

**FACTORS UNDERLYING THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIOLENT
RADICALISED GROUPS IN THE SOUTH-EAST AND SOUTH-WEST NIGERIA,
2003-2014**

BY

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CERTIFICATION

I certify that this research work was carried out by Ewurum, Evaristus Chidi in the Department of Peace, Security and Humanitarian Studies, Faculty of Multidisciplinary Studies, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria.

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to God for His endless love, mercy and support throughout this programme.

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ABSTRACT

Globally, violent radicalised groups (VRGs) pose a threat to national security. Oodua Peoples' Congress (OPC) and the Movement for the Actualisation of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) who initially emerged as groups set up to fight against perceived marginalisation and insecurity in South-West and South-East regions later got metamorphosed into violent radicalised groups threatening the national security. OPC on its own has a history of violence with recorded cases of clashes and violence with Nigeria's security agencies (Nigeria Police and Army) at Arepo in Ogun State over cases involving oil installations protection, among others. Existing studies on VRGs have largely concentrated on their emergence and proliferation, with little attention paid to factors underlying their transformation. This study, therefore, was designed towards examining the factors that led to transformation of OPC and MASSOB to VRGs, the interface with security agents in the process of transformation, the political economy that influenced the transformation and perceived influence of the groups from 2003 to 2014 in the South-East and South-West, Nigeria.

Social Movement, Political Economy and Dollard's Frustration-Aggression theories served as the framework, while an exploratory survey design was adopted. Primary and secondary data were obtained. South-East and South-West Nigeria were purposively selected as the homelands of OPC and MASSOB respectively. A sample of 452 respondents was drawn using Cochran's (1977) sample size formula. A structured questionnaire was conveniently administered to community members in Lagos, Ijebu-Ode, Osogbo, Ibadan, Awka, Aba, Onitsha, Owerri and Enugu, the instrument covered all the research objectives and was complemented by in-depth interviews and focused group discussions. Ten In-Depth Interviews got conducted with four community leaders, two each zone and six youth leaders, three each from each zone. Six focus group discussions, three each from each zone were held with youth associations. Secondary data were obtained from journals, newspaper reports, internet sources and other relevant publications. Data gathered were content analysed.

The OPC and MASSOB were transformed into VRGs as a result of politics of ethnicity and agitation for regional sovereignty. MASSOB was basically formed to advance the interest of the Igbo (53.5%), OPC was reported as ethnic movement (56.0%). It was discovered from the qualitative data that the long term political marginalisation compounded with Nigeria law enforcement agencies' reaction to their conducts accounted for transformation of the groups into VGRs. Law enforcement crackdowns on the groups (63.0%), repressive nature of the state (51.0%) and arrest of their leaders triggered the transformation to VRGs. Relatedly, 'growing poverty' and stiffening economic realities contributed to the radicalisation of the youth wings of the groups thus posed threats to live and political stability in the country. Despite the transformation to VRGs, 45.0% opined that OPC had been very helpful in securing lives and property in the South-West, while 67.0% indicated that MASSOB had been effective in the sensitisation for the actualization of the Biafra state.

The perceived ethnic or tribal marginalisation with political agitation of the Yoruba and Igbo ethnic groups were pivotal in the transformation of OPC and MASSOB to violent radicalised groups from 2003 to 2014 in the Southwestern and Southeastern regions of Nigeria. There is the need to build reliable democratic process for inclusive representations of all geopolitical zones in Nigeria.

Keywords: Violent radicalized group transformation, National security, Social movement, Marginalisation repression

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BH – Boko Haram

FGDs- Focus Group Discussions

IDI – In-Depth Interview

KII – Key Informant Interview

MASSOB – Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra

MEND – Movement for Emancipation of Niger Delta

NA – Nigerian Army

NPF – Nigeria Police Force

NSCDC – Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps

OPC – Oodua Peoples’ Congress

RG – Radicalised Groups

SW – South-West

SE- South-East

VRGs – Violent Radicalised Groups

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Violently radicalized groups remain a general incident which poses threats to international community. VRGs has manifested within the milieu of social movements. The surfacing of social movements all over the world could be situated within hypothetical limitations that endeavour to clarify the starting point for their survival as well as their modes of operations. In other words, social mobilization theories endeavour to give details the materialization, aims, techniques and strategies of groups that are opposed to either the government or multinational forces. In the same vein, the frontiers of social movements have expanded in such a way that involvement in social activism now is all over class divisions and the phenomena consist of all sorts of requests such as anti nuclear, anti armaments, anti war, secessions, environmentalist movements and nationalist movements (Tarrow, 1998:2). This array of social groupings build interactions beyond national borders for internationalizing their activities which they seek to address.

Agreed that social movements' activities transcend national borders, Tarrow (1998) states four styles of action that describe the social network's general disposition. They include: movement diffusion (i.e. temporary relations that generate related movement in other states); transnational issue networks (that is long-term information exchange between key actors of the social faction circle); political exchange (the networking of social conglomerations in a digit of societies); and transnational social movements (that is, the connections of groups with communal visions and ethics). Generally, some of the most important social movements have been ethnic nationalists and these account for the popular violent conflicts amongst states that in turn and in most cases give room for end result of strong enlistment of ethnic groups for reasons that are mainly political.

The largely important facet of the universal rebirth of what has come to be known as identity politics is the pace and extent to which demands the post world war nation building project of most states. In most instances, the combination of state failure, economic crises, domination and elite conspiracy had triggered identity searching and identity defending movements that are often grafted on the interplay of ethnicity and ethnic mobilization (Olaniyan, 2006). More often than not, this act of mobilization by ethnic movements has resulted into a form of political extremism in a violent form.

Violent radicalized groups are an endemic feature of most developing countries, and are generally found in a noteworthy amount of states in Africa and Asia looking to move through the state of political views to the strengthening of democratic rule. Instances flourish from states of Niger, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Cote d'Ivoire. This burden in substantiation indicates that democracy has often exasperated ethnic and common tensions in the localities already in divisions (Agbu, 2004). The compelling direction of ethnic national self-determination whatsoever reveals itself, shows the supreme hiccup confronting the global neighbourhood from the 1990s forward. For Nigeria, there have been the surfacing and increasing violent radicalized groups since the beginning of the Fourth Republic. There has been a noticeable trend towards violence and militancy in some of the movements, a development that has taken a toll on the Nigerian state, especially, in its quest for the much-needed peaceful co-existence, stability, law and order.

Tribal and regional clusters and their mercenaries have similarly grown to be a key fraction of the political background, frequently intimidating with infliction of violence for political benefits (Agbaje, 2003:11). Outstanding amongst these comprise the OPC in the Yoruba West, the Anambra Vigilance Service (Bakassi Boys) in the Igbo East, Egbesu Boys in the Niger-Delta area, MASSOB, in the Igbo East), and the recently formed Boko Haram in the North. According to Agbu (2004) cited in Okechukwu and Momoh (2008), the increase of ethnic mercenaries can be credited to be 'unease over alleged marginalization politically, paucity and joblessness, fall of social facilities and government welfare agenda as well as the supposed unproductive and fraudulent state system'. Numerous militia assemblies have risen to fight social and political wars against

other social groups or the country, in reaction to their marginalization. In this assertion lies the justification for the Agbekoya revolts of 1968-1969 in the Old Western Region. Gavin Williams summarizes the main causes of the revolts:

. . . in 1968 the farmers saw themselves exploited and greatly oppressed by an administration which denied paying reasonable amounts for their cocoas, but deployed crooked officials to maltreat them, deprived them of their gains and facilities pledged (Williams, 1980).

Fiercest battles had been waged in southern Osun, Ibadan and Egba provinces, where pastoral farmers and hunters were enlisted to struggle. The farmers' order for tax reduction and reasonable amounts for their cocoa products later came to bear during the reign of Tafa Adeoye, the leader of the group afterwards accosted Adeyinka Adebayo, the then Governor of Western region. However, society and state became more susceptible and insecure (Okechukwu and Momoh, 2008).

On a daily basis, the figure increases and as a result, the government come into view of being at a loss pertaining to how to address the crisis in a setting whereby personal and collective privileges have to be protected, aside the tribal and political consequences. The radical groups operating in Nigeria today have different goals. The OPC, MASSOB and Egbesu clearly pursue an agenda against perceived marginalization while the Egbesu Boys serve as bargaining outfit to gain concessions from the oil companies, the Bakassi Boys operated in search of freedom from oppression and domination. However, the recent violent group known as Boko Haram pursues a spontaneous religious purpose. In this context, the actions of the groups have taken a problematic dimension and terrorized the goals of peaceful togetherness.

Basically, extremist groups tended to arise more repeatedly from the beginning of the fourth Republic and these actually tended to develop into further violent and structured ethnically-based movements with scheduled ethnic outlines. The most worrying aspect of the recent escalation of violently radicalized groups in the country seems to be its threat to the Nigeria's corporate existence and the prospects of democratic consolidation. Thus, the substance of peaceful governance in a context of heightened inter-ethnic rivalry, social instability, division and distrust seems quite unlikely (Okechukwu, 2003:5). Indeed, most

studies on radical groups in Nigeria laid much emphasis on their impact on political and social order in Nigeria. This study however will interrogate the upsurge of violently radicalized groups in Nigeria within the context of political economy. Expressed differently, political economy hypotheses endeavour to give explanation on the materialization, goals, techniques and strategies of radical assemblies in relation to class consciousness.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The wake of radical groups during Nigeria's Fourth Republic portends different danger for the survival of democracy. The groups and their structural behaviour as observed by Okechukwu (2003:4) are only interested in what they can get from the state; these are not simply threats to the unity of the country and democracy but with a prevalence approach in dislocating the sovereignty of the state. Although, radical groups and conflicts associated with it are not new to Nigeria, considering the diversity and heterogeneity that are characteristics of the country. However, the frequency with which these violent clashes took place from the time when the present democratic administration assumed office made them one of the problematic ills that needed to be addressed.

The basis for the extremists resurgence remain dissimilar, and include the ones bred by incessant conflict and disagreement between citizen and indigene's rights, religious fanaticism, ethnic and communal intolerance, environmental degradation, historical animosities, political competition, hunger and tension arising from the dynamics of everybody's life between indigenes and settler or stranger (Thovoethini, 2005: 79). Thus, these radical groups champion various causes as they emerged in the political scenery of the state. The genesis of OPC is rooted in the interplay of forces during and after annulling the "June 12, 1993" presidential election adjudged to have been won by Moshood Abiola from Southwestern Nigeria. It started off as a pressure group to fight the perceived injustice occasioned by such annulment (Fasheun, 2002: 159). The Egbesu boys emerged to champion the cause of the Ijaw ethnic group in fighting alleged rip-off, environmental degradation and neglect by the oil producing companies and the Nigerian state (Albert, 2003:2). MASSOB was formed following the thirty years of Igbos' marginalization by the government in Nigeria. While Boko Haram emerged with religious extremism in order to

reject western education. However, Boko Haram has come out to be an apparatus at the expense of high echelon of Northern leaders in disrupting the governance which was perceived as exclusive so that they may have access to the economic and political resources of Nigeria.

Recent studies on the emergence, activities and operation of these radical groups have often focused on perceived marginalization cum injustices of ethnic assemblies in the Nigerian state as the main reason for resurgence of these groups (Faseheun, 2002, Agbu, 2004, Asamu, 2005, Badmus, 2006). However, this study will deviate from such ideas, by positioning the growth in radical groups within the framework of political economy. Thus, the astronomical rise in the level of unemployment especially among young graduates in the nation has provided easy labour market for the less privileged in the society to be recruited by radical groups. Quite obviously, operations of violently radicalized groups continue to have debilitating effects on the polity. They employ the use of sophisticated weapons in their operations and in the process caused death of many people. Every attempt at addressing the violent clashes among these groups by the deployment of sophisticated weapons and military strategy has instead of addressing the problem compounded it (Thoveoethini, 2005). The recent experience with Boko Haram in Nigeria attests to this assertion. Even more pertinent is the fact that extremist group activities has resulted into domestic terrorism.

1.3 Research Questions

The researcher carved out the questions below in guiding the study within the circumstance of the research objectives:

- i. What are the critical factors that led to transformation of social movements into VRGs in Nigeria?
- ii. Who are the key actors in the crossroad of such transformation, and why?
- iii. What are the various interfaces of security agents in the transformation process?
- iv. How has the underlying factor of the Nigeria political economy enhanced the activities of violently radicalized groups in Nigeria?

- v. What are the impacts the operations of VRGs have in their area of influence?

The questions raised above will provide a critical knowledge on *raisin deter* for the phenomenal growth of violently radicalized groups in the Nigerian political landscape, and how such phenomenon can be addressed.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The core aim of the study is to look into the transformation of the diverse hitherto legitimate social movements into VRGs in Nigeria. Specifically to:

- i. Examine the critical factors that led to transformation of the social movements (OPC and MASSOB) into violent radicalised groups (VRGs) in Nigeria;
- ii. Identify the key actors in the crossroad of such transformation, and why;
- iii. Critically investigate the various interfaces of security agents in the transformation process;
- iv. Examine how the underlying factor of Nigerian political economy has enhanced the activities of violently radicalized groups in Nigeria; and
- v. Interrogate the impacts of operations of VRGs in their area of influence.

1.5 Scope of the Study

The study got its focus on three violent radicalised groups in selected zones of Nigeria: the OPC in the South-western Nigeria, MASSOB in Eastern part of Nigeria in the South-Southern Nigeria. The choice of these groups is to study in a cross-cultural way the nature, causes, strategies and operations of violently radicalized groups in Nigerian body politics. In addition, the choice of different geo-political zones for the analysis of violently radicalized groups will widen our scope of analysis and give a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenal growth of the groups.

1.6 Justification and Significance of the Study

The justification for this research exists in three fold. One, it will offer the potential for presenting an in-depth analysis of activities of violently radicalized groups in Nigeria's body politic. Secondly, the three radical groups in focus will represent the standing and situational dimensions to radical groups problem in the country. This is possible through a robust analysis and comparative method of the activities and operations of these violent groups. Thirdly, the study would enhance our understanding of the seeming complexities

surrounding violently radicalized group activities and its nexus with political economy approach. Furthermore, a fieldwork approach will enhance an in depth analysis for the nature, causes and consequences of violent group activities in a diversified state like Nigeria.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0 Overview/Preamble

Researching the violently radicalized groups is not a novel thing. Numerous scholarly works have been written on the general nature, module operandi, objectives and activities of violently radicalized groups at the local, regional, continental and global levels. Put differently, many political scientists, historians, sociologist and others in the humanities have attempted and devoted their energy in studying and conducting research on violently radicalized groups. Thus, the aim of this literature review is to create an understanding surrounding what other scholars have said about the subject matter, see how they approached the issue and determine whether the scholars have answered the question(s) we intend to answer satisfactorily. The literature review specifically interrogates the existing works on the subject area aimed at discovering the gap in the existing literatures. It reveals what other scholars have either said or not said.

The x-ray of extant local and global literature on violently radicalized groups include a deeper conceptualization of important or key concepts that form the core of this study, literature review and theoretical framework. The chapter begins with conceptual discourse on the key concepts of religion, religious fundamentalism, religious extremism, religious radicalisation, ethnic group, ethnicity, militant and militancy, followed by a theoretical framework and a discussion of the extant literature within the series of matters on the prevalence and activities of these groups. This will put the overall discourse in context for the sake of accuracy in the analysis of the data collected thereafter.

2.1 Conceptual Discourse

As noted above, the basic concepts that form the bases of this study and are critically relevant to the heart of our thesis are: religion, religious fundamentalism, religious extremism, religious radicalisation, ethnic group, ethnicity, militant and militancy. They are hereby examined one after the other.

2.1.1 Religion

In the least effort in conceptualising religion is a very not easy responsibility from the beginning not only because it is considered a deeply contested term but also due to the fact that it does not have a universally accepted conceptual interpretation. This is why Turner (1991) posited that ‘even if the enquiry of the life of religion has been continually discussed by philosophers, sociologists, theologians, the conceptual issues are yet to be ascertained’. In spite of the fact that there is no agreement amongst academics as to the conceptual framework of religion, attempt is made here to x-ray the important insights offered by various strands of thought on the term.

Ramsey and Ledbetter (2001:2) viewed the term ‘religion’ as a concept that is not neutral but the one that contains sturdy connotations of a political and moral life. Another early thinker, Cicero, conceptualized the word ‘religion’ from its etymological connotation noting that it is a derivation of ‘*relegere*’ meaning to re-read. Put differently, religion is from the term *relegere* ‘the one that is reread’, the one which is sent in line of manacles in tradition. Otherwise, Lactantius however draws religion to mean *religare*, ‘to connect quickly’ or the one that connects women and men together and with the gods (Niekerk, 2018). Etymologically, ‘religion’ possesses a sturdy stress on society that is incongruous following the propensity in the contemporary the human race to think of religion to be personal and private (Ledbetter and Ramsey, 2001:2).

In conceptualizing religion, Niekerk (2018) noted that scholars who reel out different conceptual frameworks or meanings of religion based on its aspects or components either to agree what religion actually does, meaning it to be in congruence with its social and psychological utilities, and what is actually meant by religion in its real content. In his conception, conceptualizing religion is a function of perspectives as it could be mirrored

from various lens. This is why Schaffalitzky de Muckadell (2014) posited that the term 'religion' can be given real, functional, and stipulative definitions and the prototype approaches.

Marieke van Gaalen (2015) noted that the real meaning of religion is premised on what religion actually fulfills and how it usually drives 'according to its position in the socio-psychological context.' The situation actually indicates the spotlight is taking an influential task of religion (*Marieke van Gaalen, 2015*). According to him and it is pertaining to the shared meaning of religion for the group's rationality, social control, protection of group safety. It could as well be relevant to the emotional roles of religion by giving stories, symbols and sacrifices that will help individuals to classify with role models, be incentivised, uncover consolations, and offer responses to existential enquiries.

Possibly one of the earliest functionalist explanation of religion is presented by Durkheim who give explanation of belief as 'an integrated set of values and traditions comparative to hallowed things; things that are set apart or outlawed beliefs with practice that mix into one distinct just community called a Church, and everyone that adheres to them.' The conceptual framework of religion according to Durkhiem is an emphasis on the *social* facets of beliefs and practices that come with religion it is also a close centre of attention on the instrumental dictates of religion within the society as a collective force. Indeed, Durkheim's functionalist viewpoint on religion a focal point on the sacred as an alternative of the supernatural or awe-inspiring in religion, meaning that anything deemed highly precious by a group can be considered sacred, and it is exactly this holiness that takes on a religious nature without unavoidably being related to paranormal phenomena (*Marieke van Gaalen, 2015*).

Idowu and Turaki cited in Beyers (2009), noted that religion is defined as the way by which God is seen as a spirit and man's crucial self-communicate'. Idowu thus views religion as the consequence of humanity's unplanned awareness of a living Power. Corroborating this, Carls (2012), pointed out that three basic rudiments to each religion: holy objects, a set of values and customs and the subsistence of a ethical or just society. Similarly, Bruce (2011) posited that the Marxist interpretation of religion is an analysis of the functional perspective as it places emphasis on the function of religion in the society.

Still on the functional conceptual perspective of religion, Landmann (2013) citing Geertz , mirrors religion from a complex mix of cultural system conceptualizing it as an arrangement of symbols that acts to launch powerful, all-encompassing, and enduring frame of minds and enthusiasms in man by building notions in a broad command of subsistence and covering the notions with that quality of originality that the frame of mind and motivation appear exceptionally rational (Landmann, 2013). Accordingly, religions clutch to imitations of know-how, coordination of understanding and societal repression force; in this by providing communally-inherited remedies to existence predicaments and way of life (Landmann, 2013). In essence, culture with religion is to be identified as modification to the environment and as instrument for sustained subsistence and reproduction (Landmann, 2013).

Freire e Moleiro (2015) gives a more expanded and compressive conceptual analysis of religion noting that it has relationship with other aspects including the hunt for individual goals, meanings and rationale in life with good sizeable health as well as engaging in a social responsibility (Johansen, 2010). This conceptualization aligns with Fallot, (1998) and Haynes (2009) who defined it as quintessence of involvement in an array of ideas, ritual, and activity by attending religious and church gatherings, scripture reads, prayer and meditation. More recently, Koenig (2012) bridges the gap between western and eastern traditional modes of worship noting that the phenomenon of religion stands for the multi-dimensional make up that encompasses belief and philosophy, sacrifice and behaviour, and even formal procedures that may be implemented in private cum public arenas, but are in some way deduced from recognized traditions that got developed over time in a community.

Be that as it may, functional perspectives on religion have been critiqued massively by some scholars on the bases of the fact that such definitions are mere declarations on the outcomes which may be normally hinged on more traditional, substantiated classifications of faith and not on the fundamental contents, features and substance of religions as portrayed in various ideologies and creeds. This critique of religion has therefore necessitated another strand of conceptualization of religion which is the substantive approach.

A substantive conceptual framework of religion is given by Bruce (2011) in which he said about religion, comprises the actions, beliefs, and establishments which presume the reality in ghostly beings with powers to utilize, or impersonal powers possessed of moral principle (Bruce 2011). In the same vein, Colson & Pearson (2001) observed that religion remains the aim in existence upon that concerning someone's life, his or her eventual values run. Pitgietri and Van Walt (2014) corroborated this view positing that religion is no more than it is an ordered anthology of faith systems, enriching system and world perceptions which maintains a very close nexus with humankind to theology, ethical values and the source and importance of life. They argued that religion covers the judgment, acts and understanding of people (communal) so far as they take into custody for them to be on their feet in consonance with whatsoever considered to be godly in nature.

2.1.2 Religious Fundamentalism

Just like religion, the phenomenon of fundamentalism in the religious circle has been given variant conceptualisations by various scholars across disciplines. Pitgietri and Van Walt (2014) conceptualize religious fundamentalism as a kind of relative condition in which a cluster of people may prefer to view their religion's position in public life to be superior than it reasonably ought to be. It has also been conceptualized as a kind of approach that is revolutionary and violent in nature and which is propelled by forces of modernity. It involves issues that associated with religious as well as cultural liberalism. Lenshie e.tal (2012) views this concept as an apparent quest expressed for the return to normalcy in a society or setting. Lenshie e.tal noted that the appearance of resistance against departure from pre-existing standards that governs a particular community which defines religious fundamentalism, representing the core of its existence.

Religious fundamentalism has also been examined from the perspective of its taxonomy and essential features. Its taxonomy according to Komonchak, Collins and Lane (1996) is in three components or domains, viz: cognitive, cultural theological and social movement. In other words, religious fundamentalism could be viewed from three major perspectives according to them. The first perspective which is cognitive defines this concept as a reactionary attitude that is emphasizes exclusivity, particularity and moral rigour. The second perspective according to them is the cultural theological strand which mirrors religious fundamentalism as a stiff opposition to peculiar and specific religious and

cultural liberalism. According to them, this stiff resistance to religious and cultural tolerance is controlled by the desire to guard orthodoxy and religious traditions, dogmas and doctrines. The third conceptual interpretation given by Komonchak, Collins and Lane (1996) is the social movement viewpoint which denotes organisational and ideological exclusivity from other types of religious movements in a particular social setting.

To this end, the concept can be summed up as the existence of religious movement whose underpinning factor or element is the stringent adherence to certain religious doctrines and set traditions. Religious fundamentalism is therefore a departure from cultural and religious liberalism and the return to orthodox doctrinal and scriptural prescriptions and originality. Thus, in various climes where poses security dangers, it advocates the stringent and undiluted attention to conventional main beliefs of particular faiths, especially the two major religions of Islam and Christianity.

2.1.3 Religious Extremism

Extremism shares a line convergence with religious fundamentalism as both phenomena pose serious threats to local and global peace and security. Archbishop Desmond Tutu in his analyses and description of what extremism entails opined that:

when you fail to permit a changed opinion; when one clings to his own opinions as an elite, when he doesn't approve the likelihood of dissimilarity and when he begins to impose this belief on others with the use violence, the person is an extremist... (Tutu, 2006)

It has been given a kind of political conceptual denotation as it is sometimes mobilized as a mechanism or tool for attaining a political end. By implication, extremism is activity that is aimed at achieving set political objectives in the shape of influencing government policies and changes in political decisions of a ruling government. In this case, it is an undemocratic instrument of attaining political end.

It suffices to observe that the issue of religious extremism or fundamentalism may not necessarily entail the use of violence. In some cases, however, these issues embrace violence. It is apt to submit that religious extremists are no more than religious fundamentalists as the ideals both embrace centre on religious conservatism and doctrinal rigidity. This is why Sampson (2012) posited that those who exhibit religious extremism and fundamentalism get the arrangement that if others do not go behind their ways, they would be hopeless and fated (Sampson, 2012). By implication, they develop clear hatred

and abhorrence towards the preaching of the tenets of other religions and try to achieve this end by resorting to the instrument of violence to stop it.

The onus of the central element in the attitude of religious fundamentalists or extremists is their insistence on the universal acceptance and entrenchment of specific religious doctrines by all including. It is also the focal point to ensure that social, political and economic systems kowtow with their religious doctrine regardless of social circumstances or milieu. Indeed, fundamentalism and extremism do not have room for any sort of concession with social transformation that contradicts the orthodox tenets of a particular religion. This fact informs Sampson's (2012) submission in terms of pecking order, religious fanaticism appears the furthest and generally deadly variety of religious fanaticism in any society and that its existence poses serious threats to humanity and developmental changes.

2.1.4 Religious Radicalisation

Dozens of conceptual interpretations have been given to describe what religious radicalization denotes as there is no generally accepted conceptual framework or theory defining it. In conceptualizing religious radicalization, Horgan (2008) posited that it covers all kinds of social and psychological processes of in some cases experienced obligation to fanatic either of religion or politics ideologies (EU Commission, 2017). Horgan noted that this growing change is emphasized in mainly in literatures in which by the time "a choice is made on fear, horror and violence are defensible to attain ideologies, politics and socio-cultural changes, radicalization to violent fanaticism usually takes place" (EU Commission 2017).

Similarly, Baily and Edwards (2017) noted that as a concept, the term 'radicalisation' is a course with no exact foundation or expected end-point. Baily and Edwards (2017) noted that the term Radicalization, though a seriously debated discourse, has no established definition. Though, it is usually defined to be an individualized or multifaceted process by which people are exposed to an ideology and change from that state that is measured to be mainstreams or conservative ideas to acute beliefs and of ideas. Radicalisation encompasses the individual and structural factors with amount of additional constituents, inclusive of the root causes, strains, ideology, and socialization with people in agreement. Baily and Edwards (2017) further posit that given the complex process and changes that

underscore radicalization, the phenomenon can be broadly classified into two main types based on the complexity of the magnitude of nature it takes.

This according to Baily and Edwards are *micro-radicalisations* which describes the annoyance of great quantum of people during the time they are confronted with apparent threats in a particular society. This type of radicalisation covers the miniature movements that give to portions of the society that is becoming more engrossed in conflict situation or the one that not in harmony with other segments of the social settings (Baily Edwards, 2017). The implication of this classification is those numerous people radicalize but that most for no reason go at length to the notice of government; get more usually de-radicalized than moving on to a larger conflict. Therefore, the incentivizing factors, the start and eventuality of radicalization expeditions are varied (Baily and Edwards, 2017).

Borum (2011) that the underlying factor that underpins religious radicalization is radical beliefs as these set a pre-condition to violent behaviour in a social setting. Rink and Sharma (2016) conceptualized religious radicalization in three similar contexts. The first context according to them is associated with descriptive function of the term which denotes the activity that allows individuals' expression of certain or specific extremist attitudes and behaviour towards other members of a society on the basis of the tenets of faith they subscribe to. The second conceptual analysis given on the radicalization by Rink and Sharma is that which is based on the justification for violence. The third approach to religious radicalization as given by them defines it as the series of actions touching a religious group's universal membership, such as the increase in militant groups or political parties associated with Christianity or Islam as two global religions.

Horgan (2011) contends that mirroring the issues relating to radicalization from through the lens its targeted objectives, it could be referred to as a process and activity that is politically motivated. This notion by Horgan is a political interpretation of the concept of radicalization. Horgan argues that radicalization though may seemingly pose certain religious motivations, but beneath such as political rationalization. Thus, in Horgan's conceptualisation, the term radicalization has heavily politicized as it has been a political game of labelling and blames attribution. In line with this notion, Jensen cited in Schmid (2013) viewed the concept of radicalization as the procedural and gradual adoption of certain extreme religious or ideological views and creeds which which often propels the

prevalence of political violence in various social settings. Jensen's position aligns with the one given by Horgan as it sees radicalization as a process that is predetermined to achieve some political goals. The political analysis of radicalization is also supported by Ongerling cited in Schmid (2013) who noted that radicalization a situation in which a person keys into or adopt extreme politico-religious views and objectives with the conviction that the embracement of certain extreme methods or approaches sufficiently justifies this. Corroborating this, Ashour (2009) describes the term as follows:

Radicalisation means a procedure of practical transformation in which a set of people goes ideological or possess behavioural revolution that direct the denial of democratic ethos (as well as the peaceful substitution of power and the validity of ideological and as well politics of pluralistic manners) and probably to the exploitation of aggression in boosting the levels of violence towards attaining political aim (Ashour, 2009)

A holistically de-politicised' conceptual perspective is offered by McCauley and Moskalenko (2010) who posited that radicalization involves the series of changes in beliefs, feelings and behaviour which are direct products of the desire to bring about political conflicts. McCauley and Moskalenko 's conceptual clarification of the term points to the fact that radicalization is an instrument that is usually explored by the state, individuals and groups as a means of attaining specific political objectives. This definitional viewpoint points to the fact that the phenomenon of radicalization has no particular end point and no value judgments. Radicalisation leads a set of people to non-violent and even licit activities or either illicit or violent conducts, and this could be adjudged in the long-standing to be force for either good or bad.

2.1.5 Ethnicity and Ethnic Group

As Ratcliffe (2014) pontificated, there is a strong relationship between the concept of ethnicity and ethnic group as there appear to be many differing and divergent ontological interpretations to this terminology. Macpherson (2015) posited that ethnicity refers to the cultural group that individuals belong to and that is the common identity that describes every human being as no person can exist outside the domain of ethnic group or ethnicity. Citing Mair, Ebegbulem (2009) noted ethnicity or ethnic group are synonymous and that both denote group members who share similar or same historical, cultural and linguistic, belief as well as ideological experiences. He noted that ethnicity is a direct consequence of some trajectories viz: modernised settings, economic growth and political advancement, especially in the continent of Africa. He further explained that there ways

of identifying a particular ethnic group or ethnicity and that the main features that aptly define members of an ethnic group or ethnicity are essentially culture, language, customary political organization and defensiveness. Put differently, associates of an ethnic assembly have to share a familiar mores, language and practice and dwell in the same terrain as these are the descriptions that describe their bonding as a group.

Mair (1993) posited that there are three fundamental elements or characteristics that describes or define ethnicity as first, the racially precise tradition and exclusive set of symbols and philosophy, the faith in familiar source involving from time to time, the existence or thoughts of a common past and finally the involvement of a common sense of association to a group. Pinpointing the complexity in the phenomenon of ethnicity or ethnic group Nnoli (2007) observed that ethnicity is a kind of phenomenon that could be connected or get in touch with ethnic or tribal groups that subsist in similar political arrangement and that this social element is fundamentally characterized by socio-cultural prejudice and discrimination.

Corroborating the above, Edewor, Aluko and Folarin (2014) defined ethnicity as the a social phenomenon that captures the behavioural features a particular ethnic group poses and the ascribed membership that s defined by issues of general account, lineage, language, race, religion, traditions and terrain. To them, general narration, descent, language, race, belief, customs and region are the necessary factors that need not be there before a group is so named, the significant issue is that the group must be categorised as possessing a general distinctiveness that differentiates it from others.

Osaghae (1995) gives a robust conceptualization of ethnicity as he views it as an instrument which is deployed by social actors through series of conscious efforts and which becomes obvious in competitive unions as well as in the circumstance of collaboration. Osaghae opined that ethnicity is a conscious means or strategy deployed by social actors in a bid to attain certain political, economic and social results. The eruption of ethnic conflicts which is a product of the consciousness of ethnicity by members of a social group which makes itself evident in various methods, such as voting patterns, community engagement and violence. Consequently, Osaghae's conceptual framework of ethnicity is that which captures it the deployment and utilisation of tribal uniqueness and dissimilarity to add benefit in conditions of rivalry or cooperation. If the end justifies the

means, then, ethnicity is the means while certain political and economic results are the end products of it.

Regmi (2006) has examined the specific context and complexity associated with ethnicity and ethnic group noting that the phenomenon is grossly society specific and that it depends largely upon complete and total socio-political orientation of the concerned society. He observed that the complexity and rigorous nature of this phenomenon is attributable to various connotations in the perspective of a mono-nation and a multifaceted-cultural connection that are bound by a government with adequate majority-minority circumstances. He explained further that the tribalism is the significant feature of ethnic characteristics that carries consolidating and mobilization efforts as well as goal setting and goal attainment for the interest of an individual or individuals who are bound together by common politico-economic interests. By implication, this issue is seen as highly nebulous, confusing and complex concepts whose interpretations can be approached from various perspectives. This however, suggests the ambiguity and rigour in the conceptual meaning of ethnicity even though it shows an exhilarating effectiveness in its effects and to the recognized charge.

Santos, Palomares, Normando and Quintão (2010) observed that the issue of ethnicity or ethnic group encompasses the basic elements culture which embodies religious affiliation, linguistic characteristics, nationality, tribal affiliation, religion, as well as traditions of a particular group. They posited further that putting an ethnic community or society in context, its major determinants are basically linguistic, cultural and genetic lines of convergence or similarities. Ethnic communities therefore boast of a distinct socio-political structure, and a territorial boundary. Bacal (1991) explained the historical place of ethnicity in contemporary societies, submitting that it's a historic term that results from inter-ethnic relations which describes the contact or intermingling that exist whenever two different groups or societies. Ethnicity resulting from inter-ethnic contacts is a kind of social consciousness that emanates from various modes of spatial, political-economic, cultural and social relation.

Many sociologists and scholars who have studied ethnicity are of the view that the mobilization of ethnicity is aimed at driving at or pursuing certain perceived ethnic interests which include but not limited to the order for justice, equitability or equity in

allocating the social cum economic and political resources with political balancing. The deployment of ethnicity could take both positive and negative dimensions. This suggests that ethnicity has two major aspects, viz: positive and negative. It is positive when is meant to address specific plights of a particular ethnic group without necessarily threatening the corporate existence of the state. When it takes the dimension, tribal conducts do not make up any risk to the social and political cum economic growth in a state.

The phenomenon of ethnic tribalism is said to be deployed negatively when negative attitudinal traits are directed towards some groups who are taken to be ‘outsiders’, and a situation which constitutes serious threats for social and political cum economic growth in a state (Adetiba and Rahim, 2012). It should be noted that the positive aspects of ethnicity are insignificant in pluralistic societies because of diversity and their peculiarities. By a way of implication, it could be said that inter-ethnic interactions or relations are capable of entrenching either positive or negative consequences of effects on the social cum politics and financially workable arrangements of other organs. In real meaning, ethnicity is demanding if the various ethnic bodies go into conflicts in a other to gain political power, resulting in deteriorating through a variety of political sustenance to a foundation in the place of political variance.

One crucial question that has continued to attract the attention, views and debates by scholars on the phenomenon of ethnicity is not unconnected with the factors responsible for the mobilization and maintenance of identity and ethnicity by various groups around the world, especially in pluralistic societies where diversity is the key defining feature. The prevalence of identity crises in many countries around the world especially sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria inclusive has been rationalized through the lens of ethnicity. In other words, ethnicity has continued to nurture the seed of nationalism turned out to be one of the biggest propellers of intra-state and inter-group imbroglio in many parts of Sub-Sahara Africa. Ethnicity as an instrument of identity therefore assumes the status of a veritable tool of negotiating and winning political power and resources. This explains the Politicization and mismanagement of the rich ethnic African diversity and pluralism which is the handiwork of African ruling elites.

Olayode (2016) corroborates the mobilization of ethnicity in Africa by political elites and its overall consequences on identity issues as thus:

The rivalry between ethnically based support networks for admittance to state possessions and power was strengthened by untied electoral opposition and through elections. Votes could be exchanged for political arrangements and expected redeployment of material gains. In addition, the use of popular votes in Africa tends to improve this mannerism. What's more is that the little distinction in ideology between political parties comes little but their ethnic support for politicians to call. Historical and ongoing crises in African states of the Rwandan genocide, Darfur, civil war and religious conflicts in Nigeria among others serve as the push that ethnicity does as a trigger of conflict in numerous parts of Africa (Olayode, 2016)

'Elite ethnicity' in the words of Monty is closely related to the challenges militating against the peace and security in many African states of post-colonial era as newly independent African states are characterized by political and professional bodies or associations that remain weak when the local patronage or tribal lineages are the major bases of sustenance for political accomplishment (Monty, 2006). As measures of political interaction, ethnic way of life is politically prominent among the leaders and members of the ruling ethnic groups are powerfully preferred in the allocation of political arrangements and, especially, in command positions in the military, often including restrictions on political admittance and activities of other component ethnic groups (Monty, 2006)

Yusuf (1994) pontificated that ethnic situation and religion usually shape social distinctiveness and conflicts, and how people are assembled in support of groups based on such clusters in sovereign polities especially those known for pluralism or diversity in continental Africa. He submitted that the phenomenon of ethnicity is an underlying factor that explains the prevalence of social clashes and nefarious engagements of some associations who use violence to pursue their objectives. Ethnicity propelled hostilities are usually based on competition for the state and manifest in two major forms namely: multi-polar and bi-polar forms. In bi-polar conflict form there exist roughly two sets of group that strive hard to be in command of a country (Yusuf, 1994). Also in the condition of multi-polarity form, ethnic group may not usually have permanent adversaries but only permanent interests, as they are directed to form alliances to attain their goals. In a typical multi-ethnic setting, as in Nigeria is an example of a multi-polar form where, domination and exclusion are usually attained by a particular group acting in coalition with others (Yusuf, 1994).

2.2 Literature Review

It is necessary to begin this section using a brief conceptualisation of radicalisation. Radicalization, though a seriously debated discourse, has no established definition. Though, it is usually defined to be an individualized or multifaceted process by which people are exposed to an ideology and change from that state that is measured to be mainstreams or conservative thoughts to acute arrangement of philosophy and ideals. For years, Islamic beliefs and the agreement with and against progressive fundamentalism has led to several rancours or divisions among the muslims world. Nonetheless, numerous Muslim states in Africa, Europe and Asia have in one way or the other tried to implement secularism (Krukliis, 2014).

Consequently, a radical group can be described as an association or set of people that confesses a belief classification which rejects the eminence quo and vigorously seeks to an ideal past or future. Radicalization is usually defined to be an individualized or multifaceted process by which people are exposed to an ideology and change from that state that is measured to be mainstreams or conventional ideas to some beliefs. Radicalization varies from cognitive, that is, operating within licit means and limited to ideas (ECEG, 2008).

The concept 'radicalism' is a relative concept. This stem from the fact that it means different thing to different people, to some it is an act that is used to describe violent groups like terrorists, ethnic militia groups etc. Others also see it as a term used to describe liberation fighters. It is in this regards that Bell (1977) identified two central observations on extremism (radicalism) - the persons behind of violence on one hand and "people fighting for freedom" on the other hand. Bell (1977) sees the differing explanations as the underpinning basis of the generally acknowledged postulation radicals remain emotional extremists and their conducts can never be reorganized. The individual or group may not necessarily be a threat to the society or anyone but the fact is that they may have a different perception about politics and how thing are done generally in the society.

2.2.1 Comprehending the Processes of Radicalisation and Extremism in the Global System

Processes of radicalisation and that of violent extremism remain the notions popularly employed in the academic and other general discussions. Thus, is easy to know what the concept actually indicate, if known but for which basis; and the implications? However, it is pertinent to comprehend the intricacies of the dialogue, in order to have deep examination of the issue. Employing the various speculative viewpoints from the social sciences, the current study chapter tries answering several questions on underlying factors. Being familiar with the huge quality of perceptions and models on the issues, the very first section of the chapter focuses on the way groups actually form coupled with the way the individuals or groups among become more radicalised into violent extremisms, interrogating hypotheses about what actually push or incentivize individuals becoming radicalised, dynamism of groups, and as well the workability of ideologies.

2.2.2 Overview of the Group Formations, Processes of Radicalisation with Violent Extremism Group Formations

Recently in the area behavioural Psychology, increase in interests, making use of the psychological arena in explaining the various reasons or causes reasons of or the radicalisation processes and metamorphosis into violent extremism. This field remains a sub-set of Psychological field which discusses the significance, operations and manipulations among individuals, having a notable concentration on groups' behaviours, inter-groups conflicts as well their dynamics (Borum, 2011). Meanwhile, the concepts of group formation and social identity and that of inter-group relation and conflicts remain the arguments in the field of social psychology which remain regularly employed while evaluate violent radicalisation and extremism, but actually it sounds more significant in exploring the issues of discourse so as to comprehend the inputs of social psychology in the subject under discussion.

There also exists a social and psychological theory of social identity. Social Identity is that notion in which people describe or see themselves mainly in the areas of membership in such social groupings and also that they are usually likely to seek a positive social identity.

In addition, inter-group discriminations become regularly compelled by favouritism within the group and not the outside group suppression or control (Hewstone, 2001). Moreover, social identity theory postulates the notion that people to a great degree see themselves in tandem with the social group identified with. This kind identity on the people gets more invigorated via the group's membership serving to strengthen the nexus in-between the individuals and the group. Therefore, in case of any threat on the groups, this can then be identified as threats to individuals' identities (Miall, 2007).

Radicalization and Violent Extremism – Individuals and Groups

Even though radicalization and violent extremism become regularly uses in news write-ups and journals, but the usage and clarifications of the ideas are at times not very obvious (Borum, 2011). A suitable comprehension of the expression is then significant so as to have a basis for discussion. Radicalisation, though a debated issue, is freely made use of in defining the course by which persons or groups come in considering aggression as a justifiable means of attaining some desired aims. Though, it is not actually all radical people are to actually meant to be violent while not all the ideas seen to be radical give room for the application of violence are regarded to be acceptable when the people or members of groups act within the confines of law (Kruglanski et al., 2014; UNESCO, 2016).

Similarly, people believed to be radical see violence to be a lawful path of actions, while they fail to find it the only means of actions. Following the submission of UNESCO, violent extremism refers to the actions and belief of individuals that give credence to the deployment of motivations of ideologies influenced by violence in carrying out their religious, ideological, political, radical and ideological points. The various violent extremists' viewpoints may either be social, political, religious, social, and most especially connected to gender associations, or even environmental protections and it is believed there is no worldview as the various religious communities and societies remain invulnerable (UNESCO, 2016, 11-13).

Using the Two-Pyramid Approach – Separating the Actions and Thoughts

On the notion that a distinction exists between violent extremist actions and radical thoughts, then brings a perception which gives room for a segregation amid level or degree of radicalization activities, as this might be debated a distinction between radicalised individuals who engage in violence and join the terrorists' organizations, with

individuals believed to have been radicalized providing supports in the areas of logistics to the radical and violent groups.

This point remains also viewed in a pyramid sense of involvement in terrorist activities promoting the notion which inert apostles of terrorist engagements forming larger percentage of members, but the totality of such members declines when each progresses to the top and heightened violent and radical actions. Though the major causes such an undersized segment of admirers give adequate devotion to the goals in engaging in the act by ignoring the usual matters of: survival remains the actual issue to be discussed too (Kruglanski et al., 2014).

In addition, a related research on murderous thinking showed that though 95 percent of participants responded they grew the reflections while a little segment is committed to its flight of the imagination (Duntley, 2005). Equally, antagonism regarding groups discriminating act as well scarcely transforms into various remonstrations (Klandermans, 1997; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017).




Figure 2.1 The "Opinion Pyramid"

This two-pyramid approach responds to the condemnation by fronting the notion of an obvious disconnection between radicalized opinions and radicalized actions by making use of two pyramids which include: the Opinion pyramids and that of the Action pyramids. But looking through the bottom of the opinion pyramids, there exist people who do not mind the political grounds (neutral), upper in the pyramids remain the ones that truly devote to the cause though fail to move beyond in order to prove main cause of violence (sympathizers), still privileged on the pyramids remain the ones who validate the use of violence in the argument of the grounds of the groups “justifiers”. Also at the top of the pyramids exist persons who that sense an individual ethical commitment in taking up violence to defend stance of the group (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017).




Figure 2.2 The Action pyramid

Debates on the action pyramids comprise the people who do not carry out any function for the political groups or causes. These are composed of the pyramid “known as inert”; larger on this pyramid exist the persons known to be involved in lawful socio-political actions for the goals “known as activists”; and still elevated to the top of the pyramids exist the ones engaged in illicit actions for the real cause “known to be radicals”; while at the top exist the persons involved in unlawful activities, violently targeting the civilians (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017:213).

Obviously, all kinds of investigations seeking to unravel the nexus and banes of radicalizing into violent extremist actions need to painstakingly think about the affiliation between thoughts and actions and not to overstate the possible consequence definite situations on violent extremists’ actions. This two-pyramid approach has really helped in distinguishing between ranges of actions and that of opinions, whereas may get employed in analyzing the alterations in each pyramid. This has as well provided a practical structure to examine the course of radicalisation and the link between actions and opinions. Though it may have some policy impacts on strategies in countering the menace, owing to the fact that warring against all sorts of aggressive extremists’ notions are more distinct more than warring against terrorist. Additionally, this enunciates the nexus between actions and ideologies is relatively weaker and none fits all remedies to halt any kind of violent or aggressive extremist ideas (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017).

2.3 Theorizing the Processes of Radicalization and Violent Extremists Ideas

Numerous theories abound in the social sciences explaining the radicalization and violent extremism processes, while all the approaches indicate distinct illustrative factors for the situations. Though, a lot of peculiarities abound among the said postulations and factors irrespective of whether the logical ideas employ illustrative factors. Therefore, the two areas which are rising across the models would be clearly discussed: that is, motivating factor and the need for someone to get involved in violent or aggressive actions due to the person’s or total strain and grievance; and the roles or functionalities of groups’ dynamism, via social tentacles which promote the radicalisations into violent extremism processes (Agnew, 2010; Borum, 2011; Horgan, 2008; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017).

These processes of getting radicalized into violent extremist’s actions are usually

discovered through the popular push-and-pull factors. As mentioned, these remain the actual factors pushing or pulling the individuals or groups into getting radicalized and violent. The factors that are regarded as push-and-pull ones at times varies but depends on the channels, though there exist noted elements which may be highlighted. Significant push-factors may be as a result of marginalized, discriminated against, persecuted or the perceptions of suffering from the above; and as well having limited access to good and quality academic stance or education, rights denial and absence of civil freedom (UNESCO, 2016).

In the case of pull-factors, this usually promotes call for violent extremism, and for instance via the subsistence of well-coordinated groupings providing revenue or income, services, employment and other motivating interests in revisit of membership's supports. The groups get strengthened in their appeals via being showcased as channels of angers and also provide spiritual consolations with a sense of belonging cum the supporting social networks. However, the pull factors get classified into radical narrative and groups' dynamics (UNESCO, 2016). However, appropriate factors remain highly significant in the exercise in righting the wrongs which include: absence of rule of law, absence of well-built institution, high rate of corrupt acts and criminalities (UNDP, 2016).

Motivational factors - Significance Quest Hypothesis and the Role of Social Identity

Studies on the radicalisation and violent extremism processes in some cases take a cursory consideration of factors of motivations. They include individual motivation and collective motivation, making individuals or groupings becoming more radicalized and extremely violent in nature. The theory which totally describes motivational factor could be the worthy quest theory that hammers on the significance of emotions and identity. Outstanding scholars in the fields of social psychology and applications to the issues on radicalization; Arie Kruglanski and Michele Gelfand, emphasize the roles of emotion and humiliations in the radicalization and violent conflicts processes (Moskalenko, 2017).

People's significance losses can come due to the socio-political and economic situations in a country: incessant conflicts, political instabilities, security collapse and failures of the government in maintaining law and orders (Kruglanski et al., 2014). Emile Durkheim argues that the phenomenon leads to a condition in which a nation fails in providing the

opportunity by which the citizenry may achieve its goals. The statement as stated by Durkheim known as anomie again may spur people in the country in developing mind-sets of vulnerabilities that can probably be taken gains of by terrorist or violent organizations or communities (Denoux and Carter, 2009). Without mincing words, the malfunction of the nation in providing prospects for her citizens, or the absence of trust in the country in providing adequate benefits, can propel to people to fall susceptible to other issues that would address their grumbles, even the radicalized and violent extremists' identifications.

Again, the significance or roles of the terror-prone ideologies are driven by researchers, for example, a psychologist - Kruglanski Arie, who paints the way the mentioned ideologies contain the elements of grievances against a particular group, the culprits are assumed to be responsible for the grievances earlier perpetrated grievance, while on their own think or believe they are efficient means of deleting the dishonours that are occasioned by the grievances and injustices of violence and as well terrorism. In a similar vein, ideologies and religion may serve as a honourable elimination of violence, thereby justifying its deployment against the basis of the grievances experienced or being suffered by the apostles of such ideology (Kruglanski et al., 2014). Also, religious belief coupled with violent and radical extremists' submissions together with other forms of ideology, sharing their features may thus serve as activating elements and facilitating a common ideology (Kruglanski et al., 2014; UNESCO, 2016).

In addition, these mobilizing elements become more invigorated by the emotional elements that corroborate Lindner's submission on the effect of emotions when connected to grievance and as well as effects of an apparent insignificance. Nevertheless, it remains very imperative by emphasizing there should be actual grievance, for the ideological or religious communities to employ the mentioned grievances for recruitments and mobilization purpose. Similarly, the radical groups would never easily come up with grievances seemed to be illegitimate or irrelevant by their supporters or adherents.

2.4 The Roles of Group Dynamics in Radicalization Activities in the Global Societies

Inter-group relations and group dynamics are readily germane in the perspective of the way people are becoming radicalized in man's societies. Compared to recent intergroup models such like the ones being promoted by the foremost social psychologist, Sherif Muzafir whereby apparent goal incompatibilities or goal disparities between social groups remain the major sources of inter-group conflicts. In the same vein, the theory of social identity enhances the views whereby social classification may be the foundation of inter-group discriminations as well as that of possible conflicts (Sherif, 1966). The situation may take place simultaneously as follows.

Firstly, the threats on a group which could make members of the group to feel as if their social identity get more threatened and even in dangerous situation of being completely eliminated, may actually compel the group members into engaging in behaviours classified to not rational respectively (Cains and Hewstone, 2001: 223). The possibility of conflicts may get more emboldened in the course of "othering", meaning the assemblage of absolutely divergent groupings by highlighting the unhelpful qualities of the out-group; as the in-group may retain sanguine features (Schwalbe, 2000). Secondly, group dynamics may contain numerous impacts on individuals' behaviours, strengthening radicalizations the more. This may, for instance, develop acute extreme attitude than the ones possessed by each member of such group (Borum, 2011). The trend is known as *group polarization* as it is taken to mean an imperative for radicalised behavioural patterns.

As submitted by Group Polarization model, members of the group are conferred with the dangers and risks of getting engaged in violent behaviours and activities; the individuals already radicalised can be willing to go through or may be taking greater risks more than what they could actually do. But should the popular team of the group indicate its readiness in taking the risks, putting forward numerous debates instead of taking the dangers or risks. However, the higher a person connects with same group, the higher he gets prone to social manipulations and peer pressure in such group (Cederman et al., 2013; Vugt, 2015).

It is against this backdrop that Dickman and Bartoli (1992) argued that extremism refers to a complex trend that is often hard to see. They therefore conceptualised it to be an action (viewpoint, attitude, emotion, action, strategy) of a personality that is extremely detached from the ordinary world. The word radicalism is usually used in consonance with the all sorts of violence against the stance of the society. For instance, the activities of Al Qaeda or Hezbollah group is seen by many in the Western World as act of violent radicalism while they in turn will describe the America's invasion of Vietnam as extremist action. The inability to resolve the question of legitimacy of the use of force made Ubani (2010:24) to query Max Webber's idea of state as having the control of the lawful use of force as Webber failed to tell his audience the scale and at what circumstance the state can use force.

2.5 Overview of the Notable Factors Rendering People More Vulnerable to the Radicalization Process

The processes of radicalisation into violent groups are predicated on two major driving components and they include; group dynamics and motivational factors but ideologies provide inputs into them (Webber and Kruglanski, 2018). Nonetheless, it becomes imperative to know what primarily manipulates the society where such processes take place. Existing literatures analyze the elements affecting the societies where processes take place which include; socio-economic problems among which are bad quality in education, lack of employment and poor economic benefits, and absence of social trust. Decisively, as the thesis submits, the mentioned socio-economic problems are making people more exposed to radicalisations into violent groupings.




Figure 2.3 Socio-economic Challenge and the main element in the process of radicalisation

Vulnerability Factors – Examining the Hypotheses

Debates on the extent at which socio-economic phenomena plays some roles in making a nation to be more radicalization-prone and violence prone. One of the scholars on processes of radicalisation and violent actions, Shtuni Adrian in 2016, downplays the magnitude of socio-economic elements, highlighting other aspects, like a topical distress of a violent disagreement having an undertone of religion.

In clarifying the manner at which how socio-economic issues, influence the environments where the processes of violent and radicalized engagements take place and their impacts, this thesis examines the incident of getting radicalised into a violent group by taking a cursory look at the various *Vulnerability Factors* in the society. These vulnerability factors prompt man, towards developing some radical insinuations with an increase in the possibility of turning radicalised or becoming a violent group member. The theory is portrayed in the diagram shown here:




Figure 2.4 Vulnerability Factors and the Processes of Radicalization

In replacing the focus on the individual impetus and grievance of radicalised fellows, research has investigated three vulnerability elements or factors such as: joblessness or lack of employment, low state or quality education, and loss of social trust. Foremost, research has revealed the ways by which the socio-economic elements force individuals to fall exposed to radical thoughts as well the dynamics of groups, thereby becoming members of violent bodies. In addition, research has shown in numerous ways the rate at which corrupt actions or behaviours have impacted the *vulnerability factors*, as indicated in a study on the phenomenon in numerous African states, most especially in Kosovo.

Admitting there exist some other elements providing costly approaches, the earlier mentioned vulnerability factors; dearth of quality education, lack of employment and economic resources, and absence of social trust, are noted as they are regularly pointed to, measures and talks on processes of radicalization and violent groupings (United Nations, 2015).

Education

Results from thesis indicate that the roles education plays in the processes of radicalisation to violent groupings show a jumble of position. There exist numerous pragmatic evidences indicating the intensity of education impacting strongly the processes of radicalisation, discussed in the fact that is an avalanche of both the educated people and the persons of low education as members of radicalized groups (Silke, 2008). Nevertheless, several reasons abound to indicate the fact remains inconclusive; the first one is the fact that many studies show the way absence of education show a relationship with unemployment, means, being frustrated and dash of hope, spurring persons into seeking chances anywhere like a violent group (Gojani, 2017).

Employment and Economic Benefits or Opportunities

On employments, economies and terrorist acts, numerous researchers like: Hess, Weerapana, Blomberg, and Hess (2004) connect bad economic policy to the escalation of violent engagements in the appearance of terrorist tendencies. Employing some numerical information 200 states between 1978 and 1992, the researchers were able to depict the times of economic failings amplified the probability of terrorist tendencies. Scholarship outcomes of Urdal Henrik (2012) indicate the states having a large proportion of youths

within the ages of 16 and 25 are far likely to get indulged in armed conflicts, social unrests and violent radicalisations. And most especially, the possibility for conflicts and irrational actions are more invigorated in case a large of the youths remains unemployed.

Social Trust

One more issue affecting man's vulnerability towards radical thoughts is actually the absence or loss of trust in nation's institution and societies as a whole; and this is generally known as a *social trust* (Rothstein and Eek, 2009). An absence of social trust is stated as the major fact for non-satisfaction and loss of hope in a state. The loss of social trust between country's social groups and between state institution, social unions, as well as the populace heightens the possibilities of apparent relative denial and importance losses. The mentioned drivers of grievance would therefore be employed by radical bodies to attract more people already frustrated into their folds (Denoux and Carter, 2009:39-41; USAID, 2015,4-8; Gojani, 2017).

However, this study considers the different views of scholars. According to Bery and Tiscler (1978), ethnic group remains any human grouping bounded by knot of cultural supremacy. This group may not be completely uniformed however in an ethnic group there are prevailing soaring point of allegiance and obedience to define organization such as family, language and religion. Corroborating this view, Weber (cited in Aluko 2004:7) argued that ethnic group constitute human group entertaining a one-sided faith in their general upright due to connections of traditions and customs following the reminiscences of colonial or even migration.

The view of ethnicity was also shared by Yinger (1985:57), who defined it as a division of a broad social order in the members are educated through themselves or others and have a shared source by sharing significant units of that familiar culture. Tribal or ethnic bodies as human assemblies being held together by the faith and conviction in their general sources and presents a foundation for the construction of a society (Mbaku, 2001: 61). The stress here is centred on a set of beliefs and not actually birth or biological qualities (racial qualities) or intent group features (dressing, dancing, language, religion). Nevertheless, ethnicity could be referred to as the dissimilarities in languages, religious doctrines, colours,

extraction and cultures to which social definitions become easily ascribed and the one where group configuration usually occurs (Nagel, 1995: 443).

In her work “Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism” Kenolova (2005:17), argued that there is a great correlation between ethnicity and violent extremism. The violent extremist organizations who are otherwise known as terrorists perceive themselves as a family, belonging to the same religion and fighting to actualize a common goal which maybe of religion or some levels of power recognition for their group the state or global political space. It is against this backdrop that Barth (1969) argued that ethnicity refers to a coordination of limits between groups their powers and significance get decided principally by the natural world and span of contacts and struggle for meagre wherewithal among ethnic cleavages. The violent extremist groups are well formidable challenging the power equation of the state and disrupt the activities of the government in other to achieve some political and economic space for their members. In other to achieve contacts the global extremist groups operate through their local or ethnic militia groups and use them as cells. This is the case in not African states and third world countries where these extremist groups operate Otite (2000:63).

Violent extremist groups view themselves as purely different from other member of the society though not having blood decent, but operate on the basis of religious brotherhood. They therefore pursue ideology which negate the general system and also indoctrinate there members in that direction. For instance the Al-Qaeda Network and the Taliban have continued and consistently denounced democracy because attribute democracy to religion of polytheism. This indoctrination was given impetus in the treatise of Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi entitled *Democracy: A Religion!* According to him, democracy means that men should assume the duties of God because democracy presumes the legislation of rules. He went further to argue that this is the freedom that democracy advocates that men be free from Allah’s religion and his legislation. Also Abu Bakr Basyir (2008), made similar arguments when he posits:

All that is wanted is a state of Islam in which its laws are not only in the books but also implemented with willpower. So, room is not given for democratic consultations. The Sharia is positioned and, so the reason the need for discussion on it? Just apply it!

These ideologies and indoctrinations have to a greater extent sustained extremist groups anywhere they are found or exist. Corroborating this fact, an Israeli psychologist a specialist in suicide mission as cited in Zimbardo (2004:21-50), puts the preparation for suicide missions as follows: ...These individuals are therefore asked to give to being educated on how to carry out their intended actions. The ones that do so are then classified into a undersized group of 3 to 5 akin to youth that are at altering stages of development in becoming driving force of death. These people study the mastery of the deal from elders on how to make bombs, disguising, select and timing of their targets. After these, their actions are made public via video tape, naming themselves as “living martyrs” for Islamic religion, and for the affections of Allah.

Additionally, Korans are held with a rifle while the leader with a head bind declares the new rank. The video connects these set of people to the ending accomplishment as the video is dispatched to the newly-recruited members’ families before their actions are enforced. However the recruits recognize they would not only receive a rest place with Allah but own family members would at the same time be given or awarded a high place in heaven due to the course of martyrdom. In addition, there exist financial rewards given to members of their families for their sacrifice respectively. After this, the photographs are embossed on posters which would be hung walls in all places in the neighbourhood immediately they are able to be successful in their missions, having become motivating models to others. And in stifling anxieties concerning the pains sustained from their injuries via bomb explosions, these people get informed that prior to the time their first drops of blood touch the soil or ground, they would have already been made seated together with Allah in heaven without no pains being felt. These actions, bombers are indoctrinated to believe as an act which portrays their love for God rather than murder. To the extent that Joseph (1981) argued ethnicity has definitely become one kind of political consortium in the agenda of contemporary country where that kind of alliance is brought into existence pursuant to the enthusiastic fight on new calculated positions in the structure of a novel state. On the other hand, ethnicity cannot be separated from ethnic nationalism. Deutsch (1967) sees nationalistic move as inherently a condition of mending things that allow state-run message, memory and image as ideal

prominence in social contact and a superior influence in making a decision. But this concept about nationalism is essentially a double-edged which connotes two types of ideology. On the one hand, it is on ideology of domination and on the others; it is on ideology of struggle. As an ideology of state domination, it propagates the indivisibility of the nation state by preaching a passionate identification with the state (Shiverly, 1997: 29).

On a final note, the materialist reinforcement of ethnicity is more corroborated by the work of Nnoli in 1978 where it is illuminated in quite a lot of compliments. This however reveals the interethnic relations do not unavoidably spark up violent conflicts particularly in the place there exist no social and economic divisions in labours and exchanges. Nevertheless, there also exists the propensity to absolve the subsidiary classes in being given the privilege or the role of bourgeois resulting to submission of Jinadu in 2004 in Ukiwo in 2005 described to be 'clever elite or dumb mass thesis'. Furthermore, record argues ethnicity remains a rational end result of reliable-depending capitalist expansion. Quite a few dependent capitalist states in the global world have circumvented violent tribal conflict.

Apparently, the above submission got predisposed by the appeal of the dependency interest group in the field of social science in African continent around 1970s. This is therefore, informative to know Nnoli (1995) distorted his opinions and afterwards espoused the debate that democracy and the considerable removal of country from commercial engagements might assist in checking ethnicity problems. Ultimately, as it is factual that colonial rule was critical, the system could as well be queried for undervaluing the incidents before the colonial rule. This statement where migrants became totally removed from the pre-colonial administration indicates a stop of historical narration and a clear chasm between the different epoch periods. However, it is a fact that such an evolution becomes notable with stability and change. This gets implied in the submission of Peter's theory of two publics in (1972 and 1975) where the issues on corruption, citizenship and ethnicity are well discussed on African soil.

In the literature, violently radicalized activities cannot be separated from ethnic militia and corruption. Ethnic Militias as defined by Nkolika (2007) are in essence youth-based assemblies that are fashioned using the rationale of fronting or to protect the narrow issues of concern for self tribal unions, that its conducts at times include employing aggression

(Adejumobi, 2002). Also, Sesay *et al* (2003:23) defines militia to be a para-military body that is composed of civilians that may have welcomed some forms of unofficial military skills but armed with small arms and weapons. These even take a look of the usual qualified army in the way of their operations and command structures.

As well on 2006, Badmus defines to be the ‘extreme type of tribal campaigning for self resolve as a variety of ethnic unions presume aggressive bearing and steadily transformed into militia sets where each of them bear an tribal distinctiveness and claim to take steps as the apparatus during which the requests of its persons are recognized.’ In a way, the scholarly bewilderments branded tribal association for tribal or ethnic militia. Therefore the propensity in classifying any association to be aggressive remains bent on ethnic militia trait possessions. In exemplifying this, the ACF that is typically branded as the militias of the Northern Hausa-Fulani ethnic cluster, is actually one of the pan-cultural associations having a the similar feature like other associations ranging from remaining ethnic clusters like that of “Afenifere” in the Southwestern region and the Ohan’eze of the Igbo ethnic assembly, even though has the capability in systematizing the combative youth when the circumstance requires. Likewise, the Bakassi boys, a vigilante association which run in numerous Igbo provinces are from time to time considered ethnic militia, whereas it is not so.

This argument raised from Sessay *et al* in defence of ethnic militias in Nigeria may not hold after all. Going by one of the definitions of terrorism as an act of violence for political reason etc, for the fact that the so called militia has a violence tendencies and also inflict actual terror on the innocent citizens qualifies them not only as a militia but as a terrorist organization. These small ethnic groups who claim to be protecting the parochial interest of their groups exist almost everywhere in Africa. The polarity of the global system made it easy for networking of all kinds and in most cases the international terrorist groups or organizations seize the opportunities created by these militia groups to infiltrate Africa, today Africa has become a haven for all kind of terrorist organizations.

According to Lyman (2008), the combat on terrorism in African soil did not start on 11 September, 2001 but in Sudan around 1990s the place whereby Osama bin Laden carried out an assault on President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. In 1998, a cell of al-Qaeda threw a bomb blowing up the American missions located in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar as Salaam. Giving

retaliations to the attacks, the United States of America as a result of the one in Afghanistan, bombed up a chemical industry located in Sudan, by its claim the company was manufacturing basics for chemical weapons in support of or use by al-Qaeda group. During these periods of attacks, United States of American policy in the country, Somalia got more attentive with the search for, capture, and killing all the terrorists involved in the attacks taken to place. In recent times, the EU Terrorist Acts, mainly the attack on a moving train in Spain was connected to have been carried out by the groups in Algeria and Morocco respectively.

Immediately after the 9/11, the United States of America later focuses on terrorism in African states. Firstly in 1993, the US deployed a large contingent of American troops on African soil by establishing the combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti in 2002. Also, President Bush of America declared a \$100 million counter-terrorism idea for East Africa and the Horn in the year 2003. As well, the United States- European Command (EUCOM) led a sequence of training in military support operations in the Sahel directed at the Algeria-based GLPF; the programme eventually got boomed into a bigger Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative which now includes the North African and Sahelian states. The worry of the global society about African states is due to the fact that African states are more prone to tribal, ethnic and religious multiplicity and as well discriminations. The continent remains poor in several areas with ungoverned spaces.” With all the stated features, African states are vulnerable to the intensification of radical campaigns giving room for terrorist acts. Many of the sects aim at shooting down African states’ governments, such as, the radical Islamic sect of Boko Haran in the Northeastern region of Nigeria, as well the Christian Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda.

According to Marshall (2007:16), as the warfare against terrorism speaks about to globally-related terrorists, African states are also bedevilled with all sorts of security threats serious impact, thereby necessitating some serious efforts by the US government on counter-terrorism strategies. There are, however, numerous planned organized insurgent attacks on African soil, though not usually branded to be terrorists who usually launch terrifying assaults on Africans, thereby threatening the national and regional stabilities. Examples are found on the numbers of militia groupings in Congo East, that have one way or the other

remained the targets of the International Criminal Court (ICC) due to an avalanche of crime committed against humanity – these militants in Niger Delta region, Nigeria as well the Janjaweed militia caucus in the Darfur region of Sudan in Africa. At the same time, observed is the fact that the United States of America - African Command lists the Lord's Resistance Army, the Army for Liberation of Rwanda, as well the vague Afrikaner Boeremag existing in Southern Africa, among others. As a result of the poor features of nearly all the states in Africa earlier stated, the Continent is now beneath the observance of global world.

According to Carson (2004:173-192) Kenyan state experienced serious fatalities following the United States' embassy that was bombed in 1998. This occurrence together with the attack in 2002 on Israeli offices in Mombasa actually indicated the level of terrorism ravaging the country. These terrorist cells are already enmeshed in the Muslim neighbourhood tracing its origin to the Middle Eastern region. This same society has witnessed a stable decrease in commercial, economic and political control from the period of independence of Kenya. Following a decline in the situation, religious interests have also grown rapidly, Islamic religion and social groupings already taken further domination with growing transactions among young ones that in one way or the other seek opportunities in the Middle East.

However, the radical sects developing in this situation symbolize a small fraction of the Muslims neighbourhood which on its own is just ten percent of the population in Kenya. Nonetheless, those foreigners that were engaged in the bomb attacks that took place in 1998 as well as that of Mombasa attacks got purely made possible by the people in Kenya. From this onward, Kenyan state is living with fatal problem in apprehending and making effecting arrests of these terrorist members whereas preserving the weak openings to multi-party democratic rule coupled with a higher regards for human rights which commenced with the dethronement of the sit-tight leader in 2002, Daniel Arap Moi. In the same vein, criticism on the pressures from America on terrorist activities emanating within some leaders in Kenya coupled with one from the muslim leaders, incompetence of the judiciary and police, and also briberies have inhibited numerous endeavours in fighting the local terrorists.

As if this is not enough, Kenya is also faced with the problem of porous border. According to Ken Menkhaus (2004:52), Kenya is seemed to have lost a control of the north-eastern

neighbourhood; fortified contingents are needed while travelling across border communities and numerous refugee camps. Moreover in the 1990s, the Kenyan province at the Somali border totally became ungovernable and became more unsafe. This said free-for-all later found its line of attack into Nairobi. By the way, there existed an avalanche of swarming Somali slums of Eastleigh that have turned out to be virtually a forbidden or no-go area for the government of Kenya; an above whereby black-markets have taken a stand and criminals easily move undetected while carrying unlicensed guns.

It is of notable hint that Southern African state provides a unique case, that in spite of its coastal route to Asia and other parts of the globe, the government has as much as possible reduced tensions pose by terrorist groups in that region. The northern Nigeria has equally posed numerous and dangerous security threats to the government and people of this country since 2011. The case has worsened as the Islamic extremist group Boko Haram is getting stronger daily challenging the Government troop. They have become more sophisticated that they now engage in suicide mission. The case if not quickly nipped in the bud might be hijacked by international terrorist organizations most especially the Al-Qaeda network.

Generally, ethnic militia movement refers to extreme variety of ethnic agitations towards self-determination when several gangs take up militant stance and increasingly metamorphose to militia gangs each one bears a tribal image as well the purpose in acting to be the mechanism in the course of which the wants of its members are intended to be realized (Asamu, 2005). Common characteristics of the tribally-inspired groupings as observed by Agbu (2004) include the option of aggression, predominance of youth leanings, ethnic uniqueness leanings and as well primarily acclaimed gangs seeking a change beyond the current status.

In relating radical groups to religion, Akinboye (2001) observed that most of the time religious disturbances assume an ethnic coloration. This is so because the various ethnic groups are identifiable with one religion or the other. For Akinboye, what starts most at times as a religious disagreement soon assumes ethnic dimensions and vice-versa. Similarly, radical groups can be understood within the context of social groupings. Conducts of individuals, cultural expressions, the actions of leaders and other fangs of cultural adjustments are tagged ingredients of social groupings or movements (Hooghe, 2011: 225).

The central argument here is that in the absence of social groupings or movements, citizenry have the feelings of isolation and also alienation from the social orders. There are three broad methods to the research and understanding of social groupings or movements. This first approach is known as resource mobilization theory. McCarthy and Zald (1977) debated that social movements are not only an impulsive response to injustices and varieties of restlessness. To these people, and exactly as other varieties of collective behaviours, social movements depend on provision of substantial resources: time, funds, organizational structure and as well, skills. The major fundamental issue here is the fact that members in social gangs or movements fail to partake due to numerous frustrations or discontents.

The second approach which is cultural submitted that facts social-driven injuries on the running of society, while social movements taken not only manifestations of the misdemeanours but as well arrived at potential remedies to drive a novel ecological stability (Hooghe, 2011). Social movements frequently are recognized for staging a ground-breaking responsibility since the all succeed in arranging innovative constraints as well innovative political agenda. In the method, the word new or innovative social movements got used, to distinguish between the social groupings or movements that were classic during the 19th century (for instance, trade unions, among others) and the new social movements during the 20th century including the women's wing or movement, common rights, environment, among others (Hooghes, 2011: 227).

The third approach is the political opportunity structure. The major initiative of the model or approach is the one where probabilities for achievement and enlistment of social organizations are powerfully reliant on the prospects made and provided by the political structure (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak and Giugni, 1995). The prospects could easily be set up and made more formal like independence of assembly, candidness of *modus operandi*, although they can be made informal (such as culture of pluralism or corporatism). The political prospect configuration model became fruitfully utilized in an amount of relative researches, representing the achievement of social groupings or movements in many nations (Hooghes, 2011). Tilly (2004) identified the overlap of three areas as essential to the study of social movements. The layers are namely, populations, beliefs and actions. He argues that they work in tandem and that the learning of social groupings or movements usually

necessitates the stress on at smallest amount of two of the said portions simultaneously. These sets of group are amalgamations of population and common norms (Tilly, 2005: 52).

On the other hand some scholars instead of looking at social groupings or movements as expressions of radicalization, aggression, deprivation and violence; it is debated that the movements be further conceptualised as mutual problems that are predicated on general purpose and communal solidarity, in continued interaction with ruling leaders and governments (Turrow, 1998, Masuko,1995) In a general term, social movements connote a broad alliance of people who are motivated by the desire to pursue a common purpose of action, which may be social, economic but most of the time political. Thus, the *raison deter* of social movement is either to effect change or resist change (Brye, 1997).

Generally, the literature on violently radicalized groups in Nigeria is very diverse. More often than not, radical groups operate in line with ethnic militia. Nigeria being a multi-ethnic state, insurgency and later terrorism evolved through tribal and regional groupings with their militants who similarly became a major component of political landscape, often inflicting or threatening to inflict violence for political advantage (Agbaje, 2003). Hence, numerous militant groups get increased to fight social and political battles directed at other groups or the state in reaction to being marginalized. In this assertion lies the justification for the Agbekoya revolts of 1968-1969 in the Old Western Region.

Fiercest wars were waged in Southern Egba, Ibadan, and Osun provinces whereby local farmers and hunters got enlisted to struggle. The farmers as at then demanded a cut in their tax payments coupled with better prices on their cocoa products during the period Tafa Adeoye who led same group finally met Adeyinka Adebayo, the then Governor of Western region in the country. The implication was that the country and entire community got unprotected and unsafe, one of the causes of insecurity in the country. Nonetheless Nigeria in general, initially was a very peaceful nation particularly from 1967 and 1970 respectively. This spurred Obene (2012) to submit that Dele Giwa's murder through the October 1986 'Letter Bomb' dictated advent of violent killings and deployment of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in the country (Okechukwu and Momoh, 2008).

Consequently, the Movement for the Advancement of Democracy took over the Nigerian Airways, the nation's aircraft in October 1993 pursuant to annulling the electoral winning of Chief M.K.O. Abiola. Not quite long, a deadly bomb explosion annihilated the Shed 6 in the stadium at Ilorin, Kwara State in August 1994 (Omale, 2013). The activities of a number of Muslim fundamentalist groups, dating back to the Maitatsine group (1980), and including the Yobe Talibans (1980s), Izalla, Shiites as well as fiery leaders like Sheik Ahmed Gumi and Muhammed El Zazzaky could be said to have nurtured the seeds of full scale terrorism in the North today as the state failed to address issues of Islamic puritanism, marginalisation and poverty that gave rise to them (Osaghae, 2013). The most prominent being the Maitatsine sect, evolved in the 1980s in confronting the ostentatious leaders using numerous religious upheavals. The Maitatsine movement under the leadership of the then Alhaji Marwa Maitatsine, an immigrant from Cameroon who later came to settle in Kano in 1945 after his education, comprised religious extremists. The group's mode of operation remained assaults and killing of the rich and the poor Nigerians, not minding the religious affiliations.

Several other incidents had taken place in the country over the years. In another occasion, within 1996 and 1998, there was a explosion that hit the vehicle of the old Chief Security Officer to the Federal Aviation Authority of Nigeria, Dr Omoshola. Consequently, the escort vehicle of the then Lagos State Military Administrator in person of Brigade General Buba Marwa (Retired) got seriously hit. An since a switch over to a democratic rule in 1999, the country has in one way or the other besieged with all sorts of insecurity across all the geo-political regions to date. There are menaces Boko haram insurgency in northeast and militancy in the Niger Delta region.

However and for instance prior 1998, people in Niger Delta employed all sorts of measures in wriggling themselves out of being socio-politically marginalized, dearth of basic amenities, degraded environment, and absence of social provisions from the various corporate organisations. Also with the stated strategies exist petitions, litigations, protests, and violence with adequate mass mobilization in the region in order to drive home their demands. In the same vein, the final segment of Niger Delta protests and demonstrations that started in 1998 up to date got marked with the evolution of terror tactics that involved total combat, violence, vandalizing pipelines, oil installations bombings, combat-ready opposition

to the state security agencies. In the same manner, the multinational oil industries' officials were kidnapped and held (Ogbogbo, 2004).

In a similar vein, adopting these terrorist acts in the region was spurred by the evolution of numerous nascent youth militias. One cannot jettison the prominence of militant activities in the zone which include, the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), the Egbesu Boys, the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force being led by Alhaji Asari Dokubo, the Isoko National Youth Movement (INYM), the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) headed by Henry Okah, Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) whose leader is by Ateke Tom, Niger Delta Liberation Force (NDLF), among others. Existence of youth restlessness in the region directed at the government and also the multinational oil industries functioning in the zone have constituted huge threats or problems to national security in all ramifications. Actuality and prior to the period the Amnesty Programme got introduced by the administration of late President, Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar'Adua in year 2009 towards ending all forms of local or domestic terrorist activities in the zone, palpable tensions are yet to seize in the region, making it very a precarious and unsafe for habitation in the nation (Adesote, 2010).

It is worthy of note however that prior to when the Amnesty Programme was introduced in the region, several administrations had taken active steps in a bid to find last remedies to the plights of the residents in the zone. Many of these acclaimed workable measures are; review of the revenue sharing formula, putting in place special commissions which include; the Oil Mineral Areas Development Commission, Niger Delta Development Commission and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, among others. The prolonged confrontations in the region since independence in 1960 up to 1998 was mainly due to the fact that an oppressive measures were being employed by different administrations against these citizens in the area. The measure was also employed during the period Nigerian state got returned to democratic rule in year 1999. Accordingly, the upsurge of terrorist tendencies and acts that were employed in the zone particularly from 1999 to date spurred the government in Nigeria to alter its strategies, therefore withdrawing the stick and to offer the carrot of amnesty. It is on this note that observation is made that the Amnesty Programme probably served as the best and efficient means offered by the Nigerian government in order to halt all forms of local terror in the Niger Delta zone of the nation (Abimbola and Adesote, 2011).

In addition, the bombing of the INEC Office in Suleja, Abuja in April 8, 2011, bombings of social drinking sports in Maiduguri and Zuba an outskirts of Abuja in May 29 same year; 16 June, 2011 attacks on Nigeria Police Force Headquarters in Abuja; 26 August, 2011 bombing of United Nations Building in the FCT; November 04, 2011 bombings of Army Task Forces' Operations base, Police Headquarters as well as public facilities in Damaturu, Yobe and Maiduguri in Borno States respectively; the Christmas Day bombings at Saint Theresa's Catholic Church, Madala very close to the Federal Capital Territory on 25 December 2011; Mubi, Yola, Gombe and Maiduguri bombing (5-6 January 2012); Kano bombings of 20 January and 1 February 2012; and Headquarters 1 Division of the Nigerian Army and Kawo Bridge bombings in Kaduna on 7th of February 2012 made the endless list in the state (Adesote, 2010).

Nearly all of these terrorist attacks were ascribed to members of Boko Haram, the insurgent body was got was whittled from the "Taliban Forces" set up through late Mohammed Yusuf (a Kanuri man) and labelled it to be "Yusufiya Islamiya Group" between 2001 and 2002. And within the said period, one Islamic religious facility which contained a mosque together with a school got put in place in the city of Maiduguri. However in 2002, facility was later moved to Yobe, home state of Yusuf in a remote village of Kanamma very close to the Niger Republic borders. In addition, this body was initially recognised globally as a result of the 2009 sectarian hostilities during the period numerous members of the group was apprehended by the Nigerian Police; including its leader, Mohammed Yusuf.

In that process, Yusuf got eliminated by the police, the act which numerous global and national human rights and civil societies seriously reviled as unlawful killings. Though Boko Haram in actual sense, is comparable in ideologies and goals with that of Maitatsine both in structure and modes of operation (Danjibo, 2009). That's why, global reports submitted that that Boko Haram seemed possess strong links to global terrorist groupings in Somalia, a Northern African state and the Al-Qaeda; the submission made it more difficult easily ward off the terror group (Omale, 2013). Within this perspective, researchers and scholars have analysed the operations and manners of conduct of these radical groups from the varying points of assessment (Adabanwi, 2004; Babawale, Momoh, and Sesay, 2003). From the

analyses, the politics of engagement and containment on these radical groupings could be situated within the over-concentration of power in the federal state.

Be that as it may, there is a major gap in active literatures on the theme. As seen in reviews of extant literature above, recent studies on the emergence, activities and operation of these radical groups have often focused on perceived injustice and marginalization of ethnic groups in Nigerian state as the main reason for resurgence of these groups (Faseheun, 2002, Agbu, 2004, Asamu, 2005, Badmus, 2006). Indeed, available scholarly works on the subject area have not mirrored the issue from the political economy perspective. The emphasis has always been on perceived injustice and marginalization. This is a major gap as the dynamics operative in the Nigerian polity vis-à-vis these radical groups cannot be thoroughly unveiled and explained without establishing the nexus between this phenomenon and political economy of the society. To this end, this study will deviate from such ideas, by situating the growth of radical groups within the context of political economy approach.

2.6 Political Economy as a Variable

Political economy is drenched in the realm of the social sciences as it studies the rules of social productions and distributions of material wealth at the numerous forms or stages of development of human societies. Political economy refers to a detailed or complete multidisciplinary structure which is embedded in social theories of Karl Marx. This field encompasses not just the multifarious union of politics and economy but as well the connections of several hierarchies of social cohesion and interactions ranging from the local via national to the global ones (Sumner, 2008 in Majekodunmi & Adejuwon, 2012).

Political economy is all about the starting point of development of several societies; and this notion is predicated on materials and wealth production and its modes of production. This suggests that it advances frontiers of knowledge on production and the foundation upon which in the society, the focus on the economic relation of people in a process of production. Lenin, on political economy opines that it is not only the productions but the social relations of men in the process of production and the social systems of production. Therefore the chief focus of political economy means the production (economic or commercial) relations existing among the people, the connections of numerous social

classes to political power and the interactions of politics and economy towards determining power relations in the international relations (Okereke, 2010). They however include:

- i. The varying forms of ownership of the means of production;
- ii. The position of the several classes and social groups in production and their interrelations;
- iii. The forms and socio-political implications of the distribution of material wealth; and
- iv. The interplay of politics and economy in the international divisions of labour and exchange

It is, therefore, clear that political economy means the art of developing the socio-production which means the economic relations among the people. This also clears the debris of the rules guiding productions, distributions, exchange and consumptions of the material wealth in human society at numerous levels and stages of development. Political economy, however, takes into cognizance the relations existing in-between the productive forces and relations of production. In a slight difference, political economy signifies a class, a partisan science that deals with an aspect of economic interrelations among social classes, individuals, and states with significant focus on the essential facet of production, wealth distributions and consumptions.

In the historical science that states ways a society gets developed from lower to higher levels or stages and way the whole choice of historical expansion arranges the impartial essence of success of the communist mode of production (Okereke, 2010). Worthy of note are the productions, distributions, exchanges and consumptions that form a cohesion that in turn, determines the significance of production. The exact forms of distribution, exchange and consumption that are determined put much pressure in reciprocal, an influence on production by drawing its advancement or inhibiting it. These total sums of the relations of production forms the economic or commercial structure of society, and the true brick on which it increases a lawful and political superstructure, correspond definitely the forms of social awareness” (Marx, 1950). Meanwhile, coming into life, the superstructure, in reciprocity exerts significant control on the foundation, quickening or inhibiting the advancement of the latter.

The most important aim surrounding political economy revolves around the way societies are being notable transformations. A political economy model aids in building a decisive thoughts for well-structured power and as well appreciate the constraints and prospects faced in the process of constructing changing with egalitarian substitutes in an progressively more internationalized system. Therefore, political economy endeavours to define the grounds for the unbalanced relations among advanced and less-privileged states in the global delimitation of labour and exchange. This, however, situates the causative factors of third-world countries' underdevelopment on matters ranging from colonialism, imperialism, and neo-colonialism while as well drawing from the internal constraints known to the less-developed states to be foundational reasons for underdevelopment in all sense. Comically, bourgeois and Marxian political economy according to Karl Marx reel out different models towards liberating and growing of wealth. Finally and in the long run, understanding political economy would assist the people under oppression and exploitation in comprehending themselves and how to wriggle themselves out of the incongruities (Majekodunmi and Adejuwon, 2012).

Premised on the foregoing, over the years, the economic disempowerment among youths and other set of people who are economically backward backed by divergent political interest and opportunities among disparate violent groups has led to violent radicalization in the Nigerian polity. The series of uprising and contestation of state's power in Nigeria in forms of emergence and re-emergence by OPC, MASSOB, MEND, Boko Haram and other sub-groups are clear manifestation of the problem of diverse access to resources and challenging interests and distinctiveness of these groups. On the basis of this, the focus of this is on the nature, causes, operations of radicalised groups in Southern Nigeria between 2003-2014 within the political-economy perspective and the impacts of their operations in their respective areas of influence.

2.7 Theoretical Framework

From the above review, the study will be guided by a combination of three major theories i.e. social movement, political economy (as it relates to inequality; marginalization and inequitable distribution of resources in society) and frustration-aggression as theoretical frameworks for the understanding of violently radicalized group actions in Nigeria's body politics. The justification for the social movement theory rests on the fact that social movements on a general note have tendency to degenerate to violent groups if certain conditions do not hold. On the basis of this therefore, the focus is to justify the dynamics of social movements to degenerate to radical groups within the context of the social movement theory in order to have a proper guide for this research. Starting with political economy as a theoretical framework for the understanding of social movements, as espoused by Karl Marx, rests upon social revolutions as a ride to success. Marx ascribed the growth of labour movements to the structural situations that were created by the capitalist economy and as well put social actions in a historical frame of class conflicts. Marx insights into social movements were however seen to be a radical evaluation of the capitalist economy and controls on social structure.

The central theses in Marx analysis relevant to the understandings of social movements are his class analysis and the materialist conception of history or historical materialism. In analyzing the French Revolution, Marx outlined the aims of varying classes (namely the Parisian proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie, and the educated fractions of the bourgeoisie) and the provisional alliances made. Marx named the players as classes that were created in line with the available means of production that were filled with familiar desires, communal consciousness, and domestic planning or organisation. While writers before Marx analyzed class in a descriptive form with emphasis on level of education, style and standard of living, level of income, occupation and other indices, Marx offered a different meaning of the concept by focusing on the role of consciousness.

However, Marx distinguished two types of class as a class-in itself and a class-for-itself. For Marx, any member of society belongs to a class in itself by virtue of accident of birth. This class in itself does not and cannot contribute to history because it is not aware of its corporate existence as a class. Marx argues that it is only when the class in itself by virtue

of the inculcation of consciousness that such class can actively take part in the formation of history (Ross, 1993). It is in this context that revolution can take place.

From his analysis, Marx views historical science as the one being manoeuvred by radical disagreements between economically separated classes of individual. Therefore, the most impressive contribution of Karl Marx towards studying the social movements has been an illumination of the nexus between changing conditions and the resultant mobilization of social groups negatively affected by the changes. Thus, it is this context that the phenomena of extremist groups can be fully understood in the Nigerian context. In Nigeria, economic conditions have deteriorated and available resources have become largely inadequate to meet the basic needs of a rapidly rising population. This scenario is opposite to those of Marx who argued that members of social systems use the technological resources to facilitate their productivity and that increased productivity encourages the related phenomena of social differentiation and population.

Essentially, in the socio-political and economic context of a multi-ethnic society like Nigeria, there is always a limited availability of the essential resources that are demanded by the various ethnic groups from the commonwealth for their survival. A denial of the “due share”, of the essential resources is perceived by the victim as marginalization of group by the dominant group (Jike, 2004: 87). The result is usually a struggle of a class or ethnic type to determine who takes the lion share of the limited economic and political resources of the commonwealth or nations. It was unsurprising therefore that violently radicalized groups became a socio-economic issue as unemployed youths and economically backward class make recourse to extremist group formation to gain livelihood in a failed economy as witnessed in the Nigerian state.

Moreover, giving meanings exactly to what a social movement signifies could remain very tasking. Therefore, they are not political parties or interest groups that are constant units on politics having normal contact with political powers and influencers; or massive trends remain not organized without clear set goals; but found therein (Freemans and Johnsons, 1999). Several features of socio-political movements include; involvement in conflict contacts with notable adversaries; connected by informal network chains; and sharing a unique collective identity (De le Portas and Dian, 2006). Conceivably a typical description

remains that of Charles Tilly, that painstakingly conceptualises it as that one displaying (WUNC) meaning; worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment (Tilly 2004). Tilly's research, in decades, intended focusing on the interactions between people challenging and the ones holding on to power (Diani 2008). Nevertheless, additional latest erudition highlights the global natural world of movements (Whittier, 2002: 289).

Social movements remain not constant or bound within operating time and even in membership drive but composed of changing bunches of groupings, networking, neighbourhoods and activists, intertwined by participating in constraints and joint distinctiveness by which stakeholders describe the limits and importance of such clusters. Social movements therefore remain reflected about as planned though casual social clusters that are involved in extra-institutional conflict that is geared towards a particular goal. Instructively, the dynamic nature of social movement is justified. The objectives may be geared toward a specific policy or a bit broad at cultural amendments.

Social Movement Theory offers a way of conceiving violent radicalization with an explicit focus on the broader dynamics and processes of political mobilization. Whereas for example socio-psychological group process approaches focus on the individual and on group dynamics within small groups, and SMT instead looks at larger groups and the relationship between the individual, the group, and the broader society. Whereas the socio-psychological approaches point to psychological needs and rewards as key factors in radicalization, SMT instead conceive of social movements and their violent subgroups as rational actors, driven by a political agenda and a set of political goals as a result of differentials in access to resources. The ambition is to link structural factors, group processes, and individual motivation in an integrated analytical framework, also comprising potential feed-back loops from the surrounding society to a social movement, its behaviour, its appeal or lack of appeal (Porta, 1992:31; Wiktorowicz, 2004:3).

The third theoretical framework frustration-aggression is examined in context. In 1939, researchers at the Yale University Institute of Human Relations published a monograph that has had a tremendous impact, directly or indirectly, on almost all of the behavioural sciences. Led by, John Dollard, Leonard Doob, Neal Miller, O. H Mowrer, and Robert Sears (Berkowitz, 1989). In their book, *Frustration and Aggression* attempts were made to

account for virtually all of human aggression with a few basic ideas. It advanced a few basic propositions to explain the origin and consequences of virtually all human aggression. Thus, Dollard and his colleagues started their monograph with a sweeping generalization as their core assumption as aggression is usually a consequence of frustration. A quick breakdown of this assumption would mean that; (a) the occurrence of aggressive behaviour always presupposes the existence of frustration" and (b) that frustration always leads to aggression (Dennen, 2006).

On the one hand, frustration, in this context, was specified as the thwarting of a goal response, however, the term frustration is used to refer not only to the process of blocking a person's attainment of a reinforcer but also to the reaction to such blocking. Consequently, being frustrated means both that one's access to reinforcers is being thwarted by another party (or possibly by particular circumstances) and that one's reaction to this thwarting is one of annoyance (Dennen, 2006). While on the other hand, Dollard and his colleagues regarded aggression as not merely the delivery of noxious stimuli but as an action having a fairly definite objective: the infliction of injury (Berkowitz, 1989).

But the most relevant aspect of this theory is the clarification made by Miller (1941) that Dollard and his colleagues believed not only that frustration always leads to aggression since frustrations do not cause hostile or aggressive outbursts by necessity. However, potential outbursts may be inhibited or may result in alternative actions, such as the pursuit of other, more readily available reinforcers. Miller therefore rephrased the second part of the hypothesis to read: frustration produces instigations to a number of different types of response, one of which is instigation to some form of aggression. Furthermore, many other scholars have extended this work in the search for the form or level of frustration that could likely more lead to aggression. Thus, Pastore (1952) and Cohen (1955) were among the first to suggest that only illegitimate frustrations produce aggressive reactions. To these assumptions, it is argued that people prevented from reaching a desired goal become aggressively inclined only when the interference is thought to be illegitimate (i.e., a violation of socially accepted rules) or is viewed as a personal attack.

In the light of this background, understanding the activities of violently radicalized groups in Nigeria within the context of political economy, social movement and frustration-

aggression theories becomes easier. Over the years, economic disempowerment among youths and other set of people who are economically backward and backed by divergent political interests and opportunities among disparate violent groups, has led to violent radicalization in the Nigerian polity. The cases or series of uprising and contestation of state's power in Nigeria in forms of emergence and re-emergence by OPC, MASSOB, MEND, Boko Haram and other sub-groups are clear manifestation of the problem of different access to resources and competing interests and identities of these groups. Taking cognizance of these therefore, the study focuses on the nature, causes, operations of these groups in Southwestern and Southeastern Nigeria between 2003-2014 within the political-economy perspective and the impact of their operations in their respective area of influence.




Figure 2.5: Diagrammatic Pathways on radicalized violent groups in Nigeria

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Design

The survey design and case study approaches were adopted for this research. Thus, selected radicalized groups were targeted in order to have insights into the workings and the rationalization of the groups as social movements. Such samples and data collected enabled us to make generalizations about such groups in Southwestern and Southeastern Nigeria.

3.2 Study Area

This research was carried out in two regions in Nigeria. It was conducted in Southeastern and Southwestern zones of the country as discussed in the scope of this study. To this end, the study got conducted in major cities namely: Lagos, Ijebu-Ode, Osogbo and Ibadan in the south-western geo-political zone. The study also covered prominent cities in the south-east geo-political zone including Awka, Aba, Onitsha, Owerri and Enugu. The choice of these cities was based on the reported activities and operations of these radical groups within the period under review (2003-2014).

3.3 Study Population

The population of this study consisted of community members that were directly affected by the activities of these radicalized groups and the key members or stakeholders of the said radical groups. Thus, we targeted males and females of all categories within the cities mentioned earlier (Lagos, Ijebu-Ode, Osogbo, Ibadan, Awka, Aba, Onitsha, Owerri and Enugu), irrespective of their educational backgrounds.

3.4 Sample and Sampling Techniques

(a) Sampling.

Samplings were done at three major levels.

(1) **National level:** Purposive sampling was adopted here to purposively select one radicalized groups across two out of the six-geopolitical regions of Nigeria. – South East and South West

(ii) Regional Level

With each selected region we purposively sampled one radicalized group. This gave a total of two radicalized group for the study.

(iii) Group Level

(a) Key officers of each group were selected for in-depth interview in their official capacity, and the researcher was able to reach the selected groups through the information and directions given from the local units of the groups. The researcher was able to reach out to members at the OPC and MASSOB groups right from the Coordinators at the Local Government level through to their Zonal Coordinators in the two selected geo-political regions gave the researcher a hint on how, where and when to meet with their states' and national officers for data collection.

(b) Twenty card carrying members of each group were equally sampled and interviewed within the context of the objectives of this study. Data collection here employed the in-depth-interview technique.

(iv) Community Members

This category were composed of general community members who are not active supporters of selected groups (male and female) but were directly impacted or affected by the activities of the groups under study. A total of 300 of such residents were sampled in each geo-political zone and data collected with a pre-tested questionnaire whose content became controlled by the aims of the study. Thus, a

total of 600 copies of questionnaire were administered. Out of this figure, 452 were ultimately subjected to analysis for this study.

In addition to the general survey with members of the public, a total number of 6 focus group discussions were conducted in the communities (3 in each region) immediately hosting the headquarters of each of the radicalized group under focus.

The six FGD sessions are highlighted as follows:

- (i) Adult male
- (ii) Adult Female
- (iii) Youth Male
- (iv) Youth Female
- (v) Community Leaders Male
- (vi) Community Leaders Female

Each FGD session was made up of 6-12 members each

3.5 Sources of Data

Data for the study were generated via two sources; namely - secondary and primary. Primary data were gathered from members of the radical groups being studied and their leaders; through questionnaire, oral interviews and Focus Group Discussions. The secondary data for the study was sourced through library, archival materials and internet materials. In addition to the primary data obtained, secondary data was also sourced from archives and libraries on the objectives of the study especially in relation to the emergence of each group.

3.6 Method of Data Collection

The researcher administered the oral interview personally on the targeted sample population with the assistance of two trained research assistants. The data collected was collated, analysed and interpreted accordingly. The questionnaire was administered by the researcher as well as the two-trained research assistants employed to help in distribution and administering of the questionnaire.

3.7 Method of Data Analysis

Data sourced through primary and secondary sources were analysed with the use of quantitative (measures of central tendencies), and content analysis for qualitative data that were guided by themes developed in line with the objectives. Interviews granted were recorded and transcribed verbatim, after which the data, concepts and ideas generated were then processed into word document, edited and later categorised into common themes as to reflect the objectives of this study.

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS, RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS OF FINDINGS

The section presents and discusses some of the data that were collected in addressing the stated objectives of examining: the critical factors that led to transformation of the social movements (OPC and MASSOB) into VRGs in Nigeria; the key principal actors involved in such transformation, reason and why; the various interfaces of security agents in the transformation process; if underlying factor of Nigerian political economy has enhanced the activities of violently radicalised groups; and to interrogate the impacts their operations have in their area of influence, in the course of the study. This is done in line with the research questions. The preliminary sections of this presentation centred on the demographic sequenced data of the respondents as presented in tables, this was followed by discussion in the thesis.

Table 4.1: Socio-demographic variables of participants

	OPC	fx	%	MASSOB	fx	%
Age	41-45	7	9.6	18-23	4	4.0
	46-50	11	15.1	24-29	1	1.0
	51-55	16	21.9	30-35	4	4.0
	56-60	14	19.2	36-41	10	10.0
	61-65	11	15.1	42-47	34	34.0
	66-70	8	11.0	48-53	26	26.0
	71-75	6	8.2	54-59	21	21.0
	Total	73	100.0	Total	100	100.0
Religion	Islam	39	53.4			
	Christianity	34	46.6	Christianity	100	100.0
	Total	73	100.0	Total	100	100.0
Ethnicity	Yoruba	73	100.0	Igbo	100	100.0
Education	Technologist	23	31.5	.00	11	11.0
	Graduate	23	31.5	B.sc	40	40.0
	Primary	16	21.9	HND	16	16.0
	Tertiary	11	15.1	NCE	11	11.0
	Total	73	100.0	M.sc	11	11.0
				SSCE	3	3.0
				Technical	1	1.0
				OND	6	6.0
				B.Ed	1	1.0
				Total	100	100.0

Table 4.1 showed that (21.9%) of the respondents were 51-55 years of age, 19.2 were 56-60 year of age, (15.1%) were 46-50 years of age, (15.1%) were 61-65 years of age, (11.0%) were 66-70 years of age, (9.6%) were 41-45 years of age, (8.2%) were 71-75 years of age. Also (34%) of the respondents were 42-47 years of age, (26%) were 48-53 year of age, (21%) were 54-59 year of age, (10%) were 36-41 year of age, (4%) were 30-35 year of age, while (1%) were 24-29 year of age. The table shows that a larger percentage of the respondents (53.4%) were Islam, while (46.6%) were Christianity. Not less that 100.0% of the respondents were Christian.

Table 4.1 shows that (73%) of the respondents were Yoruba. Also, (100%) of the respondents were Igbo. The table shows that (31.5%) of the respondents were technologist, (31.5%) were graduate student, (21.9%) had primary education, while (15.1%) had tertiary education. Also (40.0%) of the respondents acquired B.Sc, (16.0%) were HND holders, (11.0%) were NCE holder, (11.0%) possessed M.sc, (6.0%) were OND holders, (1.0%) had B.Ed degree, (1.0%) had technical degree, While (11.0%) gave no response.

Table 4.2: Socio-demographic variables of Respondents based on place of birth, place of residence and period of residency

	OPC	Fx	%	MASSOB	fx	%
Place of Birth	Telemu	18	24.7	.00	1	1.0
	Ikire	23	31.5	Anambra	1	1.0
	Oyo	22	30.1	Rivers	2	2.0
	Osun State	10	13.7	Imo	1	1.0
	Total	73	100.0	Okija	42	42.0
				Abia	31	31.0
				Edo	2	2.0
				Kaduna	2	2.0
				Kano	2	2.0
				Ondo	4	4.0
				Oyo	5	5.0
				Nneny	1	1.0
				Ihiala	3	3.0
				Borno	1	1.0
			Cross river	2	2.0	
			Total	100	100.0	
Place of Residence	Owode	29	39.7	Ngbidi	17	17.0
	Ibadan	27	37.0	Aba	3	3.0
	Oyo town	17	23.3	Owerri	23	23.0
	Total	73	100.0	Onisha	8	8.0
				Ihiala	13	13.0
				Okigbe	3	3.0
				Mba anon	5	5.0
				Ubaitolu	1	1.0
				Okpe	9	9.0
				Ngboko	5	5.0
				Osisoma	3	3.0
				Water side	1	1.0
				Uturu	7	7.0
				Mbaise	1	1.0
			Nneny	1	1.0	
			Total	100	100.0	
Period of Residency	1-15	12	16.4	7-12	10	10.0
	20-30	17	23.3	13-18	7	7.0
	31-40	17	23.3	19-24	10	10.0
	41-50	11	15.1	25-30	12	12.0
	51-60	6	21.8	31-36	7	7.0
	Total	73	100.0	37-42	8	8.0
				43-48	25	25.0
				49-54	9	9.0
				55-60	12	12.0
				Total	100	100.0

Table 4.2 showed that (31.5%) of the respondents were given birth from Ikine, (30.1%) were given birth from Oyo, (24.7%) were given birth from Telemu, while 13.7% were given birth from Osun state. At the same time, (42.0%) of the respondents were given birth from Okija, (31.0%) were given birth from Abia, (5.0%) were given birth from Oyo, (4.0%) were given birth from Ondo, (2.0%) were given birth from Kaduna, (2.0%) were given birth from Kano, (2.0%) were given birth from Edo, (2.0%) were given birth from rivers, (1.0%) were given birth from Imo, while (1.0%) were given birth from Anambra. The table shows that (39.7%) of the respondents were living at Owodeede, (37.0%) were living at Ibadan, while (23.3%) were living at Oyo town.

In addition, 23.0% of the respondents were living at Owerri, 17.0% were living at Ngbidi, 13.0% were living at Ihiala, 9.0% were living at Okpe, 8.0% were living at Onitsha, 7.0% were living at Uturu, 5.0% were living at Mba Anon, 5.0% were living at Ngboko, 3.0% were living at Aba, 3.0% were living at Osisoma, 1.0% were living at Mbaise, 1.0% were living at Nneny, 1.0% were living at water side, while 1.0% were living at Ubaitolu.

The table also shows that 16.4% lived in their resident for 1-15years, 23.3% reported that they lived there for 20-30years, 23.3% lived for 31-40years, 15.1% lived for 41-50years, While 21.8% lived for 51-60years. Also 25% of the respondents were 7-12 year in their resident, 12% were 25-30 year, 12% were 55-60 year, 10% were 7-12 year, 10% were 19-24 year, 9% were 49-54 year, 8% were 37-42 year, 7% were 13-18, while 7% were 31-38 year in their residence.

Table 4.3 below indicates that 100 % of the respondents reported that they were aware of the group named OPC, and 73% of the respondents were aware of the group named MASSOB.

Table 4.3: Respondents' Level of Awareness of the existence of OPC and MASSOB

	OPC			MASSOB		
Awareness on the Group named OPC/MASSOB	Yes	73	100.0	Yes	100	100.0

Table 4.4: Respondents' Perception on the Activities of OPC and MASSOB

Briefly state what you know about the group					
OPC	fx	%	MASSOB	fx	%
The group is a militant group that belong to the Yoruba race	6	8.2	They promote the right of Igbo people	26	26.0
It is a political movement that protect the political interest of Yoruba	39	53.4	Recognition of Biafra state	6	6.0
They are non-governmental group found around the south western part of Nigeria	22	30.1	They are Biafra freedom fighter	31	31.0
They fight for Yoruba	6	8.2	They are vigilante group	8	8.0
Total	73	100.0	Actualization of Biafra republic	8	8.0
			Sovereign state of Biafra	7	7.0
			They are Biafra group	14	14.0
			Total	100	100.0

Table 4.4 above depicts that 53.4% of the OPC respondents reported that the political movement that protect the political interest of Yoruba, 30% reported that they are non-governmental group, and 8.2% reported that they are militant group, while 8.2% reported that they are fighting for Yoruba. A significance proportion of the MASSOB respondents 31.0% reported that the group are Biafra freedom fighter, 26% reported that they promote the right of Igbo people in the group, 1.0% reported that they are Biafra group, 8.0% reported that vigilante group, 8.0% reported that they are actualization of the Biafra republic, 7.0% reported that they were Biafra group.

**Table 4.5: Respondents' Perception on the reasons for the emergence of VRGs
what do you think is responsible for its emergence**

OPC	fx	%	MASSOB	fx	%
Ethnicity	12	16.4	No response	5	5.0
Injustice in the land	12	16.4	Periodic killing of Igbo	63	63.0
The need for the self-actualization of the Yoruba people among other ethnic group in Nigeria	28	38.4	Non recognition of Igbo	23	23.0
they emerge as pressure group to protect the social cultural interest of Yoruba race	21	28.8	Marginalization in the federation	1	1.0
Total	73	100.0	Unemployment	2	2.0
			Inequality in the Nigerian state	6	6.0
			Total	100	100.0

Table 4.5 above showed that (38.4%) of the respondents reported that they were Yoruba people, (28%) reported that they emerge as pressure group to protect the social cultural, (16.4%) reported that they were ethnicity, while (16.4%) reported that there is injustice in the land. Larger percentage of the respondent (63.0%) reported that periodic killing of Igbo is responsible for its emergency, (23.0%) reported that Non recognition of Igbo is also responsible, (6.0%) reported that inequality in the Nigerian state, (2.0%) reported that unemployment is responsible, (1.0%) reported that marginalization in the federation is responsible, While (5.0%) gave no response.

Qualitative analysis of the emergence of the militia groups i.e. OPC a Yoruba autonomous group, was put in place with the plan of conquering the political marginalization of the Yorubas. They came out from different formations pursuant to political agitations for Yoruba independence coupled with endorsement of Yoruba cultures to violent confrontations and vigilantism and crime-fighting groups. The result demonstrated that they existed majorly for security and vigilantism. This was reflected from the focus group discussions:

Waziri: The OPC group was formed mainly for security purpose and to also help in checking or curbing all forms of criminal activities in the society.

Adeleke: The group's emergence is as a result of the desire to strengthen the security system particularly of the community level. So their emergence has helped in beefing up security at the community level. Unfortunately, some of its members are fond of misusing the power given to them as they have indulged in illegal security operations that tormented the security of lives and properties in Fadeyi area of Lagos State. Hence, I think there is the need for

government to redefine their roles in the society in order to stop these abuses.

Olasupo:

OPC members have not promoted peace in the society. They only help the political class and promote their political interest at the expense of other community members. They are mercenaries in the hands of the political elites. This is because they get financial aids from such politicians. In fact, they participated in the electioneering activities in the just concluded election in Fadeyi Area.

For the MASSOB, the group emerged out of agitation for the Republic of Biafra consisting of Southeastern and Southwestern zones in the country. At its inception their philosophy is hinged on the principle of non-violence, MASSOB intensified on arranging rallies and making peaceful protests that later ended with the hoist of Biafran flags at strategic areas in the South East region. In the first place, I have been with MASSOB from the foundation. Though I don't attend meetings again now due to some reasons. But MASSOB is a non-violent group and the aim of MASSOB is for the actualization of Biafra (Sam Onor, Male/May/2016).

Table 4.6 below indicates that (30.1%) of the respondents reported that the groups have impact, and (30.1%) reported that they work for the security of lives and properties, (23.3%) reported that the groups are protecting lives and property, while (16.4%) reported that the groups are not encourage in the neighbourhood. Also (68.0%) of the respondents reported that the groups are good, (20.0%) reported that they are peaceful, (7.0%) reported that they are not in their neighbourhood and (5.0%) gave no response.

Table 4.6: Respondents' Perception on the activities of the groups in their neighbourhoods

OPC	fx	%	MASSOB	fx	%
Their neighbourhood activities not encouraging	12	16.4	No response	5	5.0
Their impact is at a low key	22	30.1	Good	68	68.0
They protect live and property	17	23.3	Peaceful	20	20.0
They work for the security of lives and properties	22	30.1	Not in my neighbourhood	7	7.0
Total	73	100.0	Total	100	100.0

Table 4.7: Respondents' Perception on the activities of VRGs in the state

OPC	fx	%	MASSOB	fx	%
Not encouraging	23	31.5	No response	4	4.0
They are found mostly in the Centre	23	31.5	Good	80	80.0
Maintenance of law and order	27	37.0	Peaceful	16	16.0
Total	73	100.0	Total	100	100.0

Table 4.7 indicates that (37.0%) of the respondents reported that the group maintain law and order, (31.5%) reported that the group are not encourage in the state, (31.5%) reported that they are found mostly in the Centre. A larger percentage of the respondents (80.0%) reported that the group is good, (16.0%) reported that it peaceful and 4.0% gave no response.

Table 4.8: Respondents' perception of the activities of the groups in the country

OPC	fx	%	MASSOB	fx	%
I may not be able to say much	16	21.9	No response	66	66.0
protection of government properties especially the pipelines	33	45.2	Peaceful	20	20.0
not encouraging	18	24.7	The activity is limited to the south east	14	14.0
prevention of fight	6	8.2	Total	100	100.0
Total	73	100.0			

Table 4.8 clearly reveals that (45.2%) of the respondents reported that the group are protecting government properties, (24.7%) reported that the group members are not encourage in the country, (21.9%) reported that the group are not be able to say much about the country, while (8.2%) reported that the group are prevented from fighting in the country. (20.0%) of the respondent reported that the group is peaceful in the country, (14.0%) reported that the activity is limited to the south east and (66.0%) gave no response. The major pattern exhibited is that OPC have constitute itself into a residual police force or military units that the Yoruba region in the case of political disintegration of the country.

Thus, they provide vigilantisms security services in most of the urban centres and However the MASSOB maintain purely the secessionist approach. These people possess the will and boldness to fight. For example, it is affirmed that even in the student unions in schools, it is only the students from deprived homes that fight for rights while the rich ones are never found at the forefront of battles. The current belief in recruitment (though not completely enforced, because the ‘regional coordinators’ possess autonomous powers in the enlistment procedures at the local levels) and it is, however possibly to have provoked the increasing, partial criminalization of OPC members. ‘When our group began years ago, we named the youths and activists though during that time the armed forces began threatening us as they eliminated over 300 members in Mushin area of Lagos State, Nigeria, then we resorted to recruiting a variety of citizens including area boys (street urchins) and all varieties of interested ones.

Adesanjo: They are not good enough. They abuse the power conferred on them by community leaders. They use their power for negative things.

Ogundokun: Their activities in this community have not been effective due to lack of funds and the inability to get the needed support from government.

Adeleke: In addition, they only protect their sponsor. They don’t protect ordinary community members. In fact, they put the community in serious security problems due to their selfish interests. Besides, they promote violence in this community.

Abiodun: We don't trust them at all due to lack of sincerity of purpose.

On the MASSOB:

Okoli: Their activities in this community have been peaceful in all sense.

Nnaemeka: MASSOB members' activities have remained limited to the South East.

Do their activities affect your community and Nigeria at large? All participants:

Yes **How?**

Adeosun: Their activities sometimes lead to loss of lives and properties. There was an incident that happened at Oshodi area of Lagos State. There was internal conflict within the group in Oshodi area which lead to open and violent confrontation between the two factions. The conflict was to achieve political ends as the two factions supported different political parties in Oshodi area. Hence, they are not only causing security problem to the community but they are also constituting serious challenge to the peace and security of the Nigerian nation.

My first question is that what do you know about radicalisation?

Tiamiyu: OPC is not a trouble making group, OPC is not thug or troublemakers, so the news of OPC being troublesome are rumours because I have being in this group since year 2000, and since I have being a member we don't destroy. We are for the security of the communities, and we cooperate with the police.

So what are your motivations as a group?

If you look at where we are presently, you will realize it is an Oba Palace of Alara of Ilara. So for us to have been permitted to hold our meeting here, so we can't be granted such privilege. The

motivation for OPC is many. One of its is festivals, it belong to Oduduwa, because this group belong to Oduduwa, for example the Ife day, and we so all festivals, like Osun Osogbo festival, festival o fIyas, Oke Olumo Festival, Oke-Ibadan festival, Olokun Olosa, Ayagunmale festival and so on. Because this group belongs to Oduduwa

Table 4.9: Respondents' Perception on the impact of VRGs' operations have in their areas of influence

OPC	fx	%	MASSOB	fx	%
the group works to protect the interest of Yoruba	18	24.7	No response	4	4.0
they tend to be peace ordinary	34	46.6	They mobilize people to support Biafra movement	51	51.0
it should be banned	6	8.2	Symposium, lectures, radio programmed	31	31.0
it is a very good	15	20.5	Mobilization for the feting of Biafra	14	14.0
Total	73	100.0	Total	100	100.0

Table 4.9 reveals (46.6%) of the respondents reported that they tend to be peace ordinary, (24.7%) reported that the group work to protect the interest of Yoruba, (20.5%) reported that the group are very good, while (8.2%) reported that the group should be banned. However, (51.0%) of the respondents reported that they mobilize people to support Biafra movement, (31.0%) reported that symposium, lecture, and radio programmed are the activities of the group, (14.0%) reported that mobilization for the feting of Biafra.

Table 4.10: Respondents' Perception on the impact of VRGs on peace in the Nigerian society

OPC	fx	%	MASSOB	fx	%
To a little extent it has contributed to the south western	28	38.4	No response	5	5.0
Positive	22	30.1	It has no effect on the peaceful coexistence	55	55.0
Do not know	17	23.3	It affect the peace in Nigeria	8	8.0
Negative	6	8.2	promote peaceful living	6	6.0
Total	73	100.0	it will cause fear in Nigeria	10	10.0
			They are not troubling anybody	6	6.0
			There may be some fracas between then and security agent	2	2.0
			They did not pose any threat to the peace in Nigeria	4	4.0
			Their rally or protests is capable of breaching the peace in the land	4	4.0
			Total	100	100.0

Table 4.10 indicates that (38.4%) of the respondents reported that the activities should be a little extent in contribution to the south western, (30.1%) reported that the activities should be positive towards the peace in the Nigeria society, (23.3%) reported that they do not know anything about the activities, (8.2%) reported that the society were negative about the peace in the Nigerian. In the same vein (55.0%) of the respondents reported that it has no effect on the peaceful coexistence in the Nigerian society, 10% reported that it will cause fear in Nigeria society, (8.0%) reported that it affect the peace in Nigeria, (6%) reported that it promote peaceful living, (6%) reported that they are not troubling anybody, (4%) reported that they did not pose any threat to the peace in Nigeria, (4%) reported that the rally or protests is capable of breaching the peace in the land, while (2%) reported that there may be some fracas between then and security agent.

Table 4.11: Respondents' Perception on the impact of VRGs on unity in Nigeria

OPC	fx	%	MASSOB	fx	%
Positive	28	38.4	No response	10	10.0
Negative	22	30.1	it promote mutual understanding	28	28.0
a little	23	31.5	It as separate republic	14	14.0
Total	73	100.0	It can lead to division	37	37.0
			promote unity	7	7.0
			Their call for sovereignty can affect the unity of the country	4	4.0
			Total	100	100.0

Table 4.11 depicts that 38.4% of the respondents reported that they were positive about the unity in Nigeria, 31.5% reported that they were little, while 30.1% reported that they were negative. lager percentage of the respondent (37%) reported that it can lead to division in Nigeria, 28% reported that it promote mutual understanding,14% reported that it as separate republic in Nigerian, 7% reported that it promote unity in Nigeria, 4% reported that the call for sovereignty can affect the unity of the country.

Table 4.12 Respondents' Perception on the impact of VRGs on justice in the land

OPC	fx	%	MASSOB	fx	%
New idea	28	38.4	No response	53	53.0
Good	22	30.1	They promote justice	30	30.0
Positively	17	23.3	Achieve justice for all	10	10.0
Negative	6	8.2	It promotes mutual understanding	4	4.0
Total	73	100.0	It breeds mistrust	3	3.0
			Total	100	100.0

Table 4.12 depicts that a larger percentage of the respondent (38.4%) reported that they have a new idea about the justice in the land, (30.1% reported that the justice is good, and 23.3% reported that they were positively, while (8.2%) reported that they were negative. Larger percentage of the respondent (30%) reported that it promotes justice in the land, (10%) reported that it achieve justice for all in the land, (4%) reported that it promote mutual understanding, (3%) reported that it breeds mistrust in the land.

Table 4.13 below indicates that (83.6%) of the respondent reported that they have experienced its activities compared to (16.4%) who haven't experienced. lager percentages of the respondents (96.0%) have experienced all the activities.

Table 4.13: Respondents' Experiences on the Activities of VRGs

	OPC	fx	%	MASSOB	fx	%
Have you ever experienced any of its activities?	Yes	61	83.6	No response	4	4.0
	No	12	16.4	Yes	96	96.0
	Total	73	100.0	Total	100	100.0

Table 4.14: Respondents' Perception on the positive aspects of VRGs activities

OPC	fx	%	MASSOB	fx	%
Vigilant	33	45.2	No response	4	4.0
no thing	17	23.3	Social mobilization and community service	67	67.0
Security	12	16.4	Radio programmed, lecture series, campaign	29	29.0
protecting against fight	11	15.1	Total	100	100.0
Total	73	100.0			

Table 4.14 reveals that 45.2% of the respondents reported that they were vigilant, 23.3% reported that they have nothing, 16.4% reported that they were security, while 15.1% reported that they were protecting against fight. Also (67%) of the respondents reported that the positive aspect are social mobilization and community service, 29% reported that radio programmes, lecture series, and campaign were part of the positive aspect.

Table 4.15: Respondents' Perception on the negative aspects of VRGs activities

OPC	fx	%	MASSOB	fx	%
None	23	31.5	No response	18	18.0
they are mostly after Yoruba race	22	30.1	Violent demonstration	68	68.0
encourage immorality in the society	28	38.4	Violent confrontation	9	9.0
Total	73	100.0	Protest or rally	5	5.0
			Total	100	100.0

Table 4.15 indicates that 38.4% of the respondents reported that they were encourage immorality in the society, while 30.1% reported that they are mostly after Yoruba race. At the same time, (68%) of the respondents were involve in violent demonstration, 9% were involve in violent confrontation, while 5% were involve in rally or protest.

Table 4.16: Respondents' perception on how to manage the activities of VRGs

OPC	fx	%	MASSOB	fx	%
They should be understanding between agents of gout and the group	18	24.7	No response	4	4.0
Though education	27	37.0	Organized meeting	71	71.0
By organizing in house training	28	38.4	The police should ban rally	9	9.0
Total	73	100.0	Coordinate them	6	6.0
			Monitor and moderate their activities	6	6.0
			Leaders are non-violent	4	4.0
			Total	100	100.0

Table 4.16 indicates that (38.4%) of the respondents reported that they are organizing in house training, (37.0%) reported that they are though with their educated, and 24.7% reported that they should be understating between agent of gout and the group. However, (71%) of the respondents reported that by organizing meeting, (9%) reported that the police should ban rally in the group, (6%) reported that they should coordinate them, (6%) reported that they should monitor and moderate their activities in the group, (4%) while reported that the leader are non-violent in the group.

Table 4.17: Respondents' Perception on how to manage the activities of VRGs

OPC	fx	%	MASSOB	fx	%
By allowing them to be part of the vigilant or security group	18	24.7	No response	6	6.0
These association should be careful in using OPC member for security purpose	27	37.0	Report criminal activities to police	69	69.0
Though collaboration	28	38.4	Peaceful living together	18	18.0
Total	73	100.0	Discourage their member from joining radical group	7	7.0
			Total	100	100.0

Table 4.17 reveals that (38.4%) of the respondents reported that they are though with their collaborated towards the neighbourhood association, (37.0%) reported that they association should be careful with using OPC member for security purpose, while (24.7%) reported that they are allowing them to be part of the vigilant or security group. At the same time, (69%) of the respondents reported that they should report criminal activities to police, (18%) reported that there is peaceful living together, (7%) reported that they discourage their member from joining radical group.

Table 4.18: Respondents' Perception on how to manage the activities of VRGs

Individuals					
OPC	fx	%	MASSOB	fx	%
giving them necessary assistance where required	48	65.8	No response	23	23.0
do not know	15	20.5	Individual should not join group without sympathy	68	68.0
co-operating	10	13.7	Promote peaceful living	5	5.0
Total	73	100.0	Vigilant of the activities of people around them	4	4.0
			Total	100	100.0

Table 4.18 indicates that (65.8%) of the respondents reported that they were giving them necessary assistance where required, (20.5%) reported that they do not know anything about the individuals, while (13.7%) reported that they are co-operating. However, (68%) reported that individuals should not join group without sympathy, (5%) reported that they should promote peaceful living, while (4%) reported that they should be vigilant of the activities of people around them.

Table 4.19: Respondents' suggestions on how the Nigerian government can handle the activities of the group

OPC	fx	%	MASSOB	fx	%
I say it should be banned	11	15.1	No response	6	6.0
Government should organize further training	35	47.9	They can make law	47	47.0
Round table discussion	10	13.7	Ban all form of protest	15	15.0
Through financial inducement	17	23.3	Stop marginalization	9	9.0
Total	73	100.0	Job creation	7	7.0
			Total exclusion of all ethnic groups	4	4.0
			socialize people into peaceful living	4	4.0
			No country should be left out of political appointment	3	3.0
			They can outlaw them	2	2.0
			They promote federal presence in the south east	3	3.0
			Total	100	100.0

Table 4.19 indicates that (47.9%) of the respondents suggested that government should organize further training, (23.3%) suggested that they should provide financial enhancement, (15.1%) also suggest that it should be band, while (13.7%) suggested that they should have round table discussion. Also (47%) of the respondents reported that they can make law in the group, (15%) reported that they should ban all form of protest in the group, (9%) reported that they should stop marginalization, (7%) reported that they should create job opportunity, (4%) reported that they should be total exclusion of all ethnic groups, (4%) reported that they should socialize people into peaceful living in the group, (3%) reported that no country should be left out of political appointment, (2%) reported that they cannot make law on them, (3%) reported that they promote federal presence in the south east.

Table 4.20: Respondents' perception on how the activities of the groups have affected living together of various ethnic groups

OPC	fx	%	MASSOB	fx	%
It has always been negative	26	35.6	No response	1	1.0
See them as rivals	29	39.7	People move on their normal business	57	57.0
Negative	18	24.7	They do not force anybody to join them	4	4.0
Total	73	100.0	It can endanger fear in them	4	4.0
			People would be afraid to live in the east	2	2.0
			Non indigene are protected	3	3.0
			It made some of them to relocate from south east	4	4.0
			The group attack non Igbo	3	3.0
			They live in fear	22	22.0
			Total	100	100.0

Table 4.20 indicates that (39.7%) of the respondents reported that they see them as rivals in the group, (35.6%) reported that they have always been negative in living together of various ethnic group, (24.7%) reported that they are totally negative about them. Larger percentages of the respondent (57%) reported that people should move on with their normal business, (22%) reported that they live in fear, (4%) reported that they do not force anybody to join them, (4%) reported that it can endanger fear in them, (4%) reported that it made some of them to relocate from south east, (3%) reported that non indigene are protected in the group, (3%) reported that the group attack non Igbo, (2%) reported that people would be afraid to relocate from south east.

Table 4.21 below indicates that (38.4%) of the respondents supported that right and freedom should be given, (37.0%) suggested that right and freedom should be instated, while (24.7%) suggested that they cannot say anything about right and freedom. Larger percentages of the respondent (65%) reported that there is respect for people right, (17%) reported that they should limit the opportunity to explore other ethnic group, (8%) reported that people should go on with their normal business, (3%) reported that they do not restrict peoples movement, (1%) reported that non eastern will be afraid to search for opportunity in the east.

Table 4.21: Respondents' Perception on how the activities of the groups have affected living together of various ethnic groups

OPC	fx	%	MASSOB	fx	%
I can't say	18	24.7	No response	6	6.0
this must be instated	27	37.0	There is respect for people right	65	65.0
it should be given	28	38.4	People go on their normal business	8	8.0
Total	73	100.0	Limit their opportunity to explore other ethnic group	17	17.0
			Non eastern will be afraid to search for opportunity in the east	1	1.0
			They do not restrict peoples movement	3	3.0
			Total	100	100.0

Table 4.22: Respondents' perception on sharing the resources among other ethnic groups

OPC	fx	%	MASSOB	fx	%
Should be equal	32	43.8	No response	59	59.0
It should be done the right way	41	56.2	People have equal opportunity	27	27.0
Total	73	100.0	MASSOB fight for sovereignty	14	14.0
			Total	100	100.0

Table 4.22 reveals that (56.2%) of the respondents reported that they should agree that it should be done the right way, while (43.8%) reported that sharing of the resources should be equal. In the vein, (27%) reported that people should have equal opportunity, while (14%) reported that MASSOB fight for sovereignty.

Table 4.23 below indicates that (52.1%) of the respondents reported that they should moderate the activities of ethnic based group, (31.5%) reported that they should ban ethnic based group, (16.4%) reported that they should ignore ethnic based group. Larger percentages of the respondent (81%) reported that they should moderate their activity in the group, (10%) reported that they should ban ethnic-based group, (5%) reported that they should ignore the group.

Table 4.23: Respondents' suggestions on what Nigeria should do about such ethnic-based group

OPC	fx	%	MASSOB	fx	%
Ignor	12	16.4	No response	4	4.0
Ban	23	31.5	Ignore	5	5.0
Moderate their activities	38	52.1	Ban	10	10.0
Total	73	100.0	Moderate their activity	81	81.0
			Total	100	100.0

Table 4.24: Respondents' perception on the issues that have made the groups relevant

OPC	fx	%	MASSOB	fx	%
One of the issues is cultural diversity as well as ethnic discrimination	23	31.5	No response	6	6.0
Security	28	38.4	Marginalization	69	69.0
God fathers in politics through their support behind then	22	30.1	Bad government	4	4.0
Total	73	100.0	Unemployment	4	4.0
			Ignorance & inequality	4	4.0
			Deprivation	7	7.0
			Poverty/corruption	6	6.0
			Total	100	100.0

Table 4.24 signifies that (38.4%) of the respondents reported that insecurity is one of the issues, (31.5%) reported that one of the issues is cultural diversity as well as ethnic discrimination, (30.1%) reported that god-fatherism in politics has also made them relevant. Larger percentage of the respondent (69%) reported that they have been marginalised, (7%) reported that they have be deprived, (6%) reported that poverty plays in making them relevant, (4%) reported that bad government has been the issue, (4%) reported that unemployment has been the issue, 4% reported that ignorance and inequality has been the issues.

Discussions of Findings

Objectives 1, 2 and 3: Examine the critical factors that led to transformation of social movements (OPC and MASSOB) into VRGs in Nigeria; Identify the key actors in the crossroad of such transformation, reason and why; Critically investigate the various interfaces of security agents in the transformation process.

It is, however, pertinent to examine critically the salient and fundamental issues and critical points and factors in the transformation of the hitherto social movements into violently radicalised groups. As established earlier in the analysis of the origins of the OPC and MASSOB, these organizations never started as radicalized groups but rather as social movements aimed at addressing perceived injustice in the political, social and economic space of Nigeria through non violent means and approaches. Available data indicate that the OPC started as a social movement in reaction to the developments that characterized the post-1993 elections in Nigeria. However, in order to ascertain the critical points in its process of transition and transformation, certain questions are fundamental, viz: what role did internal factors play in the transformation process? How did the actions and inactions of security agencies contribute to the transformation process? In what ways did the response(s) of the government contributions and aid the transition process of the movement? Our analysis of the phenomena revolves around these crucial questions.

The year 1996 marked a significant turning or critical point in the evolution of the OPC as a VRG. In that year, the OPC took a massive step further in its transformation process from the status or image it hitherto projected as a non violent social movement known for the adoption of violent approaches at addressing its plights. In clear terms, the transition of this social movement must be analysed and understood against the background of the developments and dispositions of successive governments towards this social movement in its early years of formation and growth. Put differently, the dynamics that prompted and propelled the transformation process of this movement in the south-western geo-political zone can be examined within the context of the political culture exhibited and demonstrated by successive governments in Nigeria. Indeed, the 'political language' and tactic adopted by General Sanni Abacha in dealing with the OPC between 1996 and 1998 could be tagged 'absolute repression'.

The government had felt that the adoption of the repression tactic was a fundamental strategic routine through which the movement could be paralysed and destroyed. Repression occurred as groups acting on behalf of their leaders used strategies (most times violent) to direct or wipe out the OPC. While the repressive actions deployed by the military government against the OPC were perceived as legitimate by the government and their sympathizers, they were never lawful from the viewpoint of the group. In clear terms, this also meant that the government passed 'decrees' outlawing the movement activities and similar organizations and justified attacks on them by declaring them somehow dangerous to public order in the country. Of course, the unleashing of such kind of suppression made it remarkably hard for the OPC as a social movement to carry out its activities which were considered peaceful means of expressing and pursuing their 'interests'. An instance of state oppression of social movement action of the OPC is that one that was unleashed in 1996.

While we may not provide a comprehensive account of the level of repression and rights' abuses committed by the Nigerian armed forces against key leaders and members of the OPC, as key instances of the government's endeavours to weaken the programs of this lively social movement deserve revelations. The leaders of the OPC notably among whom were got spied upon and jailed as part of the repressive efforts. Indeed, the climax of

Abacha's repressive tactic against the OPC was experienced by the leadership of the movement on December 18, 1996 when the State Security Service operatives on December 18, 1996 arrested the founder of the OPC- Dr. Frederick Fasehun over his alleged involvement in the activities of the Civil Liberties Organisation, the Campaign for Democracy, the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights and the National Democratic Coalition and the series of campaigns led by the OPC (Transition Review, no. 4, April 1997).

It must be mentioned that members and leaders of the OPC were not singled out by the security forces in their efforts to repress 'anti-government' elements, members of other similar groups with common objectives were also dealt with. To this end, Chief Olu Falae, Adegbenga Adebunsi, Moses Akeke Akinnola, Evangelist Bayo Johnson, Adeyemiwo Femi, Oluyinka Festus Adeboye, Layi Odumade, Olugbenga Odumade, Moshood Yahaya, Musa Okoiaafan, and Sukere Mohammed were also arrested. One fundamental point that must be stressed here is that prior to the arraignment of these OPC members and leaders, the government tried, but failed, to produce evidence against a number of them. The justification for this ridiculous level of terror and repressive tactic against the key members of the OPC was unconsciously echoed by Dr. Walter Ofonagoro (Nigerian Minister of Information) in an interview published in early January 1997 where he denied the use of excessive force against the social movement. Walter Ofonagoro's statement is worth quoting in *extenso*:

Numerous bodies naming selves supporters of democratic tenets unions ... were funded by the advanced nations to cause commotions, thus these bodies are getting used and dumped pursuant to becoming rues in values. Oppositions are dead; all citizens in Nigeria are associating with our groups. This remains sole success of Abacha's rule (West Africa, December 23, 1996 - January 5, 1997)

Of course, the leadership of the OPC and Dr. Fasehun's legal team engineered series of efforts aimed at utilizing legal procedures for the release of the OPC leader. However, the military government frustrated such efforts in spite of the initial success recorded. Prior to charging him with treason, there had been court orders in favour of the OPC stalwart but the government ignored two court orders for Dr. Fasehun's release. It would appear that

the practice of preferring a holding charge against an accused person pending the completion of investigation by the police had no place under Section 32(4) of the Constitution: for the preferment of a charge against any person for a criminal offence within the provisions of Section 32 and 33 of the Constitution postulated that the Police or the law enforcement agent had obtained sufficient evidence that would support a prima facie case against the accused for the offence for which he stands charged.

It is instructive to note, however, Dr. Fasehun was not the only OPC member that suffered this precarious level of repression and arbitrary arrest by the military government headed by General Sanni Abacha. Numerous other members of the OPC as a social movement had been detained, beaten and otherwise harassed after organizing peaceful protests deemed overly critical of the government. In some cases where security forces had been unable to locate perceived opposition figures, they had targeted family members of these OPC members. In December 1996, family members of notable OPC members were subjected to arbitrary arrest by the staff of the State Security Service. Most of the key members of the OPC were detained under the State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree No. 2 of 1984, as amended, which provided for the administrative detention of political opponents and critics of the military government for renewable periods of three months. Detention under the decree could be challenged in a court of law. According to the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993, an individual found to have been unlawfully arrested or detained had no right to compensation or other remedy. The Abacha regime has relied on these and other laws to justify harassment, arbitrary detention and prolonged detention of Fasehun and other members of the movement.

The bottom line is that the detention, incarceration and repression of the founder of OPC, Dr. Frederick Fasehun and other key members of the movement by the Abacha led administration led to the transformation and transition of the group into Violently Radicalised Group. Thus, the OPC metamorphosed into a VRG from a social movement which hitherto relied on the instrument of dialogue and peaceful protests. The detention, incarceration and repression of OPC stalwarts made its members believe that their plight of upturning the injustice unleashed on the group after the annulment of the June 12

presidential election supposedly won by Chief M.K.O. Abiola could not be attained through peaceful means but violence. Hence, the interfaces between the leadership of the group and the Nigerian government warranted its radicalization and its resort to force and violence. To further establish this fact, a KII session with a key leader of the OPC in Epe Local Government of Lagos State is worth quoting in *extenso*:

Okan Pataki ninu abala itan egbe OPC yi ni se pelu iha ti ijoba ati awon eleto abo ni Nigeria ko si awon jankanjakan ninu egbe yi. Labe ijoba Ogagun Abacha, awon olori egbe yi je iya pupo. Ijoba yi fi won si ewon, won si tun fi owo agbara je awon olori was ni iya lo ri otito ti won hun ja fun. Gani Adams, Fredrick Fasheun, Olumide Adeniji, Kunle Adesokan, Idowu Adebowale, Ibrahim Abobolanwo, Ibrahim Atanda ati Silus Atanda je Iya pupo lowo Ijoba Ologun. Ni gba kan ri, egbe wa ko ni igbagbo ninu lilo ikan ija, sugbon Iya ti awon ologun fi je awon omo egbe wa lo je ki lilo oun ija di ona wa. Ijoba ati awon eleso abo si agabara won lo lori wa, eyi nio je ki ani igbagbo wi pe , eso pele ko le so eso rere ti a ba fe se asejori ninu ija wa fun otito ni orile de yi.

A critical point or pathway in historical evolution of the OPC has to do with the disposition of the military government and security agencies towards the key members of the movement. Under General Abacha's regime, the leadership of the movement suffered immense humiliation and repression from the military government. The government locked them up in confinement facility and used their power arbitrarily on them over the clamour for justice. Gani Adams, Fredrick Fasheun, Olumide Adeniji, Kunle Adesokan, Idowu Adebowale, Ibrahim Abobolanwo, Ibrahim Atanda and Silus Atanda were subjected to incarceration. Prior to that period (i.e 1996), the movement never believed in radicalism or the use of force for the realization of its objectives. We were known for dialogue and peaceful protests. The incarceration and repression of our members by the Abacha regime and security agencies played a role in our abandonment of peaceful mechanisms and the resort to force or radicalism. The government and security agencies used their power arbitrarily over our leaders and this made some of to believe that peaceful mechanisms would not work in the advocacy for justice in this country. (KII with Sikiru Tihamiyu, March 2016)

Another informant from Gani Adams faction corroborated the above position when he explained thus:

When we started, we called ourselves youth activists but when the then military started dealing with us, that they killed about 300 at

Mushin [a popular neighborhood of Lagos], then we went back to recruit all sorts of people, area boys [street boys] and any kind of person that was interested, this to me led to the loss of focus of the organization leading to the derailing for the initial plans of it. (KII with Odeniyi Olabode, April 2016)

Of course, while there was no realistic quantitative proof found in this respect, most of the informants submitted that the immediate consequence of the military regime overlapped with an increasing gesture of radical activities by the OPC. Our submission on the impact assessment of the interfaces and dispositions of the security agencies vis-à-vis the radicalization of OPC starting from 1996 as seen in the data extracted from the KII and FGD conducted is corroborated by Albert (2001) as follows:

OPC got transformed to a violent organisation in 1996 after the time its founder [...] was put in detention by the Abacha military junta. This incident made the OPC members feel that the Nigerian problems could not be solved peacefully (Albert 2001: 282).

The year 1999 also marked another critical point in the crossroad of its transformation from a social movement into Violently Radicalized Group. A key fracture in the group's activities happened in 1999 during the time Ganiyu Adams, a prominent member of the *Esos* splinted and made known the expulsion of Frederick Fasehun from the original group. However, Fasehun as well made an announcement that Adams too had been expelled. That is the reason there are two major blocs of the OPC group. At first seen as a cerebral giant that consisted of prominent Nigerian Yoruba scholarly ones, the body has therefore become taken over by people without jobs and combat ready Area Boys, using such opportunity in perpetrating hostilities all over the land. The rationale for the polarization of the movement is summed up as follows:

... Fasehun, who happened to be the founding leader, encountered some problems during the time he was invited by General Obasanjo, the then aspirant of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). However, the easy account given for Fasehun's parley with Obasanjo was the one taken to be a nonconformist member of such political influential as well a driver of the economy. Also, the immensity of his new found constituency, the miscreants and the outcasts and casual non-sense on the brinks of the society, and as well the ones that are fully already, this was noted a traitor of error in politics. This is possibly the reason all the cerebral, cultural and

political resources accessible to the Yorubas, a 30 year old semi-literate furniture maker with the name of Ganiyu Adams now acts as the leader of the most powerful social strength existing for the Yorubas (Osita, 2004:17)

This therefore suggests that the split was not so much about the objectives of the organisation as about how to realise them (more as a result of the controversy on how to prosecute the ethno-nationalistic fight for the realisation of the set objectives of the group). The emergence of Obasanjo as the first president of the 4th Republic seemed to have precipitated this scenario (Gilbert, 2013). While the youthful Adams faction rooted for the continuation of militancy as the most viable tool for the realisation of Yoruba self-determination, the older Fasheun faction called for a thaw and support for the Obasanjo presidency (Gilbert, 2013).

Be that as it may, the polarization of the movement in 1999 was another critical point in its pathway to radicalism as available records indicate that much of the violence was unleashed by the more idealistic Adam's faction (See Akinyele, 2001; Sesay, etal, 2003; Ukeje & Adebaniwi, 2008). Without mincing words, in 1999 following the coming apart in its class, the OPC turned out to be more militant in its conducts. In actuality, its centre of attention steadily got adjusted and got linked towards vigilante actions in the region. Nigerians residing in the Southwestern region were being held hostage by the body via recurrent clashes with the security personnel as well as the remaining tribal bodies Lagos. Number of the disagreements included; the Ijaw-OPC clash, the OPC-port workers clash in Lagos, the kidnap and consequent assassination of a senior police official in Lagos, the coronation of a Yoruba Oba in Ilorin, a questionable historic-political deed, and the bloodshed in Ajegunle, a Lagos hamlet where variety of tribal or ethnic groups of the poor live (Osita, 2004:17). By the year 2000, the Nigeria Police submitted the OPC was to be held in responsibility for 60 percent of the 200 violent crises that took place across the state from 1999 to date (Adegbamigbe, 2000:14). Thus, the factionalisation of the group in that year led to the transition in its pathway from being an intellectual body into a radicalized group. To further establish this fact, A KII session with the former secretary of the OPC in Ibadan generally submitted that:

Let me say the Dr. Fasheun is the intellectual faction, while Gani Adams is the militant group. The factionalisation of the movement in the late 1990s was majorly responsible for the militancy or radicalism that is associated with the OPC today. The OPC under the leadership of Dr. Fredrick Fasheun adopted dialogue and protest as its strategy of driving its objectives. But Otunba Gani Adams and his allies do not believe in the use of such mechanisms adopted by the Fredrick Fasheun. (KII with Odeniyi Olabode, April 2016)

Indeed, data generated from KII and FGD conducted with the national and regional leaders of the Oodua People's Congress (OPC), as well as community members and supporters in south-western Nigeria further show that militancy and radicalism, that gave birth to OPC, was used by Otunba Gani Adams and his cohorts as an apparatus for the realisation of aims after the group became factionalised in the late 1990s. The phenomenon of factionalisation propelled and compelled the emergence of a new phase in the historical evolution of the OPC, thus marking another critical point in its pathway to radicalism. With the emergence of this new historical epoch, violence, agitations with radicalism pursuant to ethnicity that fuelled the attainment and the acknowledgment of the group's voice not only in the southwest but also in the entire Nigerian polity. Perhaps, it was OPC's violent ethno-nationalistic endeavours that 'popularised' it nation-wide as an ethnic militia more than anything else.

It is instructive to note that the transition or transformation of the OPC from what it used to be in its early years of formation into a Violently Radicalised Group in the early 2000s owing to the internal crises between its two prominent leaders did produce certain cumulative effects on the politics of the Nigerian polity. The militant and radical ethno-nationalism of OPC under the leadership of Otunba Gani Adams put phobia and insecurity in many northern elites that felt the Obasanjo administration was not competent enough in taming OPC and that his administration was marginalising the north. This feeling by some northern elements has been identified as the rationale behind the formation of a counter group on 13 December 1999 to checkmate the activities of OPC and also fight against the perceived marginalisation of the north. This was the Arewa Peoples Congress (APC), a pro-Northern group that protects and projects the political interests of the entire northern

part of Nigeria. Sagir Mohammed, a retired military officer became its leader. In fact, in contradistinction with OPC, APC due to its varied composition lacked “the strong ethno-cultural base, appeal and cohesion of the OPC” (Gilbert, 2013). The point being made here is that the radicalization received by the OPC coupled with perceived government’s feeble challenge to the OPC did propel the materialization of other rival ethno-militant bodies such as the Ijaw National Congress (INC), the MASSOB, and the APC, all with lively branches in the multi-ethnic neighbourhood or city of Lagos.

The year 2000 could also be regarded as another critical point in the transformation process of the OPC from a social movement into a VRG. The year witnessed the amendment of the constitution of the Otunba Ganni Adam’s faction of the OPC to accommodate or ‘legitimise’ the conversion of the movement to vigilantism. With this, the body became more radicalized and registered strained relationship or interface with security agencies particularly, the police. One major factor responsible for the strained relations between the group and security has to do with the *modus operandi* of the group in the course of vigilantism as it sometimes resorts to jungle justice, extra-judicial killings indiscriminate display of small and illegal arms among others. Indeed, in 2000, vigilantism became one of OPC’s main activities, at a time of alleged rising criminality (Guichaoua, 2006). OPC’s reliance on magical techniques and beliefs, deeply entrenched in Yoruba society (Nolte 2004), gave them a substantial comparative advantage for this kind of activity.

When recruited, new OPC members take an oath which they believe makes them bullet-proof and compels them not to commit any criminal offence (Guichaoua, 2006). They believe that, through progressive learning of the use of *juju*, neither cutlasses nor acid can hurt them (Guichaoua, 2006). Apart from increasing self-confidence among members, these techniques ensure cohesiveness within the group, as violating the oath may have very serious consequences for the culprit (Guichaoua, 2006). Simultaneously, these claims provoke fear in OPC’s potential enemies and give the OPC credibility within the population they serve. This magical equipment is often

complemented by more ‘classical’ weaponry: some OPC members (certainly not all) carry guns, locally produced, smuggled or stolen from police stores (Guichaoua, 2006). Retired policemen or soldiers offer them training sessions in ‘self-defence’, ‘in the bush’ (Akinyele 2001, Human Rights Watch 2003).

The transformation, in part, of the OPC into a vigilante organization in 2000 worsened its radical nature. Put differently, having adopted the self-help security initiative of vigilantism, the group became more violent and militant in its approach. This had tremendous impact on the relationship between the leadership of the OPC and the Nigerian security agencies, especially the police. To this end, the vigilante actions of the OPC finally led to conflict with Nigeria’s security agents. It also brought about strained relations to other ethnic groups every time the OPC unleash jungle justice to people of other ethnic groups. Its strained interface with men of the Nigerian security created serious imbroglio between the group and the Nigerian state in the year 2000. The OPC relegated the power of the federal government on itself when fingered in the murder of Afolabi Amao, a former Divisional Police Officer in Bariga, Lagos state. This development further worsened the interface between the OPC and Nigerian security agents as the authorities which had delayed in taking urgent measures against the organization, later banned it officially and declared the factional leader, Ganiyu Adams, most wanted. Adams was later arrested after a manhunt; he was detained and got arraigned before a court of law but later was granted bail in October 2001.

The period between 2003 and 2014 was also critical in its pathway to transformation. This period marked a massive involvement of the OPC in party politics, particularly in Southwestern geopolitical zone. Indeed, this period represented a critical facet of the OPC’s multifaceted conducts is its being ‘used’ by local politicians leading to tensions and as well a growth of economic boom or opportunity for its leadership (KII with Odeniyi Olabode, April 2016). During this period, the OPC became more admired among the youths and inspired fear among local communities. Accordingly, the radical group was recruited as a powerful and perfect mobilising tool for local politicians in Southwestern Nigeria (KII with Odeniyi Olabode, April 2016). Numerous occasions of the manipulation

of the OPC for political purposes have been observed at different political levels (Human Rights Watch, 2003). This period also marked the OPC's expressed claims on the national political scene. The OPC constituted privileged partners for political figures as well helping to secure personal political upgrading during the period under review. During elections periods, the group had concrete opinions to persuade the voters to decide the politicians they wanted to engage with. The accelerated level of OPC's involvement in political engineering during this period further heightened its degree of radicalism and use of violence, thereby constituting a critical point in its transformation process.

Compared to OPC, the transformation of MASSOB can be rightly described in the context of the response of the Nigerian state and security agencies to its operational activities. Between 2001 and 2014, the security agencies adopted the "kill and go" tactic which facilitated the transformation of the approach of the MASSOB from social movement that exercised peaceful tactics to VRG which relied on violence and radicalism. Its point of view on the use of non-violence in spite of, on July 21, 2001, Uwazurike, the MASSOB leader got arrested with some of his supporters by a joint team of the Nigerian Army and the police. He was later set free after 10 days of questioning in police custody at Abuja, and on his discharge, he still declared that the fight for a Biafra would continue. At a point, over 40 members of MASSOB became put on trial for alleged treason that was punishable by death (*WeeklyExpress*, 2000). MASSOB also accused the Obasanjo-led government of delaying the OPC issue and shenanigans in persecuting its members.

MASSOB additionally observed instead of confronting the forces of breakdown intimidating Nigerian delicate democracy, the administration was busy arresting innocent or law-abiding members and civil rights campaigners of the old Eastern Nigeria (*The Biafra Foundation*, 2000). On 26th August 2004, MASSOB recorded confrontational encounter with the men of the Nigerian security. That episode showed an interface of both the MASSOB and security agencies. Government hardened its approach to MASSOB after the group successfully organized a strike on which shut down private businesses and markets in the southeast and major cities controlled by Igbo-run businesses such as Lagos and Kano. On 11 September 2004, 53 people were arrested for participating in a MASSOB youth football tournament in Lagos. After being incarcerated for six months

were, they formally charged with treason on the grounds of planning to wage war against Nigeria. As if that was not enough, the arrest and detention of Uwazurike and the remaining MASSOB members in 2005 was another critical point that increased the spate of violence as a strategy by the group.

It pertinent to note that prior to the amplification of military operations against the movement, the MASSOB adopted several peaceful mechanisms aimed at addressing their plights. These included petition to the presidency demanding negotiation for separate existence, presentation of a Bill of Rights before the United Nations (UN), sensitization of the international community about the Biafran dream, formation of Biafran security agency, the declaration of the State of Biafra and the hoisting of the Biafran flag in various places in Nigeria and New York in USA., cooperation with other similar organizations in other parts of the country with similar goals, organization of sensitization workshops, seminars and conferences among others.

Objective 4: Examine how the Nigerian political economy has enhanced the activities of violent radicalized groups in Nigeria.

Pursuant to the findings of the study, there are evidences linking the violent and radical operational activities exhibited by the OPC and MASSOB and the dynamics of the Nigerian political economy. In other words, a firm relationship exists between the operational activities of the OPC and the MASSOB in the southwest and southeast geopolitical zones and the Nigerian political economy. Of course, it is generally agreed that no response was given to the question as to the reason these ethno-national radical groups have continued to be relevant on the social and political landscapes of the Nigerian state. Many scholars canvass and support the perception that a number of factors ranging from marginalization and injustice have contributed to a rise in the actions of the groups. But beyond the conventional and popular explanations and theories propounded by scholars on the influence of marginalization and injustice, this study has been able to come up with a distinct perspective which the character of Nigeria's political economy has produced preponderant influence on certain developments culminating into the boost in the activities of these VRGs. Of particular importance is the fact there is a kind of

convergence between certain economic issues such as poverty, youth unemployment and economic marginalisation and the escalated level of violence by these VRGs.

Based on the results of table 5.4, the link between Nigerian political economy and the activities of the VRGs is difficult to sever. Table 5.4 showed that larger percentage of the respondents (38.4%) reported that insecurity is one of the issues that have made these groups to be relevant in Nigeria. The table also indicates that 31.5% respondents reported that one of the issues is cultural diversity as well as ethnic discrimination, 30.1% reported that god-fatherism in politics has also made them relevant. Larger percentage of the respondent 69% reported that they have been marginalised, 7% reported that they have been deprived, 6% reported that poverty plays in making them relevant, 4% reported that bad government has been the issue, 4% reported that unemployment has been the issue, 4% reported that ignorance & inequality has been the issues.

Thus, the sustaining analysis from the above statistical explanation is that poverty, unemployment, inequality, economic marginalization, uneducated, played important function in aiding the activities of the VRGs. The unwaged youths are aggravated owing to discrimination and economic deprivation that have rendered them unemployed. MASSOB and OPC comprise of young people without salary-earning jobs. Therefore, there is a direct relationship between unemployment, poverty and high rate of insecurity of lives and properties in Nigeria and the phenomenon of radicalism and violence unleashed on the society by these groups. Precisely stated, the analysis has shown that the increased wave of violence caused by these VRGs in Nigeria is as a result of unemployment and poverty. The major issue is basically the exclusion. Extensive paucity, being without a job, no education and the incapability of the government to offer basic functions incenses large swathes of the excluded society whose grievances become multiplied by inequality: wealth generated by abundant resources does not trickle down to ordinary citizens. Repression of political opposition and civil society by the state (using state security forces whose primary role should in fact be to protect citizens) leads to additional bitterness and possible release-valves for pent up angers. Political domination may not for all time play out along definitely ethnic ranks.

Still on the political economy perspective on the phenomenon of VRGs in the country, the life and personality of such political elite and politicians in Nigeria has equally contributed to the rise in the violent activities of these groups. Table 5.2 indicates the existence of Micro evidence also suggests that the Nigerian state and security agencies are not also spared in the political economy of violence unleashed on the Nigerian state by the OPC and MASSOB. Governments and security agencies' embarkation on military or force mechanisms to curb these VRGs can also made in the area of political economy of aggression as this approach has led to the transformation in social movements, now metamorphosed to radicalised groups. Put differently, it is abundantly clear from the data generated in this study response of the Nigeria and security forces (which is political indicator) is influenced the operational activities of the OPC and MASSOB negatively.

Indeed, the conflicts witnessed in the Southwestern and south-eastern geopolitical zones through the OPC and MASSOB, the previous ten years are certainly paramount comprehended in the structure the Nigerian political economy. The transition to a democratic, elected government, which set in motion in late 1990s, stirred the activities of the VRGs in Nigeria. There exists a kind of patron-client relations between these groups and some politicians which has continued to make them relevant on the political landscape of their geo-political zones. Certain networks of political patronage are crucial to the success of the VRGs. The VRGs developed into a machinery of patronage and the axis around which the politics/economy of the society were built. The buying of the support of these groups rests on patron-clientilistic relations between some politicians and the leadership of the groups. Some political elites have continued to invest enormous amounts of money in tying up the support of these groups. This patron-type relationship is no doubt a factor responsible for the increased spate in the activities of the groups vis-à-vis politics in Nigeria. The sustaining argument from this, therefore, is as the economic cum social causes are common, political and institutional ones as the organization of the country, discerning political institutions, intergroup politics, and ethnicity along with others are significant in explaining the activities of the OPC and MASSOB.

Objective 5: Examine the impacts of their operations have in their area of influence.

On the impact of the activities of the VRGs, a clear understanding of the concept of violence worldwide will show that no nation has attained the level of its development without experiencing with its attendant insecurity in one form or the other, hence, the argument that no society in the history of mankind can exist without some kind of conflict or insurgency. Thus, it is regarded as an attribute of society. But its implications have devastating effect on the development of the nation an nation-building process. Some of its consequences according to the various media reports cited in this work, comments, observations, and reaction, from individuals, groups, corporate organizations, and the Civil Society are of great concern and these amongst others include:

- Implication for nation-building in Nigeria: The emergence and continued existence of the VRGs has heightened ethnically motivated violence across the nations since the inception of the Fourth Republic democratic dispensation is posing a great danger for National integration in Nigeria. This produced negative effect on peace, unity and the living together of various ethnic clusters in Nigeria.
- It has worsened the phenomenon of patron-clientilism in the country as politicians have adopted militancy as the tool for appropriating state power and resources with gross implication of unbridled corruption
- Administration of justice: Jungle justice has been the bane that has necessitated the strained relationship between the groups and security agencies. See page 22; A respondent” when we apprehend and hand over culprits to the police, the parents o these culprits are most times wealthy and influential, and so they work their ways to get them released from the police custody.
- Increased level of political violence: A respondent pontificated “in 2003, Remo experienced serious political violence when the chairmanship of Sagamu Central Local Government was competed for by two candidates with different backing by pro-Fasehun faction and pro-Gani faction”.
- Community security enhanced in a way through vigilantism
- Cultural renaissance: See page 33, a respondent in Epe LGA, Lagos noted that the OPC is the organizer of Ajagunmale festival in Lekki area and that this has helped in resuscitating

- Proliferation of small and illegal arms Increased ethnic Nationalism: For instance in Dec.2011, the armed militia marched unstopped through Lagos, shooting shotguns and rifles sporadically when they called a protest against a radical muslim sect Boko Haram.

This thesis argued that the ‘growing poverty’ and stiffening economic realities contributed to the radicalisation of the youth wings of the groups thus posed threats to live and political stability in the country. Despite the transformation to VRGs, 45.0% opined that OPC had been very helpful in securing lives and property in the South-West, while 67.0% indicated that MASSOB had been effective in the sensitisation for the actualisation of the Biafra state.

The thesis thereby posited that the perceived ethnic marginalisation, inequalities, high level of corruption and political agitation of the Yoruba and Igbo ethnic groups were pivotal in the transformation of OPC and MASSOB to violent radicalised groups from 2003 to 2014 in the Southwest and Southeastern Nigeria. There is the need to build reliable democratic process for inclusive representations of all geopolitical zones in the state. From the avalanche of literature on the study, and in order to eliminate radicalization and violent groupings, the state authorities should initiate an act prohibiting all forms of involvement in radicalized engagements, unlawful group or religious processions and participation unlicensed guards, paramilitary or para-police groups, organized groups or individually; and persons found guilty of all these crimes would be made to get imprisoned for up to 15 years. In addition, the Nigerian government should draft and approve “The Nigerian Strategy on Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization Leading to Terrorism. The state’s strategies and action plans remain a systematic arrangement which integrate an avalanche of methods in preventing and countering all forms of radicalisation and violent engagements There is also the need to reintegrate aggrieved citizens that earlier joined violent radicalized groups due to one form of misdemeanour or the other.

Corroborating Liednner’s submissions, the thesis has been able to establish a focus on the social and economic problems or generally the vulnerability factors spurring a man into becoming more susceptible to radicalized and violent actions, and these include: employment, education, resources, economic chances or benefits, and social trust

respectively. Moreover, recognizing the multifaceted and prejudiced causes and banes of man's radicalisation and violent actions, the thesis has been able to adequately seek to walk around the related situations, which are actually the products of corrupt acts and as well as the places where the problem takes place respectively. The study also endeavoured to find out the ways by which of pervasive corrupt attitude of man has adversely impacted the qualities of education, employments and economic gains, and social trusts, and accordingly influenced people's susceptibility to radical thoughts and the group dynamics in the society.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary

In the global system it is affirmed that the violent radicalised groups (VRGs) usually pose dangerous threats to national security. It became suspicious when the Oodua Peoples' Congress (OPC) and the Movement for the Actualisation of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) who initially emerged as groups that were set up to fight against perceived marginalisation and insecurity in South-West and South-East regions of Nigeria later got metamorphosed into violent radicalised groups threatening national security. This is due to the fact that OPC on its own has a history of violence with recorded cases of clashes and violence with Nigeria's security agencies (Nigeria Police and Army) at Arepo in Ogun State over cases involving oil installations protection, among others. The study therefore critically examined the factors that led to their groups' sudden transformations to VRGs, the interface with security agents in the process of transformation, the political economy that influenced the transformation and perceived influence of the groups from 2003 to 2014 in the South-East and South-West, Nigeria.

The study was able to reveal that OPC and MASSOB were transformed into VRGs as a result of politics of ethnicity and agitation for regional sovereignty. MASSOB was basically formed to advance the interest of the Igbo, OPC was reported as ethnic movement. It was discovered from the qualitative data that the long term political marginalisation compounded by Nigerian security personnel's reaction to their activities accounted for the transformation of the groups into VGRs. Law enforcement crackdowns on the groups, repressive nature of the state and arrest of their leaders triggered the transformation to VRGs. In the same vein, the 'growing poverty' and stiffening economic realities actually contributed to radicalisation of the youth wings of the groups therefore, posing serious threats to lives and political stability of Nigeria.

In addition, despite the transformation to VRGs, it was opined that OPC had been very helpful in securing lives and property in the South-West, while the study indicated that MASSOB had been effective in the sensitisation for the actualisation of the Biafra state. The perceived ethnic marginalisation and political agitation of the Yoruba and Igbo ethnic groups were pivotal in the transformation of Oodua Peoples' Congress and the Movement for the Actualisation of Sovereign State to violent radicalised groups from 2003 to 2014 in the South-West and South-East, Nigeria. There is the need to build reliable democratic process for inclusive representations of all geopolitical zones in Nigeria

5.2 Conclusion

The study investigated the explosion and activities of violently radicalized groups in the twenty-first century Nigerian society. Specifically, the study examined the origin and development of violently radicalized groups particularly the OPC in Southwestern region and the MASSOB in Southeastern part of the Nigerian polity. The study equally examined the underlying factors that contributed to the transformation as well as the objectives and activities of violently radicalized groups. The institutional response to the transformation of these ethnic groups or militias was also evaluated. However, the study provided credible answers to these questions:

- i. What are the critical points that transformed social movements into VRGs in Nigeria?
- ii. What are the key actors in the crossroad of such transformation, and why?
- iii. What are the various interfaces of security agents in the transformation process?
- iv. How has the political economy of the Nigerian state enhanced the activities of violently radicalized groups in Nigeria?
- v. What are the impacts of operations of the groups in their respective areas of influence?

To adequately address the stated questions, we predicated our analysis on the theory of the political economy. The adoption of this position became imperative due to its analytical utility especially its ability to unveil nexus between specific politico-economic realities and these groups.

Indeed and from data collected, it has been empirically established that the groups organisations claimed being excluded and marginalised in the country, this form of ethnical issue is easily explained within the circumstance of Nigerian political economy. Put differently, the escalation of these confrontational arrangement pervading the length and breadth of the state is attributable to the nature and character of the political economy of the Nigerian state. Perceptions of marginalisation in the distribution of power and resources, and the repressive tactics of the state to sub-national dissent, have encouraged their growth. The obsession of modern political economy is noted and remains a variety of attempts and investigation aimed at amplifying the banes of such development globally.

It was noted that in the way of explaining the issues in this research, the study investigated the relevance of the theory to Nigeria particularly in consonance with the transformation and persistent activities of violent radicalised groups, particularly, the MASSOB and the OPC. The researcher affirms using the data collected and analysed that the character of Nigeria as a nation, its power configuration, the narrow-minded conducts of its hegemonic ruling class, mainly the politics of exclusion played along with ethnicity, the non-chalant attitude of the state to the welfare and well-being of the citizens, state centred corruption, injustice and the present market norms that nourishes rather than reduce or eliminate poverty account largely for the eruption of violently radicalized groups in Nigeria.

As indicated in the analysis and discussion of data above, we have empirically established the fact that the proliferation of violently radicalized groups in Nigeria and the heightened ethnically motivated violence across the nation is posing a great danger for nationwide integration in Nigeria. As shown in the study through data provided, the activities of these groups and the subtle sympathy from the ethnic group they claim to represent have also

raised the bar of mistrust among the various Nigerian groups. That national integration process in Nigeria is rendered difficult due to the patronage of ethnic divisions using

militancy as the tool for appropriating state power has also been empirically established in this study. The actions of these groups resulted into the relocation of many Nigerians residing outside of their ethnic homelands due to fear of insecurity. In as much as the polity continues to produce such dysfunctional behaviours, the attitude of the political elite towards these development and overlooking to address the Nigeria's national question, has tended to compound the situation. The selective pacification as a response strategy to the phenomenon of ethnic militia movements across the country has turned out counterproductive following the proliferation of these behaviours. Consequently each ethnic group that forms a militia expects to be treated the same way the other were treated, which encourages cycle of demands that would be difficult to put a stop to.

5.3 Recommendations

Having discussed the emergence, prevalence and implications of the activities of violently radicalized groups on the nation-building progression as well as the social and economic with political landscape and the Nigerian polity, it is relevant every stakeholder give room for peace by taking a look at the problems that have contributed to their emergence and made them relevant in the society. One major move to reorganize the occurrence of ethnic militancy remains good governance embracing the stance of peace and security for the citizenry. A democratic process that is reliable needs be built to give room for political affiliations in order to welcome an even development in the country, thereby accommodating the diverse cultures, ethnic, religious and multicultural interests.

Secondly, there must also be reforms on the security landscape of the Nigerian society. The NPF need be totally reformed to give room for effective performance in the country. Officers have to be well trained for combating all sorts of crimes, preventing and quelling all forms of internal conflict and urban violence instead of engaging the Military personnel. Police personnel are to enjoy good payment of wages, service conditions, and be adequately armed and provided with logistics required. In addition, they need to be

morally and psychologically incentivised in all sense. The Nigeria Police is directed to organise programmes on strategies towards combating proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the country. This would definitely check the activities of these groups to an appreciable extent.

Thirdly, efforts must be intensified by the government, civil society groups and other stake holders by reducing hunger, abject poverty, graduate unemployment and youth restiveness in the country. As already established in our analysis above, unemployment is a hydra-headed monster which has contributed in no small measure towards the development and alteration of these radical groups in the society. Thus, we strongly recommend that sustainable strategies should be mapped out in order to combat this economic phenomenon.

Furthermore, there is a need to build a strong institutional capacity about citizens' welfare and the security questions in Nigeria would also go a long way in addressing the dangers posed due to the prevalence of these radical groups in the society. Youth re-orientation through formal and informal sensitization and enlightenment platforms including churches, mosques and schools should be encouraged to in other to instil a positive value system capable of discouraging radicalization and violent movements.

5.4 Contribution to Knowledge

The study has added to the existing studies by examining the underlying factors that led to transformation OPC and MASSOB in Southwestern and Southeastern Nigeria in all ramifications. The study has offered the potentials of presenting a comprehensive analysis of activities of violently radicalized groups in Nigeria's body politic.

The study has also contributed in no small measure to knowledge having posited that the radical groups in focus, however, indicate the standing and situational dimensions to the various radical groups problem in the country. However, this became possible with the use of a robust analysis and comparative method of the activities and operations of these violent groups by the study.

The study has also assisted in exploring and finding out the actual vulnerability factors that spur people towards becoming susceptible to violent and radicalised activities such as: educational matters, employments, resources and economic benefits, and at the same time social trusts.

Also in recognizing the multifaceted and prejudiced inspirations and banes for people's violent and radical behaviours, the study has also exposed the related milieu which corrupt attitude has created and in the society or environments where the processes take place respectively. The study has also revealed the manner at which prevalent corrupted behaviour has adversely impacted the level of education, employments and economic activities, and social trusts, therefore, affecting person's accountabilities on radicalised thinking as well as the dynamics of the group. The study has adequately enhanced knowledge and understanding of the seeming complexities surrounding violently radicalized group activities and its nexus with political economy approach. Lastly, the study has robustly exposed the nature, causes and consequences of violent group activities in a diversified state like Nigeria in ramifications.

5.5 Limitations to the Study

It remains highly imperative mentioning the numerous precincts or limitations to the study. Following the difficulties encountered on the field together with the enormous undertaking of unravelling the large number of theories and sources in the accessible literatures, many limitations or concessions were made to make study very suitable within the stricture of the thesis. Moreover, selecting the respondents or participants was not found easy occasioned by their hectic schedules coupled with inaccessibility, mostly to state ministries or institutions. Nevertheless, current accounts and secondary records with contact with the sources were well employed, while the interviews and submissions from expert are to be included to enhance the secondary information, though this has not in any way had severe harmful consequence on the study.

Asides the above, other limitations consist of the reality that a lot of the expressions employed in the study like; violent groupings and extremism, corruption, and

radicalisations contain prejudiced meanings which from time to time and to some extent vary from the sources and informants. Besides, study and analysis executed on violent groupings and radicalisation sustain the reality there exists no particular illustrative theory applying to kinds of groups or people, and these make the thesis topic more difficult to research on. The situation, however, renders generalization of the findings from this thesis a bit knotty.

Lastly, the observations made by members of OPC and MASSOB as violent radicalised group and the information collected via their submission is due to the results of self-selection, and the viewpoints may necessarily not be an precise versions of all groups, but to a certain extent of the ones chosen to be interviewed for their opinions.

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APPENDIX

**THE QUESTIONNAIRE GUIDE ON THE FACTORS UNDERLYING THE
TRANSFORMATION OF VIOLENT RADICALISED GROUPS IN SOUTHWESTERN
AND SOUTHEASTERN NIGERIA, 2003-2014.**

This questionnaire is designed to gather information concerning a Ph.D research work on Nigeria's political economy and the emergence of violently radicalized groups in Southern Nigeria. Your response shall be treated confidentially.

Many thanks.

SECTION A

Socio-economic Background:

Religion	_____
Ethnicity	_____
Age	_____
Education	_____
Place of Birth	_____
Current Place of Residence	_____
Period of Residency	_____

SECTION B

Are you aware of the group named OPC? Yes () No ()

Briefly state what you know about the group.

What do you think is responsible for its emergence?

How would you assess the various activities of the group

(a) Around your neighbourhood

(b) In the state

(c) In the country

Generally comment on the activities of the group

In your opinion, how have the activities of the group affected the following

(a) Peace in the Nigerian Society

(b) Unity in Nigeria

(c) Justice in the land

Have you ever experienced any of its activities? Yes () No ()

If yes,

(a) List some positive aspects of their activities

(b) List some negative aspects of their activities

APPENDIX B

OPC Members on the Street in Lagos, 2014



Source: elevatenews.com (2014)

MASSOB Boys in the Creek in Enugu, 2013



Source: elevatenews.com (2014)