur as a result of such conflicts, internal displacement causes a humanitarian catastrophe. In Nigeria's middle belt states of Benue, Kaduna, Nasarrawa, and Plateau, around 620,000 people are believed to have been displaced (kwaja and Adedamola-Adelehin 2018). Aside from the deaths in the affected state, the overall impact of the conflicts is dislocation, as well as significant humanitarian and economic problems.

The conflict has internally displaced people and forced people to flee their homes. It also includes loss of lives and properties and education of children disrupted or children are forced out of school. However, loss of a family member and relations has remained the major traumatic experience of the victims. The study also discovered that Farmers and herders' family structures have also been affected by the conflicts. The data gathered from the participants showed that, the families of both farmers and herders lost male bread winners and family members. The farmers' widows will assume the responsibilities of the bread winner

pending the time if she chooses to remarry, and sometimes seek the assistances of the extended and immediate families. The families of the herders were integrated into the extended family until the widow remarries.

Here are the views of the respondents on the subject matter:

I lost my brother due to the conflict between the herders and host community farmers it was a bad day for me and my family and we have now taken up the responsibilities of the children which has not been an easy burden on me so that their education will not be affected **(IDI/Adult/Male/farmer/2019)**.

It has been a bad experience for me and my entire family it has cost us so much I borrowed money I could not pay up for years and I also lost my younger sister's husband. It has not been easy for her and for me as the first child of the family because I have to take part of the responsibilities **(IDI/Adult/Male/farmer/2019)**.

I lost my husband as a result of the conflict; he was killed in his farmland. It was a sad day for me and my family even till now. Taking care of the children has not been easy but I thank God for the kind of parents I have and that of my husband that had made it a little bit easy **(IDI/Adult/Female/farmer/2019)**.

My sister had been a victim of the conflicts, the farmers killed her husband, the responsibilities of she and her children were taking up by the extended family **(IDI/Adult/Female/Herder/2019)**.

Another two respondents had this to say:

It has affected me because I went to borrow money for farming I expected to see the money I borrow and gain from the harvest of my production which it is the only source of income for me and my family **(IDI/Adult/Male/farmer/2019)**.

I am unable to make an estimate (the loss).Thousands of humans and cattle have perished. Our problem is that our loss isn't being broadcast like farmers' losses. But, believe me;

we've lost a lot of things So many herders have died as a result of these clashes. Hundreds of thousands of cows have also been stolen or poisoned.**(IDI/Adult/Male/herders/2019).**

The data collected on how the conflict had affected the herders and host community farmers also shows that the conflict had affected sales which will also affects the economy of the system, increase in crime rate, fear of been attacked by both parties etc. The conflict have not only increased instability, but they have also shown a significant potential to exacerbate the food crisis in Nigeria and other impacted nations by causing farmers to lose their lives, livestock, crops, and precious properties (Cotula, Toulmin, Hesse 2004). Two interviewees responded as follows:

It has affected me because cultivating process is low, fear of being attacked by the herders' sales have reduced drastically and this have affected the economy in terms of agriculture **(IDI/Adult/Male/herder/2019).**

There is no rest of mind for me and my family because I have lost most and all of my belongings, all my cows have been killed and also there is the use of small arms **(IDI/Adult/Male/herder/2019).**

Another respondent gave similar account:

There is no rest of mind for me and my family, sales is difficult and the fear of been attacked by the host community all this is happening because there is no love and unity amongst us **(IDI/Adult/Male/herders/2019).**

From the above, it is evident that the farmers and host communities' farmers have been affected by these conflicts and most of them have been experiencing post-traumatic stress (PTSD) which can manifest into poor mental and physical health. Furthermore, it depreciates the quality of life and affects the productivity of the person. It can also be deduced from the above responses that distrust and disunity which exists before the incessant conflict has degenerated.

The study shows that the victims and non-victims have put some preventive measures in order to manage the conflict which works at times and sometimes it does not. It revealed that they make use of their leaders when farmers see that their farmland is been damaged by the herders' herds and the herders report to their leader if their herds is being poisoned or killed by family or if there is any form of conflict between the two groups however if the conflict has become violent and beyond their power they report to the government authority or before reporting they can step in especially when it is a violent conflict where or when there is the use of modern weapons. A respondent gave his account on this:

Both groups have their leaders; such person will go to the leaders, if herder's herds have damaged their farm crops. As for me the day herders cow ate my farm crops I went to meet Alhaji the leader of the herdsmen, he made an effort to find which particular herders cow damaged my farm land when they finished their investigation they found out that it was not their own cow who ate my farm crops they could not locate the person if other leaders are behaving like him conflict will not be happening, I will prefer they move back to their place some of them are violent in nature they get angry easily, as for me I don't like the way they are staying in our community like what have been hearing on the news I will not like it to happen here killing of many people. **(IDI/Adult/Male/farmer/2019).**

Another respondent reported thus far:

Both groups have their leaders as for me I reported to my leader who told the farmers' leaders what had happened they found the persons' animals that did it and I was giving some amount of money which didn't quantify what I expected to get from harvesting and selling of the produce **(IDI/Adult/Male/farmer/2019).**

An interviewee gave a similar response:

I report to the group's leader, if they cannot handle the situation I report to security agencies (police). **(IDI/Adult/Male/herders/2019).**

The findings Identified that effects of the conflict on both farmers and herders was that most of the farmers agreed that they have been affected by the conflict. The effects are felt on

intermarriages between the parties, low cultivation and harvesting, low business patronage for the host farming community and herders and payment of loan.

Objective 3: Conflicts and symbiotic relationship between farmers and herders

Crop farmers and pastorlists groups had a cordial and stable relationship that enables the people to work side by side for decades. The independent relationship on each other is evident as both groups depend on each other for survival and it formed the benchmark for exchange and which brought about even development (Akejiir 2018). Although there were sources of disagreement existing between both groups that were resolved by both groups peacefully (Akejiir 2018). However, Conflict between the herders-farmers has affected the symbiotic relationship that once existed between them in terms of communal living and exchange of grains for manure. The perspective of the herders on the subject matter is that the interrelationship they shared is no longer there; they are suspicious of one another, leading to distrust between farmers and herdsmen in the host community.

Participants' explanations on the relationship between the farmers and the herders on how it has degenerated over time:

The shared sense of belonging and living together in harmony is no longer there between us also, Lack of patience had caused lives to be lost, no love and unity we are so suspicious of one another thinking the other person does not have your best interest at heart always want to do you harm when you let your guard down **(IDI/Adult/Male/herders/2019)**.

The farmers' leader had this to say:

The way the conflict have affected interrelationship among the two groups is that we don't trust one another even if you see us partly doing business with one another why I said partly is that I also buy animals from them and sell, the Fulani herders have a vicious behavior they have the spirit of domineering anywhere they are they want to dominate the area, they can't be trusted with report from the news about what happened in Ekiti state and Benue state where they massacre people like animals even in this our town though is not as bad as the reported cases because they killed so many people in those state however lives had been lost, people had lose their family

members, drop out of children from school and property damaged **(KIIs/Adult/Male/farmers leader/2019)**.

Deducing from this respondent point of view, it can be said that that the social interaction between both parties had degenerated to the point that both farmers and herdsmen are beginning to generate negative stereotypes about each other. The farmers now see the herdsmen as “vicious, wicked people, bent on destruction” with intent to dominate wherever they find themselves. As indicated from the community leader (host community) response, it can also be deduced that this perception is based on bias media reports they have heard, watched or listened to. This media reports distorts the perceptions both parties have towards each other.

A community leader among the herdsmen responded thus:

The farmers can no longer be trusted; they will say one thing and do another thing. They used to allow us go into the bushes in dry season like this. But all of a sudden, things changed. When we are taking our cows around, they will start shouting at us, they will begin to attack us. They will call us different names- Armed Robbers, Land stealers (Rustlers) etc. **(KIIs/Adult/Male/herder’s leader/2019)**.

The above is an indication of how things have degenerated between both parties. The community leader continued his response by stating thus:

We cannot deny the fact that there are some people among us that will go into their farms and destroy their crops, instead of the farmers to report such people, they will just pursue us and anywhere they find us. This is not how it used to be. Our forefathers have been herding cow in Iseyin for long peacefully without any fighting or violence. When there are quarrels or conflicts between us (farmers/host communities), we usually have ways of settling it. But now things have change, any small quarrel or issue between us it will lead to violence and bloodshed. The bond we use to share no longer exist. It is now ‘you kill me, I kill you’ **(KIIs/Adult/Male/herders leader/2019)**.

Another herders' leader also had this to say:

The implication of the conflict between both parties on how it affects our interrelationship is that, lives have been lost, business not moving the way it's supposed to move, people have left their homes Government should intervene and make resolution. Also we don't trust one another
(KIIs/Adult/Male/herder's leader/2019).

The implications of farmers' and herders' conflicts range from humanitarian effects such as human loss, occupational injury, human injury etc. It also creates an atmosphere of joint mistrust and continuous strain that threatens the safety and solidity of the state. As aptly observed by Okoli & Atelhe (2004) conflict do terrorised the communal survival of the populations that is affected, therefore, it suffices to say that, herders and host farming communities' conflict in some states in Nigeria is hostile to human and national security. All the respondents gave their account on how the conflict had affected them, their families, the community and society as a whole. One of the interviewee related his experience, explaining that when herders' cows entered a farmer's land to destroy their farm, the farmer report to his leader and his leader report to theirs. According to him, "this should have been a good solution whereby the farmers actually state the amount that the herders' cows had eaten but they would not do that they will be asking for prices that does not quantify the damage done."

A participant gave his account on how the conflict has affected him:

They hold grudges against themselves, some people may ask for money that is not worth what the herds had eaten or damaged. For instance, the farmer is asking for 30,000 naira and the damaged crops is worth 10,000 naira, the herder might not be in agreement with the amount the farmer is proposing, the herder will have to pay in order to avoid conflict
(IDI/Adult/Male/herders/2019).

Another respondent had this to say:

Our daily lives have become too difficult and things are not moving normally like before. We are losing customers
(IDI/Adult/Male/herder/2019).

The findings also reviewed the implication of conflict on the symbiotic relationship of both parties as narrated by the herders. To buttress this finding, one of the herders narrated:

The implication of the conflict is that it caused damage to the economy of our country, limiting herding and farming activities, security challenge etc. **(IDI/Adult/Male/herder/2019).**

A participant who is a farmer also noted that:

The trusts that exist between both of us (farmers'/host community) and the herders no longer exist. Things have changed; we no longer interact like before again. Before when, we used to have meetings, we used to call them. But nowadays we are afraid of what they can do, because they get angry easily these days. When there are conflicts between us, we can't settle it like we used to do **(IDI/Adult/Male/farmer/2019).**

Another respondent supported this assertion by noting that:

I used to warn people around me especially my children wherever they see them (herders), they should run away because they are dangerous and they carry weapons around. They are volatile and gets angry easily. Any small argument, they will begin to kill people. It was not like this before, when I was growing up, they used to be nice, we use to interact without any issues. But now, they are dangerous to us, they are dangerous to this country with the way they kill people everywhere **(IDI/Adult/Male/farmer/2019).**

A herdsman noted that:

There is no trust between us anymore, when they (farmer) see us around their farms, even when we've not enter self, you will see the farmers driving us away. So we too, we started avoiding them, when we notice the famers around, we will go deeper inside the bush, because of fear that they will attack us. **(IDI/Adult/Male/herder/2019).**

Another herdsman supported this by responding that:

Except maybe if they want to buy cows, they come and meet us here, but we don't normally interact or relate like before even in the market, we don't interact. When our women go to buy or sell, they usually insult them. I was born in this place, my father has been living here since 1967 but as they (Fulani

herdsmen) in other places started killing people the Yoruba people started suspecting us, they began to hate us as if we are the ones killing the people in other places. This is wrong we are children of the soil too like them. I can speak Yoruba fluently, shebi that is what you are hearing from me. So why the hatred towards my people? Any small argument like this, it will cause destruction and killings, they will kill our cows and destroy the place we live. It is wrong. **(IDI/Adult/Male/herder/2019).**

The conflict has affected the economy in terms of agriculture and herding. Also, intermarriage relationship has been affected; hence, the diagram bellow shows how many of the farmers said they cannot allow their children to marry from the Fulani tribe.

The effect of conflict on intermarriage relations; It was be observed that most of the farmers agreed that the conflict has an effect on intermarriage relation between them and the herders. According to one of the farmers, “for me yes I cannot allow my children to marry from their tribe”.

A participant had this to say:

I cannot allow my child to marry them reason is that this people are violent in nature they don't value humans and the see other people from other tribes as infidels. The average nomad is culturally obstinate and confident. Have seen cases where they marry from Yoruba tribe if there is conflict between the two tribe the first people they kill is their Yoruba wife, therefore, none of my child as long as am alive will marry from their tribe **(IDI/Adult/Male/farmer/2019).**

Another farmer is of a contrary view that his child can chose to marry whomever he or she want to marry. According to him, it is a matter of love:

I can allow my child to choose from any tribe he or she wants to get marry to is a matter of the heart if you love someone you should look beyond the tribe and follow what God had planned for them however they are not all bad we have those that are educated and also Christians. Even the Yoruba's we have those who are of bad individual so my child should marry someone who will love and show her care regardless of the tribe **(IDI/Adult/female/farmer/2019).**

However, the herders gave a contrary view or opinion. Most of the herders don't mind getting married to the Yoruba tribe. A respondent said thus:

We are all from God; we are one no matter the tribe my child can chose to marry anybody he pleases regardless of the tribe **(IDI/Adult/Male/herders/2019)**.

It was discovered that the conflict has caused security challenges, disturbing the education of children. The diagram below shows the implication of the conflict on the education of the host farming communities and the herders. It was however discovered that it has affected some especially in the areas of payment of school fees while majority of the farmers whom the conflict had not affected the education of their children try as much as possible to pay their school fees. The diagram bellow shows respondents' view on how the conflict had affected the education of their children/Wards:

They were also asked on how they have been able to manage interpersonal relationship since some of them still do business with one another.

A respondent had this to say:

By calling those involved in the poisoning or killing of herds and by paying for what was damaged **(IDI/Adult/Male/herder/2019)**.

If we know what can make the other person angry in order to avoid conflict, we should not do it if we know each other's rules and ourselves there will not be conflict only temporarily **(IDI/Adult/Male/farmer/2019)**.

From the findings on objective three (3) it is evident that the conflicts between farmers and herders had generated into inter-community mistrust and it has also discouraged of inter-communal marriages especially on the part of the farmers. It had also condensed inter-community business relations.

Objective 4: Strategies put in place by both groups to manage the conflict

The study reviewed the resolution mechanisms adopted in managing and settling clashes among the herders and farmers. It shows the involvement of the leadership of the host community farmers and the herders, the security agencies, and compensation. According to one of the farmers, “the method employed in managing the conflict is to report to the leader of my group, community leader and government agency (police)” however the study shows that majority, if not all have been able to manage the conflict by reporting to their leaders and if nothing is done by the leaders they would take the case to the police especially if the conflict seems to aggravate into violent conflict.

Respondents had this to say:

The village and traditional rulers will call on both parties to live as one **(IDI/Adult/Male/herder/2019)**.

Using their subordinate and local way of calling their people into other to address them **(IDI/Adult/Male/farmer/2019)**.

Herders’ and farmers’ leaders had this to say on how they have been able to manage or settle the conflicts.

It has not been an easy thing: I try as much as possible to call my people together and advise them if they have any issues with the farmers they should let me know they should not take laws into their hands. We are strangers in their community. However, whenever conflicts occur and the farmers comes to report to me that their animals had come into their farmlands and destroyed their farm produces, I call on my people to investigate if it is their animals that wanders into their farmland, if it is our herds we compensated them. Although the farmers complained that the money gives does not commensurate the farm produced been destroyed **(IDI/Adult/Male/herders leader /2019)**.

It has not been an easy thing, I am also a farmer and for me as a leader I try as much as possible to call my people together and advise them that if anybody farmland has been destroyed by the herders herds they should not take laws into their hands they should report to me then will take it to the other group leader if no actions were taken we report it to the police authority but is not as easy as that, especially, when lives had

been lost there is tendency it will escalate into violent crime between both groups. Also, in some cases the herders' leader will demand for compensation when the farmers and youth in the community retaliate by poisoning and killing of their herds my responses to them it would not had happened if their herds don't wander in their farmland by destroying it **(KII/Adult/Male/framers leader/2019)**.

From the responses above, it appears there have been interventions from the leaders of both groups, and the government. However the study had showed that the method of settling the conflict has not been very effective because the conflict between host community farmers and herders is still persistent which had caused lives to be lost, destruction of properties, security challenges, etc, Most of the respondents observe that the involvement of the government has been effective only temporarily, because the methods employed by them have not been effective in solving the conflict between the herders and community farmers.

A respondent gave his account:

Not effective because is not like they were not able to find the person's cow who damaged my farmland **IDI/Adult/Male/farmer/2019)**.

Not effective because is not like they bought a cow from me that have been poisoned by the host farming community only stopped conflict temporarily **(IDI/Adult/Male/herder/2019)**.

The study shows that the only way the conflict among the host communities farmers and herders can stop is to provide grazing lands for the herders. The diagram below shows farmers' views on how to settle the conflict between the herders and host community farmers.

Two respondents had this to say:

By providing grazing lands for the herders in order to stop destruction of farmlands and by moving back to where they came from **(IDI/Adult/Male/herder/2019)**.

By providing grazing lands for the herders and making sure they follow the rules and regulation of the host community **(IDI/Adult/Male/herder/2019)**.

Another respondent had a contrary view:

My people keep saying they should go back to where they came from some of these people they do not know where they came from, they have made this place their own, when anyone of them dies they buried them there at that particular location. at the point in time they believe it is God's time for the person to die, what I think is that they should look for a place for them and they must follow the rules and regulations and there must be punishment for breaking them however, the reason why my people feel threatened by their presence is that when a Fulani herder resides in a place they like to dominate such area which the host famers do not want if love and peace truly exist we wouldn't see it that way **(IDI/Adult/Male/farmer 5/2019)**.

From the response above, this can be seen in the conflicts between the herdsmen and host community farmers in Igangan, Ibarapa North Local Government Area of Oyo state, where the youth of the community headed by Ibadan based politician and youth leader came out in mass and visited the leader of Fulani in the area, Saliu Seriki, to convey their grievances, they believed that the herdsmen are behind the incessant killings and kidnappings in the area. And he gave the herdsmen seven days' ultimatum to leave the community or be forcefully evicted (Daily Trust, 23th 2021).

The herders also related their views on the subject matter:

By providing grazing lands for us and creating awareness, on how to leave in peace **(IDI/Adult/Male/herder/2019)**.

They should provide a large farm for them so that they will not move their herds from one place to another they will be confined/camped in a particular place in order to avoid eating farmers' crops in order to prevent conflict **(IDI/Adult/Male/herder/2019)**.

Lives had been lost on both sides, the farmers and herders have come into conflict with one another, and in order for these

occurrences to stop government should make provision for both farmers and herdsmen in a favorable way **(IDI/Adult/Male/herder/2019).**

Herders' leader on how government can resolve the conflict between the farmers and herders:

Government is for all they should take care of us and also give right, everyone should have right, Government should provide a place for both parties for peace to reigns, Everyone, should be treated accordingly, Government should place everyone in his own position and give a standing order Law and anyone that contravene is at fault, All land belongs to government so government should use their possible means and bring these conflicts to an end in peace **(KII/Adult/Male/herders leader/2019).**

From the above findings on government interventions on farmers and herders conflicts it was observed that government intervention was only on economic costs, the social cost was not considered. Someone who lost their husband or family members cannot be compensated, and families that have become estranged as a result of the disagreements.

4.4 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

This study is an exploratory study of the social cost of herders and host community farmers' conflict in Iseyin, Oyo state, Nigeria. The study attempted to look at their perspective on the subject matter on how the conflict had affected their livelihood, disrupted their family structure, how it has affected their interrelationship, and the method employed to manage the conflict. The results gathered mostly have convergence points and contributed more with some existing pieces of literature that have been reviewed as well as the theories. Group Action theory by Goerge B. Vold theory was used to analyse the objectives of the study to understand the Social cost of farmers' -herders' conflict in Iseyin, Oyo state Nigeria.

Places where there are constant conflicts always affect the development and sustainability of the area. When natural resources are sustained, then natural resources, lack of management, different ways of life and beliefs, as well as poor institutions, this prompts and aggravates

natural resource conflicts (Hellström, 2001). Vold's theory is of the view that the nature of humans holds that, people who are grouped form a part of each other's lives as a result of their relationship. In a situation where individuals have mutual interests and general needs that can be achieved through combined act or effort, groups are formed. Groups' conflict tends to occur as the benefit and reasons they provide tend to overlap, impinge on one another, and develop into a competition. In this context, land is what the herders and farmers need for their source of livelihood.

The research carried out shows that, the main clashes among the herders and host farming communities are caused by the abuse of land use which has affected the livelihood of both groups. It has thrown a wrench in economic processes, forcing both groups to lose their means of livelihood and disrupting buying and selling. There is also the problem of security in the area, where farmers are being afraid of going to their farmland because of the fear of being attacked by the herders which has affected farming and cultivation. For the herders also, fear for their lives when taking their herds for food not to be attacked by host community farmers. This is also in line with Mubi, H. (2018) as farmers stop farming activities due to attitudinal use of land, insecurity and fear of being attacked by the armed group: this could manifest in two ways- farmers, due to high level of insecurity are unable to go to the farm and thus lose the potential products of the farming season. Also, during attacks, they leave behind cultivated products and this contributes to the escalation of the prices of agricultural outputs and reduces the per-capital income of an individual. This was also supported by Nweze (2005) who indicated that majority of the host farming communities' and herders have lost their lives and livestock's, at the same time experienced deteriorating productivity in farming and herds.

The study also discovered that their patterns of livelihood affect each other because they both need land for their source of livelihood while few of the herders' participants are of the views that it is herders' livelihood that affects them and vice versa. Farmers need land for farming herders needs land for grazing. "Our patterns interfere with one another and the reason is that we both need land for our various livelihoods; the farmers are being accused of planting on routes to where they search for food and likewise the herders enter into our farmland and destroy them when their herds are in search of food". However, in response to this, acquisition of land by farmers intensifies the increase of conflict as pastoralists cannot longer find a

pathway to pass or where to stay (Abbass, 2012). This also endangers and jeopardizes the long-term viability of pastoral and agricultural production in West Africa (Moritz, 2010).

The rainy season (April to September) is a busy period for farmers and this is also the period where there are weeds for the herders' herds to eat while during arid season (October to March) farming activity is low unless farmers have access to water for irrigation. Nevertheless, herdsman are always relocating from one locality to another area in search of grazing lands for their herds. These conflicts are caused by animal invasion of the agrarian terrain during the season when crop production is at its greatest, according to (Adekunle & Adisa 2010; Abass 2012). As a result, the rainy season period, from May to September, has been described as a period of intense conflict between nomadic cattle rearers and farmers over arable land; when herders' travel northwards with their livestock as the foliage begins to show. Furthermore, (Okoli et al., 2014; Odoh & Chigozie, 2012; Abbass, 2012) believe that the cause of variance is due to global climate change, desertification, and drought, all of which have reduced land available for farming and grazing, forcing herders to migrate south in search of pasture for their domestic animals. Owing to the fact that climate change has caused rainfall patterns to vary and croplands to shrink due to desertification, farmers are forced to follow these patterns, resulting in grazing land overlap.

Herders' migrations, according to FAO (2011), are opportunistic in character; they follow grazing pastures and water resources in a fashion that varies periodically owing to natural resource availability. Furthermore, the more rainfall there is, the more severe the drought becomes, and the more intense the future quest for land resources McCarty (2009). However, conflicts between farmers and herders can happen at any time or at any period but it is mostly during dry season when there are no grasses for the herders' herds to eat. Some of the time, they wander on farmers' land in search of grazing land for food for their animals. The conflict between the host communities and farmers escalates more during the dry seasons.

The study also reveals that the main nature of the cause of conflict has to do with the abuse of land for grazing and farming. Blench (2004) observed that herders and host community farmers have been linked with the conflict of land resource use intensified by the attitude towards land resources. Herders and Farmers in many neighborhoods and different countries make their livelihood within the same geographical, political, and socio-cultural conditions

which may be characterised by resource scarcity (Braukämper, 2000). The results also reveal that incessant conflicts have resulted into distrust and suspicion between the parties involved and this has rendered any means of reconciliation almost impossible. The huge distrust between both parties means any activity conducted by either party within the vicinity of the other party is treated with caution and suspicion.

The result also reveals how the conflicts have a direct and indirect impact on the family and the whole society as a whole. The conflict had displaced people or forced people to flee their home or move from one village to another village, there is loss of lives and properties including education of children, forcing of children out of school, inability to pay borrowed loans, taking care of family responsibilities as a result of death of a family member. The data collected on how the conflict has affected the herders and host community farmers also show that the conflict had affected sales which also affect the economy of the system, increase in crime rate and fear of being attacked by both parties. As well as threaten and disrupt the sustainable way of agriculture and pastoral production in West Africa (Moritz, 2010). The clashes strengthen circles of severe poverty and starvation, destruction of social status, scarcity of food and mostly affect the most marginalised groups which include women and children. These also have effects on the education of children resulting to obstacles in their growth and mass displacement.

The persistent resource disputes prevalent in the tropics have resulted in the loss of lives, property destruction, and environmental degradation seen in some affluent countries such as the Balkans (Hellstrom, 2001; Niemella et al, 2005). The findings of the study were also backed up by Nweze (2005), who stated that countless farmers and herders had lost their lives and their herds, while others had seen their herds' productivity decline. This was concurred by Ajuwon (2004), as referenced by Nweze (2005), between 1996 and 2005, 19 people died and 42 others were injured in farmers-herders confrontations in Imo State, as well as the violence that often followed such conflicts. Peace and national stability are jeopardized by the conflicts. Farmers' incursion on cattle pathways has also been identified as a key source of conflict in certain studies (Nformi et. al., 2014). When ethnic or religious conflicts arise, fishermen and farmers obstruct waterholes, pastoralist livestock destroy crops, and sedentary farmers retaliate by attacking pastoralists (Umar, 2002; Abbass, 2012; Audu, 2014).

The study reviewed how herders and host community farmers have been able to manage the conflict. Both groups have their leaders and such persons will go to the leaders if herders' herds have damaged their farm crops or if farmers have poisoned their herds or if any other crime or offense is committed by them. However, this has not managed the situation permanently but only temporarily. John (2014) highlights and reports cases where pastoralist had faulted farmers and tends to pay no attention to the other side of the stories or even their losses this appears to heighten the circumstances.

The hostility between the farmer's/farming community and Fulani herdsmen has gone beyond the issue of destroying farms by herdsmen. Ethnic and religious issues have been included, influenced by media reports of the conflict in some region in the country. This is obvious in the knockback of some community to sell land to the Herders' who need land for grazing and the refusal of the people in the state to accept any plan to establish grazing reserves in the country. However, it should be stated that grazing reserves established in the state during the colonial period still exists. An implication of this is that herdsmen have no choice but to encroach on farmlands to get fodder for their cattle.

The social costs of the conflict have negatively affected the interrelationship that once existed among them. The shared sense of belonging and living together in harmony is no longer there between the groups. Also, lack of patience has caused lives to be lost, there is no love and unity and suspicious of one another. The costs of the conflict also create an atmosphere of joint mistrust and continuous strain that threatens the safety and solidity of the state. It, therefore, suffices to say that, herders and host farming communities' conflict in some states in Nigeria is hostile to human and national security. Okoro (2018) notes that the high level of distrust and suspicion between farmers and herders drive fear and aggression between both parties. This results in allegations of segregation, gender cleansing being peddled by both parties after SSAn incident that results in violent crises.

According to Abass (2012) the unrest in pastoralism and sedentarism reflect enhanced sedentarisation and increased pastoralism leading to constant conflict with the agrarian societies. All the respondents gave their account of how the conflict had affected them, their families, community and society as a whole. Also, the cost of the conflict has also affected intermarriage relationship especially for the farmers. Most of the farmers said they cannot

allow their children marry from the herder's tribe unlike the herders who do not mind their children marrying from the Yoruba tribe.

The study conducted also reveals that some farmers still do business with them likewise the herders also do business with them but this does not mean they trust one another completely. They try to manage interpersonal relationships since we still do business with one another though it is not easy because we are suspicious of one another. If there are any farmers that default, we report to our leaders "by calling those involved in the poisoning or killing of my herds and by paying for what was damaged. Also, if we know what can make the other person angry we try to avoid it. If we know each other's rules and ourselves there will not be conflict". The inability of the different parties to resolve conflicts has resulted to the breakdown of the communal dispute resolution mechanism in the study location, hence the likelihood of violence erupting in this location. The breakdown may be attributed to a new inflow of herdsmen who are young called "herd boy" who are likely not aware of the patterns of relations that exists among the farmers and herders. These boys often do not have the strength or skills to prevent cattle from destroying farm crops for consumption and when questioned often resorted to violence, thereby breaking the relationship that exists between both parties.

Krisberg model (2007) of conflicts escalation provides an apt description of how Fulani herdsmen/farmers conflict escalates from simple mere arguments/disagreements over resources to violent conflicts. Kriesberg (2007) argues that conflict escalation can be attributed to the amount of persons involved in the variance. In other words, the more the people the more escalated the conflict will be. Escalation can occur even if the people involved do not deliberately attempt to escalate the conflict. Kresberg (2007) notes that the escalation of conflict it's an unplanned effect of conflict behaviour. It takes place unintentionally, 'a step at a time without the participants taking into consideration the implications of their actions. From the interviews conducted with all the participants, the breakdown in the relationship between both parties may be avoidable. However, the inability to reach a better resolution between both parties results in a dangerous pedestal. The transformation of the clash among the herders and the farmers from latent to manifest was unintended.

Pruit and Kim (2004) identified five transformations involved in conflict escalation. The first stage is a shift stage from small to large-scale, it entails the participants involved massively investing in the conflict. This is evident from the herdsmen who shifted from using rods and sticks during previous conflicts in the study location to the use of small light arms such as AK47. An effect of this is that it sent a wrong signal to the farming community that there is an influx of a new category of herdsmen in the community breeding distrust and suspicion. This invariably has resulted to the second stage as identified by Pruit and Kim (2004) from light to heavy strategies, in this case from persuasion to violence by both parties. Shortly before the recent violent conflict in Iseyin in February 2018, there have been peaceful means by which misunderstanding and conflicts between both parties were resolved; this includes compensation for damaged crops. However, conflicts from 2018 have resorted in violence by both parties.

The third stage is a shift from specific issues to general issues, in this instance; it is from mere damage of farmland and crops as the reason for the conflict to the ethno-religious dimension. Findings from this study indicate a shift to this stage. The fourth stage involves a shift a transformation from a few persons to a large number of persons. Analyses of the findings of the study revealed the inclusion of other actors which include government, vigilante groups, security agencies, socio-political and ethnic associations. The fifth stage is the conflict resolution or negotiation stage. Unfortunately, the incessant conflicts between farmers and herdsmen have not reached this stage yet.

There is the existence of resolution mechanisms employed in managing and settling clashes amongst the herders and farmers. It shows the involvement of the leadership of the host community farmers, the herders, the security agencies, and compensation. According to the herders and host community farmers, the method employed in managing the conflict is to report to their leaders, community leader, and government agency (police)". However, the study shows that the majority have been able to manage the conflict by reporting to their leaders if nothing is done by the leaders they take the case to the police especially if the conflict seems to aggravate into violent conflict the police get involved.

However, the study had shown that the way of settling the conflict has not been very effective because the conflict between host community farmers and herders is still persistent which had

caused lives to be lost, destruction of properties, and security challenges. The level of insecurity is heightened due to the conflicts also it has shown high potential to intensify the food crisis in Nigeria and some other countries affected as a result of loss of farmer's lives, livestock's, crops, and properties that are valuable (Cotula et al. 2004). Most not all of the respondents said even with the involvement of the government it has not been effective it only temporarily. However, the methods employed by them have not been able to solve the conflict between the herders and community farmers.

The judicial commissions put in place to handle conflict issues were not able to yield any useful action (Blench 2010). Both herders and farmers want the conflicts to be settled preferably by the customary institutions rather than the courts of law, however many of these conflicts are settled through the customary institutions rather than the courts of law.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study examined the social cost of herders and host community farmers' conflicts in Iseyin in Ibadan, Oyo State. Critically looking at both the herders' and farmers' perspective towards it, the way the conflict has affected their livelihood, disruption of family structure, symbiotic relationship that once existed between them, and the methods put in place to manage the conflict. A summary was made, conclusions were drawn and recommendations were offered based on the findings of the study.

5.1 SUMMARY

The findings of the study indicate that land is what both the herders and host community farmers need for their various sources of livelihood. However, the unavailability or inaccessibility to these wants causes (violent) conflict. These have been seen as an immense basis of conflicts between the two groups (herders-farmers) by most of the participants. Also, there is no love and unity among the two groups; aside that they like to dominate wherever they settle down and they do not follow the norms and traditions of the host community.

The researcher gathered information from the participants on how the conflict has affected their livelihood. The findings indicate that both groups need land for their various livelihoods. Their livelihood is being affected by each other, that is, the herders' livelihood affects the host farmers and vice versa. However, most of the farmers said it is the herders' livelihood that affects them because it's the herders' way of life to budge their cattle's from one area to another in search for food for their herds, likewise, the herders said the farmers plant on the routes they take their herds through for grazing. Also, these conflicts have affected them such that they do not have rest of mind; it has affected their daily routine in terms of business in farming and grazing, making buying and selling difficult and instilling in them the fear of being attacked by the host community farmers. Likewise, the herders complained about how it has affected their returns from the trades of their products and caused a decrease in the

patronage of customers. Farming and cultivating has not been the way it used to be before and productivity has drastically reduced. The herders also complained about low patronage by customers.

The qualitative findings from the data also show that the location of land is the major cause of conflict among the herders and host communities farmers. If someone who wants to rear cows live further away from where people live in a remote area/settlement due to lack of development, there is a tendency for such a person to start buying lands and buildings around areas meant for farming to get pasture for herds; farmers could also be guilty of farming on the lands that herders use for grazing, without putting into consideration the fact that herders use the land for grazing. However, the conflict between farmers and herders is more severe during the dry season because during dry season there are not enough weeds or dry land for animals to eat, unlike the rainy season. So, there is the tendency for someone's animals to wander on farmers' lands especially when they see what they like to eat.

The study also reviewed that the relationship that existed ones among the host farming Communities and the herders has degenerated over time, most of the farmers agreed that the conflict has affected intermarriage relation between them and the herders. Unlike the herders who do not mind if their children marry from the Yoruba tribe. The study indicates the methods employed in managing the conflict is "to report to the leader of my group, community leader and government agency (police)". However, the police are involved when conflict has escalated into vicious conflict.

5.2 Conclusion

It is expedient to draw attention to the conclusion of the major findings of the study. This study has shown the social cost of conflict among the herders and host farmers has a direct and indirect impact on the people who have been a victim of the conflict. The clash amongst the herders and host community farmers has a serious consequence on the individual, family, community, and the entire society as a whole. The study also shows that the conflict has caused serious security problems in the society, low patronage of customers, no love and

unity, affected children's education, affected the cultivating and harvesting of agriculture, loss of lives, destruction of properties, loss of a family member, inability to pay back loans.

The study has shown that government involvement has not been effective in managing and settling of the herders and host community farmers. The study shows that government can help in the settling and managing of the conflict if only they give and allocate a particular place for the herders should use for grazing, and make sure they follow the rules and regulations of the host community, however, some of the respondents said that they should go back to where they came from that is to their hometown. This conflict however will affect or affects the development of the country. The study was able to unearth workable measures to at least minimize the conflict between herders and host community farmers. Investing in technological innovation, educating herders, and host community farmers on how to live peacefully will go a long to reduce the effects of the conflict on herders and host community farmers.

Also, the conflict has serious consequences for development in rural areas. It has showed great potentials to have an effect on various aspects of rural life. Government inadequate responses have left the affected communities in despair. The clash had extensive negative economic effects on production, loss of life, sources of livelihood, and displacements of people from their settlements. Lastly, government efforts on compensation is on economic cost the social cost was not considered. Someone who lost their husband or family members cannot be compensated, and families that have become estranged as a result of the disagreements. In other word while compensation always comes inform of economic relief. None comes as relief for social cost and it is indeed almost impossible to evaluate.

5.3 Recommendations

Therefore, my recommendations include the following;

1. Sensitization among the herders and farmers should be encouraged. This will lead to a better perception and create a better opportunity for awareness of realistic coping strategies. This will also help reduce distrust and suspicion between both parties.

2. The creation of grazing reserves may be in the long run the formidable solution to the farmer-herder conflict. However, the government must put into consideration of some people and institutions without necessarily causing a divide in the once. The federal government must include the state government, local government, community leaders' civil societies, NGOs, and some knowledgeable people in the country. This may require a bottom to top approach. In other to embark on such projects, the government must obtain the response and approval of all stakeholders
3. As a result of the bitter and negative nature of the social atmosphere pervading the interaction between herdsmen and farming communities, there should be a creation of positive narratives through the aid of the media and entertainment industry to enhance positive interaction and build a mutually beneficial social relationship between both parties. In the same vein, the traditional mechanism of dispute resolution should be encouraged and enhanced. Local peace-building and reconciliation mechanisms should be strengthened.
4. States that do not have legal frameworks guiding the interaction between herders and farming communities should enact such laws. There should be a harmonisation of the different laws on grazing, nomadic rearing of animals, and other relevant laws relating to cattle rearing, grazing, etc. at both the state and federal levels.
5. The role the media play in informing and influencing the general populace cannot be overstated. The media through its use and choice words also contribute to exacerbating the conflict through its bias reporting. Therefore, there is a need for the development of a media code that guides the media on reporting issues related to conflicts or violence.
6. In light of climate change and its attendant effects on farming and grazing activities, environmentally friendly activities such as prevention of overgrazing, integration of the grazing and manure provision should be encouraged. Movements of nomadic cattle rearers should be properly coordinated between rainy and dry seasons.

7. The social attitude to sharing and cultural exchanges should be encouraged and effective sensitization among farmers-herders should be strongly advocated by the governments.
8. Farmers and herders should form conciliatory strategies to manage disagreements in peace and conflict periods.

5.4 Contributions to Knowledge

Through a holistic and qualitative analysis of farmers and herders conflicts in Iseyin, Oyo state which is yet to be quantitatively done in Nigeria, the study fills the lacuna in knowledge with regard to the social cost of farmer and herder conflicts studies. The study has also documented the effects of farmer and herder conflicts on families, children, education and social relations in Iseyin, Oyo state by emphasizing ways conflicts have affected farmers and herders' livelihoods.

The study authenticated the importance of symbiotic relationship in enhancing positive interaction and builds a mutually beneficial social relationship between both parties in exchange of goods and services. Finally, the study documented a theoretical guide in which farmers and herders can effectively manage and resolve conflicts. This underscores the strategies that can be adopted by the farmers, herders and policy makers in farmer-herders' conflicts resolution.

5.5 Suggestions for Further Studies

This study is limited to studying the subject matter in a specific location, therefore there is the need to carry out regional or nationwide research on the social costs of the conflict as this will help policy makers and the government to understand the effects of the conflicts from a social perspective. In the light of limited knowledge about the key perpetrators, an in-depth nationwide study should also be conducted to identify the key actors, the motivation of the perpetrators, reasons for the escalation of the conflict, and agency(ices) or networks stealthily or openly encouraging the conflict. Also, research should be conducted on the victims of the conflicts especially on the family aspects.

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APPENDIX I

Chronology of farmers-herders clashes since 2014 in Nigeria.

No	Location where clashes took place	Date	Suspects	Victims
1.	Agatu local government, Benue state	20/1/2014	Fulani herdsmen	3 soldiers and seven people killed.
2.	Adeke village, near Markudi the state capital, Benue states	20/1/2014	Fulani herdsmen	35 people killed and houses burnt
3.	Gwer west local government, Benue state	2-21/1/14	Fulani herdsmen	35 people killed, 80,000 people were displaced. Over 25 villages destroyed
4.	Tiv community, along Naka road, Makurdi Benue state	24/2/2014	Fulani herdsmen	8 people killed
5.	Kwande, Kastina-Ala and Logo local governments, Benue state	6/3/2014	Fulani herdsmen	Over 30 fatalities
6.	Anagwan Sakai, Kaura local government, Kaduna state	9/3/2014	Fulani herdsmen	57 dead and the village razed
7.	Umenger village, Benue state	10/3/2014	Fulani herdsmen	The then state Governor's convoy was attacked.
8.	Ukpam village in Guma local government, Benue state	12/3/2014	Fulani herdsmen	28 fatalities, farms burnt and properties destroyed
9.	Gbajimba village, Guma local govt, Benue state	12/3/2014	Fulani herdsmen	25 people killed over 50 injured and properties destroyed
10.	Agena village, Benue state	25/3/2014	Fulani herdsmen	7 fatalities

11.	Agatu local government, Benue state	29-30/3/14	Fulani herdsmen	19 people killed and 15 kidnapped
12.	Yar Galadinma village, Zamfara state during community meeting	5/4/201	Fulani herdsmen	77 people killed and unspecified number of people injured
13.	Gassol, Taraba state	7/4/2014	Farmers/Fulani herdsmen	Unspecified number of fatalities, properties destroyed
14.	Shengev village in Gwer west local government, Benue state	10/4/2014	Fulani herdsmen	15 fatalities
15.	Logo local government, Benue state.	10/4/2014	Fulani herdsmen	Six people killed with properties destroyed
16.	Obagaji, Agatu local government, Benue state	15/4/2014	Fulani herdsmen	12 people dead
17.	Benin-Asaba expressway, Delta state	19/4/2014	Fulani herdsmen	23 people killed
18.	Four villages and a police station destroyed in Girei local government, Adamawa state	21/7/2014	Fulani herdsmen	31 people killed including the DPO, the station and villages razed
19.	Ogbadibo local government, Benue state	10/9/2014	Fulani herdsmen	Number of casualties unspecified
20.	Four villages in Agatu local government, Benue state	27/1/2015	Fulani herdsmen	17 people killed
21.	Five villages in Logo local government, Benue state	30/1/2015	Fulani herdsmen	9 fatalities
22.	Egba village in Agatu local government, Benue state	15/3/2015	Fulani herdsmen	Over 90 casualties
23.	Three villages in Guma local government, Benue state	24/4/2015	Fulani herdsmen	28 people killed, farmlands destroyed

24.	Ikyoawen village in Kwande local government, Benue state	11/5/2015	Fulani herdsmen	5 people killed, 8 injured
25.	Four villages in Logo local government, Benue state	24/5/15	Fulani herdsmen	Over 100 people dead, properties destroyed
26.	Imande Bebeshi in Kwande local government, Benue state	7/7/15	Fulani herdsmen	I person killed, unspecified number of persons injured
27.	Ilado village, Akure North local government, Ondo state	21/9/2015	Fulani herdsmen	Elder statesman Chief Olu Falae was kidnapped in his farm
28.	Saki Ago-Are and several villages in Lagelu local government, Oyo state	21/9/2015	Fulani herdsmen	Properties destroyed, unspecified number dead and villagers displaced
29.	Buruku local government, Benue state	5/11/2015	Fulani herdsmen	12 people killed, 25 injured
30.	To-Anyin and To-Attan in Buruku local government, Benue state	8/2/2016	Fulani herdsmen	10 killed, more than 300 people displaced
31.	10 villages in Agatu Local government, Benue	18-24/2/16	Fulani herdsmen	Over 500 people killed, more 700 displaced and several villages completely razed
32.	Edugbeho in Agatu local government, Benue state	29/2/2016	Fulani herdsmen	11 killed, including police officer
33.	Agatu local government, Benue state	5/3/2016	Fulani herdsmen	Houses burnt, but no killings due to security agents' intervention
34.	4 villages in Logo local government, Benue state	9/3/2016	Fulani herdsmen	8 people killed

35.	Obagaji in Agatu local government, Benue state	10/3/2016	Fulani herdsmen	2 people killed
36.	Agatu local government, Benue state	11/3/2016	Fulani herdsmen	Senator David Mark's convoy was attacked, there was no casualty
37.	Gashaka local government, Taraba state	12/4/2016	Fulani herdsmen	15 people killed
38.	Seven villages in Uzo-Uwani local government, Enugu state	25/4/2016	Fulani herdsmen	Over 100 killed, more 3000 people displaced. Churches and houses destroyed.
39.	Osisa in Ndokwa East local government, Delta state	16/6/2016	Fulani herdsmen	One person killed
40.	Riyom local government, Plateau state	16/6/2016	Fulani herdsmen	5 people including 3 soldiers were killed, 55 houses burnt
41.	Four villages in Logo local government, Benue state	20/7/2016	Fulani herdsmen	59 fatalities
42.	Kagoro, Kaura local government	13/10/2016	Fulani herdsmen	Police intervene in the conflict, 2 officers killed, 2 other officers injured.
43.	Abam community, Arochukwu local government, Abia state	14/10/16	Fulani herdsmen	Unspecified number of people killed, unknown number of injured
44.	Godogodo community, Jama'ah local government, Kaduna state	15-16/10/16	Fulani herdsmen	20 people killed
45.	Dongwhirro village, Bassa local government, Plateau state	15/01/2017	Fulani herdsmen	26 people killed, farmlands and properties were

				destroyed
46.	Ipiga village, ohimini local government, Benue state	24/1/2017	Fulani herdsmen	15 people lost their lives
47.	Kanikon village, Kaduna state	19/02/2017	Fulani herdsmen	9 people killed including 8 villagers and 1 police officer
48.	Zillian village, Kaduna state	20/02/2017	Fulani herdsmen	Unspecified number of fatalities and injured
49.	Mbahimin village, Gwer east local government, Benue state	2/3/2017	Fulani Herdsmen	10 people killed in clashes between herdsmen and villagers
50.	Mkgovur village, Buruku local government, Benue state	11/3/2017	Fulani herdsmen	7 people killed
51.	Yakiri village, Baruten local government, Kwara state	04/04/2017	Fulani herdsmen	4 people killed
52.	Ise-Akaa village, Logo local government, Benue state	8/5/2017	Fulani herdsmen	Three people killed
53.	Three villages in Logo local government, Benue state	13/5/2017	Fulani herdsmen	A reprisal attack: 18 people killed
54.	Several villages on the Mambila plateau, Saruana local government, Taraba state	17-20/06/17	Ethnic militia	An attack, 732 killed or missing
55.	Six villages in Bassa local government, Plateau state	8-18/10/17	Fulani herdsmen	50 people killed
56.	Shelewol village, Numan local government, Adamawa	20/11/2017	Ethnic militia	A pre-emptive attack, 70 people killed
57.	Seven villages in Demsa and Numan local governments, Adamawa state	04/12/2017	Fulani herdsmen	51 people were killed

58.	Omala local government, Kogi state	09/12/2017	Fulani herdsmen	1 person killed
59.	Okpanam village near Asaba and Obiaruku village in Ukwani local government, Delta state	15-17/12/2017	Fulani herdsmen	3 people killed, 8 people kidnapped
60.	Several villages in Guma and Logo local governments, Benue state	01/01/2018	Fulani herdsmen	80 people killed, several properties destroyed.
61.	Dan-Anacthowa village in Gassol local government, Jandeyukla village in Wukari local government, Taraba state	04/01/2018	Fulani herdsmen	12 people killed, several others suffer injuries, properties destroyed
62.	Numan local government, Adamawa state	05/01/2018	Fulani herdsmen	Official reports reveal 53 killed, Other unofficial reports reveal more than 200 killed
63.	Tombu village, Logo local government, Benue state	6/01/2018	Fulani herdsmen	11 killed
64.	Lau local government, Taraba state	10/01/2018	Fulani herdsmen	55 killed, unspecified number of other casualties
65.	Dangaji village, Nimin Gwari local government, Kaduna state	14/01/2018	Fulani herdsmen	10 people killed, properties and houses destroyed.
66.	Unguwar Gajere village, Birnin Gwari local government, Kaduna state	14/01/2018	Fulani herdsmen	10 killed
67.	Oke-Ako and Irele villages, Ikole local government, Ekiti state	16/01/2018	Fulani herdsmen	1 killed, several others injured

68.	Onicha-Olona village, Aniocha North local government, Ovwor-Olomu village, Ugheli south local government, Delta state	19/01/2018	Fulani herdsmen	Officially 1 person killed, 2 injured and one woman raped.
69.	Majiankhai village, Barkin Ladi local government, Plateau	20/01/2018	Fulani herdsmen	1 killed
70.	Kikon village, Numan local government	21/01/2018	Fulani herdsmen	Unspecified number dead, unofficial estimates recorded 55 killed, the whole village sacked
71.	Ilado village, Akure North local government, Ondo state	21/01/2018	Fulani herdsmen	Farms were destroyed including the 100 hectares' oil palm plantation belonging to statesman chief Olu Falae
72.	Huke village, Bassa local government, Benue state	26/01/2018	Fulani herdsmen	3 people killed
73.	Guma local government, Benue state	26-29/01/18	Fulani herdsmen	4 killed including a police officer and several others injured
74.	Kagoro village, Kaura local government, Kaduna state	01/02/2018	Fulani herdsmen	6 people killed, several injured, properties destroyed
75.	Waku village and Yogbo village Guma local government, Benue state	03-05/02/2018	Fulani herdsmen	6 people killed, including 2 police officers
76.	Ogbooro village, Saki East local government, Oyo state	07/02/2018	Fulani herdsmen	1 police officer killed, the area SARS commander was killed

77.	Barkin Kogi village, Jemaa local government, Kaduna state	12/02/2018	Fulani herdsmen	4 killed, one injured
78.	Guma local government, Benue state	12/02/2018	Fulani herdsmen	Several people injured, 4 security agents who intervened were among those killed
79.	Logo local government, Benue state	12/02/2018	Fulani herdsmen	One police officer was shot dead
80.	Itigidi, Yakurr local government, Cross River state	12/02/2018	Fulani Herdsmen	Prominent persons including a councillor aspirant was killed
81.	University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Kwara state	12/02/2018	Fulani herdsmen	Training and Research farm was destroyed
82.	Akure South local government, Ondo state	13/02/2018	Fulani herdsmen	Several people injured including staff of the local government after they accosted herdsmen for passing through the LG complex
83.	Oke-Iseyin, Iseyin local government, Oyo state	13/02/2018	Fulani herdsmen/ local vigilantes	12 herdsmen killed, 14 others declared missing
84.	Demsa, Numan local government, Adamawa state	27/02/2018	Fulani herdsmen	24 people killed
85.	Leme village, Sarduana local government, Taraba state	04/3/2018	Fulani herdsmen/ Bachama militias	20 people were killed, 12 others injured and over 300 cattle were taken

86.	Okpokwu local government, Benue state	05-06/03/2018	Fulani herdsmen	34 people were killed, several villages sacked, more than 10, 000 people were displaced
87.	Guma local government, Benue state	20/04/2018	Fulani herdsmen	10 people killed
88.	Janruwa village, Birnin-Gwari local government, Kaduna state	24/04/2018	Fulani herdsmen	40 people killed
89.	Ukpor-Mablom village, Gwer East local government, Benue state	24/04/2018	Fulani herdsmen	17 people including two parish priests were killed
90.	Tse-Ajaver village, Wukari local government, Taraba state	28/04/2018	Fulani herdsmen	The village burnt, farmlands destroyed, unspecified number of casualties
91.	Five villages between the border of Taraba and Adamawa states	02/05/2018	Fulani herdsmen	33 people killed
92.	Gwaska village, Birnin-Gwari local government, Kaduna state	05/05/2018	Fulani herdsmen	71 people killed
93.	Jarkuka village, Anka local government, Zamfara state	04/06/2018	Fulani herdsmen	26 people killed
94.	Malikawa village, Maradun local government	24/05/2018	Fulani herdsmen	27 people killed
95.	Kona, Ardo Kola villages, Jalingo local government, Taraba state	16-17/06/2018	Fulani herdsmen	11 people killed
96.	More than 18 villages in, Jos South, Barkin Ladi and Riyom local governments Plateau state	22-27/06/2018	Fulani herdsmen	Over 200 people reported killed
97.	Several villages in Mayo-Belwa local government, Adamawa	14/07/2018	Ethnic militia	Over 200 people killed

	state			
98.	Barkin Ladi local government, Plateau state	29/8/2018	Fulani herdsmen	8 people reportedly killed, several farms destroyed
99.	Rukuba community, Jos, Plateau state	27/09/2018	Fulani herdsmen	15 people killed
100.	Riyom local government, Plateau state	02/10/2018	Fulani herdsmen	13 people killed
101.	Ariri village, Bassa local government, Plateau state	03/10/2018	Fulani herdsmen	19 people reportedly killed
102.	Gindin Dutse, Jema'a local government, Kaduna state	Nov, 2018	Ethnic militia/vigil antees	5 herdsmen killed
103.	Safana local government, Kastina state	22/11/2018	Fulani herdsmen	10 people killed
104.	Ungwan Pah II village, Jema'a local government, Kaduna state	16/12/2018	Fulani herdsmen	A reprisal attack, 15 people killed, 24 others injured
105.	Mada local government, Zamfara state	28/01/2019	Ethnic militia/vigil antees	7 Fulani herdsmen killed
106.	Seven villages in Mada and Bukkyum local govts, Zamfara state	04/02/2019	Fulani herdsmen	A reprisal attack, 26 people killed, properties and homes destroyed
107.	Ungwar Bardi village, Kajuru local government, Kaduna state	10- 11/02/2019	Fulani herdsmen/ Adara Ethnic Militia	77 people reportedly killed while 65 were declared missing. Unofficial reports confirmed over 141 lives lost

108.	Ebete village, Agatu local government, Benue state	20/02/2019	Fulani herdsmen	17 people killed
109.	Karamai, Kajuru local government, Kaduna state	26/02/2019	Fulani herdsmen	A reprisal attack, 40 people were killed
110.	Tse-Kuma village, Gwer West local government, Benue state	02/03/2019	Fulani herdsmen	16 people killed, farmlands were destroyed
111.	Three villages in Kajuru and Jema'a local governments, Kaduna state	10/03/2019	Fulani herdsmen	Official reports revealed 16 people killed, locals reported 46 people killed
112.	Birnin Gwari local government, Kaduna state	10/03/2019	Fulani herdsmen	17 members of the informal security outfit were killed
113.	Inkirmi and Dongonma villages, Kajuru local government, Kaduna state	11/03/2019	Fulani herdsmen	Official reports revealed 16 fatalities, however locals claimed 52 fatalities
114.	Nandu-Gbok village, Sanga local government, Kaduna state	16/03/2019	Fulani herdsmen	10 killed
115.	Tse-Loregeb village, Guma local government, Benue state	19/03/2019	Fulani herdsmen	10 people killed
116.	Nding and Fanloh village, Jos south local government	09/09/2019	Fulani herdsmen	Two killed, five people injured
117.	Zangon kataf LGA, kaduna state	05/08/2020	Fulani herdsmen/ farmers	People killed and several people were injured. Also properties worth millions of naira was destroyed
118	Bassa county plateau state	08/04/2020	Fulani	six people killed

			herdsmen/ farmers	
119	Kwell village plateau state	03/05/2020	Fulani herdsmen/ farmers	Four people killed and properties were destroyed
120	Igangan, Ibararapa North local government area of Oyo state	22/01/2021	Fulani herdsmen/ farmers	Two killed and several people were injured. Also properties worth millions of naira was destroyed

Source: Nkwede et. al. (2018), DailyTrust newspaper, (2021).

APPENDIX II

IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR FARMERS

I am Abiola Aroyewun, a Master of Philosophy student of the department of Sociology, University of Ibadan. The aim of this discussion is to investigate the social cost of herder/farmer conflict in Iseyin. Your responses will contribute to the successful completion of the research. Please, be informed that information provided is strictly for the purpose of research. Confidentiality and anonymity are therefore guaranteed. Also, you, are free to opt out of the session at any time you deem fit.

Thank you.

1) Socio-demographics

Sex

Ethnic group

Years of residence

2) To examine how the conflict have affected the livelihood of farmers and herders in Iseyin Oyo state?

Probe for:

- a. What are the problems arising from lack of access to lands?
- b. Is the issue of size of land for farming the persistence cause of conflict between herders and host community farmers?
- c. Is Land location the cause of herders and host community farmers conflict?
- d. What are the reason for the persistence cause of conflict between the farmers and herders?
- e. How has the conflict affected the livelihood of the farmers?
- f. Does your own pattern affect the livelihood of other group?
- g. What have you done to prevent the conflicts?

3) To examine how the conflict have disrupted the family structure of herder-farmer in Iseyin Oyo state?

Probe for:

- a. In what period of the year do conflict happen between the farmers and herders?

- b. What is the nature of the conflict?
 - c. In what ways has the conflict affected your family?
 - d. What are the precautions put in place to manage the conflict?
 - e. Do you have access to healthcare services?
- 4) In what ways have these conflicts between the herdsman and farming communities of Iseyin, Oyo State affected the social relations among the parties involved?

Probe for:

- a. What is the implication of the conflict among the parties involved?
 - b. How has the conflict affected interpersonal relationship between the herders and farmers?
 - c. How has the conflict affected intermarriage relations among the herders-farmers?
 - d. How has the conflict affected the education of the children?
 - e. Was there any attempt to repair any damage to the interpersonal relationship between farmers and herders in order to resolve the conflict?
- 5) To identify the strategies put in place by farmer groups to manage the conflict in Iseyin Oyo state?

Probe for:

- a. Are there any forms of conflict resolution mechanisms employed in managing and settling conflicts between the herdsman and farmers?
- b. What are the ways employed in managing and settling the conflict?
- c. How effective are the methods used?
- d. Is the government involved in conflict resolution between herders and farmers in your community?
- e. What do you think the government can do to resolve the conflict between the two groups?

APPENDIX III

IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR HERDERS

I am Abiola Aroyewun, a Master of Philosophy student of the department of Sociology, University of Ibadan. The aim of this discussion is to investigate the social cost of herder/farmer conflict in Iseyin. Your responses will contribute to the successful completion of the research. Please, be informed that information provided is strictly for the purpose of research. Confidentiality and anonymity are therefore guaranteed. Also, you, are free to opt out of the session at any time you deem fit.

Thank you.

1. **Socio-demographics**

Sex

Ethnic group

Years of residence

2. To examine how the conflict have affected the livelihood of farmers and herders' family in Iseyin Oyo state?

Probe for:

- a. What are the problems arising from lack of access to lands?
- b. Are the issues of land size for the herds the problem of herders and host community farmers?
- c. Is Land location the cause of herders and host community farmers conflict?
- d. What are the reason for the persistence cause of conflict between the farmers and herders?
- e. How has the conflict affected the livelihood of both groups?
- f. Does your own pattern affect the livelihood of other group?
- g. What have you done to prevent the conflicts?

3. To examine how the conflict have disrupted the family structure of herder-farmer in Iseyin Oyo state?

Probe for:

- a. In what period of the year do conflict happen between the herders and host community farmers?

- b. What is the nature of the conflict?
 - c. In what ways has the conflict affected your family?
 - d. What are the precautions put in place to manage the conflict?
 - e. Do you have access to healthcare service?
4. In what ways have these conflicts between the herdsmen and farming communities of Iseyin, Oyo State affected the social relations among the parties involved?

Probe for:

- a. What is the implication of the conflict among the parties involved?
 - b. How has the conflict affected interpersonal relationship between the herders and farmers?
 - c. How has the conflict affected intermarriage relations among the herders-farmers?
 - d. How has the conflict affected the education of the children?
 - e. Was there any attempt to repair any damage to the interpersonal relationship between farmers and herders in order to resolve the conflict?
5. To identify the strategies put in place by herders groups to manage the conflict in Iseyin Oyo state?

Probe for:

- a. Are there any forms of conflict resolution mechanisms employed in managing and settling conflicts between the herdsmen and farmers?
- b. What are the ways employed in managing and settling the conflict?
- c. How effective are the methods used?
- d. Is the government involved in conflict resolution between herders and farmers in your community?
- e. What do you think the government can do to resolve the conflict between the two groups?

APPENDIX IV

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR FARMERS/HERDERS LEADER

I am Abiola Aroyewun, a Master of Philosophy student of the department of Sociology, University of Ibadan. The aim of this discussion is to investigate the social cost of herder/farmer conflict in Iseyin. Your responses will go a long way in contributing to the successful completion of the research. Please, be informed that information provided is strictly for the purpose of research. Confidentiality and anonymity are therefore guaranteed. Also, you, are free to opt out of the session at any time you deem fit.

Thank you.

1) Socio-demographics

Sex

Village/town/LGA

Ethnic group

Occupation

Years of residence

- 2) How long have you been a leader of this group?
- 3) How do the farmers/herders have access to land for farming and grazing?
- 4) What do you think is likely the persistent cause of the conflict between the farmers and herders?
- 5) As a leader how has this conflict affected the interrelation between the two groups?
- 6) As a leader of the group, how have you been able to manage or settle the conflict?
- 7) How is government involvement in the conflict resolution between herders and farmers?
- 8) Apart from the disputes resulting from grazing animal, have you encountered any other problem as a leader?
- 9) What was the cause of the dispute?
- 10) What are the procedures put in place for the settling of the conflict among the group?
- 11) How effective was it?
- 12) As a leader how do you settle disputes between the farmers and herders?

- 13) Suggest possible way(s) in which farmers can help resolve the conflict in the community?
- 14) Suggest possible way(s) in which herders can help resolve the conflict in the community?
- 15) What do you think the government should do to resolve the conflict?



Social Science and Humanities Research Ethics Committee (SSHREC)
University of Ibadan

Chairman

Prof. Jegede Ayodele Samuel

B.Sc., M.Sc. (Ife) MEdSc (Toronto), Ph.D. (Ibadan)

Email: sshrecuisoc@gmail.com

Mobile: +234-080-5725-0326

NOTICE OF FULL APPROVAL AFTER FULL COMMITTEE REVIEW

Re: The Social Cost of Farmer-Herder Conflicts in Iseyin, Oyo State

UI/Social Sciences Ethics committee assigned number: **UI/SSHREC/2021/0025**

Name of Principal Investigator (Ibadan): **Abiola O. Aroyewun**

Address of Principal Investigator: Department of Sociology
Faculty of The Social Sciences, University of Ibadan

Date of receipt of valid application: 17/7/2021

Date of meeting when determination on ethical approval was made: 18/01/2022

This is to inform you that the research described in the submitted protocol, the consent forms, and other participant information materials have been reviewed and given full approval by the SSHREC Committee.

The approval dates from **18/01/2022 to 17/01/2023**. If there is delay in starting the research, please inform the SSHRE Committee so that dates of approval can be adjusted accordingly. Note that no participant accrual or activity related to this research may be conducted outside of these dates. All informed consent forms used in this study must carry the SSHRE Committee assigned number and duration of SSHRE Committee approval of the study. It is expected that you submit your annual request for the project renewal to the SSHRE Committee early in order to obtain renewal of your approval to avoid disruption of your research.

Note: The National code for research ethics requires you to comply with all institutional guidelines, rules and regulations and with the tenets of the Code including ensuring that all adverse events are reported promptly to the SSHREC. No changes are permitted in the research without prior approval by the SSHREC except in circumstances outlined in the Code. The SSHRE reserves the right to conduct compliance visit to your research site without previous notification.

Prof. A. S. Jegede



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University of Ibadan

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