

**SOCIAL COST OF GROUP CONFLICTS AND THEIR MANAGEMENT IN
PLATEAU AND NASARAWA STATES, NIGERIA, 1994 - 2011**

BY

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ABSTRACT

Group conflicts and their attendant social costs bordering on living conditions and rights violation are prominent challenges in heterogeneous societies. Attempts at managing these costs as part of conflict transformation have been problematic in Nigeria. Existing studies in conflict management have largely focused on conflict termination, while conflict costs have been given little attention. This study, therefore, investigated the social cost of group conflicts in Plateau and Nasarawa states and their management from 1994 to 2011.

Human needs and systems theories were used as analytical tools, while case study design was adopted. Primary and secondary data were collected. Nine focus group discussions were held: six in Jos with the Afizere and the Igbo/Yoruba as clusters, and three in Toto with the Bassa as a cluster. Twenty nine in-depth interviews were conducted with six ethnic group leaders, two traditional rulers, two market leaders, 10 secondary school principals and nine primary school heads in Jos and Toto. Secondary data included the peace policy documents, journals and periodicals. Data were content analysed.

The dwindling income of households in Jos and Toto was traced to the destruction of income generating infrastructures such as markets between 1994 – 2010 (Katoko, Bassa, Farin gada, Dilimi, Filing ball, Bukuru and Kwarafa, Ugya and Jos modern market); farms in Toto (Andafwo/Ugya in 1997 - 1998) and Jos (Riyom, Barkin ladi, Bassa, Bukuru and Dogo na Hauwa, 2003 - 2011). Food insecurity in Jos and Toto was also a consequence of these protracted conflicts and sub conflicts such as between Bassa farmers and Fulani herders (1997 – 2011) and Berom farmers and Fulani herders (2003 – 2011) in farming communities like Barkin Ladi, Riyom, Bukuru and Dogo na Hauwa, which led to the desertion of ancestral farming lands by the Afizere and Berom in Dutse Uku, Tina junction and Andafwo; and cattle rustling in Jos. Other costs included breaching of human rights (financial and sexual exploitation, domestic interference, extra-judicial killings, selective security provision and aiding of crime) by security agents. The costs on basic education included: increased number of school dropouts, death of teachers and students, destruction of learning infrastructures, disruption of calendars and disillusionment of students. Destroyed schools had been rebuilt except one in Toto. There had been interventions at the farming villages by the Special Joint Task Force and vigilantes but this had not fully addressed the security issues. The National Human Rights Commission indicated interest in addressing human rights violations in Jos but had not commenced. The management approaches included: deployment of security agents and distributions of relief materials during emergencies; others like payment of financial compensation, rebuilding of schools, interventions in the farms and rebuilding of income infrastructures were done arbitrarily without a policy framework.

Group conflicts created enormous social costs in Plateau and Nasarawa states. Governments' management of these conflicts contained the violence but lacked coordination in addressing the consequent social costs. Conflict cost management body and framework are required to work with impacted communities.

Keywords: Social cost, Government intervention, Conflict management, Human rights abuse, Group conflicts

Word Count: 495

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that this work was carried out by NWANERI MADUAWUCHI MARTINLUTHER, in the Peace and Conflict Studies Program, University of Ibadan, Ibadan.

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DEDICATION

This work in its entirety is dedicated to the Holy Spirit of God, who is my unfailing helper from beginning to end.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|--------|--|
| HIV | Human-Immuno Deficiency Virus |
| AIDS | Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome |
| UNAIDS | Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS |
| WHO | World Health Organization |
| IDP's | Internally Displaced Persons |
| IPCR | Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution |
| IDMC | Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre |
| NEMA | National Emergency Management Authority |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| HRVIC | Nigerian Human Rights Violation Commission |
| UNESCO | United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation |
| ACCDA | Afizere Cultural Community Development Association |
| BCDU | Bassa Cultural Development Union |
| FCC | Federal Character Commission |
| WANEP | West Africa Network for Peace building |
| UNDP | United Nation Development Programme |
| CHS | Commission on Human Security |
| MDG | Millennium Development Goal |
| STF | Special Task Force |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| JNEA | Jos North Education Authority |
| PIDAN | Plateau Indigenous Association of Nigeria |
| IED | Improvised Explosive Device |

| | |
|--------|--|
| MAN | Manufacturers Association of Nigeria |
| HRW | Human Right Watch |
| JTF | Joint Task Force |
| MACBAN | Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria |
| WAEC | West African Examination Council |
| CEPAN | Centre for Peace Advancement in Nigeria |
| RURCON | Rural Development Counsellors for Christian Churches in Africa |
| CEPID | Centre for Peace Initiative and Development |
| SFCG | Search For Common Ground |
| BAA | Berom, Afizere and Anaguta |
| IMTD | Institute of multi-track Diplomacy |
| NaPCOM | National Peace Commission |
| NPP | National Peace Policy |

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

One of the biggest challenges confronting humanity is the intractability of violent conflict and the consequent cost it imposes on mankind and society at large. In addition to being responsible for the avoidable death of at least one million persons yearly, the cost implication of violent conflicts in terms of missed developmental opportunities are monumental (Ball, 2002). Extant study on violent conflict as an impediment to global development is plethora and this is because every violent conflict carries in its trail destruction of vast human, material and natural resources that could have been used to further make life easy for man (Albert 2012:5). Nnoli (2003) agrees that violent conflicts have often turned the people's attention from creative production to creative destruction.

Mamdani (2002) surmises that the twentieth century was characterised by colossal senseless acts of violence that make it the most violent in recorded history. Empirical studies show that violent conflict and conflict induced costs are global phenomena that affect all states in one way or another. Cambodia for instance, experienced massive social and political collapse which included inflationary pressure on goods and abysmal upsurge in prostitution by hyper violence and protracted conflicts between the 1970's and 1990's. At a time, it was regarded as a "failed state" (Ojendal, 2003). A failed state refers to a situation in which the state loses its monopoly to compel obedience to law and order to non-state actors who usurp its statutory responsibilities (Animasawun, 2010).

In post independent Africa, violent conflict alone is the highest cause of unnatural death and destruction of social, economic and political infrastructure (Adetula, 2009). Violent conflict also orchestrates homelessness, displacement, and economic incapacitation (*The Economist* 2005, p.80 cited in Adetula, 2009: 391). Equally, studies on conflict cost have shown the negative nexus between violent conflict and the rise of HIV/AIDS diseases even to an epidemic level. The connectivity is the use of rape as a tool of conflict engagement, the unfortunate offering of sex in exchange for food, shelter and other basic needs of survival by vulnerable women (UNAIDS, 2002).

In the Rwandan crisis, there have been several reports of women being raped as a means of ethnic cleansing. It is not just targeted to psychologically traumatize individual victims, but

also to inflict collective terror and humiliation on the opposing ethnic groups (UNAIDS, 2002). In Angola and Mozambique, combatants kidnap women as sex slaves, which is also a conflict strategy to terrorize and dehumanise young women from particular ethnic groups (Oluyemi-kusa, 2006: 213). Most times, these abused women do not live a psychologically stable life after the war had ended as they carry the stigma and shame throughout their lifetime (Mutunga, 2009). Mutunga further observes that:

The different sides {parties} of the conflict are known to use sexual violence against women from the other side as a tool to communicate hostility to the other side, as in cases where women are raped in front of their husbands. Rape requires the dehumanization of the victim and as such aimed at humiliating and subjugating not only the women but society. It is often argued that because women are the centre of culture and family reproduction, women are made a target to eradicate a people. During the Rwandan genocide, 250,000 to 500,000 women were raped (2009:371)

Africa is remarked to have been more severely affected by HIV/AIDS than any part of the world. A United Nations report show that about 29.4 million people, adult and children are infected with the HIV virus in Africa, in fact the region is home to 70% of the world wide total of infected people (UNAIDS; 2002). According to Alex de Waal, a big part of the blame for Africa's HIV/AIDS epidemic must fall on wars, soldiers and cultures of militarization (Alex de Waal, n.d, cited in Adetula, 2006:394). Also, a joint study carried out by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS: 2002), reveal that about 5 million people out of 26 million adult in Lesotho, Malawi Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe are infected with HIV/AIDS, while 600,000 children under 15 years are also suffering from the disease. The report further correlates this high rise of HIV/AIDS cases in these countries to the liberation wars they fought (Adetula, 2006: 306)

Violent conflicts also induce food shortages, brain drain and human development stagnations by way of negative impact and obstructions on education (Furley, 1995). According to Flores (2004), conflict and economic reasons are responsible for more than 35% of global food emergencies between 1992 and 2003, while more than half of the countries that experienced undernourishment in the 1990's were post conflict states. With specific reference to Africa, she opined that more than half of the reported food emergencies in Africa were conflict induced.

Incidentally, these destructions and dislocations do not go away at the termination of the violent conflicts, rather most post conflict societies especially those in Africa continue excruciatingly to suffer them. There are several cases of conflict torn communities and IDP's in Nigeria abandoned by successive governments at the cessation of hostilities. The *Guardian* newspaper of 17th December, 2001 tells the story of Zaki Biam refugees abandoned by the Nigerian state and in search of succor. The *New Nigerian* of 2nd July, 2002 reports of about two thousand Nigerian refugees who fled to Cameroon in the face of the Mambilla Plateau conflicts and refused to come back because there are no efforts from successive Nigerian governments to help rebuild their destroyed communities. According to the Nigerian High Commissioner to Cameroon, Hadizah Mustapha, there are about 12,000 Nigerian refugees in the Cameroon. Some of these fled from the Taraba/Benue herdsmen—crop farmers conflicts; some are victims of Boko Haram insurgents in the north east states of Bornu, Yobe and Adamawa. Surprisingly too, some of the refugees are Nigerians running away from the violent conflicts in Central African Republic.¹ What is curious and should get the Nigerian authorities worried is why Nigerian citizens running away from violent conflict in Central African Republic would settle at Cameroon and not come home instead, considering the proximity of Cameroon to Nigeria. Similarly, in another disturbing report, the *Sunday Sun* of 31st August, 2014 captured in its cover the story of about one thousand Nigerian refugees recently displaced by insurgents at Gamboru in Bornu into the Cameroon, crying out to the federal government of Nigeria to save their soul. They complain of abandonment by the Nigerian authorities, they complain of hunger and possible hostility from their Cameroonian hosts when they run out of coping capacity.

Social structural destruction is always the resultant effect of violent conflicts translating to underdevelopment when not properly managed. In 1995 for instance, the conflict in Umuleri and Aguleri literally led to the leveling of the two communities and their developmental structures: public properties including schools, banks, post offices, town halls, churches and about 200 private houses were razed to the ground, including countless human casualty (Ekeh, 1999). Albert (2001), alluded that Ife was virtually deserted as a result of the Ife/Modekeke conflict which stalled the electoral process between 1981 and 1983, led to massive deaths, destruction of several houses, housing estates like the popular Oranmiyan shopping complex and Sijuwade estate, shops, filling stations and vehicles.

¹ Hadizah Mustapha spoke on NTA's discussion program "PLATFORM" on 3/8/2014 at 8pm

According to a World Bank report, resources diverted by conflict away from development use are estimated at one billion dollars a year in central Africa and more than eight hundred million dollars in West Africa (McNamara: 1991). While Ogbogbo (2005) laments that despite Africa having fifty percent of the world's gold, ninety five percent of world's diamond, ninety five of world's platinum and twenty five thousand kilometers of its river, violent conflict had hampered development in Africa. According to him, this is so because Africa's resources are rather sources of violent conflicts pitching groups against each other and breeding underdevelopment and hardships due to their cost not being adequately attended to. On the whole, it is estimated that Africa has suffered a combined loss of around 300 billion Dollars since 1990 to violent conflicts and wars (Suifon, 2012). And according to the International Action Network on Small Arms, Safeworld and Oxfam International, armed conflict cost Africa 18 billion dollars between 1990 and 2005 in which 23 African countries experienced different kinds of violent conflicts (Alimba, 2014), prompting scholars to submit that Africa has become a very good laboratory to study violent conflicts and its destructive effects on a system (Nwolise, 2003).

Conflict has been universally described and accepted as being intrinsic and an inevitable part of human existence (Francis, 2009). Thus, progressive societies had equally evolved functional institutional mechanisms to not only prevent its outbreak but to transform it when it inevitably occurs. Conflict transformation is seen as a generic term referring to actions and processes seeking to alter the various characteristics and manifestations of violent conflict by addressing the root causes of a particular conflict over the long term and dealing with the structural, behavioral and attitudinal aspects of the conflict from start to finish (Berghof Foundation for Conflict studies, 2004). According to the Berghof Foundation, this incorporates the activities and processes of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, settlement and management to addressing conflict cost. Lederach (1995:17) further amplified this by asserting that conflict transformation offers more than elimination of conflict by transforming the dynamics of the conflict, the relationship between the parties and by what he calls "transformative human construction and reconstruction of social organizations and realities". By that, he meant the rebuilding of relationships and communities after each conflict. That is to say, conflict transformation as post conflict peace building does not just seek to terminate violence and its causes but to also deal with its cost or heal its wounds.

In Nigeria, the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) and the National Emergency Management Agency are the state's institutional agents saddled with conflict resolution and emergency intervention powers. Since the inception of the IPCR, carved out of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2002, it has taken giant steps within its operating framework to address conflict issues in the country, some of which include the Strategic Conflict Assessment of Nigeria's six geopolitical zones in 2003 and the draft report of the National Peace Policy of Nigeria in 2009. The IPCR is also the brain behind the Niger Delta Amnesty program of President Shehu Musa Yar'dua. The Niger Delta Amnesty program was conceived and designed at the institute as a multi-prong state response towards deescalating and resolving the militancy-induced tensions in the south-south, which, at a point almost shut down Nigeria's oil-based economy. At the height of the Niger Delta militancy, Nigeria's oil production decreased from 2.2 million barrels per day to 700 thousand barrels daily (Kingsley Kuku on "*60 Minutes with Angela*" on AIT, of 14th September, 2012; Omotola, 2009: 144).

Sadly, managing post conflict cost has not been IPCR's part of operation. The national peace plan which it designed as the institutional policy framework for peace and conflict management in the country, including conflict intervention is yet to be signed into law. But even at this, conflict cost management was conspicuously omitted on the proposed national peace plan draft, despite the document showing clearly that its intention was to become an operational architecture for Nigeria's peace and conflict issues:

The National Peace Policy (NPP) provides a framework for peaceful social transformation...The National Peace Policy (NPP) defines the commitment of the Nigerian State to building and entrenching a culture of peaceful coexistence through a set of actions and activities as well as addressing issues of governance at all levels. Consequently, it focuses on both the operational and structural conflict prevention measures required in Nigeria, as established by the findings of the SCA conducted by the Institute covering the Economic, Political, Legal and Institutional issues and policies relating to conflict prevention. The operational preventive measures include policies and interventions aimed at defusing tension and preventing the outbreak, escalation, spread or recurrence of violence in the society. These measures include policing, humanitarian interventions, early warning and early responses, mediation, conciliation and other actions/activities carried out with the aim of preventing the outbreak of violence as well as contributing to Peacebuilding. The structural preventive measures on the other hand, include addressing democracy and political governance issues, anticorruption measures, poverty reduction, employment generation, human capacity development, rule of law, and conflict- sensitive development to strengthen the peace fabric of the society, among other measures (IPCR, 2015:15)

Thus, it can be argued and rightly too, that Nigeria lacks an institutional framework to respond to conflict cost. The National Assembly lend credence to this when its committee chairman on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Hon. Mohammed Sani Zorro remarked that:

There is a need to come up with an operational framework that will enable all governmental institutions like NEMA, National Rehabilitation Commission, National Commission for Refugees and those that are not backed by law like Presidential Initiative on North East, or Presidential Committee on North East, and all those that may emerge afterwards to come under one umbrella, to have a robust law that will be so wide as to allow all of them to function legally (*Leadership* 11th October, 2015. P11)

The employment of adhoc executive instruments like panels of investigation to trace causes and effects of conflicts are often done at the whims and caprices of the government in power. There are no policy frameworks guiding their establishment or the implementation of their recommendations. Consequently, most recommendations of such panels are abandoned. In fact, some are seen as decoy of the government in power to distract the citizenry from the fundamental issues of the conflicts. Subsequently, the questions begging for answers include: in the aftermath of destructions in a community, for instance, residential and commercial houses, income generating structures, farms and agricultural proceeds and livestock; whose responsibility is it to rebuild the houses, restore the farms, rebuild income structures, rebuild schools, resettle the displaced and de-radicalize the disillusioned? If the answer is the state, what policy instrument does the Nigerian state have presently to guide her on this. On the part of IPCR, this is not operational.

Similarly, the National Emergency Monitoring Agency of Nigeria (NEMA) and its various state wings: the state emergency monitoring agencies (SEMA's) were established to temporarily respond to crisis emergencies in terms of provision of relief materials and saving of life by evacuation to safe grounds. By its Act, funding and operational structure, NEMA is not structured and equipped to respond to post conflict cost as it affects community rebuilding, reconstruction and resettlement, but has creditably performed its emergency-response role. This is in addition to the efforts of supportive nongovernmental agencies in the theater of peace and conflict.

Consequently, the Nigerian state continues to falter in terms of professionally managing her conflict costs for obvious reasons. In addition to not having an institutional framework to manage conflict cost, there is also the observable problem of misconception. Conflict cost is seen in Nigeria, majorly as human casualties and properties destroyed. Thus, the phrase: “20 died and ten houses burnt” is synonymous with many panel reports on conflict cause and effects. Added to this is the disconnection between research and policy makers (Voyage of discovery, 2014). Research institutions have extensively investigated the cost of most violent conflicts in Nigeria but the lack of synergy between government intervening institutions and these studies continues to deny the state of their use. This dearth of conflict-cost data in the polity makes it difficult to aggregate empirically how each violent conflict is shaping and reshaping the immediate post conflict polity and by extension the nation as a whole. According to the Chairman of the National Population Commission of Nigeria (NPC), Eze Duruiheoma, the bane of Nigeria’s development is lack of data (*The Guardian*, 17th June, 2014, P21). A pointer to this is the “figure dispute” between the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), a Norway-based non-governmental organization and the National Emergency Management Agency of Nigeria (NEMA), as it concerns the real number of insurgency induced IDP’s in Nigeria. While the IDMC claimed there are 1.5 million internally displaced persons in Nigeria consequent on Boko Haram terrorism, in addition to about 150, 000 spread across Chad, Niger and Cameroon; NEMA could only account for 981, 416 thousand leaving a whopping 518, 416 thousand IDP’s unaccounted (*Thisday* 19th January, 2015, P15).

Thus, the Nigerian state has a poor history of conflict transformation in the real sense of conflict transformation based on Louise Diamond (1994) and Maynard’s (1994) transformation model, which suffices that conflict transformation is not only about conflict containment or resolution but the management of its cost as well. What is often available in Nigeria as conflict transformation is conflict containment or termination using security agents (Animasawun, 2010) while abandoning wounded conflict victims and bruised communities to their fate, families and friends. Without prevaricating, this has not only been a recipe for social economic underdevelopment but instability (Alimba, 2014). It is posturings like this that informed the description by Albert (2004) of Nigeria as a post-traumatic state. A post-traumatic state is one that is indifferent or rather mismanages the conflict induced wounds and social economic dislocations of her citizens (Animasawun, 2012). Kukah (2011) submits

that these unhealed injuries among the Nigerian citizenry were one of the by-products of military rule:

By the end of military rule, the nation had been left with a severely wounded community that has seen some of its best's brains decimated by firing squads, imprisonment, early retirements, jealousy, and a loss of mission and focus. The result is that we are a nation of the walking wounded (2011:6)

Sustaining this argument, El-nafaty (2015) in "Healing a wounded nation" observed that Nigeria has for long carried on nonchalantly in terms of realistically addressing the bruises of her citizens:

The civil war ended 45 years ago, yet the spirit of Biafra still remains; the rebellion of Isaac Boro was crushed before then, yet his ghost still haunts the Niger delta. In the northern highlands, there is a new war path amongst the tribes. The minority tribes are on war path against the Hausa-Fulanis who had been with them for a thousand years. There is a country called Nigeria but there are no Nigerians (2015:59)

Nigeria's lack of institutional framework to address and manage conflict cost is captured lucidly by the World Bank in its empirical study of the fate of insurgency-induced IDP's and communities in the five north eastern states of Nigeria, namely Adamawa, Bauchi, Bornu, Gombe and Yobe:

To date, the response to the emergent humanitarian crisis has been deeply lacking. Whether housed in official camps, host communities, or informal settlements, IDP's are vulnerable to a number of insecurities and scarcities. They widely report a lack of access to portable water, food, health care, shelter, and education. Livelihoods, dependent on access to markets and resources, have been devastated. Women and youth have shouldered most of the burden. The national government does not have a clear policy or legal framework for administering humanitarian aid. The result has been confused, poor coordination, competition or adversarial relationships between agencies, and a lack of clear lines of accountability. Delivery of humanitarian aid has been inconsistent and there are allegations of corruption by the authorities operating camps and those disbursing aid. At the same time, international and local NGOs are also implementing ad hoc interventions with limited harmonization of their efforts. (The World Bank, 2014:6)

Presently, Nigeria is ranked 10th in Africa and 14th in the global failed states ladder out of 177 states worldwide according to the "Fund for Peace" (FFP, 2012 report). Some of the core criteria for the FFP rating includes "Security apparatus", that is state capacity to maintain and

guarantee lives and property. “Factionalized elite” or what Albert terms “elite fragmentation” (2012); “Poverty and economic decline”, “Uneven development” “Demographic pressures” among others (*Saturday Tribune*, 3rd June, 2012, p 8). Equally, the poverty level in Nigeria has been on the increase steadily, ironically alongside the GDP. In 1980, the population percentage of poverty in Nigeria was 27%, but by 2012 it has risen to 69/70% (Ogwumike, n.d), prompting former president Obasanjo to query the accuracy of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Nigeria which has also continued to grow side by side with the poverty level. (*Saturday Tribune*, 3rd June, 2012).

Experts are however agreed that the increasing poverty level in the country, insecurity, food scarcity among other things is connected with the multiplicity of violent conflicts all over the country. These conflicts are weakening people’s productive capacity, killing bread winners in hundreds, destroying infrastructure, stalling production and productive ventures, diverting funds meant for development use, remapping social-geographical settlements along explosive lines which is the foundation for future conflicts, reducing employment opportunities, weakening the social safety net, the declining capacity of the state to provide services like health and education, inability to maintain law and order (Albert, 2012). Put bluntly, violent conflict particularly its unmanaged or mismanaged effect is a major obstacle to development and growth in the country. Albert alludes to the fact that “violent conflicts have contributed in no small measure to the state of underdevelopment in Nigeria” (2012: 3).

In an attempt to mitigate and institutionally address some of these wounds inflicted by violent conflict, which to a large extent is traceable to the successive military regimes that piloted the affairs of the nation, president Obasanjo set up the Nigerian Human Rights Violation Commission (HRVIC) at the commencement of the Fourth Republic. Unfortunately, several years after, it is still contestable whether the HRVIC actually brought the desired healing to Nigeria’s hurting people. Its recommendations were not implemented by the Obasanjo regime and subsequent regimes seem not interested either (Adekunle, 2012)

The north central zone of Nigeria is arguably the hotbed of group conflicts in Nigeria (Best, 2004) and have infamously hosted one third of Nigeria’s group conflicts since 1999 (Alubo, 2006). These conflicts shackle the region with different conflict costs ranging from burning and looting of property, mass rape of women, imposition of curfew, stop and search operations, disruptions of normal rhythm of social and economic life, generations of IDPs, road blocks and deaths (Alubo: 2006), which unfortunately are under investigated empirically

and mismanaged. To compound the problem, state-led post conflict interventions as have been highlighted has so far ignored the conflict costs thus escalating the underdevelopment of the zone (Krause, 2011).

Consequently, the focus of this work is to empirically investigate the social costs of the Jos conflict and the Bassa/Egbura conflicts in Toto with reference to food insecurity, family income, basic education, right abuse and insecurity from 1994 to 2011; assess how these costs were handled by the state and determine the degree to which their handling affect the stability and development of post conflict Jos and Toto, and by extension the north central zone.

1.2: Statement of the Problem

It is clear that Nigeria is under the siege of violent conflicts of varying nature, nomenclature and proportion; and by extension its destructive tendencies. The prevalence of violent conflicts has pervasive dislocational effects on society, undermines development structure, aggravates economic incapacitation and brings states and civil societies under pressure (WHO, 2002; UNDP, 2006; Institute for Economic and Peace cited in Segun, 2013:7). As Segun further asserts:

The real threat to security in Nigeria today may not be a full blown national conflagration but pockets of communal conflicts erupting all over the country” whose costs as they boarder on insecurity are mismanaged (Segun, 2013:7)

While the prevalence of violent conflict is nationwide, no region in Nigeria seem more embattled and battered by pockets of protracted intergroup ethnic conflicts as the north central since the early 1990s. Best (2004) noted that some of the most violent and most protracted conflicts in Nigeria have been recorded in this zone. A closer look at the intergroup violent conflict profile of the region in the contemporary times is worrisome and frightening. Table 1.1 below is a graphic summary of group conflict profile in the north central zone of Nigeria. While some are intensely active, some have been momentarily contained but as is peculiar with the Nigerian state where conflicts are not fundamentally resolved and transformed, there is a high probability that there might still be future eruptions along the unresolved lines.

Table 1.1**Group conflicts in North central zone of Nigeria**

| S/N | Parties to the conflict | State |
|-----|---|------------------|
| 1 | Idoma versus Igede | Benue |
| 2 | Idoma and Igede versus Tiv | Benue |
| 3 | Tiv versus Fulani herdsmen | Benue |
| 4 | Idoma versus Tiv | Benue |
| 5 | Tiv versus Jukun | Benue/Taraba |
| 6 | Tiv versus Alago/Azara | Benue/Nasarawa |
| 7 | Intra-Tiv conflicts between Ikurav and Shitle clans in Katsina Ala | Benue |
| 8 | Berom/Anaguta/Afizere versus Hausa/Fulani in Jos north | Plateau |
| 9 | Intra-indigene conflicts between Berom, Afizere and Anaguta in Jos and environs | Plateau |
| 10 | Berom versus Hausa in Bukuru Jos south | Plateau |
| 11 | Berom versus Fulani in Barikin Ladi | Plateau |
| 12 | Bokkos versus Wamba over Farin Riwa waterfalls and farmlands | Plateau/Nasarawa |
| 13 | Mwaghavul and Ron of Mangu and Bokkos local government areas | Plateau |
| 14 | Mwaghavul versus Pyem Fier versus Kaduna | Plateau/Kaduna |
| 15 | Fier versus Mwaghavul in Mangu | Plateau |
| 16 | Pankshin and Bokkos local government areas | Plateau |

| | | |
|----|--|------------|
| 17 | Hausa/Fulani versus Taroh in Wase | Plateau |
| 18 | Hausa versus Goemai in Shendam | Plateau |
| 19 | Pan/Kofyar and Gamai of Namu Qua'n Pan | Plateau |
| 20 | Tiv versus Kwalla in Qua'an Pan | Plateau |
| 21 | Fulani herdsmen versus crop Farmers all over Plateau state | Plateau |
| 22 | Bassa versus Egbura | Nasarawa |
| 23 | Bassa/Gbagi versus Egbura | Nasarawa |
| 24 | Ayele Igah and Iggah Oyikwa clans in Nasarawa local government | Nasarawa |
| 25 | Ombatse Eggon versus Alago | Nasarawa |
| 26 | Omabatse Eggon versus Fulani and Agatu | Nasarawa |
| 27 | Gwari (Gbagi) versus Fulani in Gwagwalada Abuja | FCT |
| 28 | Iddoji versus Iddozumi | Kogi |
| 29 | Adupi in Kogi versus Epielo in Benue | Kogi/Benue |
| 30 | Alimi descendants versus Afonja Idi Ape descendants | Kwara |

Source: Developed from IPCR (2008:53-86); Alubo (2006); *Daily Trust* 14th May, 2013; *New Nigerian* 3rd February, 2002 bp; *New Nigerian* 16th April, 2002 p16; *New Nigerian* 28th March, 2002 p32; *Thisday* 20th June, 2002 P2; Best (2004)

Scholars like Alubo (2006), Alemika (2002) and Yoroms (2006), who had researched extensively on group conflicts in the north central region corroborates the fact that the magnitude and intensity of group violent conflicts in the zone is worrisome and its cost noxious.

Thus, it is an incontestable reality that the north central region had been shackled by the overbearing costs of these age long conflicts. The Jos conflict and the Bassa/Egbura conflicts which this work focuses on have been on since 1994. Though, presently contained; within their seventeen year life cycle, the social, psychological, economic and political lives of the residents of both Jos and Toto, and indeed, the region had been affected in so many ways by these two conflicts. Since the 12th of April 1994 when the Jos conflict began, the print and electronic media have been awash with pathetic, gory and screaming headlines of massacre and death of people, either in open eruptions or in isolated reprisals, revenge killings and all manner of destructions. The *Vanguard* of 31st December 2011, reports that about eight thousand Nigerians have been killed in the Jos conflict, out of which one thousand six hundred and fifty four are none indigenes. It also reported that properties worth trillions have been wasted while citing none indigenes alone as having lost a whopping nine hundred and seventy billion naira.

Similarly, Yahaya (2005) asserts that assets worth fifty nine million, six hundred and seventy thousand naira were lost to the Jos crisis in 2001, while government compensation to victims was about thirteen million, nine hundred and thirty eight thousand naira. In the 2004 crisis, he said about one hundred and two million, nine hundred and thirty two thousand naira was lost in damages, while eighty five million, one hundred and twenty one thousand was paid as compensation to affected victims.

Equally, a serving senator of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Gyan Dantong), representing Plateau north and a Plateau state house of Assembly member (Gyan Fulani) had also been killed in the course of the Jos conflict. Politically, Jos north, the parent local government of the metropolis was grinded to a halt between 1996—2008 as elections into the local government could not hold as a result of the crisis. Meaningful development was halted, political cum democratic dividends were virtually nonexistent while economic activities faltered (Ostien, 2009).

The Bassa/Egbura conflict in Toto has not been less in devastation. As was the case in Jos, democratic governance went on suspension in Toto between 1999—2003, as a result of the

violent conflict. Best (2004) notes that consequent on the intensity and dynamics of the conflict, the Bassa as a party to the Toto elections wrote a petition to the Nasarawa state government to suspend conducting local government elections in Toto in 1999. The ground for this was that the Bassa as a group were violently chased out of Toto by the Egbura in 1997. Some narratives termed this a pogrom (Maiyaki Majida 2007, 2012; Best 2004), contending that as the numerically dominant group in Toto, any election within the local government excluding the Bassa is undemocratic.

Consequently, while the rest of Nigeria welcomed democratic governance down to the local governments in 1999, people in Toto could not as a result of violent conflicts. They only did so in 2003, but even the 2003 local government elections in Toto suffered series of serious protests consequent on the conflicts as the Bassa ethnic group who were chased out of Toto prior to 2003 and hadn't returned then, urged the government to suspend it still.

There were sustained protests from the Bassa against the elections because their people were still in exile following the sacking of 1997-98 and 2001. In an open letter to INEC on 27 March 2002, the Bassa protested the attempt to register prospective voters in Toto, stressing that they represented a violently displaced majority from the area. They argued that the exercise would amount to rewarding ethnic cleansing thereby setting a bad precedence in the state (Best, 2004:23)

The government did not heed this protest and in its bid to conduct local government elections in Toto in 2003, another round of mayhem ensued culminating in the killing of a serving Commissioner in the Nasarawa state government, Mrs. Maimuna Joyce Katai, who incidentally hails from Toto but Gbagi by ethnic group.

The conduct of the 2003 elections saw the rise of what Best, termed the "Egbura Militia", a very dangerous twist to the dynamics of the Toto conflict. The "Egbura Militia" is a group of unemployed young men armed to the teeth, leveraging on the prevailing conflict cleavages in the local government to perpetuate all kinds of criminality, unleash mayhem and pursue nefarious personal agendas. It was this group that hijacked the 2003 elections, hacked down Mrs. Joyce Katai and shot her twice on the main road after beaten her to stupor in public. They then "went to her house and burnt it down and afterwards went on rampage, killing the Gbagi and destroying two of their villages, Zokutu and Yewuye" (Best, 2004:24).

For several weeks and at several times, social and economic activities in Toto came to a halt consequent on violent eruptions (Best, 2004), lending credence to Baron et al's (2004)

submission that many developing countries like Nigeria are afflicted by high level of communal and inter communal conflicts that are not necessarily civil wars, but sufficient to cause significant destruction of livelihood and properties.

Sadly, the state's response to these conflict costs has not been encouraging. The state does not even have any institutional framework or policy response to tackle post conflict costs. Ab initio, the state's peace and conflict institutions: the security agents, IPCR and NEMA are statutorily constrained in terms of handling post conflict costs. While the security agents enforces order by way of conflict termination, the IPCR understudies conflict with a view to resolving the conflict issues and NEMA handles short term responses to emerging conflict emergencies through the distribution of relief materials to mostly displaced persons housed in makeshift camps. Thus, there is still the lacuna of no systematic and coordinated institutional response to the fundamental dislocations and incapacitations occasioned by conflict in the communities. This is why most post conflict societies in Nigeria still groans under the burden of conflict induced challenges.

There is need to empirically investigate not just the cause as has been the case, but the cost of the Jos conflict and the Bassa/Egbura conflicts, and indeed every other conflict in the country with a view to bringing about a post conflict lasting peace and restorative healing to conflict induced wounds in the context of conflict transformation. Extant studies have shown that unhealed conflict inflicted social, psychological, economic and political wounds are often the firewood that powers the next round of the conflagration thereby sustaining the life cycle of conflicts. Sustaining this argument, Maynard (1994:1) alluded that "left unattended, gaping psychological and social wounds of conflict can fester and eventually cause a reversion to conflict, slowing the long term healing". Scholars like Diamond (1994) equally opine that conflict transformation is also concerned about nation building, national reconciliation, healing, change agency and social transformation.

However, there cannot be any meaningful discourse about healing and restoration to pre-conflict status, at least relatively, without a conscious empirical understanding and ascertaining of the social injuries resulting from violent conflicts. This is the challenge of this study as it concerns Jos and the Bassa/Egbura conflicts in Toto.

Violent conflict is a precursor to social stagnancy (Nnoli, 2003; IPCR, 2003), and would not produce a different result in Jos and Toto local governments. Is it possible that the protracted nature of these conflicts in the zone and their twisting dynamics, especially the lethargic

approach of the state to resolve the fundamental issues involved may have planted the seed for social insecurity challenges that might linger on afterwards like the Niger delta conflicts, the civil war and most other prolonged conflicts in Nigeria? There are allegations of arms proliferation in the zone consequent on violent conflicts and a culture of violence that has been on for more than a decade. How has this impacted on the citizenry and good neighborliness? How has the presence of the army trained for conventional warfare but now stationed on the streets of Jos and Toto for years panned out among civilian residents? How does this affect social life? Is it possible that the unbudgeted cost implication of maintaining a standing peacekeeping force, managing the internally displaced persons may have begun to affect the financial health of these states? In a *Daily Trust* report of 12th November, 2010 captioned “Jang Admits Financial weakness After Crisis”, the Plateau state governor, Dr Jonah Jang was quoted to have admitted that the financial position of the state has been weakened by the lingering age long conflict. What does this portend for the smooth functioning of the state?

The north central zone is home to most of Nigeria’s ethnic nationalities and religions, who had co-existed in relative peace and accommodated each other. How has these conflicts affected this balance of cohabitation and social cohesion? What of social interaction for national integration. The region is a miniature Nigeria playing host to almost all the ethnic groups in Nigeria. How has the violent conflicts shaped group engagements with each other especially in the context of Nigeria’s excruciating drive for a functional nationhood?

What about the family units in the affected communities? How have they coped? The family is the most important unit in social formation. It is the nucleus of societal life. Whatever affects the family also affects the larger society thus the family is the perfect mirror to view society. Conflict trend analysis has shown that the family unit is the worst hit and most vulnerable in most violent conflicts. Is it any different in Jos and Toto? What about the primary and secondary school education? Violent conflicts are known to disrupt social institutions and social developmental infrastructures, which in turn impinges negatively on the system. How has the schools coped in the course of the 18 years of recycled and persisted violent conflicts? What has been the impact of this on the academic performance of the school children? In a study, Nigeria is reported to have the highest number of out-of –school children in the world (UNESCO, 2013). How much of this out-of –school syndrome is conflict induced? Is this also a factor in Jos and Toto?

A lot of studies have been conducted on the two conflicts within the sphere of this work and indeed others in the region (Albert 2003, Egwu 2004, 2005, 2009, Best 2007, 2008, Ostien 2009, Jibo, Simbine and Galadima 2001, Obadiah and Asmau 2010, Olaniyi and Nnabuihe 2010, Dan Fulani 2006, IPCR 2008, Ihuah 2012, Mejida 2012). Most of these has been excellent attempts at dissecting and tracing the colonial root of the conflicts, the possible causes, dynamics, resolution and management, but there has not been any scholarly investigation on the management of the social cost of the Jos and Toto conflicts and its implications as it concerns the variables under interrogation.

Although, some studies commented on some of the social impacts of the conflicts especially in Jos but almost all of these are generalized assumptions or references to newspaper publications which are not investigative and empirical. For instance, after the raid on Dogo Nahawa on March 7th, 2010, the researcher went to Jos on pilot findings and visited Dogo Nahawa where the youth leader {Mr. Chuwana Luka} and the community leader took me to the site of the mass grave where 483 persons were buried. Interestingly, most newspapers had reported that about 170 persons died in Dogo Nahawa. Thus, relying solely on newspapers for conflict effect in Nigeria could be misleading.

Shedrack Gaya Best's "*Causes and Effects of Conflict in the Southern Zone of Plateau State, Nigeria*" is about the only work that came close to empirically interrogating the management of the costs of conflicts in Plateau. However, as the name suggests, the work is concentrated on the southern Zone of the Plateau and Jos metropolis is not in that zone. The need to investigate the cost and management of violent conflict effects in Nigeria cannot be overemphasized. Nigeria is precariously sitting on a cliff, the economy has slumped to the lowest level ever, poverty level has galloped to 70% according to the Central Bank of Nigeria, education has nose dived to an alarming low level (Danjibo 2012); religious fundamentalism and youth restiveness are indicators of dysfunctionality in the polity, kidnapping and gang terror has become a thriving business, and they are all partly thriving due to the proliferation of light arms made possible by lingering active conflicts and the mismanagement of its effects. In fact, Usman (2003) observed that communal conflicts in Nigeria since the 1980s have become frequent, widespread and violently destructive to life and property due to the state's inability to peacefully solve the manifestations.

The truth however is that investigating the cost of violent conflict, its management and implications to the society are necessary argument in the justification for conflict

management and transformation (Albert 2001), just as Maynard (2004) argues that conflict transformation is the various measures employed to redress and resettle society back to its pre-conflict normalcy. Redressing and resettlement cannot happen in its real sense as earlier pointed out if a society cannot aggregate the damage done by violent conflict, objectively interrogate how it has managed them and improve on it

In addition, contrary to the practice in Nigeria, conflict costs go beyond human causality. It is about broken social relationships, about internally displaced persons, about using unbudgeted state fund to finance interventions, about a hostile business environment that has driven so many companies and prospective investors out of the locality. It is about the proliferation of arms and associated by-products like violent crime and insecurity. It is about those who were raped, debased, dehumanised and economically incapacitated. It is about the economic incapacitation of families, the fluctuations and disruptions of academic school calendar and the overall stagnation of social and economic development. It is about the societal enthronement of the culture of violence and impunity that lowers the dignity, values and ethics of life. It is about a generation that has known no peace, no happiness and safety, and is certainly losing their innocence to the vagaries of violence. It is about the philosophy of “hatred” coating social and intergroup relationships, which is being bequeathed to the next generation as a parcel of land. It is the sum total of the social, economic political and psychological dislocation of the society. Conflict cost can be on the resources of the society or on the living conditions of its inhabitants. No society can develop without a conscious articulation of the issues that challenges the growth and well-being of her citizens. In Nigeria “conflict cost” is one of such challenges. For according to Albert (2012:4), “if the effects of violent conflicts are left unaddressed, there is the risk that grievances in Nigerian communities will persist and societies will remain locked in conflict dynamics. Above all, the resources that could have been channeled into the development of the health, educational, energy and related sectors are wasted on perennial expensive internal peace keeping operations and setting up of commissions of inquiry into the problems”. Albert was vehement that post conflict societies should not rest until all conflict injuries are adequately nursed and social healing perfected. This healing is also not dependent on mere passage of time or coincidence but should be meticulously planned for and executed:

We need to address ourselves to the enormity of the damage that must have been done to community life in the course of a conflict. No intervention project—no matter how well designed would remove all these problems at once. The problems would have to be removed

gradually. If a conflict would not go away that easily, it logically follows that those who live in post conflict societies should not go to sleep with their eyes closed all the time. It is true that time is a healer of the wound inflicted by conflict, but not just any time, for the kind of time that heals wound is the time that has a lot of medicaments nursed into it. It is necessary to follow up an intervention project into a community conflict, with some post conflict peace-building activities... Peacebuilding in this context has to do with “repairing” relationships, institutions and social facilities (Albert, 2001:130).

Since no single study may be able to empirically capture the entire cost of violent conflict in any given locality, and taken cognizance of extant literature that has shown research and intervention gaps in both Jos and Toto (Jane Krause 2011 and Shedrack Best, 2004), this work dealt specifically with the social cost of the identified conflicts.

1.3 Research Aim

The aim of this study is to empirically investigate the social cost of the Jos conflict and the Bassa/Egbura conflicts in Toto as extrapolation of group conflicts in north central Nigeria, assess how these costs were handled and determine the degree to which their handling affect the stability and development of post conflict Jos and Toto local governments and the zone. And explore prospects for a better management approach of conflict cost.

1.4 Specific Objectives

To achieve this, the study specifically:

1. Investigated the social costs of group conflicts in Jos and Toto from 1994 to 2011.
2. Assessed the institutional management of the conflict costs and its wider implications for the north central zone and Nigeria.
3. Explored possible ways through which the various levels of government can contain and mitigate these costs so as to engender post conflict stability and development in the study area

1.5 Research Questions

The following research questions serve as guide to the study.

1. What were the social costs of violent conflict on Jos metropolis and Toto local government from 1994-2011?

2. How were these post conflict costs managed by the state? Are there wider implications for the north central zone and Nigeria considering the broader ethnolinguistic representation?
3. Are there ways the various levels of government and stakeholders can better contain and mitigate the social costs of violent conflict in Toto and Jos to ensure a post conflict stable polity and development?

1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Research

This study is confined to the inter-ethnic/inter-religious conflict between the indigenous groups of Jos (Berom, Afizere and Anaguta) and the Hausa (Jasawa) and Fulani in Jos metropolis Plateau state; and the citizenship, land ownership, political and traditional power tussle in Toto local government area of Nasarawa state between the Bassa and Egbura ethnic groups.

The geographical study area is Jos metropolis made up of Jos North and part of Jos South of Plateau state and Toto local government area of Nasarawa state. The period of study is 1994 to 2011. This period witnessed the defining moments of the conflicts in-terms of violent outbreak and destruction. The study is not oblivious of the pre-colonial and colonial history of the conflicts, their post independent contemporary foundations. The spillover effects of the other conflicts, especially in the case of Jos. Proper attention will be paid to the inter playing of all these factors. The necessity of the chosen scope is to have a realistic and achievable target. Primary data (FGDs and IDIs) were conducted within the two communities.

1.7 Justification of the Study

The imperative of empirical conflict costing and its functional management as part of conflict transformation is germane to societal development and cannot be ignored. Conflict transformation is a means to an end, and that end is sustainable peace and life-affirming values and social structures (Barash and Webel, 2002). Post conflict Peace building has been described as the reconstruction of the state and rehabilitation of society following armed conflict, bitterness and traumas (Schmid, 2000). The frequency and intensity of violent conflicts especially that between groups and the state's conflict interventions that tend to ignore conflict wounds and its associated contribution to underdevelopment should be a concern to peace scholarship. The justification of this study is underscored by the fact that conflict transformation by way of peace building goes on everyday in Nigeria but little is

known about healing the social and economic wounds of conflict thus post conflict communities still groan under the burden of conflict wounds years after the termination of such conflicts. And as have shown by extant literature, mismanaged and unmanaged conflict dislocations induce underdevelopment and post conflict instability.

The study has both academic and political significance. There is a disturbing dearth of “conflict-costing” in Nigeria, especially on the part of the conflict management institutions. This has made it impossible for anyone to properly aggregate how much Nigeria has lost or is losing to the barrage of conflicts tearing her apart. It is important the Nigerian state begin to quantify how much of her annual budgets both in the federal and state levels are spent on conflict? As it is with defense budget so also are the conflict-induced losses in other aspects of Nigeria’s social economic and political life. Note that scholars like Kristina Hook (2013) have opined that conflict cost refers among other things to the tearing down of society by violent conflicts.

How much of Nigeria’s underdevelopment, social and economic backwardness is traceable to violent conflict? This study would not answer all these questions but it seeks to raise the consciousness of an institutional approach to the merits of empirically understudying and managing conflict cost, possibly leading to the building of a data bank for “conflict effects” for references and policy purposes. It is hypothetically implied that when the state begins to do this, it would by implication be appreciative of “proactive peace building” and not “reactive conflict containment” as is presently the norm (Albert 1999).

Academically, a survey of the extant literature on peace and conflict shows that there is a tacit but heavy concentration of research efforts on the “history, dynamics and management of conflicts” excluding empirical exploration of how such conflicts has affected societal development and stability. It is also of much concern that mainline developmental studies in Nigeria has consistently ignored the nexus between Nigeria’s multiple violent conflicts and her underdevelopment in the midst of unparalleled abundant natural resources. This work among other things, seeks to draw the attention of peace and conflict scholars and students to the need to also direct research attention to the various ways violent conflict is rapidly affecting and reshaping our society.

But more importantly, the study seeks to draw the attention of the Nigerian state towards a realistic definition and approach to conflict transformation that stretches from conflict

termination to social healing, rebuilding of lives and broken down societies which are global best practices in line with the United Nations human security guidelines.

It seeks among other things to ginger an institutional framework and response to conflict costing and management, perhaps as a pragmatic way to tackling the issues of underdevelopment and the challenges of human insecurity.

1.8 Conceptual Clarifications

As is the norm in academic studies, there is need to be clear as to the meaning of the concepts used and the sense in which they are deployed here.

Conflict Cost

Conflict effect or cost refers to the consequences and outcomes of conflict to the society and individuals that people it. The calculation can be measured in terms of social capital, intergroup social relationships, poverty, economy owing to de-industrialization etc. Although, Schmid (1998) posits that you cannot put a cost on conflict because it is impossible to quantify it accurately, stressing that calculations of conflict cost are notoriously difficult to make and tend to be limited to direct material and human losses. However, Albert (2001) submitted that “conflict cost” can be calculated by juxtaposing and comparing the post-conflict environment with the pre-conflict environment. In the same vein, Lund (1997:1-7) listed eight parameters that can be used while attempting conflict costing, they include:

- 1) The human toll: death and other effects on families leading to loss of family capacity to meet basic needs particularly as it concern the children.
- 2) The impact on communities: that is destruction on social fabrics and coping mechanisms.
- 3) The effects on national economics as resource bases are devastated and redirected from productivity to military requirements.
- 4) Repercussions within national political institutions when traditional institutions and power relations are altered.
- 5) Threats to regional stability and security if national political disputes spill over into neighboring countries.

- 6) Humanitarian and reconstruction aid costs incurred to rebuild war torn societies.
- 7) The price of peacekeeping
- 8) Lost opportunities for development, commerce and investment as the economy diminishes and scarce humanitarian aid and funding are siphoned off into emergency relief. In looking at conflict cost, the study functionally adopted Albert's (Ibid) position of the difference between the pre conflict society and the post conflict society with a modified version of Lund's list especially since the focus here is intra-state conflict.

Conflict

Contests, competitions, disputes and tensions as well as manifest clashes between social forces (Dahrendorf, 1959 cited in Schmid, 1998)

Group conflict

Refers to hostilities over power, interest, goal, economic resources, identity etc.; between different groups within a system. They may be ethnic or religious groups. Group conflict could be inter-group or intra-group. In this work, it refers to inter-group.

Peace Building

Refers to measures taken to consolidate peaceful relations and create an environment which deters the emergence or escalation of tensions which may lead to conflict (Ghali 1992)

Conflict Dynamics

Schmid (2000; 14) alludes that "all conflicts go through a preliminary dispute phase and may also go through one or more hostilities and post hostilities phase". According to him; in each phase, identifiable factors generate pressure that may influence the course of the phase towards the next threshold and transition into another phase. Best (2009.65) sees these phases as "stages of conflict" or "conflict process" which describes the courses, changes and transformations, a conflict passes through. Furthermore, fisher et al (2000: 29) outlined five different stages that conflict passes through. These are:

- a) Pre conflict stage: this is the period when goals between parties are incompatible which could lead to open conflict. At this stage, the conflict is not well known because parties try to hide it from public view, but communication is undermined between them.

- b) Confrontation: this is the stage at which point the conflict becomes open or manifest. This is characterized by occasional fighting, low levels of violence, and search for allies by parties, mobilization of resources, strained relations and polarization.
- c) Crises: this is the third stage which represents the peak of the conflict. In violent conflict, this is the stage of war and intense fighting, leading to killings, injuries, large scale population displacements and the use of small arms and light weapons.
- d) Outcome: this is the stage in which it is assumed that one party has won the conflict and the other party has lost or a cease fire may have been declared, a party may have surrendered, the government or other third party intervening force stronger than the warring parties may have intervened, imposed a solution or stopped the fighting. The critical issue at this stage is that the violence is decreased, which allows room for some discussion to commence or alternative means of settling the conflict.
- e) Post conflict: at this stage, violence has either ended or significantly reduced and the parties have gone past the crisis stage. This is the stage to address the underlying causes of the conflict, those incompatible goals which created the conflict in the first instance, such as the needs and fears of the parties. If they are not tackled at this stage, the conflict circle may be re-enacted and a return to the pre conflict stage with consequent re-eruption of violence is a possibility. This stage is also modified in this work to encompass social structural healing and rebuilding of broken down facilities.

From the forgoing, we can adduce that conflict dynamics refers to the different sequence and development of the conflict plot from the latent stage to the post conflict stage. This is so because conflict like society is not a static phenomenon, “but is expressive, dynamic and dialectical” (Lederach, 1997:65 cited in Best, 2009:65).

Post Conflict peace building

Economic, political and social re-building of post-conflict state and society, including: disarmament, reintegration of combatants, return of refugees, resettlement of internally displaced persons, reviving political processes, restoring physical infrastructure and restarting economic life etc (Schmid, 2003).

Violent Conflict

The resort to the use of force and armed violence in the pursuit of incompatible and particular interests and goals (Francis; 2009:20), Schmid (2000) calls it “dysfunctional conflicts” because it involves confrontations which harm the social structure as opposed to “functional conflict” which brings about useful social changes. In its manifestation, violent conflict could take the form of rioting, communal clashes, civil wars, mass murder, bombing and kidnapping.

Development

Development refers to improvements in the living standard of people over a long term. The measurables could include better education, better healthcare, better housing, better transport facilities, industrialization and technology, food security and better protection of life and properties. Development depends on good governance, appropriate infrastructure, functional institutions and better-trained people (World Bank, 1994, 1989, 2011, Danjibo 2012).

Political Economy

Political economy as a concept is a generic term referring to the interface between politics and economy (Collinsens 2003, Andreas 2012).

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0: Literature Review

This chapter reviewed scholarly and related literature relevant to this study on social cost of group conflicts and its management in Plateau and Nasarawa states of Nigeria. The work as has been briefly introduced in chapter one used the Jos and the Bassa/Egbura conflicts as case studies to extrapolate conflict costs and management among conflicting groups in the north central zone. Due to the nature of the topic, this review adopted both the thematic and historical approaches.

2.1 Historical background of the north central

The North Central zone is made up of Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau and the Federal Capital Territory. It is geographically situated in the middle part of the country between the north and the south. Scholars had established the dislocational impact of the Jihad and British colonial activities of 19th and 20th centuries in the zone (Kukah, 1993, Albert, 2003; Falola, 1991). Sadly, post colonial Nigeria only legitimised these structural imbalances, thus, setting the stage for some of the most protracted ethnic crises engulfing the nation (Amuwo et al, 1998). Consequently, the north central zone has had the largest share of ethnic conflicts in Nigeria because it also experienced the worst colonially induced political and social cultural dislocation in Nigeria (Alubo, 2006). Maier (2000:194) bemoans the contemporary effect of these dislocations in the zone:

Since independence the middle belt has been a scene of frequent flare ups. The Nigerian and international media describe the frequent clashes as religious, but in fact they stem from minority ethnic groups attempts to wrench themselves free from what they see as the domination by the Hausa-Fulani establishment.

Thus, Yoroms (2002) was correct adducing that Indirect Rule laid the foundation for violent conflicts in the north central. The reason being that the zone is home to various minority ethnic groups in the north with their different cultural and religious identity from that of the ruling Hausa and Fulani groups (Elaigwu, 2005). James (2000) alluded to the fact that the north central region of Nigeria is home to the largest concentration of Nigeria's ethnic groups, about three quarter of the approximately 500 mutually unintelligible languages

spoken in the country. Although Alubo (2006: 37) could account for only 180 of such groups in the zone.

The lumping together of the different ethnic groups in the north central without functional integration, as is the case all over Nigeria, has remained a constant source of group conflict as each group tries to assert their identity in the highly competitive, social, economic and political multiethnic Nigerian society (IPCR, 2003). Sufficing examples of these include the Zango-Kataf conflict in southern Kaduna, the Tiv-Jukun conflict in Wukari Taraba state, the Hausa/Fulani-Sayawa conflict in Bogoro and Tafawa Balewa local government areas of Bauchi; Fulani-Irigwe in Plateau, Tiv-Fulani in Benue, Fulani and Gbagi in Gwako village in Gwagwalada Area council of the FCT.

Alubo argues that there is nowhere else civil disturbance, and the broader contests for citizenship, identity and politics of inclusion and exclusion is more ferocious and persistent than in central Nigeria (2006). This is underscored by the fact that there is no state in the north central Nigeria that has not experienced a number of violent conflicts in the last three years due mainly to its large number of minority ethnic groups with varying cultures and values (Federal Government of Nigeria, 2003 cited in Alubo, 2006).

The north central zone historically is also the meeting point of Christianity and Islam as the two main religions had existed side by side each other since colonialism (Egwu, 2004), commanding large followership. The convergence of the two religions in the belt has a tensed history that tends to reinforce the ethnic cleavages (Mejida, 2007).

The North central zone is principally noted for crop farming. Most of its rural population depends on farming. According to the IPCR (2003), the zone is the most prolific farming zone in the country and hosts large numbers of farmers, fishermen, cattle herders and other livestock users. Plateau state is noted for its vegetables like carrot, cucumber, apple, cabbage, potatoes and tomatoes which it supplies on daily basis to neighbouring states including the FCT. In fact, one state in the zone “Benue” is known as the food basket of the nation. Unfortunately, the parasitic dependence of its population on land, water and environmental resources for agricultural purposes has also made it susceptible to conflicts bordering on land, water and other environmental resources. The issues of conflict in the zone are further exacerbated by desertification and insurgency up north which had continued to make it the ideal migration destination for herdsmen and violent displaced persons. The interplay of these

had ensured that the intensity of herdsmen and crop farmer's conflict in the zone is unparalleled in Nigeria (Odoh and Chigozie, 2012).

2.2 The Jos conflict

The contemporary history of the protracted Jos conflicts between the indigenous groups (Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere or BAA) and the Hausa and Fulani started in 1991 following the creation of Jos north by the Ibrahim Babangida administration (Jibo, Simbine and Galadima, 2001). However, the root of the problem predates colonialism. In "*Plateau Societies resistance to Jihadist Penetration*" Morrison (1982) posits that the occupants of the area named Jos today were a part of the larger plateau indigenous people which successfully defended themselves and their land against attempted jihadist penetration from neighboring Bauchi, the nearest outpost of the Sokoto Caliphate in the 19th century. Consequently, it would be historically correct to assume that the conflict between the indigenous ethnic groups of Jos and the Hausa and Fulani over Jos actually started in the 19th century, the only difference then was that the Hausa and Fulani were fighting from outside.

Providing further illumination on the pre-colonial settlement in Jos, Samuel Egwu (2004) opines that the indigenous Jos groups, that is, the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta were not the political unit which they have become today; rather each of them seemed to maintain a loose political organisation unlike the centralized political authority found among the pre-colonial Hausa, Yoruba or the Jukun. Although, this submission of "pre-colonial centralized political authority" among the Nigerian ethnic groups have been debunked by some scholars like Okeke (1997) who argued that, there were no centralized political authority among any of the Nigerian ethnic nationalities prior to colonialism. Nevertheless, Okeke's submission may not have also taken cognizance of some pre colonial empires in Nigeria that housed units of sub-groups within the broader homogenous groups. For example: the Oyo Empire of south wester Nigeria.

According to Okeke, the names of such Nigerian peoples as the Igbo, Yoruba, Hausa, Fulani, Efik, Ibibio, Ijo, Tiv, Idoma, Ebira, Igala, Itsekiri, Jukun, Bini, Esan, Isoko and Urhobo and so on are traceable to the emergency of the colonial state of Nigeria. She alluded that these Nigerian peoples did not begin to identify themselves as Igbo, Yoruba, Hausa and so on, until colonialism because it was European visitors, traders and writes who first began to refer to the whole conglomerate in terms of the language they spoke, thus, when they refer to the Yoruba or Hausa, they meant those who spoke Yoruba or Hausa languages respectively, and

not a single politically coherent group. Conclusively, she said, “in the pre-colonial times therefore, it did not make sense to speak of Hausa, Igbo, Ibibio, Yoruba, Tiv, Itsekiri, and so on, but it made more sense to speak of Onitsha, Arochukwu, Kano, Katsina, Sokoto, Bornu, Oyo, Ife, Ijebu, and Benin” (1997: 2).

Similarly, in the pre-colonial geographical Jos setting, Egwu (2004.111) claims the Berom occupied the eastern portion of Jos, the Afizere were in the west and the Anaguta lived in the northern part. But agreeing with Okeke in terms of Nigerian linguistic and cultural groups being forced together by circumstances of history to act politically together in defense of their common interest, Egwu asserts that the plateau indigenous groups did not confront the 19th century jihadist threat individually, or as a “self –contained” community rather they joined forces especially the Anaguta and the Afizere against the Fulani jihadist (2004.112). However, with the advent of British colonialism, the Hausa and Fulani eventually penetrated Jos in the 20th century courtesy of the British political and economic policies which created urban centres and encouraged rural-urban migration, thus accomplishing the Jihad started by Uthman Dan Fodio in 1804 in Jos by other means (Ostien 1999: 8).

Supporting this line of thought, Jibo, Simbine and Galadima (2001.65) agreed that “British colonialism in northern Nigeria among other things created a climate in which it was possible for population migration to take place on a large scale...The migrants included a big Hausa-Fulani population that responded to the tin mining industry, which provided jobs and cash to them directly or indirectly”. There have been many scholarly submissions that this migration did not bring integration to the Nigerian people. Instead, it limited opportunities and eventually became the precursor of most contemporary conflicts in Nigeria.

Elucidating on this, Albert (2003: 91), argues that “colonial and post-colonial labour induced migrations changed the demographic composition of Nigeria and many Nigerian cities, and in the process established the grounds for some of the violent ethnic, sub ethnic and religious conflict that we now have in the country”. Albert elaborates this further with particular reference to northern Nigerian that after the British completed the colonization of northern Nigeria in 1903, they tried as much as possible to bring all communities in the region under the Emirs through the indirect rule system of government. In the case of Jos, it came under the sovereignty of Bauchi emirate council, which in turn appointed Hausa and Fulani rulers over it even though the indigenous population was culturally, politically and religiously different from the Hausa Fulani.

Nevertheless, Jos was excised from being a part of the Bauchi Emirate council in 1926, but the Emir of Bauchi retained the right to appoint Hausa and Fulani rulers over it. This and the discovery of tin in 1930 induced a higher level of Hausa and Fulani migration into Jos (Albert 2003: 108). Many other scholars also agree that at Nigeria's independence "indigenous colonialism" took over from "British colonialism" which saw the Nigerian state structured to seat on the dormant tripartite ethnic groups with hundreds of others uncomfortably lumped under them, without integration or a political road map towards unity of any sort. It is this lopsided and uncomfortable state structural defect that fertilizes and breeds conflict (Golwa 2008, Albert 2003, 2004, Danjibo 2010, Amuwo and Herault 2004, Osaghae 2002, Nnoli 1978, Alubo 2008). While concurring, Egwu added that the creation of the Nigerian state was purely to satisfy British economic interest without recourse to the people whose destinies were being mortgaged. According to Alubo:

The ethnic tripod to which the colonial powers granted independence is central to persistent questions of ethnicity, sense of belonging and crises of citizenship (2004: 5).

Scholars have adduced many reasons why the British adopted the indirect rule system in Nigeria. In their work "*History of Nigeria 3*", Falola et al (1991.11), identified six factors. These include the desire of the British to win the cooperation of Nigerian rulers and people of Nigeria, the need to give the people a sense of belonging by having their own people preside over them instead of forcing them into the British style of administration, the need to preserve some of the people's custom and tradition, the necessity of making the local leaders relevant in the colonial scheme of things. The thinking is that since these traditional rulers led the resistance in respective communities during the British violent conquest of Nigeria, making them relevant in the new scheme of things is a way of forestalling effectively future oppositions. The other reason is shortage of manpower, finance and communication, which the British faced in Nigeria. Finally, there is the case of using a system that has worked for them in every other place before Nigeria. The indirect rule system has worked for the British in some other places like India and Uganda. However, the concern in this work is in the structural dislocation it brought to the Nigerian state and the conflict it breeds in the contemporary times.

In Jos, the first of this conflict was in 1932 following the great depression that engulfed western economies, their colonies and the consequent rumour of the departure of the British (Olaniyi and Nnabuihe, 2010). According to Okeke (1998), this prevailing situation caused

the conflict between the Berom, a part of the aboriginal inhabitants of Jos and the Hausa Fulani over the local leadership of the city, supposedly in view of the leadership vacuum the departure of the British will create.

Nevertheless, the British did not depart Nigeria in 1932 and the dispute between the indigenous Berom and the ruling Hausa Fulani was suppressed but it made a crack on the wall of their political relationship. This conflict resurfaced again in 1947 following the creation of the stool of the Gbom Gwom Jos, which effectively marked the end of the Hausa Fulani indirect rule in Jos (Olaniyi and Nnabuihe, *Ibid*) and ushered in the indigenous rule of the Berom. Albert (2003: 08) concurs that the 1947 conflict was due to the persistent complaints of the Berom, perhaps against the Hausa Fulani, and in a bid to placate them the British created the “Sarkin Berom” (King of the Berom). According to him, Mallam Rwang was the first Sarkin Berom named by the British in 1947 but due to the contestation arising from the name “Sarkin Berom” which tends to suggest that the Sarkin was just the head of the Berom rather than the head of Jos community; it was changed to Gbom Gwom Jos in 1951.

However, Philip Ostien (1991) contends that what actually happened in 1947 was a renaming of the “Sarkin Jos” which the British created in 1902 and operated through Hausa and Fulani proxies up to 1947 when the Berom agitation came to the fore. Ostien argues that between 1902 and 1947, the British appointed 12 successive persons as Sarkin Jos, who was of Hausa and Fulani origin. It was the Hausa and Fulani Sarkin Jos that was deposed in 1947 and the office renamed Sarkin Berom to placate indigenous tensions. Best (2007: 26) listed the successive Hausa and Fulani Sarkin Jos from 1902 to 1948. In a chronological order, they are:

Table: 2.1 Hausa and Fulani Chiefs of Jos from 1902 to 1948

| S/N | NAME | PERIOD |
|-----|-------------------|-------------|
| 1 | Salihu | 1902 – 1904 |
| 2 | Ahmadu Dan Inna | 1904 – 1907 |
| 3 | Hashimu | 1907 – 1909 |
| 4 | Buraimah | 1909 – 1914 |
| 5 | Audu Sarkin Ningi | 1914 – 1995 |
| 6 | Garba Dan Tafida | 1915 – 1920 |
| 7 | Usman Kura | 1920 – 1922 |
| 8 | Samanja Dogo | 1922 – 1925 |
| 9 | Garba Dan Waziri | 1925 – 1927 |
| 10 | Saidu | 1927 – 1937 |
| 11 | Isiaku | 1935 – 1948 |

Source: (Best, 2007:26)

Incidentally; from this list, they are 11 and not 12 as stated by Ostien. Other scholars like Boer (2001) agrees with the submission that there is a colonial root to some of the contemporary group conflicts in Nigeria, but posited that the indigenous groups should also share in the blame. According to Boer, some of the political institutions created by the British to address some indigenous problem like the Gbom Gwom Jos were none existent prior to colonialism. Boer’s argument is that instead of helping to cement peace in the new societies created by the colonial masters, institutions like the Gbom Gwom Jos succeed in polarizing them. While Boers postulation may make sense in some “non-indigenously” colonized societies like the Igbo and Yoruba societies, who are also largely homogeneous in nature, the same may not be completely acceptable in a society like Jos where the indigenous groups were subjected to the governance of another local group, thus endangering their cultural identity. The demand for the creation of a traditional political institution by the Berom or any of the indigenously colonized groups could be interpreted to mean a vote of no confidence on the arrangement that pegs them second class citizen even to locals like them. Thus, it could be argued that the British were only attempting to resolve the problems they created originally.

However, looking beyond Boers “blame game” Uzoigwe (1999) puts the blame squarely at the doors of the British. To him, the problem was not in creating the urban centres, which stimulated economic activities, and encouraged rural-urban migration, the problem was that the British did not attempt to unite the diverse people, perhaps congregating for the first time in close proximity. Uzoigwe further asserts that the rural-urban migration was a response to the new opportunities created by the British colonial development. It was in the process of attempting to live together, accommodate one another and compete with one another for

scarce resources that the dichotomy between the owner of the land or son of the soil and settlers developed. According to Uzoigwe, the mismanagement of this dichotomy led and still leads to ethnic/ religious conflicts in Nigeria.

Sustaining this argument, Falola et al (1991:20) observed that colonial administration in Nigeria was organized in such a way that local differences were highlighted by the constitutional and administrative arrangements of the colonial period. They noted that Lord Lugard, in spite of amalgamating the administrative units of the country, retained and maintained the pre-colonial boundary between the north and the south. The separation of the two provinces continued under Sir Hugh Clifford, who took over from Lugard. The trend also continued under Donald Cameron, who governed from 1931 to 1935. It is true that Cameroun's administration introduced significant judicial reforms especially the separation of the executive from the judiciary but Falola et al argues that these measures did not affect the "two province" structure introduced by Lord Lugard.

They also chided governor Bourdilloun, who succeeded Cameroun, that instead of fusing the two province together which is the first step toward integration, Bourdilloun rather stretched the gap between the Nigerian people by creating two groups or provinces out of southern Nigeria: the eastern and the western groups. This further splitting eventually laid the foundation for regionalism introduced under Arthur Richard whose tenure lasted 1943-1947. The argument in Falola et al's submission is not to fault regionalism or punctuate any form of government the country adopts but to show how British colonialism, lumped the diverse Nigerian people together under one country, where they were expected to live together, work together and share a common wealth and destiny. However, instead of building structures and institutions that can foster integration and a national identity, consciousness and outlook, the British succeeded in keeping each group very far from each other that even regionalism was based on no other consideration but ethnicity, especially the placating of the three dominant groups. Aluko (2010: 134) bemoans "the artificiality of the Nigerian state which was largely as a result of the amalgamation of clearly distinct groups into a nation state in 1914 without any conscious effort on the part of the colonialist to constructively engage the desperate groups for natural integration"

Consequently, since the end of colonialism, the history of Nigeria has been replete with inter-group conflicts, showing that beneath the name "Nigeria" that hold together the over 250-500 different groups, there are so many fundamental and unresolved issues bordering on the

cooperate existence of the entities that make up Nigeria. These issues are what various scholars has termed the “national question” (Kukah 2003, Momoh 2005, Balareba Musa 2004, Osaghea and Suberu 2005, Egwu 2004, Abdu 2002, Ali Arazeem and Saka 2007, Suberu 1995)

Philip Ostien (1999) also criticizes the skewed and lopsided structuring of the Nigeria state as the cause of most indigene-settler conflicts in Nigeria. Similarly, so many other scholars like Alubo (2008), Danjibo (2010) and Ambe-Uva (2010) have also queried the structuring of the Nigeria state in their bid to dissect the cause and sustainer of identity conflicts in the country. However, Ostien identified other issues like the “religionisation” of political interaction and the conflicting position of the Nigerian constitution on “indigeneity” and “citizenship” (1999: 411). According to him, “every Nigerian has the full right of indigenes in one small locality, one ethnic enclave and only partial rights of citizens in every other place, this is the pathology or crises of Nigerian citizenship”

On the religionisation of political interaction and engagement, Kukah (2003) blames it on the proclivity of Nigerian ethnic elite to recourse to the “mobilisability” of religion due to his ideological bankruptcy. He states:

“The competition for power as a means of resource allocation has meant that the ethnic elites within the Nigerian state have had to fall back on what can, and will, enhance their prospects of capturing and retaining power for their immediate environment/ constituency... Today, both, Islam and Christianity are straddled across the Nigerian polity, each no longer knocking and pleading to be admitted, but seeking to take over the architectural design and construction of the Nigerian polity. In matters of religion and political competition...it is in the absence of a water tight mechanism to reduce this alienation and enhance the participation of Nigerians that there is consistent recourse and allegiance to primordial sentiment to traditional institutions and religious ideologies” (2003: ix)

In addition, Egwu (1998: 24) concurs that in the recent times, Nigeria has been faced with the phenomenon of religious politicking with all the attendant conflicts that are generated especially in relation to the two official religions. Hussaini Abdu (2002: 148) alludes that this is partly so because to the Muslim, there is a deep relationship between religion and the state.

Further on the crisis of “indigenized citizenship” Oluyemi- Kusa (2010: 26) argues that the problem is the ambiguity surrounding the use of the word “indigeneity” to functionalize citizenship in section 25 (11) of the 1999 constitution. According to Kusa, the constitution did not clarify on the use of the clause “belong or belonged to a community indigenous to

Nigeria! Is it the place of residency or birth? It is left loose and subject to individual and group interpretations”. Unfortunately, the ethnic minded Nigerians went for the parochial interpretation of indigenized citizenship. It is this confusion that has given birth to indigene/settler conflict all over the country. This is traceable to the inability of the constitution to specifically define who is an indigene of a community or who is a settler in the community, rather it goes ahead in section 42 (1) to guarantee the non-discrimination of all citizens irrespective of community, ethnic group, place of origin, sex, religion, and political opinion. She submitted that even section 42 (1) in a bid to partly address the problems of 25 (11) created another problem which is the ambiguous use of “place of origin” which incidentally was also not clarified in the constitution. She asks “where is the place of origin of an Urhobo man or woman born in Ijebu ode? Is it Delta state or Ogun state or both? (2010: 27).

Added to Kusa’s observation on the conflictive Nigerian constitution is the insertion of “federal character” clause in 1979, ostensibly to correct the minority imbalance in the Nigerian body polity as it concerns equitable distribution of resources and opportunities. However in addressing this problem, the constitution writers created a bigger one. The federal character sub section 14 (3) of the Nigerian constitution reads:

The composition of the government of the federation or any of its agencies in the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or in any of its agencies.

In Section 135 (3) of the constitution empowering the president on appointment of ministers, he is referred to the “Federal Character Principle” as enshrined in section 14 (3) with a further clarification that not only will at least one minister be from each state but the minister to be appointed must be an indigene of the state. It needs:

“Any Ministerial appointment...shall be in conformity with section 14 (3) that is, federal character...provided that the president shall appoint at least one minister from each state, who shall be an indigene of such state”.

In 1995, a new Federal Character Commission (FCC) was created and included among the federal executive bodies defined and enabled by the Nigerian constitution. It became operational in 1996 and had among other things since then given a comprehensive

constitutional definition of an indigene of a state. In the federal character commission Act 17(2) (k), it defined an indigene of a state as an indigene of a local government in that state, while an indigene of a local government means a person either of whose parents or any of whose parents was or is an indigene of the local government.

The detailed sharing out of power and resources to defined ethnic and sub ethnic groups which the administration of the federal character promotes may have succeeded in preventing the unfortunate wholesome “tripartization” of Nigeria as it has helped the minor ethnic groups or minorities to get a decent share of the common wealth. It has also empowered them to a certain degree to control their own local territories but this has come at a great cost for Nigeria. That cost according to Ostien, is the country’s disaggregation into hundreds of tiny principalities run on the basis of indigene sovereignty (2009). Added to this is the contestation of this indigene-based administration by those excluded which has polarized and tensed the polity (Egwu, 2005).

Scholarly submissions subscribing to this argument that the “confused definition” of the Nigerian citizenship by the Nigerian constitution is at the root of indigene/settler group conflicts all over the country include (Dunmoye 2008, Osoba and Usman 1976, Bakut 2008, Dakas 2008, Ojiji and Kim 2008, Golwa 2008). A situation where the constitution empowers and guarantees the right and privilege of every citizen across the length and breadth of the country in one hand and in another hand removes some of the citizenship rights and privileges in its bid to accommodate “minority rights” and some vested interests is the bone of contention for according to Dunmoye “it is rather disturbing to note that in contemporary Nigeria, indigeneity is the basis upon which rights and entitlements are given and not citizenship”. This contestation take the form of the fundamental question “who owns the land? or “who was the first settler in the land”? (2008: 60). Local governments determine who their own indigenes are. Acceptance as an indigene in a local government is indicated by issuance of a certificate of indigeneship or indigene certificate. Whoever controls the local government controls the issuance of indigene certificate and every other economic, psychological and political benefit dependent on it. This is what the fighting in Jos is all about (Ostien 2009, Best 2007).

Furthermore, while acknowledging the defect in the Nigerian body polity, Boer (2001: 19) again blames the Nigerian political class for this. According to him, “since independence Nigerians have continued to divide themselves so that the 90 different ethnic groups

categorized by the British for administrative reasons have now grown to 373". In his view, every Nigerian is now being categorized as being indigenous to a particular place and this has made it difficult to move to another place within the country and enjoy full rights as citizens. He went further, that even those who have managed to achieve the move and have lived elsewhere for generations are never considered to be from the new place. Rather they remain visitors staying only because of the generosity of their host. He concluded by submitting what many scholars agreed is at the root of indigene/settler conflicts all over Nigeria, which is that "one is not really a citizen of Nigeria but only a citizen of the place to which they are indigenous".

This submission can also be deduced from Balareba Musa (2004), Shedrack Best (2008, 2007) and Okechukwu Okeke (1998). Abubakar Momoh (2005: 14) laments:

Everywhere in Nigeria today, there is a reification of ethnic differences or the politicization of the native settler question, this has resulted in so called communal conflicts, and rural ethnicity and other forms of violence ...underneath there is the issue of son/daughter of the soil syndrome, based on the contestation for power. This contestation has so many sides- land, traditional power, economy (control of market, transport routes), political authority and political representation

Reading through Momoh's lamentation is an underlining presupposition that indigene/settler disputes are more complex and deeper than the surface value. Here, we are confronted with deeper sentimental issues of culture, psychology, values, ethics, economics and politics all bordering on a people's survival. Beneath the cries and agitation for territorial preservation are economic and political interests which the constitution has made accessible only through indigeneity. Perhaps, it was because of this mindset that the subdivision of Jos into two local governments by the Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida administration in 1991 was interpreted by the indigenes as a strategic political calculation by the Hausa and Fulani dominated national leadership to give their kith and kin a political space in Jos, which would also bequeath them economic benefits (Best, 2007, Albert, 2003). Ostien (2009) corroborates, "that the new Jos north as created in 1991 was to enable the Hausa and Fulani have some political space and its derivable economic benefits, hence they would be able to win elections there, it was done to favour the Hausa community in Jos, the Hausa community certainly lobbied hard for it, the plateau indigenes protested vociferously but to no effect" (2009: 9).

Similarly Albert adds, "The area tagged Jos north is Hausa and Fulani dominated, while Jos south is dominated by the indigenes, mostly Beroms. This enabled the Hausa and Fulani to

have access to vast lands in Jos, in addition to control wielded by the group over much of the market and business opportunities, particularly trade, transport and petrol distribution in Jos” (2003: 109).

For the *Newswatch* editorial of 15th December 2008, IPCR (2009), and Wilson Idoko (2005), the political class cannot be isolated from the Jos conflicts. It is the political class that ethnicized politics in a bid to garner support at the polls. It is the political class who over time has failed to manage properly the diversities inherent in the Nigerian system thereby creating the vacuum for ethnic groups to take their destiny into their own hands. It is the political class that created battalions of unemployed youths of different ethnic and religious backgrounds, who are ready recruits for ethnic or religious conflicts, ready to loot and kill. It is the political class who had economically incapacitated the citizenry. It is the political class who cannot ensure adequate security, whose policies have led to the wide spread of illiteracy; the increasing proliferation of arms of every description, “the pervasive and unchecked corruption by public officers, and the pervasive corruption of election and widespread electoral violence and the sheer incompetence of many public officials, elected and appointed, compounded by ingrained habits of autocratic, arbitrary, secretive and unaccountable rule” (Ostien, 2009: 11).

Situating the above discourse in the history of the Jos conflict, it could be recalled that the root cause of the contestation between the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta and the Hausa and Fulani was the secret creation of Jos north local government in 1991, by the federal government, which tilted in favor of the Hausa and Fulani, as against the constitutionally-recognized indigenes (Best, 2007, See several commissions report on Jos conflicts, 1994, 2001, 2004, 2010). While nothing was being done to assuage this heightening tension in Jos north, the federal government again went ahead and appointed an Hausa (Alhaji Aminu Mato) originally from Bauchi as the chairman of the Jos north local government caretaker committee in 1994 (Best 2007, Ostien 2009), which eventually led to the violent outbreak. The remote cause of the 2001 eruption was the political appointment of another Hausa and Fulani (Mukhtar Mohamed) to the position of the NAPEP coordinator for Jos north by the Federal government (Obadiah and Asmau 2010, Ostien 2009). That of 2002 was caused by intraparty skirmishes in the PDP ward congress in Eto Baba Jos south to elect ward officials. Once again, it became a window for the conflicting parties to confront each other for the soul of Jos, ostensibly for the accruing dividends (Obadiah and Asmau, 2010). Owing to this conflict, from 2002 to 2008, Jos north local government area remained without an elected

government. The attempt to conduct local government elections there in November 2008 ended in violence with massive destructions. The actors were the same, the indigenes were in the PDP and the Hausa and Fulani were in the ANPP (*Newswatch*, 15th December, 2008; Obadiah and Asmau, 2010). The contention was the election results between the indigenous candidate and the Hausa and Fulani candidate, once again the readymade unemployed youths on the streets and the imported mercenaries were the tools of engagement (*The Nigerian Standard*, 7th January, 2009. P8) .

From 2010, the conflict changed form and dynamics, and didn't need any immediate trigger to erupt, "they became a matter of routine, and likewise the killings that have become common place" (*Daily Sun*, 12th July, 2012: 56). From the 17th to 19th of January 2010, another round of conflagrations was ignited in Jos metropolis though as was noted, there was no apparent or immediate trigger. This was followed by underreported but destructive reprisals. Again, on March 7th 2010, there was a raid on Dogo Nahawa Jos south by unknown gunmen suspected to be Fulani herdsmen. Since March 2010, Jos has become a killing field as raids and silent killings have become the order of the day. This silent killings and the heightened tensions and apprehension culminated in the Christmas Eve bombing of 2010, which the Boko Haram claimed responsibility for (*Tell* 21st March, 2011, *Newswatch* 10th October, 2011), thus introducing a new twist to the already complicated conflict situation in Jos. That twist as has become obvious is the deployment of bombs meant for conventional wars in intergroup conflicts. As it concerns Jos, it is the first time conventional bombs are being used in intergroup conflicts and the effects in terms of human death, property destruction and accompanying dislocations have been catastrophic since 2010. A pointer is the 17th to 19th January 2011 simultaneous bombings that took place in six places inside Jos, killing about 326 persons and leading to the displacement of about 4000 people, creating about 1265 widows and 213 orphans within the two days (*The Guardian*, 26th January, 2010 .P 1, 2, 3, 4, 5).

2.2.1 State's management of the Jos conflict

Since the outbreak of the Jos conflict in 1994, the Nigerian state whose responsibility it is constitutionally to maintain peace has managed it in terms of deployment of security agents, constitution of panels of inquiry, provision of relief materials and through dialogues, mediation and other peace building instruments courtesy of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), in partnership with nongovernmental organizations like

WANEP, HD Switzerland, UNDP, and Search for Common Ground (SFG) (Best 2007, ICG 2012, Albert, 2012, Animasawun, 2012). Both track one and two has consistently maintained their presence in the management of the Jos conflict. Track one here refers to federal government and plateau state governments and their conflict resolution and intervention arms like IPCR and NEMA and SEMA, while track two refer to nongovernmental interveners. They include NGO's, civil society groups, religious organisations, humanitarian relief agencies and community-based organisations. Some of these include the Centre for Peace Advancement in Nigeria (CEPAN), STEFANOS foundation, HD Switzerland, Rural Development Counsellors For Christian Churches in Africa (RURCON), Centre for Peace Initiative and Development (CEPID), Inter-Faith Mediation Centre, WANEP, Civil Liberties Organisation, Community Action for popular participation, the Red cross, Christian Foundation for Social Justice, International Centre for Reconciliation (Coventry Cathedral), the Catholic Peace and Justice Committee, League For Human Rights and Search For Common Ground (SFCG).

Track one courtesy of the federal government drove the security intervention in 1994 through the police. But by 2001 the conflict has escalated both in spread and intensity and thus it became obvious that the police alone could not contain the violence. The government thus deployed a Joint Task Force (JTF) made up of police and military to quell the 2001 violence. Ever since government's readymade response to the Jos conflicts has been the Joint Task Force of police and soldiers. In 2010, this was expanded to include Air Force, Mobile Police Force; the State Security Service and the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps totalling about 3200 (*Vanguard*, 14th September, 2011. P10). In addition to traditional security the federal government in partnership with the plateau state government also jointly floated Operation Rainbow as part of the security architecture of the conflict (Plateau state Task Force on Peace and Security, 2012, 7). Incidentally, scholarly submissions have continued to query the efficacy of these approaches in the light of the protractedness of the conflict (Animasawun, 2012).

Government interventions also took the form of panels of inquiries. From 1994 to 2010, there were five different panels of inquiry on the Jos conflict: Justice Fiberesima (1994), Niki Tobi (2001), Bola Ajibola (2008), Emmanuel Abisoye (2008) and Solomon Lar (2010), and two talk shops, namely: the 2002 Peace Summit and 2004 Peace Conference. Issues arising from the commission's work were the non-participation of the Hausa and Fulani community in the

2008 Ajibola committee sitting leading to their rejecting it and the conflict of power between the Federal government and Plateau state government over who has the right to constitute a committee over the conflict in 2010. Besides this, analysts and commentators are of the opinion that the panacea to the Jos conflicts can be found in the recommendations of these successive commissions (ICG, 2012, NSRP Undated). Unfortunately, the recommendations of these commissions were hardly published not to talk of implementation. The few that are published are after so many years that the conflict has changed shape and dynamics, and have persistently consumed more lives and properties. According to the NSRP policy brief on responses of Plateau state government to the violent conflict in the state, the implementation of the recommendations of these commissions has always been hampered by the same political polarisation that drives the conflicts themselves.

There is also the setting up of IDP's camps, mainly using primary/secondary schools, military and air force bases inside Jos and environs at each eruption. Some of these also were quartered in neighbouring states depending on where they found safety and succour. For instance, the more than 4000 internally displaced persons from the January 2010 conflicts in Jos were housed in Bauchi at Boto Central Primary school, Nabordo Tilde Fulani and Magaman Gumau in Toro council and Lere in Tafawa Balewa local government council (*The Guardian*, 26th January, 2010. P5). While the IDPs are temporarily housed, government provided relief materials like food and beddings through the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the SEMA, but this was the much that were been done as it concerns resettlement, rehabilitation and rebuilding. Almost all of the IDPs resettled and reintegrated themselves back into the society despite having lost their homes and income (Best, 2007, field work 2013).

In Peacebuilding through interfaith, government had equally made an inroad. In 2008, the Jonah Jang led state government established the Plateau state inter-religious council co-chaired by the leadership of the two main rival religions in the state: the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) chairman representing Christians and the Emir of Wase representing the Jam'atul Nasril Islam (JNI) on behalf of Muslims. The terms of reference of the council was to promote dialogue aimed at addressing the grievance of various sectors of society and improve trust and communication among religious and community leaders. However, even though this council has been meeting successfully and in fact, the latitude gained seem to have also been replicated in similar groups though without government aid springing up here and there in Jos, leveraging on the charismatic nature of religious messages

to persuade people to sheath their swords. An example is the Young Ambassadors for Community Peace and Interfaith Foundation (YACPIF). YACPIF, like the plateau inter-religious council is a Christian-Muslim group geared towards peace building among youths and communities. One of its success stories is that of Pastor Yakubu Pam. Pam used to personally lead Christian youths in attacks against Muslims and their belongings. But since 2009 his old prejudices had been so transformed that he founded the Young Ambassadors, to bring Christian and Muslim youth together to work for peace. They have organized several community gatherings and football matches under the tag “fighting for peace” in which Muslims and Christian preachers has spoken about the love and tolerance of one another. Pam has been so transformed into an advocate of peace that in January 2011, in the ensuing violence and counter violence between Muslim and Christian youths, he stood on a car in front of Christian youths who were preparing to attack a neighboring Muslim community, shouting “You must stop this thing!” And they listened.

Like Pam, many Muslim hardliners who had actually spearheaded some of the attacks on Christian communities have also given up their arms and hatred for Christians and are today, preaching peace. One of them is Magaji Sule, his is a powerful story of a change of heart made possible by the YACPIF. Sule was a self-admitted political thug in Bukuru. He had led Muslim youth in attacks and burned houses. However, in 2010, an encounter with Rev. Pam caused him and a Christian youth leader in the neighboring community of Gyel to call off mutual hostilities. After both youth were recognized with a “Peace Ambassador certificate to honor their courageous efforts to maintain peace in their communities” they embraced and became friends. Since that time Magaji Sule become a “zealous peace ambassador,” doing much to keep Bukuru calm in times of crisis (*WeeklyTrust*, 24th March, 2012. Online version)

Nevertheless, despite the moderate achievements of the interfaith council and other groups like YACPIF, the constrain has been whether such groups have the capacity to foster serious discussions on key issues as indigene-settler and citizenship which are the core of the conflicts, this can only be addressed through a constitutional reform (NSRP, n.d).

Track two concentrated majorly on peace education, public enlightenment, organising reconciliatory meetings between warring parties, and mediation. Organisations like CEPAN have been involved in peace building talks and efforts in Jos since 2009 and had organised an annual peace conference (APC) in plateau state in the quest for sustainable peace. Equally,

the “League for Human Rights” has also been in the fore front of championing the course of peace and the right of the down trodden in Jos through advocacy and public enlightenment courtesy of its numerous publications which included books and articles. Similarly, HD Switzerland had also been facilitating a peace building dialogue between all the ethnic groups in Jos as an attempt at peaceful co-existence. The researcher was involved in the talks between the Hausa and Fulani, and the Plateau Indigenous Association of Nigeria (PIDAN), organised by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution Abuja (IPCR) and WANEP West Africa at Abuja.

However, the interventions on the part of government have been geared towards termination of the violent conflict by way of gun diplomacy, getting the conflict parties to talk and drop their sword. Thus, the Nigerian state has not really considered it worthwhile to explore the uncharted path of addressing or mitigating the social costs of the Jos conflict like the destroyed income infrastructures, human capital development, food insecurity and the abuse of human rights, with a view to resolving or transforming them together with the conflict issues, at least from a policy perspective. It was only in 2011 that the Search for Common Ground (SFCG) working in synergy with the residents started making demands on the state and interveners on a program they termed the “**The Five R’s of Our Lives**”. The five R’s refer to “recovery, rehabilitation, reconstruction, reconciliation and reintegration”.

It is in line with this that the “Geneva Declaration on Costs of Armed Violence and Development” placed a demand on states to aggregate the cost of violent conflicts within their domain and mitigate it on or before 2015 (Krause, 2011). This is also the underpinning issue behind the human security concept of UNDP’s human development initiative of 1994.

So while there have been monumental social economic and political dislocations in the metropolis as a result of the Jos conflict little have been heard by way of managing the consequent social costs as enumerated. Jane Krause (2011) in her study on the Jos conflict submitted that though there has been responses and interventions on the part of the Nigerian state and concerned nongovernmental organizations in Jos, none of these has adequately focused on the cost of the conflict. Below is a diagrammatic representation of her findings on track one and two response to conflict cost in Jos metropolis:

Table 2:2 the state of Peace building interventions in Jos

| Type | Actors | Notes |
|--|--|---|
| Policing | Special Task Force (STF) comprising mobile policemen and military forces | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quells riots, prevents violent escalation • Little impact in preventing small scale violent clashes and “silent killings” • Lack of prosecution of perpetrators • Limited efficiency in preventing illegal arms trade. • Lack of violence prevention on Jos rural outskirts. • Severe criticism of STF for delayed response. • Extra judicial killings: firing live ammunition on residents fleeing clashes, arbitrary arrests, general brutality and lack of neutrality. |
| Government led peace building initiatives | Plateau state, civil servants, security forces, community and religious leaders, women and youth representatives | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2002 peace summit: criticized for failing to engage stakeholders with strong grass root support • 2004 peace conference: criticized for failing to organize open discussion of conflicts and grievances, no engagements with the most relevant community stakeholders. |
| Early warning | US Agency for International Development’s Conflict Abatement through local mitigation (CALM), 2005-2010, | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Early warning and response system has never become fully functional • Lack of adequate and timely |

| | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|---|
| | a project with local NGO's | response to early warning signals by security forces |
| Youth sensitization | Local NGO's (including the Damietta Peace Initiatives, interfaith mediation centre, Justice Development and Peace Caritas, and the young Ambassadors for community peace and interfaith foundation | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Workshops, youth camps, soccer matches, and other social activities • Participants report positive effects and personal transformation, difficulties in reaching routing perpetrators, thugs and gang leaders. • Too early to assess overall impact on violence-prone communities |
| Urban community arrangements | Local community and religious leaders, elders, residents | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local peace agreements and assurances of nonviolence, negotiation and conflict management, establishment of mixed youth patrols. |
| Rural community arrangements | Traditional and religious leaders | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peace agreements and local conflict management and resolution, prevention of violent escalation. |
| Intervention Gap Conflict Cost | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No intervention in terms of restoration of means of livelihood, agriculture and human rights |

Source: Modified from Krause (2011)

As is inferable from the table, the state's intervention is defective as it concerns the management of conflict costs. And because conflict costs impacts directly on development and stability (Albert, 2012), it is imperative empirical research attention be paid to it.

2.3 Bassa/Egbura conflict

Unlike Jos, it was the Usman Dan Fodio jihad of 1804/1805 that laid the foundation for the Egbura and Bassa conflict through the creation of the Nasarawa Emirate council which eventually brought the two groups and a host of other ethnic groups together under the dominant Islamic society of the north (Maiyaki 2012). Before the incursion of Islamic Jihad into Toto, the Bassa, the Egbura and indeed the Gbagi had lived as neighbours though independent of each other (Best, 2004). Toto local government is made up of these three ethnic groups. The Bassa has numerical advantage over the other groups consisting of about 90% of the entire Toto population, followed by the Egbura and the Gbagi. The Bassa are mostly Christians, together with the majority of the Gbagi while the Egbura are dominantly Muslims (Maiyaki, 2012).

Toto as a local government was created in 1979 by the then Plateau state government under the leadership of Chief S.D Lar out of Nasarawa local government. In the coup of 1983, the local government was abolished. It was recreated in 1996 made up of three chiefdoms Opanda, Ohimage and Gbabyte all belonging to the Egbura. Opanda chiefdom was founded by the first Ohimege Opanda (Ohime-Legedu) in 1750 (Ayih n.d). Colonial writers like Marc Gregor Laird who visited Opanda in 1883; John and Richard clapperton also made references to the existence of the kingdom. In fact, W. B Blaikie (a British Explorer) listed nine Ohimeges who ruled Opanda before its collapse in 1853. In a chronological order, they are:

| S/N | NAME | PERIOD |
|-----|--------------------------------------|-----------|
| 1 | Ohimegye Ohemi-Legadu | 1750-1770 |
| 2 | Ohimegye Idoko | 1770-1775 |
| 3 | Ohimegye Asamaiko | 1775-1790 |
| 4 | Ohimegye Ameh Lafia | 1791-1794 |
| 5 | Itodo | 1795-1796 |
| 6 | Asanya | 1796-1801 |
| 7 | Akoza | 1802-1812 |
| 8 | Abuha | 1813-1835 |
| 9 | Adeke | 1835-1848 |
| 10 | Oyigu | 1848-1863 |
| 11 | Ogara | 1854-1863 |
| 12 | Kpapkataku | 1863-1870 |
| 13 | Okpaki | 1870-1890 |
| 14 | Adokorohu | 1890-1893 |
| 15 | Omura | 1894-1896 |
| 16 | Ikutepa | 1897-1902 |
| 17 | Ekuzimishi | 1902-1904 |
| 18 | Odalla | 1904-1912 |
| 19 | Atakoro | 1917-1918 |
| 20 | Abu Gani | 1918-1920 |
| 21 | Amadu Azegba (1 st Time) | 1920-1930 |
| 22 | Ogbehya | 1930-1937 |
| 23 | Ahmadu Azegba (2 nd time) | 1937-1954 |
| 24 | Yusufu Useze | 1954-1957 |
| 25 | Ibrahim Usman Gani | 1957-1960 |
| 26 | Usman Ohyaba Adokorho | 1960-1981 |
| 27 | Usman Idrizu | 1931-1995 |
| 28 | Usman Abdullahi | 1995-date |

Source: W.B Baikie (1854) cited in Ayih (Undated)

On the other hand, there are about three oral traditions about the origin of the Bassa people: the Gadabuke oral tradition, the Toto oral tradition and the Bassa oral tradition. The Gadabuke oral tradition claimed the Bassa originated from Niger province. They migrated from Zungeru to Tawari near the present Koton Karfe. A part of them moved to Gadabuke, Toto and Umaisha area while others moved to Bassa LGA in the present Kogi state. The Toto oral tradition states that the Bassa were living in Yauri in the present Zamfara state. They left Yauri as a result of wars and traveled to Gitata, Abuja, Zuba, Kwali and Gwagwalada areas. Some continued their journey to Toto and Umaisha areas while others crossed the river Benue to Kogi state. Authorities like Captain F. Byng Hall, Mr G.L. Monk, Mr. T.W Dye, Mr. W. Morgan and G.W Webster in their writings made reference to Bassa in the plains to the south and south west of Abuja.

Both Temple (1919) in his book, *Notes on the Tribes of Northern Nigeria* and T.J Hutchinson (1855) in his own book, *Narrative of the Niger, Tshadda and Binue exploration*, referred to the Bassa as one of the ethnic groups congregating amongst other groups though uniquely within central Nigeria. They both acknowledged that the Bassa lived with the Egbura as their neighbours though both operated their kingdoms separately. While the Egbura had their Opanda kingdom, the Bassa had their Ikerekwu kingdom. But Baike (1854:252) noted that in the 18th century there were skirmishes between the Bassa and the Egbura over territorial conquest. He claimed the Egbura felt betrayed by the Bassa whom they alleged to have conspired with an intruder Makama Dogo to capture their kingdom, Opanda. This action was the beginning of the mistrust and the acrimony that had existed between the two groups till date.

According to Ayih (Undated), from these early records, it seems that the kingdoms of Ikerekwu and Opanda existed side by side until they both were conquered by Makama Dogo and were both brought under the tutelage of Nasarawa. Best (2004) agrees that both groups may actually have had their separate kingdoms but there were no historical evidences to substantiate this.

Under Nasarawa Emirate Council, both groups were lumped together under the headship of an Emir even though the Bassa refused to convert to Islam. The Egbura on the other hand converted to Islam and were co-opted into the Nasarawa Native Authority ruling council, thus the Egbura through their acceptance of Islam became the over lord of the Bassas. When the districts were created, the Nasarawa Native Authority placed the Bassa under the District

Headship of Umaisha and Toto which were Muslim areas. It was this that gave the impression expressed by J.C Sciortino, the Colonial Resident Officer of Nasarawa province in 1919 that, from Nasarawa, Umoru Makama Dogo through series of successful forays conquered the Egbura and their Bassa subjects and by so doing broke their kingdom and destroyed the town Panda. This colonial distortion of historical facts is part of the challenge between the Egbura and the Bassa today, because the Egbura consequent on the narrative from J.C Sciortino sees the Bassa as their erstwhile slaves. Based on this, they do not believe they have equal stake with them politically and traditionally in Toto, they do not believe they have equal stake in land matters with them. Worst of all, they do not allow their men to marry Bassa women.

Both groups however, were conquered again when the British overran Northern Nigeria and decided to sustain the Emirate rule already in place. The British appropriated the political and economic structures of the caliphate to serve their interest and in doing this; they truncated the existing history between the groups. In Toto specifically, the “Emirate-made-rulers” called the “*Emissaries*” were used to superintend over the Bassa and most of these are Egbura. According to Maiyaki (2007), the *Emissaries* did the dirty jobs of the colonial masters like tax collection, forced labour, maintenance of law and order. And it is against this conflictive background that the sharp divisions, cleavages and confrontations between these two groups in the Jihad and colonially created northern Nigeria can be understood, especially in Toto (Maiyaki, 2007).

The Bassa resisted the lordship of the Egbura during the British colonial times that it became an issue needing to be addressed by the British. Since the colonial times, the Bassa and the Egbura has been locked up in conflict cycle. Instances have been given of conflict eruptions between them dating as far back as 1979 and 1983 at Kuwa; Zono and Nyimowa; 1985 at Katakpa and Umaisha; 1986 at ten locations, 1992 at Ugya and Chiji; 1994 at Bakete, Kolo and Ugya; 1995 at four locations; 1996 at six locations, and 1998 at Toto (Best, 2004), even though the conflict actually became violent in 1994. Best further posited that the conflict became explosive between 1997 and 1998 when military-type assault rifles and other prohibited weapons of warfare exclusively meant for conventional wars were freely used by the civilian combatants. The consequence was mass death, destruction of property, social and economic dislocations. According to Best, (2004:11), Toto was ethnically cleansed of the Bassa” (Best, 2004:11)

2.3.1 State's management of the Bassa/Egbura conflict

The Nigerian state's management of the Bassa/Egbura conflict has followed the same pattern as the Jos conflict and most other group conflicts in Nigeria. This involves the deployment of security agents to deescalate the spread of the violence, setting up of judicial panels to investigate the causes and effects of the conflicts, peace building talks to diffuse and transform the conflict issues and positions amongst the groups and short term relief interventions by NEMA or SEMA. In Toto, the state's attempt to manage the internally displaced and dispersed Bassa ran into serious problem in 2001 when an Egbura militia group the Agaba Idu attacked the over 55,000 Bassa Internally Displaced Persons at the make shift camps at Ugya, Toto, Kanyehu and Gadabuke leading to their second dispersal (Best: 2004).

In addition, the federal government donated 100 million Naira coupled with the 20 million Naira donated by the Nasarawa state government to resettle the Bassa. Also, there were promises that their broken down communities would be repaired after an audit of the losses. Incidentally, the donations became the source of another round of conflict as the Egbura began demanding compensation for their displaced. In all, neither the Bassa nor the Egbura were satisfied with government intervention as the Egbura did not even have a home to return to (Best, Ibid). As at 2013, ten years after the promises were made, the Bassa were yet to receive government intervention as it concerns rebuilding their broken down homes and lives. Many are putting up in mud houses as Toto is still defaced with burnt and destroyed buildings and other sad relics of the conflict. Best summarized the state's interventional effort in the north central region as it concerns conflict cost though with emphasis on Toto: "many of the conflicts in this region were... protracted and were largely neglected by Track one and other Tracks of conflict transformation" (2004:7).

2.4 Conceptualising Conflict Transformation

Conflict transformation is one of the so many frameworks devised by society for planning an intervention in violent conflicts (Hugh Maill, 2001). Some conflict interventions are only geared towards deescalating the eruptions, while some, in addition to containing the outbreak also seeks to mitigate the resulting destructive effects of the violence on the citizens. Albert (2001) concurs that conflict transformation is one of the ways by which the dynamics of a community conflict can be changed. The dynamics of a conflict is the transition from one conflict phase to another. Sometimes this transition can be from the latent level to post conflict Peacebuilding. This is why conflict analysis equally takes cognizance of early

warning mechanisms as part of the gamut of conflict management. Reychier (1997) noted that early warning systems alert potential parties to a conflict and audiences of the potential costs that could be incurred if an abstentionist policy of “wait and see” is adopted.

Conflict transformation as a framework to operationalise conflict intervention is an improvement on existing intervention paradigms which do not sufficiently cover the course of conflicts from termination of violence to post conflict reconstruction. According to Lederach (2003), these inadequate paradigms include conflict settlement, conflict resolution and conflict management. Conflict settlements refer to the process of reaching mutually acceptable agreement by the conflict parties, thus settling the conflicts, at least overtly. But scholars like Ramsbothan and Woodhouse (1999) had alluded to the fact that conflict settlement does not often address the underlying structural challenges that precipitated the conflicts. Thus, “little wonder that many conflicts that have supposedly been settled soon resurfaced, either in their original or transformed states” (Albert, 2001).

On the other hand, conflict resolution also presupposes a peaceful means of terminating confrontations giving the illusions that its deeply rooted sources and structures of hostility have been removed. Incidentally, this is always far from the reality. Equally, conflict termination is the sudden termination of the conflict by either a protagonist or a third party. This happens because the expected result of the confrontations has been reached by one side, or the situation has reached a stalemate with negative consequences for the fighting parties (Schmid, 1998). The problem with conflict termination is the same with conflict settlement and resolution. As intervention analytical concepts, they do not go beyond the end of hostilities to tackle underlying structural social-economic issues of conflicts. This has proven counter-productive. Conflict termination in most cases employs a zero-sum settlement approach in which one party wins absolutely and another loses absolutely. The absolute loser would naturally live in frustration, and frustration at some point would naturally translate to aggressive behaviors, thus, the re-enactment of the conflict. This is the underpinning arguments of the frustration-aggression theorists (Faleti, 2009).

The other paradigm is conflict management, which as a generic term refers to the long term and short term objectives covering the cycle of crisis intervention and conflict resolution. According to Schmid (1998), in the short term, the most realistic goal is conflict settlement in the sense of reducing or containing the escalation of crisis and wars. He argued that only when this is achieved can we begin to work at a more fundamental solution of the conflict. In

a nutshell, conflict management approaches seek to mainly manage and contain conflict from escalation. It involves all the actions and process put in place to manage the fragilities around conflicts and violence. Its main thrust includes:

- Reduce conflict violence or destructive effects
- Check its escalation towards the use of destructive weapons (E.g., Atomic bombs)
- Prevent the horizontal expansion of violence into other areas

Conflict management as the name implies is focused on managing the conflict situation so as not to get out of hand. But as John Paul Lederach (2003) observed, conflict management, like other paradigms enumerated above does not address the needed societal changes to drive a sustainable peace. Such issues include human rights violations, relationships and development. Since the end of the cold war, the world is increasingly shifting focus, including conflict intervention focus to a development centred activity. Unfortunately, conflict management is primarily concerned on conflict de-escalation and containment of the evolving violence. It is this gap that necessitated the search for a better intervention platform hence the introduction of conflict transformation (Lederach, 2003).

The debate between conflict management and conflict transformation is explosively on-going and widely documented (Galtung 1995, Rupesinghe 1995, Schwein 1995, Spencer and Spencer 1995, Vayrynen 1991). The fact is, due to the inadequacies of frameworks to address conflict cycles from violence to post conflict rebuilding and sustainable development, the world seem to have settled for conflict transformation as a better paradigm towards conflict intervention. What then is conflict transformation? And why is it germane to a study that focuses on the cost of conflict?

Conflict transformation is the process by which conflicts are transformed into peaceful developmental outcomes. It does not seek to just de-escalate the violence or manage the tensions; it seeks multiple ways to transform the conflicting society to a peaceful and developmental one. It differs from mere termination, resolution and management of conflict, in that it recognizes that contemporary conflicts require more than the reframing of positions and identification of win-win outcomes. It goes beyond terminating the surface conflict to transform social relationships, interests, discourses, social economic structures of existence, and even constitutions that inadvertently support the construction of violent conflicts. “Search for Common Ground” (n.d), refers to conflict transformation as initiatives and interventions

at multiple levels, aimed at changing perceptions and improving communication skills, addressing the roots of conflicts, including inequality and social injustice. It is a truism that there can never be sustainable peace in the absence of social justice and constitutional equality. So it can be said that conflict transformation as a conflict intervention process, beyond terminating violence also seeks to enthrone social justice and equality. Scholars like Onuoha (2015), had rightly argued that society is full of social asymmetry and cannot have equality but may do with equity². But in complete alignment with Search for Common Ground, Albert (2001) posits that the main goal of conflict transformation is to change unjust social relationships, thus, re-emphasizing the issue of justice.

The International Alert broadened the horizon of conflict transformation as a conflict interventionist tool that can be used as well to address social injustice, and other forms of structural violence that continually sustain the conflict cycle, when they defined it as a:

Particular approach which aims to recognize the grievances, needs and issues of all the parties. It focuses on the processes by which conflict develops into violence, rather than focusing exclusively on how to bring a violent conflict quickly to a ceasefire or settlement. It addresses the structural reality of inequality, rights and injustice in the societies involved, and offers alternative ways of addressing those realities. This approach aims to transform a conflict from violence and destruction into a constructive force which produces social change, progressively removing or at least reducing the conditions from which the conflict and violence have arisen. The peace, which develops can then be well-founded and sustainable” (International Alert, 1996:6)

Burges and Burges also harped on structural transformation. In fact, they itemized three ways conflict transformation transforms the conflict society: causing a change in the entire context of the conflict, causing a change in the conflict parties’ relationship, or causing a change through empowerment in the lives of the individuals involved in the conflict (1997: 285). Other scholars like Curle (1990), Ramsbothan and Woodhouse (1999) agreed with Burges and Burges’ submissions but expanded the transformation areas into five:

Context transformation: every conflict is a product of its context. It is difficult to want to fundamentally address a conflict situation without recourse to its context. Conflict context refers to the period in which the conflict happened or its environment. For instance, militancy in the Niger delta in democratic Nigeria is different from militancy in military regimes. With the hindsight of history, it is apparent the Niger-delta militancy surged and escalated since the

² Workshop on interface between Human Rights and Businesses in Nigeria within the UN Guiding Principle on Human Rights (UNGP) at Lokoja

return of democracy in 1999 for obvious reasons. It is documented and ironically too, that Nigeria's democratic experiment since 1999 despite its pretences and promises to regulate overlapping interests and ensure order, had recorded an alarming increase in number, nature and intensity of conflicts (Yau, 2000; Momoh 2000; Bangura 1994).

Many scholars blame this on the fact that military regimes use force to compel obedience and suppress agitations, sometimes even legitimate demands. Thus, it has been argued that most of the conflicts playing out in this democratic dispensation are age long suppressed frustrations in the land. Conflict analysis or planned intervention for such conflict must recognize its prevailing context because this has an influence on its manifestation.

Structural transformation: according to Albert (2001), embedded in every conflict are some influencing structures like actors, relationships, issues and goals. In the mapping of any conflict, they must be carefully studied and understood if any sustainable solution is to be found for the conflict. Albert further argued that an ethnic or religious group that had been oppressed for long might take up arms against the state not because of an ethnic agenda but because of structural violence that reduces their human capacity. These include issues like poverty, group marginalization or politics of exclusion; human right and social injustice. For instance, he identified that poverty is the unseen hand behind most of Africa's violent conflicts. His submission is that poverty makes many African societies to become theaters of stress—as unemployed young people gets pressured into warlord politics around them.

Several studies too have implicated poverty, uneven resource access and distribution; unemployment and competition over land as responsible for conflict escalation in Nigeria (IPCR, 2003, 2008, 2012/2013). Franey in *Poor Law: The mass arrest of homeless claimants in oxford* (1983) equally asserted that poverty and long-term unemployment increase the propensity of the poor to commit “survival crime”. In *Conflicts, Rural Development and Food Security in West Africa*, Margarita Flores (2004), while analyzing the conflict intervention and post conflict reconstruction in Sierra Leone and Liberia, made it clear that while conflict exacerbates food insecurity, food insecurity, which is a form and manifestation of poverty also fuels conflict. Consequently, strategies designed for conflict intervention need to address key dimensions of food security: availability, access and stability. She argued that considerations of these dimensions are necessary joint conditions in designing and implementing a conflict intervention. Albert agrees also that “a poverty-alleviation program is within the context of a conflict transformation strategy” (2001:29). This view is in tandem

with that of *Transconflict* in their principles of conflict transformation where they argued that conflict transformation should not be regarded as an isolated event that can be resolved or managed, but as an integral part of society's on-going evolution and development (n.d). Equally, the UNDP's backed concept of Human Security as articulated under the Human Development Report of 1994 clearly portrays conflict transformation as a development agenda.

Human needs or human security centred conflict transformation which addresses living condition and human right issues such as food security, shelter security, access to qualitative and affordable basic education, personal security, community security and preservation/enfranchisement of fundamental human rights is the underpinning theoretical basis of this work. The argument here is that conflict intervention should not only target the containment and de-escalation of violence but should be used as a developmental tool. This would be achieved by properly managing the destroyed and dislocated social structures and structures of development such as markets, basic school facilities, farmlands, estates, shops, industries and commercial cattle which serve as the main economic backbone of a cultural group in Nigeria.

Amartya Sen, whose work, *Development as Freedom* has become one of the most influential global voices supporting human security argued on this line in a lecture presented on human security in Tokyo Japan:

When the victims remain severally deprived not because of an economic downturn, but because of persistent neglect of social and economic institutions such as schools, hospitals etc. on a chronic basis, what is needed is a better understanding of the failure of governments involved in these long term lacunae and greater determination to make provisions for these vital necessities. Given the global nature of politics and public discussion in the contemporary world, this is a matter for international initiatives as well as for national and local leadership (2000:4)

Actor transformation: actors are parties to the conflict, either individuals or groups. Actor transformation refers to the internal changes in their lives or the emergence and recognition of new actors (Schmid, 2000). Overtime, conflict dynamics and other variables may have contributed to the change in leadership of conflicting groups. Interventions should also take note of this and mainstream it in any program being designed.

There is also *issue transformation*: issue transformation seeks to alter the political agenda of the conflict or downplaying the importance of the original conflict issues, instead emphasizing shared concern for new issues. This means getting conflict parties to not be rigid and stick to their original demands as presented, but to creatively redefine their position, interests and needs in other to make them achievable within a shared concern.

Lastly, there is also personnel and group transformation. This has to do with positive changes that have taken place in the heart of individuals. In intervention, it must be understood that sustainable peace is not possible especially in intergroup conflict which is the focus of this work, if groups and individuals are not transformed. The transformation here seeks to create an atmosphere of love instead of hate, accommodation instead of lack of tolerance. There must be mutual acceptance and respect for others. Albert (2001) submits that people must be willing to forgive their adversaries and start a new course of life. Desmond Tutu, the South African bishop and human right crusader added his voice to this discourse when he said:

Each of us has the capacity to grow through pain and distress crime creates. Broken though many maybe by horrendous offences against themselves or their loved ones, all are capable through Gods healing grace of forgiveness and mercy. This is the only road that leads to reconciliation and peace (Consedine, 1999:8)

But apart from the issues of justice, love, forgiveness and equity among conflict parties, this work is particularly interested in the deployment of conflict transformation as a tool for conflict cost management. According to Harington and Merry (1998), and Burton (1990), societies are transformed when fundamental social and political changes are made to correct inequities and injustice, to provide all groups with their fundamental human needs. What this means is that conflict transformation, apart from attempting to terminate violent conflict in a given society, equally seeks to factor in programs and initiatives to manage the fundamental needs of the society. The fundamental needs of the society includes the right to livelihood, the right to life and protection, right to shelter, to basic education, to health, water, food, right to association and in business as contained in the United Nations guiding principles on business and human rights. The United Nations guiding principles on business and human rights are the most authoritative global standard and best practice in addressing the complex challenge of managing relations between businesses and the communities in which they operate, so as to ensure that no parties' rights are breeched even during a conflict (UN, 2011).

Unfortunately, the Nigerian state in designing conflict interventions does not take cognizance of how the cost will be managed. As has been argued here, the state does not even have a framework of intervention that stretches from conflict termination to providing fundamental needs which most often are breached and destroyed in the dynamics of violence. Businesses in conflict communities are raided; set ablaze, most destroyed for those in the telecommunication industry; most are shut down by conflict dynamics throwing investors capital and employees to the abyss, and escalating underdevelopment, yet the state does not even know that it has a responsibility as “duty bearer” to protect these facilities and their owners. The rights of businesses are breached with careless abandon yet in designing intervention, they are not factored in. Basic school facilities are broken down in conflict communities’ thereby breaching access and the rights to education of pupils and students within such communities. Some of the children are disenchanted, disoriented and radicalised. Some needs psychological helps to be de-radicalised in order to be able to live a normal life again after the conflicts had ended, so far the state has no such program.

The north central in particular, consequent on the multiple group conflicts that seek to tear her apart is defaced with shattered and abandoned primary and secondary school buildings (Alubo, 2006). Studies in Nigerian conflicts are filled with loss of livelihood which generically impacts on development and well being, but there are no institutional structures or frameworks to mitigate the loss of livelihood in communities. While doing a critical analysis of the social-economic effects of inter-communal conflicts in Yoruba land, Adesola (2012:34), with particular reference to the conflicts between the Ijaw and Ilaje in Ondo state asserts:

Eighty percent of the people in Ijaw and Ilaje communities are fishermen, 6 percent are farmers while other are either public or civil servants. The violence resulting from the conflicts adversely affects production, marketing and investment in agriculture, the dormant economic activity in the both areas. When violence breaks out, most fishermen and farmers are forced to abandon their nets, boats and crops as well as their crops in the farm because they fear being either attacked or killed

It is very possible with the spate of violence bestriding our local communities to assume that violent conflict is a substantial contributor to the increasing rate of hunger in the local communities. If conflict is able to disempower and isolate 86 % of the population in a

community from their livelihood (farming and fishing), according to Adesola; how would such community cope with food and basic needs?

Nigeria does not have a policy to manage the loss of livelihood resulting from violent conflict beside the arbitrary payment of compensations. Compensations as is deployed in Nigeria have proven to be defective as a development tool and incapable of being termed as conflict transformation. Little wonder, Diamond (1994), views conflict transformation as not just an activity but processes seen more in terms of nation building, national reconciliation and healing, change agency and social transformation.

Paul Lederach, who is regarded as one of the fathers of conflict transformation observed in *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation* (2003) that the framework of conflict transformation should emphasis peace as embedded in justice, building of right relationships and social structures through a radical respect for human rights and non violence as a way of life. The issue about respect for human rights needs to be emphasized because Nigerian security agents, who most times are the interventionist agency of the Nigerian state, operate as if a conflict community is an anarchic state where all known rules of engagement are suspended. In the course of their work, they go on the rampage sometimes in collusion with the state to breach people's human rights. Many have been extra judicially killed, raped, beaten, tortured and injured for life. The sights and sounds of Odi, Zaki Biam, Wukari, Bama, Baga and the extra judicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf in police cell in 2009 are pointers to this. Amnesty International just published their findings on Nigerian soldier's activities in the North East where an estimated 8000 persons were killed by security agents extra judicially. Those killed included suspected Boko Haram members awaiting trial in police cells and relatives of suspected terrorists reined in as a bait to trap them (*Guardian*, 25th June, 2015, online version).

Historically too, it is documented that in 1964, the Nigerian state in its bid to resolve the conflict between the Tiv and the Hausa/Fulani clearly breached the human rights of the Tiv. Iyorwuese Hagher (2002) articulates the Tiv frustration in the hands of the Nigerian state thus:

Several Tiv were killed and overrun, 4000 were arrested, many convicted to various phony prison terms, and many of these convicted were never released till the army took over in January 1966. Apart from these oppressive measures, Tivland was denied all amenities. The

Tiv suffered deprivation, and did not hold any important positions in Kaduna. Their school leavers were jobless. The land was left bare with no hospitals, electricity, water supply, telephone and other facilities. These were the repugnant conditions that the NPC left the Tiv in. Up till today, the findings of the Comassie commission have not been published and the nation spared the shocking revelations of how much the Tiv suffered under their fellow brothers in the practice of party politics, piteously laced with emirate feudal structures (2002: 46, 47, 48).

Furthermore, reports of the Justice G.C.M Onyiuke tribunal constituted on the 14th day of December 1966 to investigate the alleged massacre of easterners in northern Nigeria from May 1966 showed that about 37,000 persons were extra judicially killed, while as at December 1967, about 4,680 were missing (Obumselu, n.d). The report indicated that the Nigerian state was never interested in investigating these killings, or bringing the perpetrators to book. It never took steps to mitigate or placard the region consequent on the loss, thus it was this pogrom that eventually pushed the eastern region out of Nigeria. In the forward to the report, Elliot Uko, president of Igbo youth movement wrote:

We are forced to issue the report of the G.C.M Onyiuke tribunal of enquiry which sat in Enugu from December 1966 to June 1967. It tells the gruesome story of the massacre of about 37,000 persons of Eastern Nigerian origin: Igbo, Ibibio, Efik, Ndoki, Ijaw, Okirika, Ogoni etc. from May to October 1966. This bloody event was the immediate prelude to the civil war and indeed its immediate cause (ND: 5)

These extrajudicial deaths that seem synonymous with the Nigerian state in its bid to resolve conflicts and contradiction among her congregating groups are not often redressed or healed, leaving the national landscape with grieving people and open sores. Violent conflicts will always induce societal wounds, in conflict transformation the intervening state, its agencies or intervening track two bodies are thus, expected not only to terminate the conflicts but should also deal with the resulting wounds. This is global best practice as we saw in the Marshal plan. Although the Marshal plan as announced by the then American secretary of state George Marshal was heavily criticized by the USSR as “dollar imperialism”, but it was able to economically aid the rapid recovery of Western Europe from the devastations of the Second World War. As European Recovery Programme (ERP), the Marshal Plan was a form of conflict transformation for war-ravaged Western Europe in terms of cushioning hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos (Lowe, 1990).

Equally, Liberia's conflict transformation went through three phases according to Kantarina Bajzikova of the African Centre of Slovakia, whose work, "Distribution of Power within Post-Conflict Reconstruction Concept (Liberian case)" studied the conflict transformation apparatus of the Liberian crises of December 1989 to 1996, 1999 to August 2003. At the end of this conflict, Liberia's economy was left in ruins, basic infrastructure and services were lacking, parts of Monrovia as at 2014 had no electricity since 1989. Malnutrition affected 40% of Liberian children under five.

The first phase targeted the containment of the violence and stabilization of the polity. These entailed the deployment of security agents both ECOMOG and UNMIL. These interventions halted the conflict in 1997, making way for Taylor's election as president and also leading to his resignation in 2003, after his regime was embroiled in multiple factional crises. Subsequent on the resignation of Taylor, other activities of the transformation went on as planned. Some of the coordinated social healing programmes enumerated in the post violent stage include, "150 Day Action Plan, Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy, Lift Liberia (which was in force from April 2008 to June 2011, Stabilizing Peace and Security, Revitalizing the Economy, Strengthening the Economy, Governance and rule of law, Rehabilitating Infrastructure and Delivering basic services". Even though the Liberian case was a national case while the conflicts in Nigeria under interrogation are community conflicts but the multiplying effects on the residents are virtually the same—affecting their well being and livelihood, thus these should also be taken into consideration at intervention. But as is evident here, the conflict intervention architecture of Liberia did not stop at terminating the violence as is mostly the case in Nigeria. It had well coordinated people-centred healing and economically empowering programmes like "back to farming" and the "Truth and Reconciliation Commission".

These programmes were mostly funded by International development aid and donor agencies but coordinated by local initiatives and frameworks. This is where Nigeria is defective; there are no frameworks to even coordinate track two interventions. This accounts for why development partners, donor agencies and intervening civil society groups are working unilaterally, sometimes at cross purposes and the ultimate loser are the victims of the conflicts who ought to be benefitting from the various uncoordinated efforts. In relation to this gap in Nigeria's conflict intervention, it can be said that Johan Galtung (1995), was spot-on when he surmised that every conflict-struck society must pass through three phases of

resolution, reconciliation and reconstruction to arrive at a sustainable and development centred peace.

The African Post-Conflict Reconstruction policy framework of 2005, enumerated these three phases of conflict intervention as:

- (a) Emergency phase: This target at creating a secure environment and humanitarian recovery amidst the violence. According to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), this phase usually lasts between 90 days to one year and involves a lot of external actors in form of security agents for local conflicts.
- (b) Transition phase: This phase attempts at strengthening the legitimacy and capacity of reconstructed societies. This phase initiates recovery of basic social services, economy, judicial systems, creation of system of governance in the event of absolute collapse of governments, and reconciliation of society. In the case of absolute collapse of government, a transitional government is appointed for one to three years to create the best conditions for elections. Here, closer co-operation between local and external actors is expected.
- (c) Development: This phase is targeted at sustaining previously achieved and accomplishing recovery/development initiatives. External actors like international development agencies, NGOs, CSOs and donor agencies support local recovery, development initiatives, and provide much needed help, especially in form of technical expertise. The phase should last between four to ten years. Strategies and progress of this phase should try to point the community or state in the direction of sustainable security and development. However, it must be noted that no international intervention can represent a sustainable solution without local participation in terms of decision making, coordination and ownership.

The African Union Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) policy which was finally adopted in July 2006 has since became the operating template in designing conflict interventions or transformation in Africa. According to AU-PSD (2015:3), the AU policy on PCRD:

Is intended to serve as a guide for the development of comprehensive policies and strategies that elaborate measures that seek to consolidate peace and prevent relapse to violence, promote sustainable development and pave the way for growth and regeneration in countries and regions emerging from conflict. Given the peculiarities

of each conflict situation, this policy is concerned as a flexible template that can be adapted to, and assist affected regions and countries (communities) in their endeavors towards reconstruction, security and development.

In line with the human need theory that drives this work and the human security concept as enumerated by the UNDP's human development index of 1994, the World Bank has designed a 40 year program of rebuilding the livelihood and human capital of the insurgency-ravaged north east of Nigeria. The Program which is estimated to gulp 2.1 billion US dollars would see the World Bank give out loans through the International Development Agency (IDA) to the conflict induced economically incapacitated peoples of north east as start ups to build their lives again. The first ten years of the loan will be interest free, while the last 30 years will be at a rate lower than that of capital market (*Vanguard*, 22/7/2015, p9). There is no doubt that a start up loan would go a long way in helping economically disempowered victims of violent conflict claw themselves back to their feet. This is essential in any conflict intervention and peace process if it must be sustainable.

Similarly too, the UNDP has designed a program to alleviate the suffering of victims of violent conflict in the north central and north east of Nigeria through economic empowerment, in view of the fact that violent conflict is known to be a threat to livelihood. In fact, in mapping the program UNDP observed the calamitous effect of conflict on well being and livelihood of residents in Nigeria:

The various crises in Nigeria have had cumulative impact of catastrophic proportion particularly on the citizens residing in these areas. As a matter of fact, numerous people have been killed (and continue to be killed), infrastructures have been destroyed (and continue to be destroyed), livelihoods and socioeconomic activities have been largely disrupted, a huge number of people displaced. A number of youths, women and men have fallen victims – losing their loved ones, means of livelihoods and shelters. These victims of violence are currently homeless and live with host communities and not being engaged in economically benefiting activities, and could be potential targets for political manipulation and participation in violent conflict, especially the youths (UNDP/UNDAF 111, 2015:6)

UNDP's development centred conflict intervention in both the north east and central is being operated under the "UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF III)" in form of easy access to loan as a start up for economically incapacitated victims of the conflicts akin to


what the World Bank intends to do. The only point of departure is that UNDP is backing up its loan with multi-stakeholder capacity building trainings for these impacted individuals on how to begin afresh in life, to be able to maximise the use of the funds. UNDP's approach is a justification of Professor Tim Finnan's "enterprise capacity" submission in *The Sustainable Livelihood Assessment Tool*, where he argued that it is always better to build the enterprise capacity of individual victims of a crisis before helping them out with start up funds than giving them financial compensation as a standalone (2002).

Both the World Bank and UNDP's interventions in the north east and central are initiatives driven by track two operatives—that is; development partners, NGOs and CSOs. What about the state? The concept of human security is such that the state is supposed to be the driver and coordinator in other for it to be sustainable and achieve its target goals (UNDP, 1994). The lacuna in the Nigerian set up is part of the gap that necessitated this work—just as the UNDP observed, and as earlier cited:

The national government does not have a clear policy or legal framework for administering intervention aid. The result has been confused, poor coordination, competition or adversarial relationships between agencies, and a lack of clearness of accountability

But as John Paul Lederach (2003) and Professor Alex Schmid (2003) has finally established this ought not to be because conflict transformation is a generic term that captures an inclusive process stretching from conflict containment to peaceful resolution of conflict issues and the rebuilding of conflict torn societies and individuals leading to a sustainable post conflict peace and development.

A Development Centred Conflict Transformation Diagram



Point 3 is clearly missing in terms of institutional framework or policy in Nigeria, thus there is need to rejig Nigeria’s conflict intervention policy.

2.5 Group Conflicts

Group conflict as a concept is germane to this work. What are the ideological issues driving it? What are the factors breeding and sustaining it? Groups can be ethnic, religious or social. A further elaboration by scholars like Post and Vickers refer to ethnic groups as “cultural sections” (1973), while to James Coleman (1958); a “nationality” is the largest traditional African group above a tribe which can be distinguished from other groups by one or more objective criteria normally language. In the light of this, language clusters like the Hausa, Yoruba, Berom, Anaguta, Afizere, Bassa, Egbura, Gbagi, Igbo can be contextualized as groups.

Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe had argued in their work, *Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A theoretical perspective* (1971), that all communal or identity groups are not traditional as some were created by social construct. Okeke (1998) amplified this in saying that such groups or identities have not always been there, for men sometimes change their communal identities as occasions demand. Historically, some occasions that has necessitated the creation of social grouping or changing of group identities is social mobilization, modernization and conflicts. In the words of Melson and Wolpe:

Under conditions of social mobilization and inter-group conflict, communal boundaries are indeed transformable. In fact, much contemporary communal conflict is being waged not by traditional entities like the Igbo village group of the pre-colonial era or by the Ijebu, Egba and Oyo of pre-colonial Yorubaland, but by communities which were formed in the crucible of mobilization, cultural homogenous communities like the Igbo and Yoruba of contemporary Nigeria (Melson and Wolpe cited in Okeke et al, 1998)

Okeke further elaborated that the same processes of modernization, mobilization and conflict, which overtime had led to the development of a common identity and common interest among various culturally homogenous peoples, have also led to the emergence of larger multi-ethnic groupings which in their relationships with one another act like ethnic groups. An example of this would be the “Muslim north” which is created as a political and religious negotiating instrument in the highly competitive multi-ethnic and multi-religious Nigerian society. The argument is that social groupings apart from being traditional can also be a contemporary social creation depending on the existing or emerging social milieu or challenges. In other words groups by their composition have needs, interests and challenges that confront their well being and existence.

Most times in a heterogeneous society a group need runs parallel to another groups need thus the inevitability of conflict. Group or communal conflict are those organized along regional, ethnic, religious, tribal, clan or linguistic lines, struggling to obtain greater autonomy or self determination to form an independent state, or to join a neighbouring state, thereby clashing with other communal groups and or with one or several states (Schmid, 2000). The problem with this view is that it does not take cognizance of the fact that some group conflicts especially those in Africa are not necessarily driven by the desire at independence or break away to join another state but the desire to have social justice, equity and fairness while still operating within the same system. Conflict by the way has been described as the

confrontation between individuals or groups' resulting from opposite or incompatible ends or means (Schmid, 2000).

It is documented that religion is one of the highly contested group interests in Nigeria. For instance, shortly after the dawn of democracy in Nigeria by 1999, some groups in the Muslim north either rightly or wrongly in defense of the purity of their religion embarked on what some scholars have termed political sharia (Tanko 2012; Abdu 2012, Ali 2012). Peter Tanko further calls it a game of masks that is deployed to serve all clandestine purpose.

This perveted sharia was non accommodative to non Muslims and moderate Muslims. Many non northerners left the north in protest, while non Muslim northerners resisted it thus the sharia implosions that led to destructions in the north between 1999 and 2000 (Abdu, 2002). Apart from religion, groups have also been known to have been in conflict with other groups over land related issues.

Land is a volatile issue and at the core of most intergroup conflicts in Nigeria because of the large reliance on it for daily sustenance. Agriculture is the largest employer of labour in Nigeria sustaining about 80% of Nigeria's total poor population (World Bank, 2006). Most of Nigeria's groups literally live on subsistent farming and fishing (Adesola, 2012). In the north central and south east land is the biggest resources and had triggered most group conflicts. The Tiv and Jukun crisis in Wukari is centred on land, the Ezza-ezzillo conflict is about land, the Umuleri-Agulaeri conflict is about land, the Ife-Modekeke is about land, the Tiv- Alagoa, Tiv-Fulani are all centred on land. The Jos conflict and the Bassa-Egbura conflict which this work focused on are all land related, even though other factors like politics and religion have entered the mix. Primarily, land is the foundation of these conflicts.

Closely related to land is local citizenship contestation among groups which has been infamously tagged indigeneship and settlersip conflict. This is because through the conspiracy of the state and the constitution, the economic and political benefits accruing to an individual Nigerian is only accessed by his capacity to prove he belongs to the local group. This has been adequately dealt with in the literature. However, it is important also to state that diversity alone is not a sufficient reason for violent conflict as Eghosa and Suberu has argued. Concepts like federalism are essentially a compromise solution to regulate the overlapping interests of groups in a multi-group society. It does not necessarily achieve this by muzzling the individual identity of the groups; rather it provides a national umbrella where all the converging groups can congregate together, with their diverse strength, building a

great society without losing their individual distinctiveness. Elaigwu (2010: 5) succinctly captured this in *The Politics of Federalism in Nigeria*:

Federalism is essentially a compromise solution in a multinational state between two types of self-determination—the determination provided by a national government which guarantees security for all the nation-state on one hand, and the self-determination of component groups to retain their individual identities on the other. Thus, federalism is an attempt to reflect the diverse political, social, cultural and economic interests within the broader framework of unity. It therefore attempts to satisfy the need for cooperation in some things coupled with the right to separate inaction in others. Only federalism fulfills the desire for unity where it coexists with a determination not to smother local identity and local power

Federalism as Elaigwu and others had argued remains a viable option to regulate the tensions and contradictions of diverse groups in a heterogenous enclave as is evident in the United States of America and other multi-racial societies. But the question is in its impotence in the Nigerian case for as Alimba (2014), had observed, poor relationships between groups are all too often a trigger for conflict, and remain a critical hindrance to peace building efforts after the violence is over.

2.6 Theoretical Framework of Analysis

The study adopted the systems theory and the human needs (human security concept) theories as frame work for analysis. The system theory helped to lay the theoretical foundation of the interconnectedness of the social system where groups are component social units, who are also politically and economically gregarious. The system theory helped to put into perspective that a functional society is one where the social, political and economic lives of individuals and groups work in sync. Thus, an abnormality in one affects others. The human need theory and the human security concept is employed in the work to aid the understanding that violent conflicts through their manifestations challenge the needs of a society whether shelter, livelihood, health, food and education. In intervening to contain the violence and build a sustainable peace which is what scholars have termed “conflict transformation”, there is need to factor into the plan how these challenged needs of the society can be taken care of in the intervention process. This is the nucleus of the human security concept as enunciated by the UNDP and the proponents of the human need theorists. The central argument is that conflict intervention should not only contain the violence but should address development issues for peace to be sustained. Human needs apart from being the cost of conflicts have also

proven to be its cause. Thus, where they are not addressed, they have a high propensity to return the society to another round of conflict in addition to deepening underdevelopment.

2.6.1 Systems Theory

The system theory was originally developed as a biological concept in 1928 by Ludwig Von Bertalanffy to explain the interrelationship of organisms in the ecosystem. According to Laszlo and Krippner (1988), the system theory in its broadest conception can be seen as a complex of interacting components together with the relationship among them that permit the identification of a boundary-maintaining entity or process. Its central assumption according to Kuhn (1994) is the fact that it views its variables from a functional “whole” or what Lilienfeld (1978:7-8) calls “system” or “organizations” which runs on the interdependence of its components units. Russell Ackoff (1981:15-16) submits that a system is a set of two or more interrelated elements with the following properties:

- (1) Each element has an effect on the functioning of the whole
- (2) Each element is affected by at least one other element in the system

It thus can be sufficed that social systems thrive on the holistic view and functionality of societal structures and the interdependence of its sub-structures or components. The system theory has in its historical evolution and development benefitted from the contributions and works of scholars like Alfred Whitehead, Anatol Rapoport, Kenneth Boulding, Paul Weiss, Raph Gerard, Kurt Lewin, Roy Grinker, William Gray, Nicholas Rizzo, Karl Meninger, Silvano Arieti and a host of other scholars who had adopted it as an interpretative model in various strata of life (Laszlo and Krippner, 1998). Because of its elastic and interdisciplinary nature, the system theory has become a multifaceted inquiry tool in most field of human endeavor.

Although the system theory has been adopted in social conflict as an interpretative and analytical tool to understudy the social-structural causative factors of conflict (Faleti, 2009), which in essence means that there are systematic or structural factors responsible for the emergence and escalation of conflicts, however the system theory as an elastic theory can also be expanded to cover conflict effects or costs on society. This is predicated on the premise that society as a “system” is composed of several inter-dependant “sub-systems” like political systems, social and economic systems. With the hindsight of Ackoff’s definition of system theory, it presupposed that any dysfunctionality in any of the systems would definitely

affect the other systems either good or bad. This is so because according to Strauss (2002), two of the perennial philosophical issues upon which Bertalanffy's concept of a system is built on is "one and the many" and the "whole and its parts". Thus dysfunctionality in the political system automatically translates to effects in the social-economic sectors.

Situating this theoretical perspective into the political economy of group conflicts in Jos metropolis, it is an established fact which the literature review also corroborated that the Nigerian political structuring from the colonial era to the present is defective. Samuel Egwu posits that this is not peculiar to Nigeria but a general reflection of the colonially-created African state:

The post colonial state, being a relic of the colonial past that it is...embodies the contradictions of the African political economy. The institutional ensembles of the African state reflect the deep social cleavages of the African society; the personnel that control and operate the apparatuses of the state are bearers of specific class, ethnic, regional and religious interests, while the conception of order and the essence of the political community reflect the narrow power calculation of the ruling elite (2009:418)

An example of the post-colonial African state being a relic of the colonial past according to Kuna (1998:83) is the construction of "Northern Nigeria identity" as being rigidly "Islamic and Hausa" thus elevating it as a political dominant position within the area and in the process subsuming minority ethnic groups within the same locality who are neither Muslims or Hausa into the artificially created political mould. Regrettably, this has led to tensions, agitations and feelings of exclusion at all level of governance (Egwu, 2009).

In Jos, the Hausa and Fulani, who by the privilege of colonialism had settled in Jos since earlier 20th century, had also by the same making ruled Jos from at least 1927 to 1947/48, had helped in the development and emergence of modern Jos metropolis by building schools, mosques, industries and settlement, would not now accept any categorization that defines them as strangers or settlers in Jos. Unfortunately; the Nigerian state since independence has consistently refused to address the problem of "primordial citizenship" in its perennial clashes with "national citizenship" which has over the years manifested in group conflicts.

Furthermore, as has also been established by the literature review, the constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria which is the operating document of the political entity called Nigeria is also said to be faulty and conflictive; especially as it concerns its position and

definition of an indigene and a citizen. The constitution in its bid to address the minority problem ended up creating two kinds of citizens under one polity. One is the “indigenous citizen” who enjoys all the rights and benefits accruing to the state citizen as long as he is within the locality of his “indigeneity”. He draws his powers from section 25 (11), 35 (3) and (14) 3 of the Nigerian constitution and 17 (2) of the Federal Character Commission Act (FCC ACT) of 2006. The second category of the constitutionally created citizenship is the “settler citizen”. The settler citizen enjoys only the partial rights and benefits of state citizenship because his place of domicile is different from his place of indigeneity. Even though section 42 (1) of the Nigerian constitution empowers and guarantees him all the citizen rights and benefits but the same constitution took away the same rights and benefits in the other sections of its provision, leaving him hopelessly and helplessly at the mercy and benevolence of his host community. The Jos conflict is very much on the contestation between these constitutionally backed two layers of citizenship.

Also, the political class who operates the political system and manages the allocation and reallocation of the nation’s resources does not seem to have fared well. With substantial evidence in the literature review, the Nigerian political class seems to be the creator and sustainer of group conflicts in Jos and Toto. The controversial subdivision of Jos in 1991 without wide consultation and consideration of the indigenes which is the foundation of this contemporary conflict is a political decision. The appointment of Alhaji Amino Mato, an Hausa as the caretaker committee chairman of the newly created Jos north local government in 1994, to the chagrin of the indigenous populations, which eventually led to the 1994 violent confrontation was by the state. The appointment in 1996 of Ado Ibrahim, an Hausa to the position of the secretary of Jos north education authority which was rejected and resisted by the indigenous population heightening the tension in Jos was by the state. The introduction of indigene certificate as an instrument of accessing citizenship benefits which became a contentious issue in Jos between the indigenous population and the Hausa/Fulani from 1999, when the reign of political power both at the local government level, where it is issued and at the state level fall into the hands of the indigenes and they immediately stopped its issuance to the Hausa, who themselves for no fault of theirs had lived all their lives in Jos, was also by the state.

The appointment in 2001 of Mukhtar Mohamed, an Hausa to the position of the Jos north local government coordinator of the National Poverty Eradication Program (NAPEP), was a by the state. It was tensions arising from the protestation over Mukhtar Mohamed’s

appointment that eventually exploded on the 7th of September 2001 into violent confrontations. Even though conflicts by nature do not conform to monocausal analysis but on the strength of the overwhelming empirical evidence, it can be said that the Jos conflict is largely as a result of the contradictions in the Nigerian political system. Ibeanu (1998:56) puts it succinctly:

In Nigeria, government cannot be exonerated from the spate of communal and ethnic conflicts ravaging the nation largely because of the manner in which it manages the nation's resources

As it is in Jos, the creation of Opanda kingdom for the Egbura (headed by Ohimege Opanda or the Emir of Toto) in 1981 by the administration of Solomon Lar while ignoring the Bassa who had shared the same locality with them since the pre-colonial times is also an indictment of political insensitivity. This was compounded in 1983 when the same administration created a second class stool for the Egbura thus bringing their traditional stools to two in Toto local government while totally ignoring the Bassa who constituted the majority of Toto population and the Gbagi who followed in size (Best, 2004). The unresolved traditional contestation of power, space and resources orchestrated by the political class in Toto is at the root of the conflict.

Since the system theory presupposes that once a component part of a polity suffers a defect, it affects the other parts. It is just normal if we hinge our findings, which cuts across losses and destructions in the economy, the social system and even the political system on the dysfunctionalities in the political system. The human, social and economic activities in Jos metropolis and Toto are dependent variables on the politics of plateau and Nasarawa states and Nigeria. As long as the political environment is dysfunctional, there is bound to be consequent effects on these sub systems. According to Faleti (2009:53), systemic factors that leads to changes in peoples material comfort, reduces access to sources of livelihood, scarcity of resources and its allocation through lopsided political processes and competition, widespread poverty in the midst of plenty, the domination and marginalization of minority groups by those in the majority are what causes conflict. Thus, if an enduring solution must come to the Jos and Toto conflict, both in terms of conflict prevention and functional transformation that stretches to managing the costs; it must come from the political class who operate the political system. Consequently, we can assert that the effects of the Jos and Toto conflicts which this study focused on and their management are dependent on the political system of Nigeria.

2.6.2. The human need theory

Human existence is driven by needs which are called “human needs” or “basic needs”. The totality of man’s daily endeavors is on how to meet his needs. Human need theorists posit that individuals and groups engage in conflicts and violent conflicts as a result of unmet needs. According to Coati and Rosati (1988:6) in *The Power of Human Needs in World Society*:

[H]uman needs are a powerful source of explanation of human behavior and social interaction. All individuals have needs that they strive to satisfy, either by using the system, acting on the fringes, or acting as a reformist or revolutionary. Given this condition, social systems must be responsive to individual needs, or be subject to instability and forced change (possibly through violence or conflict)

In fact, Rosenberg (2003) had argued that violence is nothing but the tragic expression of unmet human needs. Human needs as well as group needs are biological, economical, psychological, political and social, and at any given point in time or circumstances they vary from one individual or group to another.

The human needs theory is also as elaborate as the needs themselves but the shallow understanding of these needs not only precipitate conflicts but also impede the inclusion of needs approaches in conflict transformation and peace processes (Valenzuela, 2005). Human need theory as a multi-disciplinary tool of interpretation, has benefited from the works of scholars from different disciplines such as biology; psychology, politics; sociology, economics and development studies. Some of these include Abraham Maslow, Marshal Rosenberg, Manfred Max-Neef; John Burton and Paul Sites.

In his influential work, *Pyramid of Human Needs*, Abraham Maslow (1954) itemizes human needs and puts them on a priority scale meaning that some are more urgent than others. In the order of urgency he puts food, water and shelter on the first level. On a second level, he places the need for safety and security, followed by belonging or love. The need for self-esteem is found on a fourth level and finally on a fifth and final level, personal fulfilment. Although Maslow argues that each human being and by extension groups tries to meet his need one after another in the ever competitive and complex world in the order of urgency, failure at any point creates tensions that are often vented on others frustratingly.

This is further illuminated by Burton (1979), in *Deviance, Terrorism and War: The Process of Solving Unresolved Social and Political Problems*, where he posited that human needs are not only universal but their neglect often leads social groups to the edge of employing violence as an instrument of claiming their rights and satisfying their needs. Burton contends that education and culture makes parties manipulate the issues and dehumanises the other parties in pursuance of their own needs (Valenzuela, 2005). Like Burton, Marshal Rosenberg (2003), admits that human needs are universal and meeting them is essential to human survival and well being. Although scholars like Burton and Rosenberg adopted Maslow's theory and expanded it, the point of departure between their work and Maslow's is the view that human needs are not necessarily in a hierarchical order but are rather emergent collection of human development essentials. Human essential needs being a causatic factor of conflict is also the central argument in Paul Sites (1973) work "*Control: The Basis of Social Order*", where he defined 8 essential human needs whose satisfaction was required in order to produce normal (non-deviant, non violent) individual or group behaviour. According to Sites these included the primary needs of consistency of response, stimulation, security and recognition, and derivative needs for justice, meaning, rationality and control. There is no doubt whatsoever that the theory of human need had evolved over time and the ideas of many of its proponents had rubbed off, and influenced the works of others in one way or another. For instance, Richard Rubenstein opined that, Sites works influenced the position of Burton and other later day apostles of human needs as cause of conflict.

Sandra Marker (2003) leveraging on Sites work listed these human development essentials as:

- ✓ Safety/security—the need for structure, predictability, stability, and freedom from fear and anxiety
- ✓ Belongings/love—the need to be accepted by others and to have strong personal ties with one's family, friends, and identity groups
- ✓ Self –esteem—the need to be recognized by oneself and others as strong, competent, and capable. It also includes the need to know that one has some effect on her/his environment.
- ✓ Personal fulfilment—the need to reach one's potential in all areas of life
- ✓ Identity—goes beyond a psychological "sense of self". Identity is a sense of self in relation to the outside world. Identity becomes a problem when one's identity is not

recognized as legitimate, or when it is considered inferior or is threatened by others with different identifications.

- ✓ Cultural security—is related to identity, the need for recognition of one's language, traditions, religion, cultural values, ideas, and concepts.
- ✓ Freedom—is the condition of having no physical, political, or civil restraints; having the capacity to exercise choice in all aspects of one's life.
- ✓ Distributive Justice—is the need for the fair allocation of resources among all members of a community.
- ✓ Participation—is the need to be able to actively partake in and influence civil society.

Apart from the primary argument of traditional human need theorists that the unmet needs of individuals and groups induce protracted or intractable conflicts, they also believed that in seeking for a sustainable resolution of the ensuing violent conflict, these needs must be addressed or factored into the intervention process. For instance, according to Marker (2003), the Palestinian-Israeli conflict involves the unmet needs of identity and security. While the Palestinians feel their identity is being denied them by Israel, personally and nationally, the Israelis feel challenged security-wise individually and as a group by the activities of Hamas, the indifference of the PLO and the Palestinian authorities that could not control suicide bombings; and generally the anti-Semitism that characterise their relationship with hostile neighbours. If a sustainable solution must be found for this conflict, the unmet need of the Palestinian identity and Israel's security must be addressed and satisfied by whatever intervention that is being designed.

Human need theory offers a new dimension to conflict intervention in the sense that it provides an important conceptual tool that not only connects and addresses human needs on all levels, but makes a case for turning away from traditional models that approaches conflict intervention from a zero-sum or power philosophy, where for instance, parties to a conflict are coerced by brute force to accept a hostile peace as is the case in Nigeria. The peace obtained by violence must be sustained by violence and do not often last because the underlying issues or unmet needs have not been addressed. The Nigerian Niger Delta is an example of this. The human need approach supports collaborative and multi-faced joint problem solving models and techniques, workshops, processes and interventions that take into account the complexity of human life and the insistent nature of human needs. Joint problem-solving approaches and interventions also analyse the fundamental sources of

conflict, while maintaining a focus on fulfilling peoples unmet needs. More importantly, they involve the conflicting parties in finding and developing acceptable ways to not only contain the violence but also meet the needs of all concerned including needs created by conflicts (Sanders, 2003), like loss of livelihood and shelter.

A closer look on human needs as articulated by the human need theorists shows essentially they are the same component of human security which has dominated global thinking in terms of development intervention and conflict intervention since the end of the cold war. The concept of human security as a developmental paradigm shift gained momentum in 1994 consequent on UNDP's *Human Development Report* of 1994. It has been argued that "human security" as a concept is an all-inclusive improvement on the traditional concept of "security" which characterized the cold war era (Shinoza, 2004). The end of the cold war provided the world an opportunity to re-interrogate the linkage between security as "territorial protection" and development with "human beings" at the center. Banjo (2001) corroborates that at the center of development is people. In fact, Shinoza (ibid) opines that human security should be understood as a tool for discussing a particular type of development.

Prior to the end of the cold war, human security scholars like Richard Ullman and Barry Buzan had unsuccessfully tried to get the world to rethink security from a development point of view. In 1983, Ullman published his work, *Redefining security*, in which he sort to draw attention to a broad understanding of security. The same year, Buzan published his findings titled, "*People, States and Fear*" through which he argued that "narrow views of national security are increasingly inappropriate and counterproductive". Their argument is that the emphasis of security should be shifted from the state as an entity to the "individuals" and their "fears" in the state as the object of security. It is a shift from a security obtained through armament to a security obtained through sustainable human development, expressed in freedom from threats and impediments to life and living. These include "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want". According to the UN's Commission on Human Security (CHS, 2003:4), "...It is to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment".

Amplifying the concept of human security, Thomas (2004) sees it as securing people and their everyday concerns and existence. These concerns can be in the area of food, shelter, income, education and personal security. Thus, human security as against the traditional concept of security that lays emphasis on "territorial security", tries to secure the individual

from every known need, danger and threat on the earth. Consequently, in human security, we can talk of food security, economic security, job security, environmental security, political security; personal and community security. It is to be free from man-made and environmentally induced threats and fears. “Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.” (CHS: 2003: 4). This is also Amartya Sen’s argument in his seminal book, “*Development as Freedom*”

According to Shinoda, economic security requires jobs to secure an assured basic income. Food security means that all people at all times have both physical and economic access to basic foods. Health security is to provide healthy environment and health services to meet challenges of poor nutrition, infectious diseases etc. Environmental security is concerned with lack of access to clean water, deforestation, air pollution, natural disasters and so on. Personal security is to protect human lives from threats of various kinds of violence by the state and other groups. Community security is about threats like oppressive practices and ethnic clashes in traditional communities. Political security means the protection of human rights and democratization. Then, there is universal access to basic education which has also been covered by the United Nations MDG2.

Scholars have identified local and global threats to human security, they include: violent conflicts either by states or groups; violent crime, industrial and traffic accidents, threats to women, abuse of children, unchecked population growth especially without a corresponding social safety net, disparities in economic opportunities, migration pressures, environmental degradation, drug trafficking and international terrorism (Shinoda, 2004). Threats to human security are multidimensional in manifestation, in an international system where states are players, actors and visible entities—some threats are offshoots of international politics of who gets what, how and when in the protection of national interest. For instance, David Roberts (2008), argued in his book, “*Human Insecurity: Global structures of violence*” that globalization and its skewed political and economic structures ensured that a minute part of the world live in opulence while the majority live in abject poverty. He cited a report about 25 Indian farmers who committed suicide because they are trapped in debt and falling prices occasioned by the forces of globalization. He called their death “avoidable” and caused by

the human components of the political and economic contradictions that force ever increasing exports which increase competition and consequently lower income, in order to service misdirected external debts skewed to favour the rich nations. Thus, structural violence in the international space is an impediment to human security. Human security is a security against such avoidable deaths and conditions as occasioned by the international structures of violence.

Besides the threat of globalization, human security has also been challenged by issues like climatic change through desertification which is presently drying up the Sahel region and forcing migration down to southern Nigeria. Geological findings indicate that two-third of Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara states could turn desert or semi-desert in the 21st century (Federal Ministry of Environment 2008 *National Policy on Desertification and Drought*. Abuja: Federal Ministry of Environment). The threat of climate change on human security can be better appreciated by its impact on agriculture and the frequent clashes of herders and crop farmers in many parts of Nigeria.

Table 2:3 Types of Human Security Threats

| Types of Security | Example of Main Threat |
|------------------------|--|
| Economic security | Persistent poverty and unemployment |
| Food Security | Hunger and Famine |
| Health Security | Deadly Infectious diseases, unsafe food, malnutrition, lack of access to basic health care |
| Environmental Security | Environmental degradation, resource depletion, natural disasters and pollution. |
| Personal Security | Physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence, child labour |
| Community Security | Inter-ethnic, religious and other identity-based tensions, political repressions, human right abuses etc |

Source: UNTFHS, 2001

However, in Nigeria, destructive violent conflicts appear to be the most potent threat to human security or human needs, consequent on the multiple costs it leaves behind in communities and in the life of its dwellers. It challenges the individual's economic well being by the destruction of income infrastructures. Whether they are markets, shops, real estates, farms, animals and jobs, none is spared by the destructive hands of conflicts. Conflict cost affects resources, opportunity cost and human cost (Cranna, 1994). According to Saferworld and the Strategic Foresight Group (2009, 2006 and 2004), conflict cost is all encompassing: economic, military, environmental, social, political—human deaths, expenditures, destructions on lands, physical infrastructure, migration, humiliation, growth of extremism, and lack of civil society.

Violent conflict affects food security through the destruction of farms, the desertion of farm villages and communities consequent on conflict-induced insecurity. Through arms proliferation and conflict induced crime and criminality, issues like cattle rustling has become endemic threatening not only the micro economy of the breeders but causing food insecurity as it concerns beef supply (Ismail et al, 2014). Solomon Hussein, while highlighting the effect of violent conflict on human security in sub Saharan Africa captures this argument succinctly:

Conflicts rage in many regions across the African continent. The apparent insolubility of several of these conflicts compromises hopes that Africans have of a renaissance on their continent. The conflicts undermine economic development and result in the further marginalisation of Africa within the global political economy. These conflicts result in tragic loss of life, the devastation of communities, and the displacement of millions of people. In the process, human security is severely compromised (2007:131)

Violent conflict, when not properly handled is known to breed other conflicts and even with more devastating costs (Albert, 2012). There is the case of security agents in the developing world who are implicated for violation of human rights in their overzealous attempt to contain the violence which often leaves the state with more cost as it bears endlessly the burden of maintaining a “residential peace keeping force” as is common in Nigeria. There is also the issue of barrage of litigations over extra judicial killings. Furthermore, violent conflict equally is an impediment to the realisation of universal access to basic education. First, it leads to death of teachers and pupils which is a direct threat to personal security, which also impacts on social capital development. Secondly, learning structures are destroyed, academic calendar is disrupted and in most cases, many pupils and students abandon their education due to physical handicap, parental incapacitation to continue paying

the fees, disillusionment, family pressure to hawk on the street so as to argument shattered family income. This is why scholars like Caroline Thomas opines that human security at a level is the fulfilment of basic material needs and at another level, the achievement of human dignity, which incorporates personal autonomy, control over one's life, and unhindered participation in the life of the community (Thomas 1997.3, in Parleviet 2001). In fact, the Bonn Declaration of 1991 defined human insecurity simply as threats to human life, life style or culture.

While human security scholars agree that the state is the driving force behind most threats to human security, it is also believed that human security cannot be in place without the active participation of the state (Hideaki Shinoda, 2004). Shinoda equally argues that because the state has been reposed with the collective wealth of people, it is also expected to guarantee these securities. This is the underlining argument in the social contract theory which dictated that the government should be responsible for protecting individual rights, because that is the very reason why it was established. Within this context, we can talk of the state having legitimacy and monopoly of coercive force to compel obedience to its laws and order. Ideally, the state's governmental power must be strong enough to overwhelm any other domestic groups to protect the rights of her citizens. The essential state mechanisms to implement this include well functioning police and military powers as well as other agencies and parastatas set up to help deal with issues like health, shelter, food and education. Because human security is also a global concern, international developmental agencies like WHO (World Health Organization), UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), WFP (World Food Programme), UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees) have also joined the fray in the global attempt to ensure the social and economic well being of all humans, especially the majority living in the less developed nations.

In line with the concept of human security or human need, conflict transformation by way of "post conflict" peace-building interventions is also being streamlined to manage conflict cost; hence it appears this is a fundamental challenge to "human security" in most developing countries. In fact, scholars like Albert (2001), Diamond (1994), Maynard (1994) and Lederach (1996) insist conflict interventions should not only deescalate the raging violence but should also rebuild the human and structural damages inflicted by conflict which directly impacts on development. The UNDP corroborated this in their 1994 report when they

asserted that conflict transformation is a developmental tool. Managing conflict cost is to undo the damages conflict imposes on communities and individuals. Presently, states are mainstreaming the concept of human security as a policy tool to guide programmes in peace-building, security, development and humanitarian work (UNTFHS, 2009).

Nevertheless, the concept of human security driving peace building and intervention policies as developed by the UNDP is not exclusive a track one or two responsibility. What is actually required is a synergy between the state, all tracks (public sector stakeholders, private sector stakeholders and civil society stakeholders) and the conflict-torn communities with track one coordinating under a functional institutional framework (UNDP 1994). In addition to containing the violence, the state-led synergy is expected to take responsibility in terms of rebuilding damaged structures, maintaining law and order, punishing offenders, rehabilitating the psychologically wounded, de-radicalising and counselling those who suffered exposure, providing relief and succour for the internally displaced, demobilising and disarming groups—including mopping up arms in civilian hands, mitigating food insecurity challenges and addressing health issues occasioned by conflict.

Table 2:4 Multiple Actors involved in a “human security-driven” post-conflict peace building

| Local | Public Sector Stakeholders | Civil Society Stakeholders | Private Sector Stakeholders |
|---------------|---|---|---|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local government councils • IDP's • Refugees • Former Combatants • Community Police | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community groups • Local NGO's • Religious groups • Women's groups | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Individual business leader |
| National | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ministers and advisers • Civil servants and departments • Elected representatives • Courts • Human Right councils • Political parties • Military/police | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Media • Religious groups • Schools and universities • Social movements and advocacy groups • Trade unions • National NGO's | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corporations and businesses • Business associations • Professional bodies • Financial institutions |
| International | International bodies (UN, World Bank, WTO, ICC, International or regional peacekeeping forces etc) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International NGO's • International media • International advocacy groups • International trade unions | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IFI's • Multinational corporations |

Source: UNTFHS, 2009

According to the UNTFHS (2009), in any given post conflict community, the devastations that conflict places on the social fabric of a given society needs to be repaired as part of the post conflict peace building. However, to achieve this objective, local capacity building must be the cornerstone of a human security programme to peace building operations (UN, 2009). Human security in conflict transformation means a people-centred peace building or need driven intervention. The state in actuality is to create an enabling environment for the people to drive the process. In the words of the UNDP:

If given the opportunities to meet their most essential needs and to earn their own living, people will set themselves free and ensure that they can make a full contribution to developments of themselves, their local communities, their countries and the world (1994: 7).

Applying the human need theory or human security concept to the Jos and Toto conflicts, empirical evidences show that the economic security of the resident families has been breached by the destruction of income infrastructures³. Food security has also been threatened by the insecurity around the farming communities of Barkin Ladi, Riyom, Bukuru, Bassa and Dogo na Hauwa (these communities supply Jos metropolis with vegetables), the clashes between the Berom crop farmers and the Fulani cattle herders, the desertion of farming ancestral lands by groups like the Afizere and the land contestation at Andafwo between the Bassa crop farmers and the Fulani herders in Toto. With the prevailing insecurity in Jos resulting in ambush, midnight raids and rape, extra-judicial killings and suppression of human rights, it is also apparent that personal and community security has been compromised. The same applies to universal access to basic education which according to field work has been enmeshed with escalating number of out-of-school dropouts and calendar disruptions.

From all indications, the Nigerian state may not be able to redress these dislocations alone. But in line with human security, these dislocations directly affects the social economic well being of the citizenry and not addressing them as part of conflict intervention means a recipe for underdevelopment in the communities. Drawing from the UNTFHS (2001) operational template for implementing human security in post conflict communities, the Nigerian state should not only synergise with stakeholders (public, private and NGO's) but should capacitate the communities so that they can identify with the process, own it and see it

³ Income infrastures refer to economic platforms through which people eke out their livelihood (eg. Market)

through. For instance, if the state or its partners wish to tackle food insecurity, the communities should be made to know what the programme is about and what it seeks to achieve for them—by so doing, they would give their all to ensure it succeeds.

In terms of personal security which has become porous in Jos and Toto consequent on the conflict, it is advised that the state should begin de-emphasising the heavy reliance on military might and fire-power approach to resolving conflict issues. While it is a truism that “fire-power” cannot be completely stamped out in containing and managing violent conflicts, the paradigm shift from traditional security to human security which has gained prominence since 9/11 has been centred on “people” as against “territory”. Consequently, the Nigeria state should do well to make post conflict peace building to be “people-centred” as against its present “territory-centred”. In tackling the issue of insecurity on the street of Jos and Toto, the state should look towards the economically disempowerment youths induced by the protracted conflicts. The Frustration-Aggression theorists would allude that frustration will always find ventilation in aggression and aggressive behaviours (Ademola, 2012). This is not to completely blame the insecurity on the streets of Jos and Toto on the prevailing hardship caused by the conflicts, but the loss of means of livelihood of families cannot be isolated from the pervading insecurity. For instance, according to the Commander of the STF in Jos, the religious and ethnic conflicts in Jos ended two years ago. What the metropolis is presently suffering are activities of criminal elements and unengaged disenchanted youths who specialize in cow rustling and other evils as a survival strategist. Most of these youths are victims of the conflict (Enetie, Elotiv, 30/3/2014). Economically empowering them is the development approach to tackling the challenge of insecurity in Jos which human security advocates. Studies have variously shown that local conflicts are inevitably influenced by wider economic and political forces (Alimba, 2014).

Equally, it is the need of the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta to appropriate the social-economic and political benefits accruing to them consequent on being the aborigines of Jos as enshrined in the indigeneity clause in the Nigerian constitution, they do not wish to share this with those they perceive as settlers which would mean a shrinking of opportunities. On the other hand, it is also the need of the Hausa and Fulani as groups to be giving a sense of belonging in Jos and accorded their full citizenship benefits as Nigerians, which would entail having equal access and right as the aborigines. This is the conflict point that interveners must find a way to go round, in addition to addressing the other need areas raised here like livelihood, shelter,

security, rebuilding the schools and ensuring access to basic education. In Toto, the Bassa wants equal traditional and political access in Toto like the Egbura. In addition to addressing the human security issues caused directly by the protracted conflict, there is need to also address the traditional stool challenge and local power tussle that heightened the tension since the 1980s and 1990s. Their fears should be addressed. Conflict cost management may not be effective in Jos and Toto, if it addresses other need areas without dealing with these.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

This chapter is an outline of the methodology employed in the investigation of the social costs of group conflicts and its management in Plateau and Nasarawa states between 1994 and 2011, using Jos and Toto as case studies. In chapter two, relevant literature was reviewed showing the causes of the conflicts and the gap necessitating this study. This chapter provided the procedure through which data was collected and processed. It is organized around four broad areas: the study areas, the sampling procedure, instruments of data collection and method of data processing.

3.1 Study Areas:

The area of study consist of Jos metropolis i.e. Jos north in Plateau state and Toto local government area of Nasarawa state. Jos north local government was carved out of the old Jos local government in 1991, with Jos town as its council headquarters. It has only one district (Gwong), and has a population of 429,300 people based on the 2006 national population census. Jos north is inhabited by many ethnic and linguistic groups. They include the autochthonous groups: Berom, Anaguta and Afizere (Jarawa). Others include the Hausa (Jasawa)—who incidentally are numerically dominant in the local government, the Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo, Tiv, groups from the south—south region of Nigeria often generically referred to as “south—south”, and other Nigerian groups. Also, according to the Jos north educational authority, there are 51 government owned public schools and 23 secondary schools in the metropolis (JNEA, 2010).

Equally, Toto local government area of Nasarawa according to the 2006 census has about 119,007 people living inside it. Its headquarter is Toto town and it is inhabited by three indigenous groups, the Bassa, Egbura and the Gbagi (Gwari), though there are pockets of other Nigerian groups like the Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba and Fulani. There are 65 public primary schools and 57 secondary schools in Toto.

3.2 Research Design

The primary purpose of any research design is to specify how data relating to any identified problem is collected and managed. Asika (2008) alludes that it is an outline or a scheme that serves as a useful guide to the researcher in his efforts to generate data for his study.

According to Ojo (1994), the research design should provide the procedural outline for the conduct of any given investigation. This study employed a case study research design and qualitative tools in data collection and analysis. A case study “is a story about something unique, special or interesting ... about individuals, organizations, processes, programs, neighborhoods, institutions and even events... the case study gives the story behind the result by capturing what happened” (Neale, Shyam and Boyce, 2006). Cases of case studies are selected because they are highly effective, representative, and typical or special thus can be used to extrapolate for larger groups. Yin (2004) corroborates this when he affirms that a case study examines in-depth a “case” within its “real life” context. There could be “exploratory”, “descriptive” or “explanatory” case studies.

This work investigated the social cost of group conflicts in north central Nigeria and its management from 1994 to 2011, using the Jos conflict in Plateau state and the Bassa/Egbura conflict in Toto, Nasarawa state as case studies. Most group conflicts in the north central zone of Nigeria are relatively similar in nature, manifestation and cost. The state’s management of the costs are the same across the zone as extant studies has shown (See Best, 2004). Thus the chosen design is appropriate. Primary data for the work were qualitatively collected using focus group discussions (FGDs) and In-depth-Interviews (IDIs), while secondary data were collected from both published and unpublished documents.

3.3 Sample Frame

Samples of a study population are taken when it is not feasible to carry out whole population studies. It is also employed to utilize limited available resources like money, time, material and manpower more efficiently (Avwokeri, 2003 and Araoye, 2004). The sample for this work was based on multistage sampling. Multistage sampling is commonly used in large scale surveys because it allows different random methods at different stages until the final sampling units are arrived at (Asika, 1991). Consequently, both purposive and cluster sampling were employed at different stages. Purposive, also known as judgmental sampling is the selection of subjects who the investigator believes are typical of the population to be studied while cluster sampling is often used to divide the population into clusters of homogenous population units such as families, classes of a school or villages. Accordingly, Asika (2008) observes that cluster sampling method can be used when the researcher recognizes that some populations are distributed in clusters or pockets of settlement and he wants to use the clusters as a basis for selection. If the sub –population represented by each

cluster is known, this can be used as a basis for proportional selection of samples such that number of subjects selected from each cluster will represent its share of the entire population. Jos metropolis and Toto local governments are ethnically divided localities which the present conflict has amplified. Thus, the ethnic groups were used as clusters.

3.3.1. Sample

Using multistage sampling technique, the study segmented the resident ethnic groups in Jos and Toto as clusters and purposively chose three to represent the other groups in the FGD. The Afizere represented the indigenous groups while the Yoruba and Igbo serving as a cluster represented the settler groups in Jos. The Bassa being the most impacted by the conflict represented the other groups in Toto. These cluster groups were then subdivided into adult male, adult female and youths for the FGD, which thus represents sufficiently the households. In all, a total of nine FGD's were conducted with the average of 10-12 persons in each session. Respondents for the IDI's were also purposively chosen based on their experience, occupational, traditional and residence status. In all, 29 IDI's were conducted. Thus, total sampled population was 122 (93 for FGD and 29 for IDI) in Jos metropolis and Toto local government area of Nasarawa.

3.4 Instrument of Data Collection

Focus Group Discussion (FGD)

A total of 9 FGD's were conducted, each made up of about 10-12 participants. The participants were selected with the aid of the head of the ethnic/cultural groups and the help of an assistant. One session of FGD were conducted for the adult males of Afizere, Igbo/Yoruba and Bassa, likewise the adult women and the youths. The composition was to reflect the target population: impacted family units.

The researcher acted as the moderator, facilitating proceedings with a prepared outline, and the help of an assistant. The outline contained the objectives of the study and other guiding questions. The FGD's, apart from complementing the data generated from the IDI acted as check and validity. Find below a table summarizing the FGD sessions.

Table 3:1

| Locations | FGDs | Males | Females | Youths |
|-------------------|---------------|--------------|----------------|---------------|
| Andafwo | 3 | 10 | 10 | 11 |
| Rock Haven | 3 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Rayfield | 3 | 10 | 10 | 12 |
| Total | 9 (93) | 30 | 30 | 33 |

Source: Field work, 2013

In-depth Interview

According to Kerlinger (1996), there are three main uses of interviews: they can be used to explore and identify variables and relations, to suggest hypothesis and to guide other phases of the research. It is also a discovery oriented method that is well suited for describing both program processes and outcomes from the perspective of the target audience or key stakeholders (Olutayo, 2014). They can be the main instrument of the research or can supplant other methods (Abraham, 2011). In fact, interviews have been described as the most potent source for collecting information on a conflict situation as other sources have problems (Albert, 2001). In this work, the in-depth interview complemented other sources.

They were mainly face to face personal interviews conducted at the home of, and convenience of the respondents who were purposively chosen considering their experience, traditional, social and residence status. Those interviewed were 6 ethnic group leaders, 2 traditional rulers, 2 market leaders, 10 secondary school principals and 9 primary school heads, who were purposively selected. In all, twenty nine in-depth interviews were conducted. The interviews were conducted with prepared open ended questions. The advantage of the in-depth interview lay in the fact that the actors/impacted freely expressed themselves once the confidence was established.

Observation: The researcher has been a participant observer in some of the peace building dialogues between the Hausa and Fulani and the Plateau Indigenous Association of Nigeria (PIDAN) organized by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) Abuja. Observations were made in the course of the interactions, contacts were established, and some of these were leveraged on in the course of the work while the duration of the field

work also afforded the researcher the opportunity for closer observation of the variables under investigation.

Documentary analysis: The necessity of employing these medium which included published books, newspapers, magazines, monographs, panels reports and the draft of the peace policy was to trace the historical development of the conflicts, its causes and dynamics and what has been done on the costs. This helped to clarify the gaps which the work sought to fill.

3.5 Method of Data Analysis: In order to answer the research questions, the data were content analyzed. Information obtained through the IDIs and FGDs were analyzed together after transcription from the tape recorder. The analyses were done by reducing the information to themes and sub headings as derived from the research objectives. The findings were presented using paraphrased accounts, diagrams where necessary and quotations from the relevant/significant discourses of the respondents.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

SOCIAL COSTS OF GROUP CONFLICTS AND THEIR MANAGEMENT IN JOS METROPOLIS AND TOTO LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA

This chapter focuses on the interpretation of data and its presentation. The presentation is in themes and sub-themes in line with the objectives of the study which was to investigate the social costs of group conflicts in Plateau and Nasarawa states of Nigeria and its management by the Nigerian state from 1994 to 2011, using the Jos conflict and the Bassa/Egbura conflict as case studies. The Jos and Toto conflicts left behind enormous social costs among the resident groups in the metropolis and Toto local government, in terms of an astronomical rise in the level of poverty owing to destruction of income infrastructure; food and social insecurity. It led to massive breach of human rights in the hands of security agents in terms of extra judicial killings, interference in domestic issues, sexual and financial exploitation, and aiding of crime. The devastations also affected basic education in terms of disruption of learning calendar, deaths, destruction of learning facilities, fostering of ethnic/religious cleavages and plummeting of academic performance. This is compounded by the lack of coordination and the clear absence of a policy direction in terms of managing conflict cost on the part of the Nigerian state.

4.1 Violent conflict and family income in Jos metropolis

Collected data correlate the dwindling household income in Jos to the destruction and intense pressure on income generating infrastructures within the metropolis consequent on the protracted violent conflicts. These include public markets, real estate, shops; shopping malls, jobs, cattle rustling and unsafe farm settlements in the outskirts of Jos. Of course, there maybe other reason aside conflict related. It must be stated that every society is dynamic and a monocausal approach should not be taken while interrogating it.

The destroyed markets: the Jos international ultra-modern market built in the 1970s at the cost of 20 million naira and commissioned in 1985, with capacity of 4,290 stalls of different sizes, a space for 300 cars, 60 trailers, and 200 buses parking simultaneously; and regarded as the mainstay of Plateau economy because it provided means of livelihood for over a million households in and around Jos (Sadiq, 2013), through direct and indirect engagement,

and was generating about 40 million naira monthly (Mohammed, Undated) in revenue for plateau state was burnt in 2002 in the course of the conflict. A section of it has been previously destroyed in the 1994 eruption. Other markets that were burnt and destroyed include the Katoko market in the 2008 crisis, the Bassa market in 2010, the automobile spare parts and vegetable markets in Farin gada in 2001, 2008 and 2011; the Gada-Biyu market in 1994, the spare parts market Dilimi in 2008, the market in Filing ball in 2008, building material market Bukuru and the Kwarafa market in 2010, the grain and yam market along Zaria Road in 2008. These markets cumulatively provided millions of Jos households with daily income and livelihood but their destructions in the successive conflicts have left the involved families stranded and impoverished. Apart from the Farin gada market that is operating at about 10% of installed capacity due to the ingenuity of some of the traders, the other aforementioned markets are completely abandoned.

In one of the FGD sessions, the researcher was handed a compendium of losses including stolen and burnt goods at the Farin gada motor spare parts market⁴. These losses which represent the means of livelihood of about 83 families and their hundreds of dependants was incurred in the market in 2010, when the market was burnt down. It was not the first or the second (as the various panels report shows) but one of what has become a recurrent decimal in the dynamics of the Jos conflict and which has continually affected the livelihood of most families.

Responses from the In-depth interviews also reinforced the position that the destruction of these markets impacted negatively on household income. A Berom elder, Mr Yohana, of Rayfield recounts:

You must understand that so many families in Jos depend on the markets for their livelihood. Jos is predominantly civil servant, farmers and traders. So whatever affects the markets naturally will affect them. Severally, the markets are being destroyed. Some of the crisis here usually starts in the market... that is why they keep destroying them. I am a retired civil servant but I have a shop and I know how that shop helps my family. (IDI/ 11th November, 2013)

Also, most participants in the focus group discussion with the Igbo/Yoruba cluster group confirmed their shops have been repeatedly destroyed as well as their goods and this has

⁴ The Volume given to me as I was told has earlier been submitted to the authorities in 2010 for compensation that never came.

affected their income and livelihood greatly. Mrs Roseline Okonkwo, one of those whose business was burnt at Katoko market in 2008 says since then her livelihood had been ruined permanently, and she and her family has been living from hand to mouth, and unless assistance comes from government or any quarter they would remain impoverished depending on handouts for daily sustenance.

Studies indicate about 970 billion naira (\$6.4 billion) worth of properties alone has been destroyed in the Jos inferno between 2005 and 2012 (ICG, 2012, Animasawun, 2012). This figure has since been countered by the “Abuja Berom”; an association of Berom indigenes living in Abuja who claimed that about 180 billion naira was actually lost within the period. As contestable as the figures might be, the fact remains that it is a massive loss with consequential implications (*Punch*, 16th July, 2012. p6). A substantial part of this money is made up of the burnt goods and shops sustaining the livelihoods of households in Jos. In the 2008 destruction of Katoko market which hitherto was one of the multipurpose and multi-ethnic markets in Jos, hosting Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba and indigenous traders (Berom, Anaguta and Afizere), who dealt in timber, second hand cars, food stuffs, building material parts and second hand clothes; the second hand car sellers alone claimed they lost about 2 billion naira to the inferno. As at 2013, the relics of hundreds of the cars burnt at the Katoko markets were still there speaking volumes of the destructive power of conflicts to community economics and livelihood. By all standards, 970 billion (ICG, 2012) or 180 billion (Berom Indigenes) is a huge loss to any community economy in Nigeria and capable of disempowering households. Perhaps, this explains why most of the affected families are still staggering to find their footing in terms of a stable living standard.

With specific reference to the 2008 Jos violent conflicts occasioned by local government election result contestation between the PDP whose support base is the indigenes and the ANPP supported by the Hausa and Fulani, one of the interviewees opined that the Yoruba for instance lost about 113 persons, in addition to an unquantifiable number of properties, and income generating assets. He lamented that the Yoruba had been in Jos since 1891, contributed in the development of the place like other groups, built the first church in Jos and have been carrying on their business in the city without dabbling into its politics, thus it is incomprehensible that their businesses would be destroyed in a conflict that clearly revolves around local politics. His lamentation is at the core of conflict issues in Nigeria, where religion, ethnicity, politics and economics are inextricably interwoven and pursued, most

times using one to achieve the other. For instance, while the Katoko and Farin gada markets went up in flames in the 2008 conflicts, there were conflict entrepreneurs who were bent on raiding shops, homes and businesses before setting them ablaze. Some of these were economically driven while respondents agree some of them were on retaliatory mission. Whichever is the case, the activities of these groups as it concerns the recurring looting and burning of markets in Jos as part of the conflict dynamics has gravely impacted on residents whose livelihood is dependent on the markets.

For these impacted participants at the focus group discussions, their losses in the markets are not only monetary. The markets to them are not just a place to sell and buy goods, they represent deeper opportunities upon which their social-economic lives have been built and centred on. For instance, the markets served as meeting points for cooperatives amongst traders, especially women traders. Some of the cooperatives engage in contributions of one thousand naira to two thousand naira daily which are redistributed in turn to members. Some traders depended on the contributions to restock their wares and attend to family needs. For some, their children often come to assist in the markets after school hours. So the markets also afforded them the opportunity for daily family bonding. This buttresses Butter's (2011) argument that markets mean much more than a given space for commerce, profit and earning a living. They define communities; they are a reflection of who are the community and what they are all about. It is a place where people are confronted with societal challenges, where social networks intermingle and where communication and identity play important roles in creating a feeling of belonging.

In addition, the Jos ultra modern market at terminus prior to the 2002 inferno was generated about 40 million naira monthly for plateau state government in terms of internally generated revenue. These funds were coming from shop rents, taxes, the motor parks providing parking space for a combined capacity of 560 cars in all. After the 2002 destruction, the Terminus became a shadow of itself with skeletal activities only by the road side. A vast part of the inside became abode of chain smokers and other societal deviants. The big industries like Leventis, Unilever, UAC, NASCO that were frequenting it with their trucks to supply goods disappeared and that chain of income ended for them. Government lost all the revenue it was making from it, in addition to those coming from other destroyed markets. A state government that losses an average of 40 million naira out of its internally generated revenue monthly would definitely feel it. Perhaps, this helps to explain why Plateau state in the years

after had struggled with payment of workers salary (Abubakar, Undated). Recall also that governor Jonah Jang had been quoted in an interview with the *DailyTrust* (12th November, 2010), admitting that the financial position of the state had weakened owing to the protracted conflicts and developments around it. More importantly, the displaced households that depended on these markets are contending with different dimensions and faces of poverty. In the group discussions, many claimed paying school fees have become a challenge. Some children have had to drop out of school to hawk on the road to help the sustenance of the family. Some families switched to farming and relocated to the village but had to rescind their decision because farming is also challenged all over Plateau state due to conflicts. In an FGD discussion with ethnic group women in Jos to understand the impact of the recurrent destructions of the markets to them, many admitted the protracted conflicts especially as it affects the destruction and insecurity pervading their trade has undermined their capacity to provide for their families. Some of these have become bread winners having lost their husbands in the conflicts, and having also lost the opportunity to regularly provide for their families through trade. A participant in the focus group discussion noted:

Since my husband was killed in the violence I am now both the father and mother of my children and as a result it has not been easy for us to meet our family needs. As a result of these three of my children dropped out of school to help out in selling to argument our daily feeding and to meet basic needs. We have had to endure days without food in the house. Since we lost the shop in the market, we either hawk in friendly neighbourhood, put a table in front of our house and sometimes around the burnt markets. What we make daily is not enough to take care of our needs (FGD/ 19th August 2013)

The unsafe farms: as have been established by extant literature and corroborated by this study, a substantial percentage of Jos households depend on the farms in the outskirts of the metropolis for their livelihood. Studies have shown that each community around Jos metropolis has their own area of agricultural product strength. For instance, Riyom is noted for vegetable products namely cabbage, lettuce, carrots, green beans, cucumbers, peas, green peppers, acha, rice, sweet and Irish potatoes, maize and millet. Bar kin ladi, Bokkos, Jos east, Jos south, Kanem and Kanke are noted for guinea corn, groundnuts, cassava, cocoyam, cotton and sweet potatoes. These crops are produced through rain fed agricultural and irrigation farming and are supplied to the metropolis for both commercial and consumption purposes. Commercial farming is not actually done within the Jos metropolis rather it depends on the supplies from nearby towns. In the dynamics of the protracted conflicts, the farms and the farming communities have come under increasing attacks and insecurity, making it difficult

to sustain their supply to Jos metropolis. This affects both the living condition and the livelihood of households in Jos who depend on the farm produce as trading stock.

Best (2004) observed that the farming communities in the outskirts of Jos came under attacks between 2003-2004 with the clashes and disagreements between the Berom crop farmers and the herding Fulanis over the rustling of their cows and the retaliatory attacks on their settlements. However, respondents/participants pointed out that these attacks had intensified and became bloody since 2010 following the introduction of bombs (improvised explosive device, IED's) into the conflict on the Christmas eve of 2010 and the midnight raids starting from Dogo na Hauwa, a Berom farming community on March 7th. Some explained that the new frontier of the Jos conflict is the violent exchange between the Berom crop farmers and the Fulani herdsman and unfortunately, the venue of this exchange has been the farms and the farming communities, namely: Bukuru, Dogo na Hauwa, Barkin Ladi, Bokkos and Riyom. Table 3 shows some of these clashes and casualties.

Table 4:1 some documented clashes between the Fulani herdsmen and farming communities around Jos.

| DATE | INCIDENT |
|---------------|--|
| May 30, 2002 | At least 10 people died in clashes between nomadic Fulani herdsmen and local people in Bari kin Ladi parts of Plateau State. |
| June 20, 2002 | At least 30 people were killed in clashes between crop farmers and herders in Barkin Ladi local council area of Nigeria's central region Plateau State. The clashes were sparked by a dispute over grazing land in the village of Kassa. |
| July 15, 2002 | At least 12 people were killed in an outbreak of ethnic and religious violence between Fulani herders and crop farmers in Plateau State, central Nigeria. Farmers blame the attacks on Fulani herdsmen who, would have been seeking to avenge the death of one of their chiefs in the September 2001 Jos conflict The herdsmen in turn accused the indigenes of giving them ultimatums to leave the land which, for decades, had been their traditional grazing areas. |
| April 2009. | Clashes between these two groups made local authorities in Plateau state to expel 2,000 pastoralists from Plateau |
| 4/12/2010 | Seven persons killed and four others injured in a reprisal attack on a farm settlement in Kwal, the attack came barely a week after a Fulani man was killed in Gero village in Jos south |
| 12/1/2011. | Eighteen people were killed on 11 th January, 2011 in two separate villages in Jos. Five more were killed in reprisal attacks in Barkin Ladi |
| 7/7/2012 | Bloody Saturday as Fulani herdsmen kill 20, injure 25 in Plateau villages |
| 9/7/2012 | Death toll rises to 104 as suspected Fulani gunmen attacks six villages in Barkin Ladi and Riyom |
| 7/3/2010 | 483 persons killed by Fulani herdsmen in midnight raid in Dogo na Hauwa, Jos |

Source: Reproduced from Bello 2013, Odoh and Chilaka 2012, *Daily Sun*, 9th July, 2012; *Sunday Sun*, 8th July, 2012; *Leadership* 12th January, 2011; *The Nation* 4th December, 2010; *Saturday Sun* 4th December, 2010.

The result of this is that many have abandoned their farms and their communities for fear of attacks; some are discouraged to venture into the farms alone; while some had out-rightly fled from their ancestral farming lands/community and this has also impacted on their livelihood since they depend on proceeds from the farms. A respondent, Mr Peter Azi Magaji, who is also the president of the Afizere Cultural Community Development Association (ACCCA), confirmed for instance, that the Afizere as a group in the evolving Jos conflicts had abandoned their ancestral homes and farms in Dutse Uku, Tina junction, Mangu, parts of Jos east and south due to this development. According to the Afizere the economic or social cost of abandoning ones ancestral farming lands for years cannot be calculated and quantified. Many families depend substantially on the farms for upkeep while some use it to argument other sources of income. Beside the periodic and yearly plants and vegetables, there is also the issue of commercial trees like mango, cashew, orange which the group cannot calculate. The worst however, is that rival groups (Hausa and Fulani) had occupied some of the abandoned houses and use the farms for grazing. “How would you quantify the psychological feeling of unworthiness knowing you have lost your father’s inheritance? You see it every day as you drive through, you know those who now occupy it but you cannot have it because of conflict”, he queried. He further said most of the Afizere like other indigenous Jos groups now pay rents in some parts of the metropolis and often, they don’t have the money, thus showing the depth of the impoverishment.

The insecurity in and around the farms and the nearby farming communities had affected the livelihood of households in Jos negatively as can be deduced from group responses at the FGDs and interviews. The worst hit has been the various indigenous women who trade and sustain their families on these farm produce. In fact, Blench and Dendo (2003) had actually established that most indigenous women in Jos are into one form of trading in agricultural proceeds or another, supplying as far as to Abuja and beyond. A participant in the focus group discussion remarked in response to the challenge posed by the insecurity at the farming communities:

I run a big vegetable shop at Ahmadu Bello way. Some other women also have shops around too. I have customers coming from near and far places. It was a big shop and I feed my family from it and meet our needs too. Since the January 2010 conflicts, my shop has been off, burnt down. After series of borrowing to start it again and again, each time they will burn it down again. I am finding it difficult to borrow enough to start it. I have not finished paying old debts. I worry about

debts, I worry about my children and our needs. I worry about our safety, nobody knows when the next one will start, please let government help us (FGD/ 19th August 2013)

The loss of real estate: there are households in Jos whose income or livelihood is dependent on earnings from the real estate market in the city, but who has had to endure punctuations in their income and livelihoods as a result of the dynamics of the Jos conflict in the metropolis. Most of these had lived long in Jos, acquired land and built houses. Many are retired from active service and depend solely on what their tenants pay either monthly or annually. With this, they are able to take care of themselves and ensure the daily sustenance of their families. Unfortunately, just as the violent conflict in Jos affected almost every strata of life, real estate property owners are not spared. Most of the buildings have been destroyed; many of the tenants killed and chased away, some, on their own volition relocated from one end of the city considered vulnerable and volatile to another end where they assume their safety is guaranteed. In fact, hardly does anyone cross these conflict induced boundaries even for business sake beyond certain hours of the day. This reality dawned on me when I was warned strictly not to visit certain places beyond 5pm in the evening because no one would guarantee my safety. Many of my respondents also confirmed this. These intra-city destructions and segregated movements had indirectly left a segment of the metropolis resident impoverished and pauperised. The plateau patriots in their submission to the 2008 panel of inquiry commission also raised issues on this especially as it concerns security:

The successive conflicts in Jos have brought sharp divisions between Christians and Muslims. In fact, it has resulted in self imposed Gerrymandering of Jos city into exclusive “safe homes” for each religion. Today, Muslims in their numbers are crowded in Gangare, Angwan Rogo, Bauchi Road, Ali Kazaure, Yanshanu, Tudun wada and Dilimi. Most Yoruba Muslims are resident in fairly mixed area of Nasarawa Gwong. This has resulted in Ghetto-ization of these settlements with serious security implications for the entire city. They are sleeper cells of militant terrorists. There is therefore an urgent need for the authorities including government, security agencies, scholars, traditional rulers, conflict resolution practitioners and most importantly religious leaders to understand these phenomena and provide remedial lasting measures (Plateau patriots, JCI/J//72/2009)

Jos Metropolis has been residentially remapped along religious and ethnic lines. Corroborating this also, Gwom and Rikko (2009:3) in their work on urban violence and housing market in Jos observed:

In the last 15 years, the city (Jos) has witnessed three major communal crises which were ethnic-religious in nature, resulting in the loss of many lives and property. These crises have had profound influence on intergroup relations, attitudes and perceptions on where one lives and who one's neighbours are. They have ushered new trends in residential mobility and influenced emerging new land and housing markets in Jos. The trend is towards ethnic and religious cleavages (niches) (retribalization of the city) which exert intense pressure on land and housing markets in some areas and the abandonment of others

Even though Gwom and Rikko would argue the current process is as much the result of rapid urbanisation and population growth as it is influenced by the need for security, identity and social solidarity, the truth remains that this “residential retribalization” of Jos metropolis triggered by protracted violent conflict is negatively affecting the livelihoods of families. One of those affected is the president General of the Yoruba in Plateau state and a member of the Solomon Lar led presidential panel on the Jos conflict in 2010, Chief Toye Ogunseyi. Although, from Akure Ondo state, Chief Ogunseyi had lived in Jos for forty years, had worked and retired in Jos, owning his own properties in the metropolis like most people but in 2010, his buildings and a Mercedes car was burnt inside his compound. Responding to the loss of family income consequent on the destruction of buildings and abandonment by rent paying occupants as a result of the conflict, He said:

If you go right now into the heart of Jos... that is around Terminus. Most of the important buildings are owned by Yorubas and Igbos. In fact, the word “Terminus” was imported into Jos by a highly respected Oba in Yoruba land—the (Oshun) of Ogbomosho. He owns the Terminus hotel. Beside his hotel at Terminus, you will see other buildings on your right along Agbata area, they are owned by other Yorubas like late chief Olagbenro and chief Akunji. If you move towards Nasarawa, you will see many Yoruba and Igbo houses destroyed, bombed and abandoned. Some have managed to sell theirs; others abandoned theirs and left Jos due to the present problem. They have left Jos but they can't take the buildings (IDI/12th November 2013)

Gwom and Rikko were spot-on when they pointed out that community conflicts in Africa has indeed led to displacement and mass movement of people, exacerbating the problems of poverty, exclusion and growing mistrust, among different groups in society bringing to the fore the ethnic issues in the 21st century. Apart from the fact that conflict induced displacement and residential segregation of people leads to loss of livelihood for households, it also creates additional burden of cost for relocating families, who must put up with unbudgeted funds in order to meet up with the rising cost of buildings in their new area of

settlement. Respondents alluded to the fact that the conflict has created a situation where most buildings are destroyed leading to increase in construction activities. But construction activities also suffer from the pervading fear of another outbreak and associated uncertainties. Despite this, there is also the problem of the quality of what is offered as houses to families.

Cattle rustling: the Fulani in Jos are one of the prominent groups in the metropolis and anything that affects their livelihood affects the livelihood of a substantial percentage of the population of households in Jos. Scholars like Best (2007), Egwu (2004) and Krause (2011) has identified the Fulani in Jos as depending largely on their cattle and live stocks for income. The Fulani livestock industry in Plateau cum Jos is so big that as at 1982, there were 9 million cattle, 8 million sheep and 20 million goats at the Wase grazing reserve in Plateau state (Iro, 2003, 1982). By 2003, the figure has jumped to 15.6 million cattle, 45.26 million goats and 28.69 million sheep (Fetuga, 2000).

Unfortunately, the livelihood of the Fulani in Jos has been seriously threatened as a result of cattle rustling, which this study has identified as a bye product of the protracted Jos conflict. Respondents/participants acknowledge that cattle rustling have become a major issue in the metropolis that impacts directly on the livelihood of the Fulani as a group and indirectly on other groups. They contend that most Fulani depend solely on earnings from cow and animal breeding for their sustenance but cow rustling which seem to have become a lucrative business for the frustrated and economically disempowered youths in Jos is undermining that. One of the respondents, the Miyetti Allah Jos, Alhaji Boro Useini, said the cows were being stolen in hundreds and sadly with the active collaboration of security agents and this is impacting on the livelihood of the average Fulani in Jos. (An average cow sells for 80,000 to 100,000 thousand naira, so it is a great loss). According to him, about three hundred cows were rustled in May 2013, about three days before our discussion (The researcher could not confirm this independently). Though, he said the police recovered about two hundred. However, an overview of documented cattle rustling incidences in Jos and other northern states tends to lend credence to his claims.

Table 4.2 documented incidences of cattle rustling in plateau state and other states in the north.

| |
|--|
| 7,450 cattle rustled, 4,180 recovered in Plateau—SJTF periodic Report |
| 20 killed in plateau state over cattle theft, Fulani clashed with three villages killing 28 in June 2013 |
| Plateau community loses 430 cows to thieves in October 2014 |
| 14 killed, 230 cattle rustled in Shendam and Jos east plateau, August 2014 |
| Two herdsmen killed, 232 cows rustled in another Plateau village, October 2014 |
| 260 killed, 2,501 cattle Rustled in Jos attacks—JTF periodic report |
| Police arrest two for stealing 62 cows from Abba Moro Farm in Benue. |
| Cattle rustling: 200 soldiers deployed in Zamfara |
| Worries over cattle rustling, rape in Katsina |
| Stakeholders lament high rate of cattle rustling in Jos |
| 200 million naira worth of cows stolen from Nigeria’s vice president’s farm by armed by “soldiers” |
| Plateau state: from ethnic crises to cattle rustling |
| Food insecurity looms as cattle thieves roam free |
| Cattle rustling a major security challenge in Plateau—STF |
| Cattle rustling responsible for crises in plateau—Emir of Wase |

Source: compiled from *Punch* 24th October, 2014; *DailyTrust* 1st October, 2014; Channels TV 28th June, 2013; *African Examiner* 12th August, 2014; *Nigerian Pilot* 24th October, 2014; *Viewpoint Nigeria* 12th August, 2014; *The Nation* 30th March, 2014; *Newsrescue* 24th May, 2014; *Naijalately* 22nd September, 2014; *Leadership* 7th February, 2014, 25th April, 2014, 5th April, 2014; *Nigerian Tribune* 11th June, 2014; *Information Nigeria* 24th August, 2014; *Nigeriannorth* 23rd March, 2014.

Cattle rustling in Jos cum Plateau have become monumentally volatile that it is also affecting the fragile peace in Jos, and it appears the security operatives do not seem to have answers to it yet. According to the commander of the Special Task Force (STF) in Jos code named “Safe Haven” Major General David Enetie:

The major challenges the task force and security agencies in the state are facing in the restoration of peace remain issues of cow theft, prohibited arms in the hands of civilians as well as proliferation of army uniforms. What we are now facing are attacks and killings caused by criminals who go about stealing cows. And such criminals are heavily armed. Stealing of cows has become a very lucrative business in Plateau State. The youths have found stealing of cows as a means of survival because the major business with high income in the state is cattle breeding. So, the youths have devised ways of stealing cows. The recent attacks are reprisals following theft of cows. In several cases where the task force was able to recover the cows and return them to the owners, there will be no killing or attack. But in some cases where the stolen cows are not recovered, what followed are attacks and killings as witnessed in Shendam and Barkin Ladi few days back. Criminals use army uniforms to steal cows and commit all sorts of robberies. The puzzles we are trying to solve are: why do criminals steal cows at gun point? How do they dispose the cows after stealing them and where is the market and who are the buyers? If we can find answers to the questions above, we will be able to stop cow rustling business and when we stop cow rustling or minimize them, there will be no more killings or attacks. So to stop further bloodshed here, I call on citizens of the state to stop stealing cows; people should stop buying stolen cows from the state and people should cooperate with the task force to stop these attacks, then we would have restored permanent peace in the state. (ElotiTv, 30/3/2014)

Loss of Jobs: the protractedness of the Jos conflict and the pervading insecurity it induced impacted negatively on the fortunes of employers of labour. Some companies have left Jos; some had reduced their operations due to lull in business, drops in sales and material losses. NASCO FOODS was at the verge of relocating to Bauchi but suspended at the last minute to further watch things. ABC transport plc with many buses taken off from its office at UTC junction daily to Abuja, the south west and south east had to cut their daily operations to minimize their losses and exposure to risk. Presently, they load only one 15 seater bus (Smart Coach) to Lagos daily. The cost of this reduction in operation is a reduction in staff strength. From an average of twenty staff it now has three staff including the station manager. MTN

Nigeria closed down its head office in Rayfield and laid off about one hundred staff⁵. Some others did not close down completely but scaled down their operations to reflect the low patronage and unfavourable conflict induced business environment the metropolis has become. Many other companies like Nigeria breweries and Nestle also complained of dwindling business prospects in Jos consequent on the crisis. Many of the sole proprietorship businesses have relocated to Abuja, Nasarawa and other neighbouring states and in the process laid off their workforce. At the centre of these ugly developments are the households whose fathers, mothers, sisters and brothers have been affected in one way or another. Bottom line is that family income has been affected by the age long conflict in Jos. A participant at one of the FGD sessions and coincidentally, one of those affected by the job loss narrates her ordeal:

Initially, the conflict did not affect the company but as people started moving out of Jos, with the mass death.., destruction of our mast, our sales dropped continually. There was insecurity everywhere, nobody was sure of his life anymore. Most times people don't come to work. Revenue could not meet up overhead and other expenses. First, the salaries of the contract staff were reduced but when the conflict situation did not improve, the management had to lay off staff, closing down the office completely. Many of us presently are in the unemployment market because it was a sudden decision. As breadwinners, our individual families are also affected (FGD/ 4th October 2013)

4.2 Violent conflict and family income in Toto

As is the case in Jos, most households in Toto are farmers and civil servants. But unlike the impact of violet conflict on the livelihood of households in Jos which centred on the markets, farming communities, cattle rustling, loss of Jobs and real estate; that of Toto is a bit different. The reason is because there are no big markets or industries in Toto (Toto has only one big vegetable/food market at Ugya). Most of the Bassa's for instance, are farmers and dwells in the hinterlands of Toto, like the Gbagi, they are close to their farmlands. Few of the Bassa's who constitute the elite are civil servants and live in Toto town. The Bassa make up 70% of Toto population and are the worst hit in the violent conflict. The various ways violent conflict impacted on the livelihood of the family units include: abandonment of farms and

⁵ Recently, MTN opened a small office at HILL STATION and a customer complaint office at SECRETARIAT round about as against its big head office closed at Rayfield due to conflict. However, the over one hundred staff sacked were not recalled.

animals, destruction of farmlands and crops, usurpation of farmlands, devastation of lands by miners and displacement/dispersement.

However, the bigger problem of economic incapacitation for the Bassa households were recorded between 1997-98 when according to studies, the entire Bassa population in Toto were forced into exile due to conflict (Best, 2004). Between the year 2000 and 2001, the federal government's attempt to assist the Bassa's return to Toto was botched by the Egbura who attacked them at the primary schools where they were being quartered waiting for resettlement. A total of fifty five thousand Bassa's that heeded the plea of government to return to Toto in 2001 were dispersed back into exile without a functional means of livelihood after spending close to one year in the four refugee camps provided. Many of these sought solace in far and near places like Oyo, Kwara, Niger, Benue and Kogi (Best, 2004; Field work, 2013). Incidentally, as at 2013, some of the dispersed Bassa refugees and their children are yet to return to Toto. Those who eventually resettled back at Toto met their homes burnt, their shops and businesses destroyed especially at Ugya market where they sell their agricultural products, and sadly their farmlands sold to the grazing Fulani.

One of the Bassa returnees, Michael Ibrahim, who is 40 years of age and hails from Andafwo village, said, he and his large extended family of about 25 persons ran away in 1997 after one of their sons was hacked down in broad day light. According to him, they came back three years later but only nine persons returned. Most of their kids were left behind in the care of kiths and kin in Ganagana Niger state and Kogi state due to the pervading insecurity, but their biggest worry presently is their farmlands which is their only means of livelihoods. Their farmlands have been taken over by the Fulanis as a result of their long absence from home. And it is impacting on their livelihood being their only source of income:

You see all these farms, (pointing to a large expanse of land behind a destroyed primary school in Andafwo village: Andafwo primary school), they belong to us (referring to his large extended family). We ran away in 1997 at the peak of the conflict, on the day that one of us was killed at Umaisha on his way back from school. He was about 25 years old. They came with gun and began shooting everywhere. We ran from here leaving behind everything including our farms and crops. We followed a bush pathway, main road and bush, and for two weeks trekked to Kogi at first, begging for arms on the way including the elderly among us. We spent three years in Kogi and Niger states. Most of our children are still with relatives in Bassa Niger state, Ugya and Sabon gari Nasarawa local government. When we came back, we also discovered the Fulanis have taken over our farmlands, and have turned

it into residential and grazing places and we have nothing else to live on. (FGD/ 2nd April 2013)

The land problem at Andafwo village is symptomatic of what obtains around every village in Toto where the Bassa dispersed from. While the overt conflict with the Egbura seem to have abated, the Bassa had been saddled with another round of battle, this time over their means of livelihood with the grazing herdsmen of Fulani stock. It was reported some Egbura took advantage of the absence of the Bassa's to sell their land to the Fulani, which supposedly opened up another twist to the contending issues. The Bassa respondents at Andafwo pointed out that the land case involving them, the Fulani and the Egbura had been decided by a law court in their favour but the Fulani refused to vacate the lands. The civil authorities also appear handicapped in vacating the Fulani probably because of the volatile nature of herdsmen and crop farmer's conflict in the area.

Consequent on this failure on the part of government, the Bassa took their case against their will to the Emir of Opanda, who is the only legitimate traditional authority in Toto recognised by government. They were not optimistic of being fairly treated or obtaining justice at the judgment because the Emir is Egbura, but they appear handicapped in the case—but were determined to follow it to its conclusion. The fact that the Bassa (despite their numerical superiority in Toto) are meant to come under the headship of the Egbura traditional authority is part of the contestation that fuels the conflict in Toto.

It is also instructive to note that the Fulani herdsmen and Bassa crop farmers conflict as we have in Andafwo Toto is a reflection of the herdsmen and crop farmers violent conflict that is presently threatening peace, security and stability in the north central zone, especially the boundary communities along the Nasarawa—Benue boundary and in plateau state. Most of the groups in this axis are linked by age long conflicts over land resources and survival (IPCR, 2003). Agriculture being the main stay of their livelihood means their lives are centred on land and land resources. Most times events in one end snowballs into conflagrations in another end coupled with alignments and alliances to protect common interests (land). For instance, the Tiv and Alago conflict over land along this route is what spiralled into the Tiv-Alago/Fulani herders versus crop farmer's violent conflict in Guma stretching all the way to Doma in Nasarawa state. Some argue the Fulani were enlisted in the fight by the Alago in order to be able to defeat the Tiv and in return, part of the contested land

will be given to them⁶. As at 2013, the fighting along the Benue—Nasarawa route was the most intense and devastating as most of the communities there were deserted. It is also this theory of enlisting the support of the Fulani in order to win a war that seems prevailing in Toto. At the height of the violence with the Bassa, the Egbura was accused of importing their kith and kin in Kogi to fight for them⁷. The Bassa also admit that their lands given to the Fulani by the Egbura were to gain the support of the Fulani in the fight against them. Communities within Benue—Nasarawa are locked up in complicated land conflicts and the Fulani herdsmen are at the centre of it. The events that triggered off the 2001 Egbura attacks on the Bassa IDP's camps in Toto (Toto town, Kanyehu, Ugya and Gadabuke) happened in this zone. It was caused by the killing of an Egbura village head of Shafa Abakpa, named Baba Alhassan at Tudun Adabu, who was caught up in the Tiv crisis (Best, 2004), unfortunately due to the interconnectedness of the conflicts, it led to explosions in Toto between the Bassa and Egbura.

Conflict Marbles and the devastated lands: another conflict issue that is seriously challenging the utilisation of lands for farming and family sustenance is the mining of marble at Ugya. The marble at Ugya was discovered in the early 1990's by some resident Igbo boys who still mine it illegally, though they now pay royalty to the Emir of Opanda⁸. However, there is no access road to the marble site; there is no development around it, no environmental impact assessment, just indiscriminate excavations that are destroying farmlands including the carriage trailers that are creating routes for themselves through the farmlands. Most of the farms/lands that are being destroyed are owned by the Bassa and they are not benefitting anything from the marble mining⁹. In 1994, this was one of the issues that precipitated the annexation of Ugya by the Bassa, declaring it their Ikereku kingdom. But because Ugya is an important economic part of Toto and geographically situated at the middle of two important towns: Umaisha where the Ohimege resides and Toto town where most of his Egbura subjects live, the Egbura would not let Ugya go without fighting thus the escalation of the 1994 conflict. But the point is that the Bassa was partly protesting the loss of their means of livelihood. Sadly, the indiscriminate mining still goes on unregulated threatening the lands and the livelihood of a substantial percentage of the Toto population.

⁶ I spoke with the Tiv chief (Zaki Abur Ashile) along this route (Daudu) in the course of the fieldwork.

⁷ This is common knowledge in Toto, even some Egburas brag about it proudly.

⁸ Most respondents including those of Egbura extraction confirmed this. The Emir of Opanda acknowledged that the marble is being mined illegally by Igbo boys but did not admit he is being paid royalty and would not give me permission to visit the place even when it is common knowledge in Toto that he alone can give authorisation for anyone to visit the site.

⁹ According to the president of the BCDU


Meanwhile, while the issue of land and farmlands drag on, the Bassa households largely dependent on its outcome groans in anguish and misery because there is no ready alternative. Many are struggling to eke out decent meals per day; some cannot pay school fees and health services. Some are switching to trading but it hasn't been easy because the markets are sustained by the farm proceeds. The daring ones are taking their fate into their hands by squaring up against the Fulani over their lands. The result has been isolated skirmishes in the hinterland of Toto. An FGD participant explains:

Many of us are farmers and depend on the proceeds from the farms for our daily needs. In Toto, the Egbura control the politics until now, they control the schools, the local council work force and the traditional stool. Through it too, they are controlling the lands and the marbles on it. We are not bothered, but the miners are destroying the lands and our crops. They are sending us away from our means of food. Many of us are not educated; we don't have any other means of livelihood. How do we feed our children? How do we survive? This is why this conflict has lingered (FGD/ 2nd April 2013)

This reinforces Flores Margarita's (2004) submission that because most African households generate their own foods and depend largely on lands, any disruption in the production process affects the entire members in many ways beyond the conflict:

For many African households, a substantial part of the production of crops occurs for own consumption. Hence, the disruption of the production process or the inability to cultivate directly affects the command over food of the household members. This could be the result of direct fighting that forces household members to abandon their farm and take refuge elsewhere. The decision to leave one's farm is probably the last one a farmer wants to make because it means that (s)he will lose control over the means of production, most importantly the land of the farm, the house and the tools to cultivate. From that point onward the members of the farm household are by and large at the mercy of others. They can stay with friends or family in a nearby village, but for the same token they may end up in a refugee camp 100 miles away from their village. When they are not displaced or when fighting does not occur in their village, the production of crops may still be imperilled by the placement of land mines, the burning of crops or the destruction of plots" (Flores cited in Verwimp, 2012: x)

DIAGRAM 4.1: DIAGRAMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE NEXUS BETWEEN VIOLENT CONFLICT AND FAMILY INCOME IN JOS/TOTO



Note: The map shows how violent conflict induced variables eventually translate to the dwindling of family income.

4.3 Violent conflict, food insecurity and high cost of living in Jos

Philip Verwimp in his paper, “*Food security, violent conflict and human development: causes and consequences*” (2012), argues that the effect of violent conflict on food security can best be understood by analysing how conflict affects the command over food of the average farm household. This occurs according to him via the undermining effects of conflict on the income sources of the farm household in combination with its effect on the local food chain and the political system. By food chain, Verwimp refers to the long drawn interplay between the agricultural farms and the end users. In between this two ends are vulnerable variables like transport and markets.

With emphasis on Africa, Flores (2004) concurs that this is possible because most African economies are agricultural based and most of Africa wallows in violent conflict of different nomenclature and nature. She traces the relationship between conflict and food insecurity and submits they are so closely related and cannot be separated. Specifically, on West Africa, she said the emerging picture of food insecurity is more complex and arises from the interaction of both human and natural causes.

In Jos metropolis, the challenge on food security consequent on developments occasioned by the conflict is an obvious fact. “It has hindered businesses and economic transactions between the wholesalers and the consumers who are at the receiving end. People suffer the sudden hike due to the insufficient supply of goods and commodities in the state” (Ezekiel Dontinna, *Sunday Standard*, 7th Febuary, 2010; p10)

Unsafe farms again: the reason for this insufficient supply of goods especially agricultural goods in the state (with emphasis on Jos) is the fact that farms supplying agricultural products to Jos metropolis are situated in the outskirts of the city. Jos is noted for vegetables and agricultural products like carrot, potatoes, cucumber, garbage, apple and tomatoes but most of these are not planted commercially inside the metropolis but are supplied from neighbouring towns and local governments like Bukuru, Barikin Ladi, and Riyom as have been noted before. The interface between the various markets in the metropolis and these farms in the outskirts are the greatest guarantee of food security in the metropolis. Unfortunately, this interface has been one of the most pressured and challenged by the pervading insecurity and instability in Jos orchestrated by protracted violence.

The farms in the outskirts of Jos have become isolated killing fields where raids and rape go on simultaneously according to respondents. Many of the traders lament that their farmer customers are no longer meeting up with their orders due to violent conflicts. It must be noted that most of the outskirts around Jos and indeed most of Plateau state has been embroiled in different kinds of conflict for decades (Best, 2007). Some of these like the Berom/Fulani conflict in Bukuru, Barkin Ladi; Riyom, Bassa and Dogo na Hauwa farm villages are extensions of the larger Jos conflict. We can recall that nearby farm towns and villages like Dogo na Hauwa and others where the Berom is predominant have become battle grounds since 2003-2004. A pointer is the 7th of March night raid on Dogo na Hauwa by unknown gunmen. Since March 7th 2010 in which the farming population of Dogo na Hauwa was substantially decimated vegetable and crop supplies from Dogo na Hauwa to Jos metropolis has reduced drastically according to FGD participants. People are afraid to go to farm so that they do not get killed. The sellers especially the vegetable sellers are afraid to travel to these farms to restock. There is subtle apprehension everywhere as a respondent observed noted.

Also, in 2011, the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) in lamenting the disruption the Jos crises was imposing on businesses and life in the metropolis noted:

...the disruption in the supply chain of goods and services in and out of the state is posing a big challenge. Cost of foodstuff and other essentials have shot up because truck drivers and other transporters are shunning the state for security reasons. Petrol has also become scarce in most filling stations because tanker drivers have also stopped taking fuel to the state. Farmers, especially growers of tomatoes, cabbage and other vegetables which are at their peak production period are also groaning as a result of glut... Many of those who travel to Jos from the Eastern part of the country with trucks of plantain or oil and take back tomatoes and other vegetables are said to have stopped coming resulting in a decline in the supply chain of items they take to the state and in demand for those they take out (*The Vanguard*, 28th Febuary, 2011. P9)

Security checkpoints as cash collection centres: Apart from the heightened tensions in the farm settlements, a part of the conflict induced dislocation that is affecting price and affordability of goods especially agricultural products that are produced locally is the activities of security agents at the various road blocks mounted on the road and its effect on the actual price a consumer pays for a unit of a product. Between the metropolis and some of the farm outskirts, there is an average ten to twenty road blocks and at each of these, commercial drivers who are mostly used to ferry agricultural products are subjected to

parting with varying amounts of money daily, normally not less than two hundred naira at a check. These amounts are added back to the cost of the products and by the time a particular vehicle settles about ten check points, it would have accumulated to a significant amount capable of greatly inflating the cost of the goods. This is not peculiar to agricultural products as other goods transported from other states into Jos suffer the same fate as my respondents confirm. This was further substantiated when within a space of three months the transport fare of commercial cars from Jabi Park in Abuja to Jos doubled from seven hundred naira to about one thousand and three hundred naira. On inquiry, the transporters said this is occasioned by the multiple settlements on the road. A trader at an FGD explains further:

If I buy a bag of potatoes at two thousand naira, I would sell it between two thousand five hundred naira and three thousand naira but if I am charged an unusual transport cost as it is happening here. Let's say five hundred on top of what I have been paying from the farm to the market. I will have to add it to the goods because I sell to make a living (FGD/ 1st October 2013)

Most respondents admit that in the light of the present tenses realities, transportation to the farms outskirts of Jos has become nightmarish as only the diehards could brave it and they are few. The resultant effect is that the individual household in Jos is paying more on foods and other basic necessities because of conflict. Even though social scientists frown at mono casual interpretation of social phenomenon, some of the respondents like the Berom Community leader and the EzeIgbo Jos insist the violent conflict in Jos and developments around it are responsible for the high cost of food, especially vegetables. They insist Jos and Plateau is an agricultural community and have no reason contending with high price of agricultural commodities when it actually supplies to other states. Corroborating this, Shedrack Madilion and Gabba Abba¹⁰ of the University of Maiduguri and Nigerian Farmers Association agrees that violent conflict affects the production and distribution of food crops as people are afraid to go to farm or travel long distance to sell their agricultural products and this in turn creates inflation. They submit that consequent on their findings, the tensions in Jos and Yobe has jacked up the prices of food stuff in Abuja because Jos is the major supplier of vegetables and Potiskum Yobe is the hub of beans for Abuja residents.

¹⁰Madilion and Abba were guests on AIT's discussion program "The Money Show" on 26/6/2012

Equally, several studies especially in agrarian economies have firmly established a link between violent conflicts, food insecurity and high cost of agricultural products (Scanlan and Jenkins, 2001; UN 1993; Morello 2012; Hendrix C and Brinkman H 2013). According to the United Nations, “Violent conflict is an important factor behind severe food insecurity. Conflict often affects the ability to produce; trade and access food” (UN, 1993: x).

Cattle rustling impacting on food security: according to Bello (2013), the Fulani indisputably represent a significant component of the Nigerian economy as they constitute the major breeders of cattle, the main source of meat: the most available and cheap source of animal proteins in Nigeria. They contribute 90% of Nigeria’s livestock population which accounts for one third of agricultural GDP translating into 3.2% of the nation’s overall GDP according to Eniola (2007). Thus, the contribution of the Fulani to the local food chain and national food security cannot be ignored (Bello, Ibid). The Jos Fulani are part of this generic Fulani number whose contribution to the local food chain and food security cannot be ignored and their product is cattle.

As collected data has shown, cattle rustling have become a major social-economic issue in Jos threatening not only the livelihood of the herding Fulani communities but also impacting negatively on food security in the city. Just as the city suffers the comparative unavailability and price irregularity of locally produced agricultural products and other goods, so it suffers the comparative scarcity of beef as a result of massive cattle rustling. Respondents/participants agreed that this has happened because those who rustle cows would not dare bring them to the market for fear of being apprehended, while the breeding time of the cows does not match the rapidity with which they are stolen thus there is “beef gap” which has induced inflation. Opinions expressed in the FGD suggest the Fulani cannot sustain the provision of beef in the market when their cows are being stolen in hundreds. An earlier indication of this conflict inducing burden on Jos metropolis was noticed in 2010 when the Fulani herdsmen versus crop farming communities’ conflict gathered momentum, and as the violence raged consuming men, crops and animals, there was a visible need to source for alternative meat source apart from the Hausa and Fulanis. A report showed that even churches at a time started setting up their own abattoirs:

Not taking the matter lightly, *Sunday Sun* learnt that churches in Jos metropolis have opened their own abattoirs, trained and employed Christian butchers (4th April, 2010. p4).

Respondents observed that since the escalation of the conflicts in 2001, which led to the killing of many Fulani and their cattle, including the hundreds that were burnt, some of them had left Jos and Plateau state for other places like Bauchi, Nasarawa, Federal Capital Territory and southern Kaduna. And since then Jos had experienced the scarcity and high cost of beef. Cattle rustling is not just a major criminal problem in Jos, it is also a major problem in Plateau state and the entire North central as herds are being killed as part of the larger conflict between herders and crop farmers. In neighbouring Kaduna state, the Fulani are up in arms with locals and herds are being killed and stolen as part of the conflict. In Nasarawa state, the Fulani are up in arms with the Eggon and other groups, their herds have also come under increased persecution. In Benue, the Fulani are in a bitter conflict with the Tiv, the Idoma and other groups over farmlands. Part of the conflict casualty has been their cows. So several conflict factors are triggering the phenomenal increase in the cost of livestock products especially beef and milk.

Respondents alluded to the fact that the state should find a way to stop the ugly development because it is not only the Fulanis that are suffering it. The prevailing frightening rate of cow rustling in Jos and the north central is not only a realistic danger to food security in the zone but in Nigeria as a nation as noted by Ismail et al in their study, "*Food Insecurity Looms in Nigeria as Cattle Thieves roams free*" (2014). Invariably, cattle rustling have become a huge market in the north central and north west of Nigeria ostensibly accentuated by the various active violent conflicts in the zones that constantly fuels arms proliferation and criminality. Not only does it impinge on food security, but it also escalates the existing conflicts widening their frontiers. This is the import of Flores (2004) submission that food insecurity is a cost of conflict and can also be its cause.

4.4 Violent conflict, food insecurity and high cost of living in Toto


The food chain in Toto is also sustained by the interplay of the farms, transport and the markets, though unlike Jos, there is only one big crop and vegetable market in Toto, which is situated at Ugya; and the Bassa's constitute the majority in the market because they are the farmers.

The resulting heavy battle that followed continuously years after devastated the market, and with the pervading insecurity in the farms, coupled with the displaced Bassa's who are 99% farmers and produces the bulk of the foods in Toto thus the food security of the local government was seriously threatened. In the years after 2003, this was sustained by the lingering crop farmers and herders conflict in Toto hinterlands thus violent conflict led to food shortages and high cost of living in Toto. There cannot be food availability when access to farm lands is contested in a community that depends solely on the farms for its food supply some respondent affirmed. A Bassa participant at an FGD further corroborates:

Toto has no industry, it is not developed. It is largely an agrarian society. We produce the food we eat here in the farms. Our livelihood is dependent on what we get from the farms. Whether we are civil servants or farmers, we all eat what the farms give us. The conflict in Toto has been a big challenge to agriculture in this town and it is affecting the availability of foods. Many of the farmers cannot access their farms, some farms are in dispute with the Fulanis. The Ohimege and the local government are helping but it is slow (FGD/ 25th March 2013)

Below is a diagrammatic interpretation of the correlation between violent conflict and food insecurity in Jos and Toto:

DAIGRAM 4.2: DIAGRAMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE LINKAGE BETWEEN VIOLENT CONFLICT AND FOOD INSECURITY IN JOS AND TOTO



Note: The diagram shows how violent conflict is affecting other social and economic variables, and they in turn are jointly inducing food insecurity.

4.5 Violent conflict, violation of human rights and security of citizens in Jos

Security is the protection of life and property while human rights are the natural and constitutionally empowered rights of an individual (Olukayode, 2014). They include right to life, right to social and personal security, right to work and livelihood, right to a just and favourable remuneration, standard of living, adequate health care and well being of an individual and his family, including their food, clothing, housing and right to education (Bako 1998; Ali 2013). As has also been highlighted, these are the rights captured by the UNDP in the human security index. The Nigerian constitution empowers the Nigerian government both at the federal and state level to ensure these rights (Chapter 2 (14) b, while the government in turn uses the security agents and the entire apparatus of governance and the administration of justice to achieve it. Violent conflict, on the other hand stretches the bounds and capacities of societies making them susceptible for erosion of societal values, ethics, order and the sanctity of life. In fact, violent conflict is the major threat to human security in Nigeria.

In Jos metropolis, insecurity and human right abuses are challenges imposed by protracted violent conflicts according to my respondents and participants at the FGDs. Some of them provided verifiable evidences. The issues of insecurity and abuse of rights are not just aftermath developments of the Jos conflict; they have lasted as long as the conflict itself. Most of the respondents singled out the security agents squarely for blame as it concerns rights violation. Even though, they agree the presence of the security agents in the metropolis have brought relative peace and order, but it has also opened up a lot of cans of worms like brutalisation of citizens, interference in strictly domestic affairs, helping individual's to collect debts, sexual exploitation of girls, extortion, aiding of crimes where they have interest and taking sides in the conflict. A respondent in particular fingered the SJTF as the reason why the underground conflict in Jos has protracted. One of the respondents and an Afizere leader indicts the security agents in Jos for both gross violation of human rights and the heightened state of insecurity:

... a lot of the problem are caused by the security agents. I can... tell you that in the presence of the security agents... I have seen a situation... you see, a security agent (referring to a soldier) is not trained to investigate, a security agent is not trained to prosecute. Now you have a problem with your wife, she comes out crying. The next thing a soldier man will just come knocking for you... he will break your door and start beating you. In some many instances, they will shoot you. We have situations where soldiers have shot our boys who are playing. We have

cases where soldiers had pursued them to their homes, bring them out from their own house, parades them like armed robbers and shot them...four of them were killed in front of their papa and mama. (I asked him why they were shot). They didn't do anything. They soldiers said they heard gun shots around. When they turned it was the boys they saw. When they accosted the boys, they had no weapon. Is that not extra judicial killing? (IDI/ 12th November 2013)

To buttress this, he showed me the petition the Afizere wrote to the commandant of the Special Joint Task Force, plateau state in respect of some of the incidences of human right abuses that concern them directly. Some of the issues raised include arms training for rival groups, subletting their arms, identity cards, uniforms and actually aiding them in the dispute. The group even called for the withdrawal of the SJTF from their domain of Jos metropolis (See appendix 1). In the strong worded petition, the Afizere (Jarawa) wrote:

...We make bold to say with the foregoing evidence, that some members of the Task Force took sides to the point of coaching hoodlums, and giving out their official federal government arms to be used in maiming and killing defenceless and innocent citizens of Jasawa, District... In view of the above sir, we urge you to immediately confirm and withdraw the services of the SJTF assigned to Alhaji Mai—Kasuwa and Alhaji Suleiman Badamasi, we will not stop at anything to ensure that justice is done. In fact we would wish that you withdraw the operations of the JTF from Jos Jarawa District, considering their collaborations against the community... Furthermore, it's our humble request, in the interest of the credibility of the army, that there should be a total overhaul of the members of the SJTF posted to conflict areas like ours. This is because they have lost the confidence of the community

Human right watch (HRW) raised a similar issue in 2008, but with particular reference to the 2008 election crises where they alleged about 133 persons were killed in Jos metropolis extra judicially by members of the security forces who had been deployed to quell the sectarian violence. Excerpts from their report reads: “Police officers or soldiers gunned down residents in their homes, chased down and killed unarmed men trying to flee to safety, and lined up victims on the ground and summarily executed them... the Nigerian government owes the families of those killed an explanation about why their loved ones are long buried, while security personnel implicated in the deaths are still walking around free” (HRW, 2009:3)

In another instance, the Heipang (Berom) community equally decried the activities of the security agents especially in their locality, which they say has left them with unsavoury taste. As was the case with the Fulani and other groups, the Heipang community also rolled out

their catalogue of woes in the hands of the security agents. These include molestation, intimidation, harassment and brutal killings for which they have also reported to the authorities. Extracts from their protest letter to the authorities reads:

...It is very necessary for us to make a formal report to you to put the records straight so as to know who actually attacked and killed innocent civilians in Heipang at about 12:15am of Monday, 15th August 2011... the particular spot where the attack/killings took place is an enclosure located between the Heipang railway roundabout and the fence of the Jos airport, a distance of about half a kilometre. Prior to the time of the attack, there was an usually large presence of soldiers at the Heipang railway roundabout with 3 Army Hilux vehicles belonging to the JTF. At about the said 12:15am gun shots were heard, the entire community was alerted, some members of our vigilante group who were already keeping the watch also made frantic efforts to go to rescue the families under attack but the routes leading to the houses under attack were blocked by the soldiers with one of their Hilux vehicles parked on the street leading to the houses under attack. However, some members of our vigilante group were able to run to the railway station which is the only possible escape route for the attackers with a view to blocking any escaping attackers. But up till day break when our members left the railway station and its surroundings, no one attacker was seen, even neighbouring settlements at Kuru, Kwi, Wereng and around the airport area were alerted, yet no sign of any escaping attackers was sighted. A member of our vigilante group (Mr Pate) who insisted on going into the houses under attack to rescue/help the victims who were being attacked was stopped and shot severally by the military men who later took his body away. We emphatically make it very clear that no invaders came to attack our community because neither the soldiers, nor members of our community and members of our vigilante group saw any attacker. It was the presence of the soldiers in uniform except two unknown armed men in plain clothes that were in the company of the soldiers at the time of the attack...after the attack, the soldiers drove their vehicles from the scene of the attack, nobody else was seen at the scene of the attack or escaping from there. However, upon entry into the scene of the attack by members of the vigilante group, four (4) identity cards of military men were found at the scene of the attack. ...we also observe with curiosity that at about 4:30am on the faithful day, all the soldiers out of guilt had packed all their personal belongings overnight and had abandoned their duty post in Heipang and around the polytechnic area... (See appendix 2)

I replicated copiously this protest letter from Heipang community because of the salient issues raised in it which is symptomatic of the grouses against the security agents in Jos. First is the issue of complicity and taking sides in the ongoing secret killings and raids in Jos. Many groups have repeatedly complained about soldiers and police men aligning with their ethnic or religious groups to protect and defend their interest in Jos (See *Sunday Standard*, 7th

February, 2010; Fieldwork, 2013). The second issue is the midnight killings that are done by people on military uniform. This seems to have emerged as the dangerous new face of terrorism and group conflict engagement in Nigeria, which the security agents seem to be handling with kid gloves. Groups like Boko Haram and herdsmen fighters have severally been implicated as wearing military uniforms in their various operations. This is creating confusion all over as communities do not know who to trust anymore. The danger is that people expose themselves unknowingly to these fake soldiers for protection, only to be maimed and killed. Recall the soldiers killed at Zaki Biam for which the community was wiped out was attacked mistakenly because the Tiv claimed they were Jukuns dressed as military men, which has become a practice in the conflict engagement. The *Sunday Standard*, a Jos based local paper lucidly captures it:

...the Nigerian Army uniforms may have allegedly found their way into the wrong hands. There is equally the great fear that the security agencies in Nigeria may have been polarized along ethnic lines. During the September 2001 and the 2008 Jos crises, it was revealed that not all who wore Nigerian Army uniforms were truly soldiers. This episode has repeated itself again in the wake of the ...attacks on Sunday, January 17, 2010 and the days that followed... the alleged possession of the Nigerian Army uniform by civilians is a frightening pointer to the level of security deterioration in the nation. This is not only an expensive development but spells danger ahead and the Nigerian Army that has always fought for the unity and security of this country will do well to probe and investigate how these uniforms found their ways out of the barracks; and appropriate measures taken to safeguard further occurrence. If Nigeria must exist as a corporate entity, our leaders must change the orientation of the Nigerian Army. There are institutions that cannot be toyed with and we cannot afford to have a security institution that takes side in the internal conflicts of her people (*Sunday Standard*, 7th February, 2010. p10).

The issue of complicity and bias has also been raised against the police severally, it would be recalled that the then police commissioner of police in plateau state, Mohammed Abubakar (retired inspector General), was indicted by the Niki Tobi judicial commission of Inquiry into the Jos crisis in 2001, on account of complicity, bias posting and transfers within the state, which the commission submitted was tilted to favour one of the interested groups in the conflict (Commissions report 2001; see also "Police transfers: A plot against plateau state" *Nigerian Standard*, 12/12/2008, p13). Equally, the Justice Aribiton Fiberesima commission of Inquiry into the 1994 crisis also indicted the plateau state deputy commissioner of police, Alhaji Hamisu Isu for dereliction of duties (Draft white paper on the report of the

commission of inquiry into the riots of 12th April, 1994 in Jos metropolis, September 2004:35)

The other is the retreating of the regular soldiers from their duty post shortly after the attacks. Several media reports have indicted Nigerian security agents deployed to maintain peace in conflict zones as always leaving their duty post before each attack. The case of Chibok, Bama, Gwoza and Jos outskirts would suffice here (*Daily Post*, 6th May, 2014 p1).

The implication is that public perception is frightened as many are asking if the military have been compromised. Perhaps the case of the Nyanya Abuja bomber, Aminu Sadiq Ogwuche, who is a corporal in the Nigerian army but a Boko Haram hit man, would help in answering the question (*National Daily*, 17th July, 2014). Finally, there were also the identity cards of the soldiers picked from the scene of the murder (please see appendix 3). This was what angered the Heipang community and they took to the streets to protests the following day, 15th August 2011.

Stefanos Foundation, a local nongovernmental organisation in Jos, who intervened in this case in 2011, even pointed out that the community chased out the security agents and burnt their camp situated in their domain due to anger¹¹.

Similarly, the Igbo community in Jos also complained about the security agents in Jos about human rights violation and handling of security. The Eze Igbo Jos and the Igbo president general confirmed the complicity of the security agents in Jos. The Eze Igbo noted that the security maintenance in Jos has been ethnicized. He lamented the attitude of selective protection that seem to be prevailing in the metropolis. According to him, his subjects have been severally killed in the presence of security agents. Though, he did not accuse the security agents of directly being involved as the Heipang community but he says they are aiding it by their inability to stop it even when it is done in their presence. According to the Igwe, he is referring to cases that happened in the presence of the security agents hence they are constitutionally mandated and equipped with tax payer's money to ensure the safety of life and property. He cited some of these cases as the 8th of January bus burning in which a fully loaded luxurious bus (Ekwo's transport company) carrying mainly (Igbo) traders from

¹¹ See "Fresh Trends of Attacks on Jos North, Riyom and Barikin-Ladi Local government areas of Plateau State". Unpublished Internal Memorandum from the Stefanos Foundation.

Jos to Bauchi was burnt at Bauchi Road Jos, the secret killings (of Igbos) at Dilimi and Gangere. He insists that these killings were done in the presence of the security agents and were not done during open conflict. The traditional ruler contends that his contention with what is happening in Jos presently is that, the surface conflict has abated consequent on the presence of the security agents but “selected group killings” still go on, and unfortunately, most times unreported or underreported.

A press release was made to this effect on the 10th of January 2011, by Engineer Richard wayes, the Igbo president general in Jos. The press release drew the attention of the defence headquarters Abuja and they sent a three man delegation to the Igwe’s palace in Jos on Monday 28th February 2011, led by Colonel Dan Kochia, on a fact finding mission. A documented narrative at the palace which was made available to the researcher reads in part:

...Colonel Daniel introduced his other colleagues as Jerry Davidson and Corp. Uzo Emerogwu. He told the cabinet members that their visit emanated from the reports received at the defense headquarters that Ibos were killed in the recent Jos crisis before soldiers. That JTF deployment were bias, soldiers were deployed more to Muslim dominated areas leaving behind Christian dominated areas leading to the killings of our kinsmen. That a luxurious bus belonging to Ekwos Transport Company was burnt and Christians killed and that Christians were killed in their houses (See appendix 4)

Further on the issue of selected protection which had emerged as a consequence of the protracted conflict in Jos, and the fragility of the peace now dependant on the “residence” of security agents, the JTF commander then Brigadier General Umoru visited the Igwe to appeal for calm and understanding while promising to address the issue (Palace report: 2011). The complicity of security agents in Jos as a factor in the pervading insecurity in the metropolis has also been noted by the International Crises group:

Police and military action... has had little success. Security forces not only fail to share intelligence among themselves, they are also suspected of taking sides in the conflict and soldiers are accused of trading guns for money (ICG, Africa Report, 17th December, 2012 p6)”

The dominant opinion expressed by the generality of respondents points to the security agents as breaching the citizen’s human right in Jos. It was not a one group thing as virtually all groups in Jos (excluding the Hausa) had complaints against the SJTF. The Miyetti Allah Jos said, they have been compromised and are fingered in most crimes in the metropolis. This is

largely consequent on the fact that there is an upsurge in the crime level in Jos since the advent of the peace keeping forces. He also indicts them because most of the robbers brandish sophisticated arms akin to those used by the security agents and in most cases; they are in military or police uniforms. He said the security agents have become “soldiers of fortune” and should be removed, even though he acknowledged the peace in Jos is still fragile and could be undermined if they are not there. He and a lot of others are handicapped as per how to deal with the situation of letting the soldiers go consequent on their alleged culpability on one hand and on the other hand managing the fragile peace that seem dependent on the soldiers. While the position of the Miyetti Allah may be perfectly correct because it seems to be the opinion of majority of people in Jos, however, in any society just emerging from protracted conflict, the likelihood of conflict entrepreneurs leveraging on the prevailing circumstances is high. Conflict entrepreneurs refer to those who are criminally minded and would latch unto any opening to carry out their trade. If a conflict situation provides an opportunity, they will not fail to explore it. They do not have to be security agents, they do not have to induce the conflict, but they can capitalize on it by sowing military uniforms, acquiring arms that are already proliferated and using it for selfish ends. Even though, there is overwhelming evidence implicating the security agents in Jos, but the possibility of conflict entrepreneurs still exists.

Insecurity and external influence

The state of insecurity in Jos occasioned by conflict is of a multidimensional nature which is also complicated by external “hit and run” mercenaries as pointed out by FGD participants and respondents. There is a consensus among them that a part of the cause of the pervading insecurity in Jos metropolis is the importation of armed men or mercenaries from other states of Nigeria, and nationals of other countries in the west African sub region, especially those who had been exposed to protracted violent conflicts, violent regime changes, arms proliferation and climatic changes that are driving herders away from the Sahel region (*DailyTrust* 29th May, 2013 P3; 31st May, 2013 P27, Zachary 2012, and Ikumola 2010). In response to the question of which group are actually doing the importing, there was divergent opinion as each of the conflict groups pointed at the other. While the Hausa pointed at the indigenous groups, the indigenous groups also pointed at the Hausa as being behind the influx of mercenary killers in Jos. The arguments adduced include: that groups bring in their kith and kin from other states to unleash mayhem on those they perceive as obstructing their interest. They also engage other nationals who either share their cultural affinity or religious

interest. These imported mercenaries breach the security and quickly breeze out of Jos to evade apprehension. By so doing, the security agents are consistently being fooled as their internal search for perpetrators of crime are mostly futile.

These positions and counter positions are compounded by some socio-geographical configurations around Jos north. For instance, the Afizere (Jarawa) has large populations in Bauchi state and there is a common boundary between Jos north and Bauchi state. That of the Hausa is very obvious from neighbouring Kaduna to Bauchi and Nasarawa. Sometimes events in any of these localities have a domino effect in neighbouring communities peopled by the same kith and kin. A pointer is the 1994 Jos conflict. It could be recalled that the Bogoro/Tafawa Balewa local governments conflict between the Sayawa and the Hausa started almost immediately Jos began to burn. The Jos conflict also helped to turn the Bassa/Egbura skirmishes in Toto into violence in 1994. The Toto conflict had been on since the colonial times but never became violent until 1994, shortly after the Jos conflict started. Nasarawa state was a part of plateau until 1996, and the peoples are connected in many ways especially in pursuance of common interest and justice.

A respondent noted:

We have the Jarawa in Jos and Bauchi, we have the Fulani in Jos, Bauchi, Wase and other local governments, the same is the Hausa in Jos, Kaduna, Bauchi... even the Tivs are here, in Nasarawa, Taraba and Benue, anytime there is crisis involving any group, their brothers will mobilise to help (IDI/ 11th November 2013)

“Mobilising to help” even illegally is part of the security challenge in Jos metropolis. In the 2008 local government elections in Jos north that triggered the outbreak in 2008, it was variously reported that groups in the conflict imported mercenary voters from outside the state to vote for them (Best, 2007). This, respondents alluded to were responsible for the insecurity. According to a local media:

Before the outbreak of the crises on the 28th of November 2008, there were a number of strange commercial motorcyclists brought into Jos city by the Hausa and Fulani. These, I believe were some of those people that had come as mercenaries from Bauchi, Kano, Kaduna and other Hausa dominated states including neighbouring countries to vote in the local government election and to execute the war” (Dung, *Nigerian Standard*, 18th March, 2009. p16)

After the elections, the insecurity that pervaded Jos since 2008 have largely been blamed on these imported mercenaries both local and foreign. For instance, in January 2009, a bus with the inscription “Okene L.G.A legislative council” and a Toyota Camry said to belong to one Alhaji Yusuf Hassan (group leader), was arrested at UTC junction with 26 armed persons inside, in addition to several shotguns, one locally made revolver pistol, six locally made shot guns with large quantity cartridges and live ammunition; police teargas, 17 knives, charms, machete, army and police uniforms and boots, with fake police identity cards (*Nigerian Standard*, 7th January 2009, p2). On investigation, it was discovered the group were mercenaries imported from Bauchi into Jos to execute a group agenda. The misleading inscription on their bus, the identity cards and uniforms were designed as a decoy to deceive the authorities (*Nigerian Standard*, 12th January, 2009). Again, in December 2008, the plateau state commissioner of police disclosed to the media the arrest of about 500 people believed to be mercenaries in police and military uniform wielding all sorts of weapons, looting items and money. They were arrested at different locations in Jos like Nasarawa Gwong, Tudun Wada, Zaria road and Farin gada and they were confirmed to be nationals of Chad and Niger (*Nigerian Standard*, 5th December, 2008, p2)

In a related incidence lending credence to the issue under discourse, there was another report of mass arrest of about 500 foreigners made up of Chadians and Nigerien nationals at Kadorko in Wase local government of plateau state. They were rounded off in different places while attacking people on 23rd and 24th of July 2002 (*Thisday*, 28th July, 2002 p4). There is no doubt that the criminal activities of these imported mercenaries have heightened the tension in Jos and the north central as a whole.

The north central zone by its strategic location and land resources have emerged as the battle ground for herders and crop farmers as earlier noted. It is also important to note that findings have shown that most of these herders are not Nigerians but are rather migrants from Niger and Chad (Plateau peace conference report 2004; Bello 2013, and Gundu 2012). Some of these migrants who came into Nigeria and live at the benevolence of their Nigerian benefactors have been fingered in most of the attacks in the north central, Jos included. In fact, there is plethora of reports indicting them in the various herdsmen/farmers conflict in the zone (*Leadership* 13th July, 2014; *Premium Times* 29th December, 2013). A report from the presidency also concurs that mercenaries have infiltrated the ranks of herdsmen in the north central thus the heightened level of clashes between them and crop farmers, and the level of

destruction often left behind (*Nigerian Newsday*, 8th October, 2010). Some studies blame this on the various wars and violent conflicts in the sub region which had made fighting mercenaries and their arms available for recruiting (*DailyTrust*, 31st May, 2013; 29th May 2013), some blame it on the desertification that seems to be shrinking cultivable lands up north and the Sahel region (Gundu: 2012). Goyit highlights it as it affects the security balance of our study area:

What started in the final years of the military era as the fall out of rebel activities in the neighbouring Chad and Niger republics has over the years taken different forms. From theft of cattle to sacking of entire villages and highway robberies, these aliens have made incursions into areas that hitherto seemed out of reach. Whether it is an ambush for passengers along the roads of premeditated assaults on communities, the fact today is that communities even on the plateau are under some form of siege. The September 7th 2001 religious uprising in Jos was what pointed the way to the plateau... propelled by blind conviction and economic reasons, foreign mercenaries are today in the valleys and hills of plateau villages and communities (Goyit, 2002, p9)

To buttress the fact that these foreign mercenaries are here and living at the instance of their Nigerian kiths is a report in which the police brandished identity cards, addresses and signed agreements linking some of the arrested foreign nationals to some community heads:

..the police commissioner ...said one of the dead mercenaries... had on his dress an identification card bearing Tanko Yaki, member Vigilante group of Nigeria (Kungiyar Yan Sintirin Nigeria), Head office, A1 Ahmadu Bello way, p. o box 949 Kaduna 062-232042. Area office GR 3 Zango Road Sabon Gari and was signed by one Alhaji Sani... Also found was an agreement for which 14,000 had been paid up front remaining a balance of 21,000 to be paid after the execution of the contract (*Sunday Standard*, 4th September, 2002, p18).

Insecurity and arms proliferation: the prevailing insecurity in Jos is sustained by what a respondent called “local arms race” among the groups in Jos. The scenario is like a vicious cycle because according to participants, it is the conflict-created state of insecurity that gave birth to the observable arms proliferation in the city, while the arms proliferation in turn fuels the conflict and insecurity. The arms challenge in Jos is of two kinds. There are those who are leveraging on the conflict conditions and the availability of arms to acquire it for economic gains. These group are made up of the mercenaries/entrepreneurs profiled earlier, the criminal elements who have systemically turned Jos into a looting field. A respondent submitted that

some of the eruptions especially those at big shopping centres and markets were actually started by these hoodlums. He said, most times they just ignite the fire, retreat to the background and rob the affected shops while everyone runs hysterically for safety. He specifically pointed at the Jos ultra modern market burnt and looted in 2002, stressing this is the reason why until today no one knows those who perpetuated the act. The second group are rather victims of the widespread insecurity, who had suffered for long but had now chosen to suffer no more by taken their fate into their hands since government effort appear not to be enough. To do this, they are taking “appropriate measures’ to protect themselves and their families. Responding to group measures taken for protection against persistent attacks, a respondent, who is also a group leader said:

I do not think there is any family or group in Jos that has not been affected in one way or another by the conflict. We have lost loved ones even when we could have helped. I will not say government is not trying. They are... but it is not enough. Do you know that there are some places you cannot go to in Jos now? Do you know there are places you can't go beyond 5pm because of insecurity? There are even markets you don't go to anyhow here? Every time there is conflict here, our people are killed, our shops are destroyed and houses are burnt even though we are not contesting anything with anybody. We have chosen not to run or put our safety in the hands of government. Every one of us, we have decided to stay, fight or die fighting like a man. Don't ask me what we have done.... because I won't tell you. Some of us are educated and we know one or two things (IDI/ 8th November 2013)

This opinion is also a reflection of the opinions of the group leaders, which could only suggest that the people had tacitly lost hope in the ability of government to provide adequate security. A respondent quipped that they have every right to protect themselves since for over a decade government has not been able to do that. Another respondent said, himself and his household have acquired protective charms and machete to protect themselves. In the course of an interview session, I was given a confidential video coverage of an intergroup meeting involving about three cooperating ethnic groups in Jos where self and group protection was discussed as a necessary response to the issue of insecurity in Jos. In the said meeting, the issue of acquiring arms for defence and funds for protection of collective interest was discussed. And this only substantiates Albert's (2012) postulation that it is lack of confidence in state officials and institutions that make people resort to self help strategies in dealing with conflict and conflict issues.

Even documented reports on the outbreaks have severally implicated the use of arms stocked at home:

...they brought out dangerous weapons from their homes and made flagrant display of them as they brandished and chanted derogatory slogans and sang war songs. Those with swords and other long knives continued to sharpen them on the tarred road. And before long they started attacking..... houses and setting them ablaze. They began it at Ali Kazaure Street and immediately proceeded to the adjoining Dalyop Pam street and burnt down almost all the houses there while attacking the helpless residents of the area. Within a twinkle of an eye, the pattern of attack became spontaneous in the state capital... (*Nigerian Standard*, 5th December, 2008, p5)

So it is a double tragic phenomenon in the city because the Jos conflict induces arms proliferation and arms proliferation on the other hand sustains the life of the conflict. This is not only evident in Jos but across the country as Nigeria grapples with perennial conflicts sustained by arms proliferation (Yellow Duke, 2013).

These are parts of the cost and cause of the pockets of internal violent conflicts tearing the country apart. For instance, the Fulani who hitherto innocently used sticks to shepherd their cattle are now violently engaging crop farming communities in bloody gun battles, heralding the negative implications of security self helps. This is very evident in the whole of the north central particularly plateau, Nasarawa and Benue. The legal Adviser of the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN) Mohammed Bello blames this on the inability of government to provide adequate security for herdsmen and their cattle. This, to him engenders self help in terms of arms acquisition:

The era when you used a stick to herd your cows and a small cutlass to cut leaves or trees for forage for your cows is begging to pass. Now there are armed bandits who are roaming around with machine guns. If you want to protect your herd, what will you do? Will you still carry your stick and follow the man? If you provide security, nobody will resort to arming himself. Nobody! (*The Dark Corner*, 21st March, 2014.)p2

Conflict and high rise of HIV/AIDs in Jos: security agents as spreading factor:

There is the problem of sexual exploitation which most participants affirm is prevalent in Jos metropolis. Unlike in Liberia and Rwanda where studies has proved security agents indulged in rape of women as part of the conflict engagement, the situation in Jos is not rape but sexual exploitation with financial inducements and protection as bait. The aggregate view did not

establish rape as the problem if strictly seen from forcefully taken advantage of women sexually. However, when a girl's economic and security vulnerabilities are exploited by those who are constitutionally empowered to protect her, then a case of moral right violation can be established. The security challenge and economic incapacitation in Jos orchestrated by conflict are obvious realities, and in such vulnerabilities according to studies (Beerli 2013; WHO 1997, UNICEF 2005, UN 2014, Patel et al 2012), most women are in danger of being exploited. The security agents who had been in Jos for decades though intermittently replaced are fingered by respondents as sexually exploiting women especially young girls (15 years and above) due to economic and social psychological reasons. A 43 year old respondent who resides at Lugard/UTC junction clarifies:

...I will not call what is happening here rape because nobody has reported of such in the town to my hearing... but the security men are sleeping with all the girls here and this is dangerous. We have so many security agents in Jos as you can see at the various check points scattered everywhere. Most of the girls have been affected by the conflict and are looking for help... these people are befriending them sometimes against the will of their families. There is a case we handled here recently where a girl was prevented from seeing a security agent and the security agent turned back and beat members of the family (IDI/ 14th April 2013)

Aggregate opinions however suggest there is rape except that victims are not speaking up due to stigmatisation. This is mostly rampant in flash point localities in Jos like Laranto/corner shagari, Gandere/Dilimu, Jenta Adamu, Kabong, Farin Gada, Tudun Wada/Mado, Bukuru—Angwan, Doki, Gyero, Gyel, Dogon Karfe/Abattoir, Hwolshel/Anglo-Jos, Angwan Rogo, Bauchi Road, Rikkos/Yashanu, Tina junction/Angwan Rukuba, Filling ball Nasarawa, Congo Russia, Angwan Damisa and Risau by Unijos, where there is heavy concentration of security agents. Since 1994, security agents have been government's readymade solution to the lingering conflict in Jos. Most of these have participated in peace keeping missions in Mali, Liberia, Sierrelone and Guinee, and have been exposed to the scourge of HIV/AIDS, which at a time became an epidemic in war torn Liberia (Adetula: 2006). According to Ekong (2006:8), epidemiologic evidences indicate world over that the military are among the most susceptible subpopulations to sexually transmitted infections (STD's) including HIV. He further asserts that in peace time, sexually-transmitted-infection rates in the military are two to five times higher than in comparable civilian populations while war time rates are astronomically higher. He surmised that:

In many African countries, the uniformed services report HIV prevalence rates higher than the national averages. In Uganda, for instance, the HIV prevalence rate of 27% among the military in 1996 was more than three times the 1999 national prevalence rate of 8.3%. Researchers in South Africa have reported prevalence rates of 60% to 70% in the armed forces, compared with 20% in the adult population. In Cameroon, Nigeria's neighbor to the east, an HIV rate of 6.2% was reported in the military compared to 2% in the general population in 1993. In Malawi, 25% to 50% of army officials are already HIV positive. Indeed, AIDS is now the leading cause of death in the military and police forces in some African countries, accounting for more than half of in-service mortality (Ekong, 2006:8)

Nigeria has about 3 million persons living with HIV/AIDS (Gobuim, 2011, PLACA 2008), which is the second highest in the world after South Africa. In a startling revelation, the United Nations rated Nigeria as having the largest number of new HIV infections among children with 60,000 new cases in 2012 alone (*Daily Trust*, 28th June, 2013 P3). Also, the Nigerian National Primary Healthcare Development Agency (NPHDA) in a related submission said at least 300,000 Nigerian's die annually from HIV/AIDS while more than 1.5 million children are orphaned yearly by the virus in the country (*Daily Trust*, 19th August, 2013, P9).

In plateau state, the prevalence level of HIV/AIDS is 7.7% as against Nigeria's national level of 4.1%. In 2008, it was 2.6, so between 2008 and 2010, plateau state witnessed an average 5.1 percentage growth in HIV/AIDS prevalence (see Table 4). In adducing reasons for this abnormal growth level, the Chief Executive Officer of the Plateau AIDS Control Agency (PLACA), saddled with screening and control of HIV/AIDs in the state, Dr Francis Magaji said protracted recurrent conflicts in plateau and the residency of soldiers on the streets of plateau is the spreading factor in plateau state. He said the disease became an issue in the state in the early 1990s which is the same time of the outbreak of the conflict in Jos, thus confirming the position of the United Nations under secretary for humanitarian affairs and emergency affairs coordinator, Valerie Amos (2014), that conflict situations involving troops and vulnerable populations promote the transmission of HIV/AIIDS, and that the military as a resident force is a high-risk population because of its demographic constitution, social norms and occupational exposure. This is further compounded by the fact that even though the United Nations which had midwived most of the external peace keeping operations where Nigerian soldiers had participated recommends that once a military personnel is infected with

HIV or other STIs, he should not be deployed for peacekeeping operations and that all countries contributing peacekeepers provide their troops with standardized guidelines and training on prevention and control of HIV and other STIs (UN, 2000); however, once deployed, healthy HIV-positive UN peacekeepers are not repatriated on account of their HIV status; though those with AIDS symptoms nonetheless are sent home (Ekong, 2006), which means by implication, a healthy carrier could serve out his posting and still be reposted to another location.

Buttressing the fact that security agents are the spreading factor in Jos and the plateau consequent on their “elongated residence” is the prevalence figures in plateau state supplied by the Plateau AIDS Control Agency (PLACA), based on empirical screening across the Seventeen local governments of the state in 2008.

Table 4:3 HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in plateau local governments

| S/N | LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREAS | NO SCREENED | NO POSITIVE (%) |
|-----|------------------------|----------------|--------------------|
| 1 | Barkin Ladi | 289 | 14 (4.84) |
| 2 | Bassa | 297 | 2 (0.68) |
| 3 | Bokkos | 300 | 6 (2.00) |
| 4 | Jos East | 282 | 3 (1.06) |
| 5 | Jos North | 280 | 45 (16.07) |
| 6 | Jos south | 305 | 8 (2.62) |
| 7 | Kanam | 316 | 10 (3.16) |
| 8 | Kanke | 300 | 10 (3.33) |
| 9 | Langtang North | 299 | 15 (5.02) |
| 10 | Langtang South | 279 | 27 (9.68) |
| 11 | Mangu | 300 | 4 (1.33) |
| 12 | Mikang | 299 | 10 (3.34) |
| 13 | Pankshin | 299 | 16 (5.35) |
| 14 | Qua'an Pan | 299 | 10 (3.34) |
| 15 | Riyom | 292 | 9 (3.08) |
| 16 | Shendam | 287 | 35 (12.20) |
| 17 | Wase | 298 | 6 (2.01) |
| | Total | 5021 | 245 (4.88) |

Source: PLACA, 2008

A total number of 280 samples were screened in Jos north local government area. Of this number, 124 (44.29%) were males while 156 (55.71%) were females. A total of 45 persons (16.07%) were HIV positive. Out of these were 42 females (26.92%) and 3 were males (2.42%), thus females had a higher prevalence rate than males in Jos (PLACA, 2008). It is also interesting to note that the age group 25-29 years had the highest prevalence rate of 21 (7.50%) and this is the sub-group under study. From table 4, it can be seen that Jos north has the highest prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS in the whole of plateau and this has been largely attributed to the activities of the resident peace keeping soldiers in Jos, who are latching onto the conflict induced vulnerabilities of the young girls in Jos. The exploitation of vulnerable girls by security agents in Jos is a malaise which participants acknowledged, and for which many local reports had consistently raised alarm over:

There cannot be any progress on the challenge we face in the state if our sisters, daughters and other relations are not warned on the danger of what they indulge in. On a daily basis what I see and observe take place near where I work is ridiculous. The traffic of young and old girls that are paraded is to say the least intimidating and worrisome to some of us. Confronted, they will always tell you, they have a life to live. No one denies this fact, but we cannot but begin to look at ourselves and take precaution for our future (*Sunday Standard*, 18th December, 2011, p3)

Even though the whole of plateau had experienced violent conflict but the conflict in Jos seems to have precipitated most of them, have been more intense and have had the unfortunate privilege of playing host to resident soldiers for the longest duration of time than all the local governments thus its status as the local government with the highest HIV prevalence rate can be understood.

4.5 Violent conflict, violation of human rights and security of citizens in Toto

Respondents alluded to the high rise of crime and criminality in Toto consequent on the elongated violent conflict. The variables identified as having contributed to this includes the proliferation of arms, rise of militia groups, increasing poverty level and general insecurity. **Armed Robbery**: most respondents agreed Toto is not known to violent crime prior to the conflict. They concurred the local government had its fair share of crime but violent crime was not prevalent. A respondent compares Toto before and after the conflict:

...Hardly you travel before the conflict and somebody stops you on the road. But because of the way we are now, today you talk of the highways and the rural areas. This road going to Abaji for instance has become robbers den. They will stop you and rub you...once I was a victim. ...Like last two years, they killed one of our boys on this road... all of us agreed it was armed robbery. (IDI/ 14th April 2013)

The Militia group: apart from the rise of armed robbery as part of the insecurity challenge, being an offshoot of the Toto conflict, there is also the problem of the militias that unleashed gang governance in Toto for years. The Egbura militia group with its head-quarter at Ugya called Agaba-Idu or Ozi-Idu in Egbura became the supreme authority in the local government area. This group became law unto themselves; the police became ineffective in Toto and was clearly incapable of maintaining law and order. The constituted authority in Toto was forced to dance to their tunes as the local government council and the courts were held hostage, and there was no effective state presence capable of calling them to order. Even the traditional authorities including community elders also lived under the militia.

The militia became the de facto rulers in Toto that in 2000, they attacked the four IDPs camp at Gadabuke, Kanyehu, Toto town and Ugya, where 55,000 of the returning Bassa's were being kept temporarily by the Halilu Bala Usman committee and dispersed them again thus heightening the insecurity in Toto. Incidentally, for years both the state and federal government was mute and inactive over the activities of the militia group in Toto thus indirectly encouraging their regime of terror in Toto.

The cost of elongated militarization: presently Toto, like Jos is a militarized zone with the security agents mounting road blocks everywhere. Though, unlike Jos, it appears calmer. The challenge with the militarization in Toto is the inconvenience they bring to civil and social lives by way of regimentation, extortion and the various stopping and searching. This is not peculiar to Toto and Jos alone, but seems to have become a peculiar feature on the streets and highways of the entire north central zone stretching from Jos to Lafia, Mararaba, Nyanya, Guma, Doma, FCT and Lokoja. Insecurity seems to have redefined life and living in the entire zone. The entrance to most high rise buildings, government establishments and shopping malls inside Abuja has been cordoned and repartitioned to prevent bombings. In Toto, motorcyclists are ordered to disembark their passengers at the check points, and the various passengers are made to walk through the various security checks. To many of the

residents, this poses a constant discomfort as motorcyclists are the commonest mode of transport in Toto.

Also, unlike in Jos where human right abuse is still being reported, respondents and participants cannot remember any new case but made strong allusions to abuses between 1997 and 2003. They observed there were many extra judicial killings, illegal and unwarranted arrests, detention and extortion. Unfortunately, some of the issues are still pending as there has not been any holistic resolution.

4.6 Violent conflict and basic education in Jos

Analyses of data collected showed there were four major ways in which the violent conflict in Jos impacted on primary and secondary schools within the metropolis. These include: (1) elongated but intermittent closures, (2) displacement/relocation of teachers/students and (3) infrastructural destruction and (4) religious/ethnic polarization

On displacement and relocation of teachers and students: the aggregate opinion of sampled respondents indicates it as a prevailing challenge they have had to contend with for more than a decade now made possible by the frequent fightings and curfews. One of the respondents response sums up this reality.

Schools face a peculiar challenge because of the conflict. We have a lot of teachers and students turnover because of the fightings and destructions that this town has witnessed for years. I am barely two years here ... I moved from Ali Kazaure to this St Luke's Nursery and primary school in 2010. Since I came in, I have seen plenty students and teachers come and go as a result of the conflict. Those who are Moslems moved to the moslem dominated areas and the Christians moved to schools in Christian dominated areas. Some even left the local government and the state, at a time we didn't have up to five pupils in one class and we merged classes (IDI/12th March 2013)

Another respondent alluded that at a time, her school did not have enough teachers to cover all subject areas and the local government education authority was not forth coming with new postings in response to constant memos to that effect, perhaps because none was available considering the situation on ground, so the school resorted to using none core specialised teachers to teach. For instance, a mathematics teacher could be asked to teach English vice versa. Even though it had served its purpose then, but using a none core subject teacher to teach secondary school children, who were still in their formative age is an aberration that

would only be felt later by both the individuals and the society at large. This may also be part of the explanation why for three years consecutively now, Nigeria's performance at WAEC May/June examination has been on a steady decline. In 2012, failure rate for English and Mathematics across Nigeria was 61.19%; in 2013, it jumped to 63.43%; and in 2014, it further jumped to 68.72%. (*Vanguard*, 11th August, 2014). Many reasons have been adduced for this ranging from inadequate funding, non commitment of teachers and lack of reading culture, but it would also help if researches can look towards the various pockets of violent conflicts in Nigeria especially as it concerns the dislocations it festers on education. For instance, some respondents claimed some public schools in Jos didn't register for the 2009 May/June WAEC examinations due to conflict. The Jos conflict also induced overcrowding in some schools because others were destroyed. Respondents noted there were times when classes were filled beyond standard capacity because pupils were coming from other towns or locations. A class of 45 students were made to take in 60 to 70 students. Thus, displacement and relocation affected and still affects the schools in Jos differently.

Religious and ethnic divisions: In addition, there is also the problem of maintaining the "community and communality" spirit among staff and students especially in schools situated in neutral places like Gadinkowa. A respondent noted that the conflict created a divisive atmosphere in the schools between Christians and Moslems:

In our school, we have Moslem students and teachers; we also have Christian students and teachers. The conflict in Jos made us not to be free with each other. There is tension in the staff room, there is tension in the classroom, there is confusion everywhere... how would it not affect... students and teachers (IDI/ 3th March 2013)

Even though the Jos conflict is not religious but religion has been employed in it to weep up sentiments, support and easy mobilisation. Thus, in its evolutionary dynamics, it has been referred to as "ethno-religious" and fought along ethnic and religious lines. In schools situated in neutral places, this became a major issue as mutual suspicion and distrust became a norm. One respondent claimed the tensions and fear of not being treated fairly made almost all Moslem teachers in her school to call for transfers. She continued that even when the authorities did not grant it, most of the teachers left on their own.

Loss of students: the various relocations, displacements and death meant cumulatively that many pupils and students were out of school due to the conflict. Most of the schools with only a few exceptions alluded to losing more than 20-30 % of their regular pupils/students in the course of the conflict, though opinions differ as per what actually led to this drop. Combinations of factors were adduced ranging from relocation to death, fear and displacement.

According to the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation Report 2013, Nigeria has the highest number of out-of-school children in the world with a mind boggling figure of 10.5 million translating to 47% globally (UNESCO, 2013). Table 5 shows Nigeria’s out of school figures compared with that of 12 other countries in the world.

Table 4:4 Statistics on global out-of-school children

| Country | Number of out of school children |
|--------------|----------------------------------|
| Nigeria | 10.5 Million |
| Pakistan | 5.1 Million |
| Ethiopia | 2.4 Million |
| India | 2.4 Million |
| Philippines | 1.5 Million |
| Ivory Coast | 1.2 Million |
| Burkina Faso | 1 Million |
| Niger | 1 Million |
| Kenya | 1 Million |
| Yemen | 0.9 Million |
| Mali | 0.8 Million |
| South Africa | 0.7 Million |

Source: United Nations Education Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 2013

In the report, UNESCO affirms that countries in sub Saharan Africa account for more than half of the global out of school children and has the highest rate cumulatively. It said 20% of African children have never attended primary school or have left school without completing primary school ostensibly because of conflict. The report further said even though, the number of out of school children globally has fallen from 60 million in 2008 to 57 million in 2011, this progress is not reflected in conflict-affected countries like Nigeria. In fact, a related

report posits that Nigeria's MDG (2) —which is supposed to address universal access and completion of primary education is seriously threatened by conflict impact on education (EAC, 2014). The EAC report also showed the global list of countries whose basic education had suffered severe violent conflict induced impediments from 1999 to 2014, and Nigeria tops the list out of 35 nations.

Taking a holistic view of these conflict induced issues threatening education in Jos, the Centre for Peace Advancement in Nigeria (CEPAN), one of the indigenous NGOs working in Jos aggregates the issues and their impact on education in Jos:

School enrolling has taken a new shift. Most parents and guardians now prefer to send their children or wards to schools located in the areas where they are either predominantly Christian or Muslim. The reason is not unconnected to the fear of security uncertainty. The children of faiths can no longer mix to socialize. The school children have been separated; and with the recurring of violent conflict in Jos and Bukuru in particular, the situation does not encourage social integration, peaceful co-existence, unity in diversity and love for one another. These school children will grow up with a mindset of hating people of other religions rather than their own. Some schools have witnessed a sharp decrease in population. Posting of teachers to schools located in certain areas gives room for unqualified teaching staff as the qualified ones can only go to areas where they feel is safe for them—christian or muslim dominated area. This is affecting the standard of education (CEPAN, 2013)

Out of the ten sampled primary and secondary schools in Jos metropolis none was structurally affected by the protracted conflicts, though, there were reports of minor destructions. It was only the Izala Islamiya primary school in Rukuba that was burnt in 1994 but as at 2013, when the field work for study was conducted, the school has been repaired. According to respondents, the school also lost two teachers in the 1994 inferno. Some schools however, complained of having a part of their wall and windows broken down but would not want their identity disclosed. Some became IDP camps during the protracted conflicts and as long as it lasted, which ran into months there were no academic activities.

4.7 Violent conflict and Basic education in Toto

As is the case in Jos, data gathered in Toto local government revealed the following: most of the primary and secondary schools in the hinterland of Toto were closed for more than two years at a time; and severally at other times; some were destroyed and burnt, some of the

fittings and aesthetics stolen. Some students and teachers were killed even at school, and all these interplayed to affect performance.

All the respondents agreed primary and secondary schools were closed completely at different times as a result of the conflict especially at the hinterlands, though they differ on the periods and the duration. While some of the schools were closed completely for upward of 2-3 years, some had their academic calendars punctuated intermittently consequent on eruptions. For instance, the government secondary school in Bassa Ukja was closed down for two years (1997 – 1999) and academic activities paralysed, while the government secondary school in Umaisha alluded to one full academic year closure (1998) . These closures were as a result of the intensity of the fightings which made it difficult for either teachers or students/pupils to come to school. And of course, the location of the eruptions also contributed.

Between 1997-2003, some of the primary and secondary schools in the hinterland of Toto were destroyed or burnt, and most had their fittings stolen and vandalised. Umaisha west primary school, Auda primary school and Andafwo village primary schools were destroyed in 1997. Incidentally, as at 2013; Andafwo primary school has not been rebuilt. Asked about the pupils of the school, a respondent said the school is in a Bassa village and when the Bassa fled, they left with their children and their returning has been spatial, and this probably explains why the authorities have not been quick to fix the schools. But other respondents pointed out that there are also other schools touched by the conflict though not destroyed but till date, government has not repaired them.

Opinions of respondents also showed that some schools were specifically attacked during conflict eruptions. Not only were the schools attacked in session, some students were actually killed though most of the respondents being government functionaries were not favourably disposed towards giving specific figures, but at Adadu government secondary school, a respondent affirmed the school lost 20 students in the conflict thus lending credence to EAC's assertion that conflict do not just destroy school infrastructure but also the lives, hopes and ambitions of a whole generation of children, through destruction and damage to schools and educational infrastructure, death or displacement of teachers and students. It cited similar instances in Rwanda where as a result of genocide, two third of teachers in primary and secondary schools were killed or displaced, and Bosnia-Herzegovina where 50% of basic

schools require reconstruction and rehabilitation as a result of the Bosnian conflict, and also in Mozambique where 58% of primary schools were destroyed or closed as a result of its long civil wars (EAC, 2013).

The cumulative effects of these social-structural dislocations translated to abandonment of studies, relocation out of Toto for pupils/students and teachers especially those of Bassa and Gbagi, forfeiture of external exams, low enrolment of pupils/students, low academic performance of students/pupils and delays. For instance, central primary school in Toto town at the nerve centre of the battle recorded 80% absenteeism of both teachers and pupils at some point in the conflict, while other schools like GSS Umaisha recorded 70% of absenteeism. Other issues encumbering basic education in Toto consequent on the conflict even in this post conflict stage includes group segregation on ethnic lines and teachers whose schools were destroyed in the hinterland still collecting salaries without any academic activity.

According to a respondent, who is also a staff of the Toto local government education authority, basic education was virtually dead during the conflict years especially between 2007 and 2003. According to Him, violent conflict set Toto 40 years back educationally and economically.

4.8 Attempts at managing the social costs of the Jos and Toto conflicts

Data were generated to know how successive governments managed the social costs of the Jos and Toto conflicts. This sub section thus examines how the different levels of government managed the social costs of conflict in the study communities as highlighted in the work from the inception of the conflicts in 1994. The presentation is done thematically in line with the second objective of the study.

How was the destroyed income infrastructures managed in Jos?

Livelihood is so crucial a part of human need and well being especially in conflict intervention. In realisation of the state's responsibility to protect this need; the Honourable Justice Aribiton Fibresima commission of inquiry into the 1994 conflicts in Jos metropolis charged government to not only own up to this responsibility but to recompense those who had become victims of this seemingly negligence on the part of the state for no fault of theirs. In page 38 of the commission's report, they told government unequivocally that:

Innocent individuals, organisations, and the general public have been deprived of their properties and means of livelihood by the unfortunate incident. The commission therefore makes the following recommendations with regard to rehabilitation and recompense:

- (a) We recommend that the Barikin Ladi hall in Jos main market (a section of the market), and all other market stalls and sheds destroyed by fire, or by physical damage by looters, should be quickly rehabilitated, so that trading activities may return to normalcy.
- (b) We further recommend that persons and organisations that suffered genuine losses be adequately compensated and rehabilitated.
- (c) We also recommend that Government should find a reasonable and compassionate manner of consoling and wiping away the tears of the families of those who lost their lives through no fault of theirs (Report of the commission of inquiry into the riots in Jos Metropolis on 12th April, 1994, p38)

Unfortunately, and as is characteristic of the gaps in Nigeria's conflict transformation architecture, these recommendations that underscore the core of human need and human security has not been adequately handled since the inception of the Jos conflicts in 1994. Successive governments both at the federal and state levels, including local councils had intervened in the management of destroyed income infrastructure but there are issues revolving round the non existence of an operational policy framework, implementation and administration. For instance, till date and in total disregard to the recommendations of the Aribiton Fiberema's commission and even subsequent commission's recommendations, none of the markets has been repaired despite the fact that they cumulatively provide sources of livelihood for millions of Jos households and a huge chunk of the state's IGR to attend to the needs of its citizenry. All the markets are in different state of disrepair as at 2013 when this field work was conducted, and the traders whose sources of income have been disrupted are all over the place with different tales of agony, pain, misery and impoverishment. The Jos main market whose Barkin Ladi section was destroyed in 1994 and was completely burnt in 2002 has not been repaired. It is in a complete state of disuse though frustrated and helpless traders mill around it and the adjacent roads trying to eke out a living. The spare parts market in Dilimi has also not been repaired, the vegetable and spare parts market in Farin Gada have not been repaired. Both Filing ball market and Kwarafa markets are completely abandoned, the same goes for the Bassa market, Katoko, Kwarafa and Bukuru.

Mr Peter Okoye is both a victim of the incessant burning of public markets in Jos metropolis as part of conflict dynamics and the inhuman neglect of successive governments to adequately attend to the social cost of the conflicts. He has been a trader at Farin gada market since 2001. His business is the only source of livelihood sustaining him, his wife and three children. In 2001 his shop was burnt down in Farin gada market and he lost everything. Government promised to assist but the assistance never came. He had to lift himself from ground zero having lost virtually everything just like so many others through borrowing from friends, associates and selling off personal properties at outrages prices. Government did not even have the compassion to repair the market so that the traders can focus on restocking their lost goods. In January 2011, his business again was hit by conflict fire and everything went down the drain throwing him into a traumatic state he is yet to fully recover from. He tells the story reminding you that so many of his co-victims have died not because of the conflict directly but because of the psychological effects like heart attacks and high blood pressure:

My shop and goods were burnt in 2011; everything I had went up in flames. This was the second time as it was also burnt in 2001. When we lost everything in 2011, we were asked to submit the list of the things we lost at Kuru. We did, both at Kuru and to the traditional ruler at New Haven. Since then, nobody has given us any assistance; not even compensation. It so affected me that I couldn't take care of my family, that I had to send my wife and children to my in laws in Abia state, where they stayed for two years. I had to go back to Anambra state to sell my father's land to be able to raise money to start my business again. But even now, the market is not repaired so we are selling our wares outside in fear. Some of the other traders have died because of the sufferings they passed through like high blood pressure and heart attack (FGD/ 23rd August, 2013)

The politics of managing the social costs of Jos conflicts is complex and complicated. Many volatile factors are implicated but at the centre of all is lack of political will on the part of the state government. This ugly mixture is also what has continued to play out as it concerns the rebuilding of these income structures. Many group opinions suggest that the state government does not like the fact that most of the stalls in the markets are owned by other groups outside of the indigenous groups thus, repairing them would mean using the state's lean resources to empower non indigenes. While this proposition may not entirely be the complete story because by composition, Jos is a cosmopolitan city. It has been variously described as a "melting pot or meeting point of Nigeria" or a "miniature Nigeria" (Egwu, 2004), hosting several of Nigerians ethnic groups, who had contributed to its development and who have

also severally suffered in its conflict, so it makes no sense discriminating against them in terms of conflict transformation. Jos conflict has never discriminated against any group as all the ethnic groups in it have suffered different degrees of loss. Besides, government would not sacrifice the hundreds of millions it ought to be making as IGR from the markets if they are rebuilt at the altar of ethnic politics. Furthermore, one of the peace building initiatives in Jos “Plateau Resolves” of 2004 in one of its recommendations asked the state government and the indigenes to henceforth stop the discrimination against other Nigerian citizens but should embrace and accord them full rights and privileges (LHR, 2012).

One of the previous governors of the state, Michael Botmang, (November 13th 2006 – April 26th 2007), made concerted efforts towards rebuilding the Jos main market between 2006 and 2007, including awarding the reconstruction contract to a firm, carrying out the ground breaking ceremony in full public glare, mobilising men and machine before his administration was sacked. But he observed the importance of the market to the livelihood and economy of Jos metropolis:

Burning down the market had brought economic activities in the state to a standstill, while it had also “seriously impoverished” the people of the state. The decision to rebuild the market was informed by our firm conviction that a solid structure of a modern market will not only increase commercial activities but empower poor people economically (*DailyTrust*, 11th October, 2009. Online version)

Writing under the caption, “Why famous Jos Terminus market won’t be rebuilt” Andrew Agbese, noted that many previous governors in plateau state had indicated interest in repairing particularly the Jos main market but had not been able to concretize their talks. He alluded to the fact that at some point a commercial bank in the state declared its interest to finance the rebuilding of the market but the Jonah Jang administration refused the offer, stressing that development had caught up with the market at the centre of Jos, with other structures competing with it for space, like the railway terminal, the UNIJOS teaching hospital and other malls resulting in serious overcrowding, heavy traffic and congestion in the area (*DailyTrust*, 11th October, 2009).

The deeper problem however, is that of a conflict transformation framework that addresses livelihood issues of conflict victims in Nigeria irrespective of the whims and caprices of the government in power. This is completely lacking and governments do not see any responsibility whatsoever towards those whose means of income has been lost. Today, Jonah Jang had left the plateau government house and governance continued but the livelihood

issues resulting from the protracted conflicts are still not addressed. This is despite the fact that some of these market stalls have been sold by government to these individuals and they pay tax to the state in view of the fact that government has a responsibility under social contract to protect the structures.

These markets at their installation provided income for millions of families in Jos and environs. With their incapacitation for years now, most family income has been punctuated. This is what has given birth to the conversion of major streets and high ways in Jos like Terminus round about, Ahmadu Bello way, Langtang streets, Rukuba road, Jama'a junction and Bauchi road to markets. The shopping malls and shops are being rebuilt by the individual owners or the new buyers but this itself has not been easy as the economy is harsh. Another respondent corroborated this by stating that since he lost his business in the successive conflicts, he has not been able to recoup because money has been difficult to come by. He said his family is solely dependent on the wife who teaches in a government primary school but unfortunately for five months now their salary has not been paid.

Even with the indifference of the Nigerian authorities to livelihood as it concerns Jos conflict, studies have shown that financial compensations are not the ideal recompense for victims of conflict or violence who had lost livelihood because most times, compensations are not anywhere near the damages nor are they able to even kick start a start up (Finan, 2002). According to Rebecca Levin (n.d), they are surrounded by issues of "equitability and just" and thus pose great challenge to any government. However, in response to this kind of challenge, the American Congress in realisation that violence and conflict has psychological, financial and legal implications; and the fact, that government has a primary responsibility to protect her citizens from these threats instituted the "Victim Compensation Fund" through an ACT of parliament to recompense the victims of the September 11th Terrorist attack in 2001. The victim compensation funds were meant for households who suffered different kinds of losses in the violent attack. Each individual household was paid an average of 1.85 million dollars compensation from the fund for economic and non economic losses. Congress declared that government has a responsibility to provide aids to communities down to state levels and to the victims directly. Consequently, victims were asked to refrain from suing any party (government agencies) potentially responsible for allowing the terrorist attacks to occur. That is to say the American state understood that under social contract it has an obligation to protect the livelihood of its citizens from destruction and failure to do that the citizens can

legally demand for their rights. Official statistics of the 2001 terrorist attacks showed 3,063 people died, approximately 4000 injured and over 7000 jobs lost. Since 2001, the victim compensation fund has become the operating template for violent destructions in America. Prior to 2001, America had the “Compensation Status” and the “Restitution Status” as policy instruments to deal with issues of recompense (*Washington Post* 18th January, 2002, P24; *New York Times* 23rd December, 2001.p9; Meye 2002; Reich 2001). Under social contract and human rights, government has a responsibility to secure and protect citizen’s life, property and livelihood. The victims of September 11 terrorist attack in America was compensated because America realised the breach in public security leading to massive death and loss of lives is consequent on government’s negligence. This is not only done because of the legal implications but because it involves people who are the fulcrum of society. Their impoverishment is *sin que non* to societal underdevelopment. This is why conflict interventions globally are now involving issues of development in designing interventions. No intervention can be said to be complete without addressing human needs.

While government have not compensated the victims of the protracted violent conflicts in Jos who lost their means of livelihood in the markets, government has on the other hand initiated some economic empowerment programmes aimed at addressing the deepening poverty associated with the Jos conflict among the households in the metropolis. In 2009, it launched a program called “Tackling Poverty Together” in which

It created direct employments for 910 youths. The breakdown of these showed that the government bought 500 tricycles (Keke NAPEP), 400 cars and 10 buses to help the restive youths in the metropolis. Within this period too, it generated direct employment for over 1000 people in the provision of public infrastructure (NSRP, n.d). While there is no doubt that this schemes had contributed towards ameliorating the poverty level of households in the metropolis, many respondents and participants said it is not enough to address the issue of livelihood as orchestrated by the protracted conflicts in Jos. Besides, the number said to have benefitted from these poverty reducing program is infinitesimal compared to the hundreds of thousands whose livelihood has been punctuated since 1994.

Equally, shortly after the 2001 conflict, the Plateau state government constituted the Relief Material Management Committee chaired by the commissioner for Women Affairs and Social Development. Between 2001 and 2010, this committee in liaison with the National Emergence Management Agency, coordinated relief emergencies among the temporary IDP

camps that littered the metropolis in terms of medical recovery, relief material distribution: food, water, beddings and medication. In 2013, the Plateau state house of assembly institutionalised it as the state emergency management agency (SEMA). Presently, it is saddled with the responsibility for emergency preparedness and response all over the state in terms of food, water, medical, care, protection against abuse and violation of rights as well as temporary shelter and basic sanitation. Respondents acknowledged the interventions of the RMMC but noted that it wasn't set up to address livelihood challenges resulting from conflicts. Its duty just like NEMA and the REDCROSS is short term emergency response especially as it concerns provision of temporary shelter, food and beddings for the displaced. They alluded to the fact that short term relief provisions and interventions do not address fundamental issues like loss of livelihood and its attendant consequences like poverty. In addition, some development agencies as noted before like the UNDP is presently working in the north central and north east to help empower economically, victims of violent conflicts. Also some individuals like Dangote made donations in 2010 to Muslim groups to help alleviate the pains of the conflict. Incidentally, none of the victims interviewed or participants at the FGDs benefitted from the UNDP empowerment program. This only lends credence to the early assertion that Nigeria's conflict transformation especially as it concerns humanitarian aid administration is frost with the challenge of lack of an operational national policy framework, which should be able to coordinate the activities of track two operators and other interventions, and reduce administrative overlaps.

As it concerns those whose buildings were destroyed and those who ran away from their buildings because of the dangerous conflict-induced geographical remapping of the metropolis, respondents admitted that the state government did not offer any kind of assistance in this regard. Most of the abandoned buildings left by Christians in Muslim dominated areas like Rikkos, Bauchi road or Angwan Rogo which has been renamed "New Zamfara" since 2001 are still standing unused. Despite the heavy presence of security agents on the streets, the religious and ethnic division of the metropolis is very strong thus Muslims rarely access houses left in Christian dominated areas like Apata and Nasarawa and vice versa. A respondent remarked about this:

Before now the Yoruba used to dominate the Nasarawa Gom area of Jos, prior to the 2001 conflicts and house burnings, today, they have moved out, with only a handful of families left there. The same with the Igbos at Apata, Bauchi road, Zaria road and Bukuru road, today, they have abandoned their houses and shops in these places. And the

Hausa-Fulani now exclusively occupy them. The Bauchi road connecting university of Jos and Terminus hotel is now a dreaded zone for non Muslims including UNIJOS students (IDI, 12th November 2013)

Aggregate opinions suggest that government should be able to address the issue of housing in the metropolis in the light of the prevailing conflict induced dislocations because keeping quit is creating its own problems. The geographical segregation in the metropolis apart from impacting heavily on the livelihood of many dependent households is also taken its toll on access to and quality of commercial activities. Many complain that their Muslim customers are now in the other side of the divide and as such can no longer have access to them.

The insecurity in the farms and the farming communities are yet to be adequately addressed. Each individual farmer or community ensures their safety in and around the farms even as the isolated killings consequent on the herdsmen crop farmers conflict go on unabated.

How was the destroyed income infrastructures managed in Toto?

The Ugya vegetable market which is the centre of commerce in Toto has been repaired and activities had picked up but the hinterland farms that ensures the steady supply of the foods are still being disputed thus the many families depending on the farms for livelihood are still groaning. Noting that farming is the chief occupation of the largest population in Toto, it suffices that family income is still under threat. Just emerging from violent conflict, and having their farms and crops damaged, respondents/participants expected that government would have intervened by way of agricultural support but this has not been the case. They agreed however, that at the return of the internally displaced Bassas in 2003, the federal government through the then vice president Atiku Abubakar made a cash donation to ensure the resettlement of the community. Apart from the fact that the money became a source of another round of conflict between the Bassa and the Egbura, who contended that their internally displaced persons should also be resettled, respondents posit that ten million naira is grossly inadequate to begin to address the monumental devastation violence inflicted on Toto in terms of accommodation and means of livelihoods. So not only did government not address the conflict induced issues in the farms and the farming communities, the problem of insecurity and tensions as it relates to the farms still lingers unaddressed. Respondents also admitted that at the height of the conflicts, government agencies came around and took inventory of what their needs were but sadly, several years after, they felt abandoned.

How has the insecurity in Jos been managed?

Group conflicts have been identified by scholars as a major source of insecurity in Nigeria (Ibrahim and Igbuzor 2002; Salawu 2010; Igbuzor 2011). As we have seen, this is also the reality in Jos. The factors contributing to the insecurity in Jos include arms proliferation, the protractedness of the conflict, pockets of other conflict around Jos, and other parts of plateau and neighbouring states like Nasarawa, Bauchi, Benue and the entire north east under Boko Haram siege.

Government's first response to the security breach in Jos was the deployment of the police to quell the riots in 1994. The 1994 Jos crisis had a build up period which helped the police to also strategise on how to approach it. As early as on the 5th of April 1994, there were palpable tensions all over Jos consequent on the appointment of Alhaji Mato as the Jos north local government council chairman against the wishes of the indigenes. At about 8.30am on the 5th, some members of the Anaguta, Berom and Afizere, numbering about 200, illegally stormed the military administrator's office to register their displeasure over the appointment of Mato as council chairman. The administrator diplomatically dismissed them advising their leaders to go home, or about their businesses lawfully, and process their grievances through the right channel. Though he warned them to avoid anything that might disturb the peace and security of the state but he did not address the issues brought before him. Many respondents had argued that this initial mishandling of the Jos case was the seed that unfortunately germinated the decades of wastages that had heralded the conflict. The protesters dispersed but later converged around Terminus market and from there advanced to the palace of the Gbong Gwon Jos where the police dispersed them again.

With the tension already in the area, there was an emergency Security Council meeting to discuss strategies to deal with the issue. According to the submission of the police to the Fiberesma commission of inquiry, police mobilisation and deployment to sensitive areas around Jos city started immediately:

On the part of the police, both uniformed and plain clothes policemen were mobilized and deployed to sensitive areas of Jos in particular. All other local Governments Divisional Police Officers (DPOs) and heads of Directorates and Departments in the metropolis were also alerted, and series of meetings with SPOs were held to discuss the issue, with particular regard to the security and maintenance of law and order in the state. Strategies were mapped out and discussed, on how to bring

the situation to order, in view of the tension and threat to security being posed by the stiff opposition of the indigenous tribes in Jos North local government council area (White paper on 1994 conflict, 2004: 29)

The test of the police preparation and strategies happened the following day, 6th of April when indigenous groups from Berom, Anaguta and Afizere numbering about hundred attempted to disrupt the swearing in ceremony of the newly appointed local government caretaker chairmen at Dadin Kowa youth centre in Jos. The police was able to quell the emerging riots at least for a while. But the insecurity increased forcing the military administrator to suspend the swearing in ceremony of the local government care taker chairmen, thus the Directors of personnel management were made to act as council heads. While this development seems to have calmed the natives the Hausa and Fulani were not impressed and began mobilising. Overtures from the government to maintain the peace did not go down well with them and on the 11th of April, they informed the police of their intention to demonstrate against the government. The police rejected the request and on the 12th around 7.30am the conflict erupted.

The first casualty was a police patrol team attempting to stop the rampaging Hausas on the 12th. The police patrol van with registration number No NPF 4753A was burnt beyond usage while the police men inside barely escaped alive. Police was well prepared and sent reinforcement who eventually confronted the demonstrators and routed them off the street by 10.30am. Thus calm returned to Jos. But this was the beginning of a long drawn battle against all manner of social deviants because shortly policemen were forced back to the road to face vandals and bandits who set markets, mosques, school buildings, and vehicles on fire at various places of the metropolis and killed innocent people. However, calm was restored by 1.30pm but a whole lot of damages have already been done. The emergence of vandals and other criminal elements in the riots and the maximum destructions they effected on public properties were to become a disturbing trend that followed the Jos conflicts for years. Many blamed this on youth bulge, others blamed it on the built up ethnic rivalries that has been boiling in Jos for decades prior to 1994.

Initially and from the surface, it would appear the police was on top of the situation but the scale of destruction in one day was an indictment of the security operatives. It was so gruesome that the Fibresma commission indicted Hamisu Isa, the state's deputy commissioner of police for dereliction of duty:

We recommend that the state's deputy commissioner of police, Alhaji Hamisu Isa, who handled the riotous situation in a shoddy manner, in spite of all warnings and information from the state security service at his disposal, should be subjected to disciplinary measures by the appropriate authority (Commission of inquiry 1994, 2004: 35)

In addition, based on the prevailing tendency of youths and conflict entrepreneurs to destroy and loot public and private properties, the commission recommended that government should take appropriate measures to safe guide these properties especially markets, "*We recommend that adequate, round the clock, police and private security be maintained at all important public buildings*" (Fibersma Commissio, 1994). Incidentally, the prescribed protection by the state never came adequately, thus the trajectory of the Jos conflict has been dotted with massive destruction of properties especially that owned by the state, public markets inclusive.

It was during the 2001 eruption which was more intense that the government officially started experimenting with a joint military police operation on the streets of Jos. The Special Task Force (STF) was an instant success in its early days in Jos, routing rioters, arresting criminals and calming down the tensed situation. This endued it to the hearts of both indigenes and settlers in the city. In fact, people were ready and enthusiastic in helping and contributing to their success. However, as things began to unfold, a lot of twists and dynamics also came into the operations of the STF, most of these borders on what some respondents refer to as the "Nigerian factor", a reference to our unethical and unprofessional gravitation towards satisfying our sectoral, religious and ethnic interests at the expense of pursuing national interest or professional ethics.

Since 2001, the role and importance of security agents in Jos conflict has been one taken with mixed feeling by the residents. In so many instances, security agents have been fingered as colluding with ethnic groups particularly Fulanis in attacking defenceless villagers. Over the years, there have been protestations against security agents. Many of these are by resident groups as have been noted here. A pointer is the three Berom villages of Dogo Na Hauwa, where over 400 people were massacred on the night of March 7th 2010. What is pathetic about the Dogo Na Hauwa killing is that different important persons in Jos including the governor and the Gbong Gwong Jos pointed out that they got advance information about the attacks, which they shared with the security agents, yet no proactive measure was put in place to forestall it (*Vanguard*, 7th March, 2010. P9). The invaders started killing in Dogo na

Hauwa by 1.30am and the security agents who since 2001 has presence in every nook and cranny of Jos, including road blocks did not show up until around 3.30am when the assailants had finished with their business and had gone. In fact, the police authorities quickly transferred the commissioner of police plateau state out of the state in the heat of this development. Also, there were calls for the removal of the GOC of the 3 Armoured Division Jos over claims and counter claims between him and governor Jonah Jang on whether he should have acted on the intelligence information the governor gave him.

This also is part of the larger security problem in Nigeria, where the governor is said to be the chief security officer of the state and by virtue of this position he receives a lot of intelligence reports which he shares with security men, unfortunately, the military and police who are supposed to enforce compliance take their orders from Abuja. The killings and the complacency of the security agents so infuriated the indigenous women that they took to the streets demonstrating against the security agents prompting federal government to replace the entire STF contingent in 2010 with 850 new soldiers (ICG, 2012).

In addition, in 2001 the Niki Tobi commission of inquiry indicted M .D Abubakar, the then commissioner for police in plateau state for wrongly handling the security issues of the conflicts:

Of all the individuals, groups and organisations who were mentioned in the various memoranda as having played one role or the other with regard to the crisis, none received more scathing comments than Alhaji M.D Abubakar, the plateau state commissioner of police at the time of the crisis. He served in that capacity from 16/7/2000 to 16/11/2001. His name was mentioned in not less than fifty percent of the memoranda submitted to the commission with varying degrees of condemnation of his role before and during the crisis. Such memoranda include Exhibits L, 16, 48, 52, 257, 470, 507, 521 and 524 among many others. The oral evidence of witness before the commission is equally replete with allegations that Alhaji M.D Abubakar was responsible in one way or the other for causing the crisis or failing to curtail its severity or extent (White paper on 2001 conflict 9th April, 2009:105)

From the 2008 conflict to the eruptions in 2010, there were cries about mercenaries being imported into Jos for conflict sake. Most of these have been fingered in the series of conflict induced crimes pervading Jos. Unfortunately, the security apparatus in Jos do not seem to have the capacity to deal with this. Beside this, crimes and all manner of criminality are

common sight on the streets: armed robbery, cattle rustling, shop and market looting and entrance of Boko Haram with improvised explosives rocking Sunday worships in the churches in the metropolis. For instance, the 28th November 2008 attack on the metropolis was premeditated, taking place in six places simultaneously by men in fake military uniforms. It was said to have started from Angwan Dalyop Pam-Osumenyi, a neighbourhood in Ali Kazaure by Hausa and Fulani youths of the slum, brandishing dangerous weapons such as cutlasses, machetes, clubs, bows, arrows and guns as the attempt to forcibly take over the election collection centre, yet the security agents could not stop them or the ensured violent all over the city where many people and properties were destroyed for days. If these were not enough indictment for the security agents then, the retaliatory attacks of Christian youths from the Tudun Wada Youth Vanguard who went about setting Muslim houses ablaze should be. Before the eyes of security agents the Katoko markets, the largest timber market in plateau state was set ablaze, the Hausa-controlled grains and yam market along Zaria road, including the hundreds of Belgium cars on sale on that road was burnt. The Ajibola Commission of January 2009 reported that about 312 people were killed and 323 sustained varying degrees of injuries. But the big question is whether this could have been prevented? Respondents agree intoto that the security agents had all the information they needed prior to the 2008 local government election which sparked it off. They also gave assurances of their preparations for any eventualities. But the end did not justify that at all. Beside the problem of complacency, the security agents were said to have extrajudicially killed about 130 people going from house to house in a bid to flush out trouble makers. This looks more like a reactive measure that has characterised the actions and activities of Nigeria's security operatives, being also the main reason why they are always using crude methodologies and jungle justice to deal with supposed suspects (*The Sun*, 5th August, 2014 online version).

Between 17th and 19th of January 2010, Jos was literally on fire on multiple points while the security agents battled to contain the violence, but the question begging for answer is what happened to intelligence reports. The tensions were there, on the streets information was rift that an attack of high proportion was imminent, rumour milling was at a crescendo that mercenaries were invading Jos for an attack, all the entrance roads into Jos has scores of heavily armed men mounting road blocks and conducting screening, but the eruptions were not stopped and it was glaring there was no proactive measure. It is obvious that it was this January attacks in the metropolis that led to the March 7th retaliatory attacks on Dogo na Hauwa and again the security arrangement was caught napping. To compound the problem,

the counter reprisals by the BAA in area like Riyom, Barkin Ladi and Jos south were also without any proactive response from the security agents. The unrestrained killings continued up till 2011 and in fact hundreds were killed within the first few months of the year (ICG, 2012).

Between August and September 2011, about 150 persons were killed. Another 50 was killed in just one week to buttress the killing spree and the ease at which security was being breached (*Thisday* 16th September, 2011). This infuriated the then president Jonathan to direct the then chief of Army staff Air vice Marshal Oluseyi Petinrin to immediately go to Jos and take charge of the security situation there (*Nigerian Tribune*, 1st September, 2011. P9). The then secretary to the government was also asked to bring forward all pending commissions reports on the Jos crises for review and necessary action. While that was still on-going, another round of killings began between Muslim youths and Christian youths in Barkin Ladi in November leading to massive deaths and again the begging question is what about the security agents roaming all over the place. The military reactively responded this time by imposing a 24 hour curfew on Jos. The chief of Army staff who by this time has started overseeing directly the activities of the 1200 men of the STF decided to beef it up by making it truly a joint paramilitary operations with men drawn from air force, mobile police force, the state security service and the Nigerian security and civil defence corps totalling about 3200 (*Vanguard*, 14th September, 2011. P10).

In addition to the STF, plateau state government in partnership with the federal government in 2010 flouted a “military-civilian-Peacebuilding” initiative called “Operation Rainbow” to tackle security challenges in the state Jos inclusive and to build peace through human security. The principal goal of Operation Rainbow has been defined as to build peace (Plateau state Task Force on Peace and Security, 2012, 7). It is headed by a retired air vice marshal. Its commitment to Peacebuilding and security has seen it recruit members from diverse groups in Plateau to work for public good. It seeks to make plateau safe in order to revive the dwindling economy. It seeks to create avenue for dialogue with and between different warring communities and act as a mediation agency and facilitators. The Operation Rainbow is geared to replacing the STF as the permanent peace time peace builder in plateau state focusing not exclusively on traditional security as have been the practice but a combination of traditional security based on armament and human security based on development, livelihood and well being. Consequently, its work is premised on four dimensions of security: political security with emphasis on the promotion of good

governance; economic and human security with emphasis on poverty alleviation and provision of livelihoods through training programs for women and youth; social security, by attempts at de-radicalising violent youths and preventing the radicalisation of the most vulnerable segments of the population; and physical security, by working with the major security agencies present in the state to control crime and build peace in the communities (Plateau state Task Force on Peace and Security, 2012, pp 9-14).

Operation Rainbow is a multi-sectoral body bringing members from the Nigeria Police Force, the State Security Service, the Road Safety, Immigration, Fire Services and the National Drug and Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA). It is involved in capacity and Peacebuilding efforts all over the seventeen LGAs of plateau state. It has plans for “stakeholders quarterly meetings” with the governor and to organise workshops on conflict monitoring, early warning and early response. It has recorded some achievements in the areas of physical and human security. In 2012, about 4,000 volunteer youth recruited from the entire 325 wards in the state were trained as neighbourhood watch operatives by OR’s team on civil defence, community protection and information gathering were deployed to their respective wards. They are also expected to provide auxiliary security watch over their communities in addition to engaging in communal security awareness. In addition, 30 youths have been trained on counter-terrorism at the international security academy in Israel.

Furthermore, Operation Rainbow has also attracted international development partners in terms of funding for its programs. Presently, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) is providing capacity building and technical assistance in the form of an SMS crowd-sourcing platform for monitoring early warning signs and encouraging rapid response, as well as computer infrastructure and training support for security agencies and civil society organisations, to ensure some synergy between the two categories of actors. This will also include ICT security training for election and vote counting monitoring systems. From all indications, the intent and purpose of Operation Rainbow in terms of security is worthy and well suited for the security challenges in Jos and plateau state but the reality on ground shows the issues are still lingering. It would appear Operation Rainbow is pursuing so many things together and needs to harmonise and re-strategise in other to make its impact felt in arresting the insecurity in Jos. None of the youth groups in the discussions admitted having witnessed a de-radicalising program by the OP. Beside, as at 2015, the UNDP was still commissioning

consultants to start addressing the livelihood issues of the victims of Jos, meaning the gap which the OP claims to be filling is still there.

According to Best (2007), the most bold attempt at dissecting the security issues in conflictised communities in Nigeria (Jos inclusive), is the formation of the national commission on security by the federal government. The main task of the commission was to investigate the security issues raised by the rising wave of communal conflicts in Nigeria and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. As is expected, the commission headed by Professor Tekena Tamuna, covered Jos, but being a general policy commission; it did not specifically set out to resolve the conflict induced insecurity in Jos and never did.

There have also been security meetings between the state government and security agents on one hand and security agents and communities on the other hand but all of this has been mere talk shows/shops that have not translated to meaningful solutions. Even though communities had formed community based vigilante groups and had recorded some successes, the challenge of insecurity in Jos is multifaceted and would not be contained by community self helps independent of a holistic government approach. It must be acknowledged as respondents alluded that sometimes, the police had made spectacular arrests and busted what would have been major disasters in the city, some of these include the arrest of a 26 man gang from Bauchi with all kinds of lethal weapons to unleash mayhem in Jos, the arrest of a young man whose parents were killed in a neighbourhood and he decided to poison the community well water (the only source of water for the neighbourhood) as a revenge, the constant arrest of hundreds of armed foreign mercenaries trying to enter Jos; however the issues fanning insecurity in Jos is way beyond what the regular police can handle. While the concept of operation rainbow should be the way to go, it needs to be properly structured having enough bite.

How has the insecurity in Toto been managed?

The boldest step towards tackling the conflict induced insecurity in Toto was the successful demobilisation and disarmament of the militia by the security agents in 2003. A lot of arms and sophisticated weapons were recovered from the group. Many of them were arrested, many surrendered on their own and many fled Toto. It could not be established if those arrested were charged to court or rehabilitated back to normal life. Beside this, there have been security meetings between the security agents and the group leaders but many

respondents do not see this as translating to any meaningful security measure against the pervading insecurity independent of resolving the conflict issues. These issues as the literature review highlighted borders on politics, ethnicity, history and land resources. Presently, there is a rotational power sharing arrangement in Toto among the three ethnic groups on all elective positions and this had greatly diffused the political tension. But there are still unresolved issues on traditional chieftdom, ethnic superiority and history, marriage, land and land resources especially the marbles at Ugya. As long as these issues remain unresolved, there would be pressure on security.

How has the effects on the schools been managed in Jos?

Respondents alluded government did not set out a policy frame work to collectively address the issues occasioned by conflict on education. Rather each school cum parent/pupil/student has been left to address its local problems. Although, the government through the ministry of education had rebuilt the damaged school structures in Jos, but there are still unresolved and emerging issues bordering on conflict induced developments. Some of these include: the high number of school children who dropped out of school due to a combination of factors ranging from parental incapacitation to shoulder the responsibilities, fear and discouragement, deformity, death of parents and guardian, hawking as a means of surviving the harsh economic realities. A respondent summed up government's indifference thus:

Nobody has intervened in any formal way in the school system as to de-radicalize the children, there is no programme whatsoever to help them overcome the setbacks, the hates planted and the low performance, everything continues as if nothing happened and nothing is happening (FGD/ 11th November 2013).

It is true that some nongovernmental organisations like CEPAN and JDPC has been organising peace talks for schools and communities but there are fears this may not be able to cover the grounds lost in the past and bridge the human capital development gap for the future.

How has the effects on the schools been managed in Toto?

Just as it is in Jos, there is no coordinated government response to address conflict induced educational issues in Toto. The schools in the towns have been repaired structurally but some in the hinterlands have not. In fact, some primary schools like Andafwo primary school was not only destroyed but abandoned. Presently, weed had overgrown what used to be the site of

the school with relics of its old structure. Some of the primary school teachers in the hinterlands whose schools are destroyed are still collecting their salaries with the active knowledge of the educational authorities in the local government. A respondent added that this is “community support” until things normalise. Furthermore, the human development issues like school dropout, stunted academic development/performance, psychological disillusionment and culture of hatred and fear have never been addressed. Some of the teachers are even disoriented and needs help as respondents alluded. Each school however is left to creatively manage its own peculiar challenges. However, there are real fears on so many of the children that are out of school due to the displacements and dislocations of the conflict as respondents alluded in their schools.

How has the food insecurity been managed?

Though there has been consistent challenge on the farms in terms of insecurity, raids and the grazing cattle wars, yet no concrete measure has been taken to address these issues that have direct bearing on food security. While security remains disturbingly porous, the state and the federal government appear to lack the political will to deal with the issue of grazing routes. The carving out of grazing routes as a government policy framework was established in the 1960's partly to cater for the availability of livestock for national use and diffuse tensions between grazing herdsmen and crop farming communities (Ilo, 1994). However, a combination of poor management, poor financing, lack of maintenance culture, bureaucracy, cultural challenges, policy abandonment and over population led to the collapse of the program (Ilo, 1994). But the threat of climatic changes in the Sahel region breeding desertification up north, coupled with the menace of Boko Haram, which had ensured a mass movement of people and herds from up north down to the north central region, triggering all manner of conflicts as it were, participants and respondents cannot recall any specific government intervention to deal with the issue of unsafe farms. They cannot remember any attempt to stabilize the price regime, especially of food items that are locally produced. The same applies to other issues threatening food production and availability like displacement of people and large scale migration from the insecure communities to a perceived one just like the Afizere, cut off from market links, destruction of farming lands as we have it in Ugya, insecurity and decreasing level of family income.

In 2009, plateau state set up the Agricultural Services and Training Centres (ASTCs) in each of the three senatorial districts as part of a 10 billion naira investment in agriculture to boost

food production in the face of serious conflict induced food insecurity. The farm centres are to increase agricultural productivity by providing diverse field services and technical training to staff and farmers, along with farm inputs such as tractors, seedling, herbicides, soil-testing equipment, harvesters, cold storage and marketing facilities. There is no doubt that the ASTC is a well thought out program but its implementation has been problematic. Apart from the bureaucracy of government institutions that has riddled its operations; it is highly restricted in operational reach because of the high level of insecurity that still reigns in many farming areas in Jos and its environs.

How has the human right abuses been managed?

Available data suggest communities have formally reported and are still reporting issues of human right abuses to the authorities. The research design of the study tilted towards groups so what is considered here are group complaints? The indigenous groups (BAA), as well as the southern groups at Jos have serious complains of police/military brutality as noted earlier. Some of these complaints have been forwarded to the police commissioner plateau state, while some have been sent to the commandant of the STJF. Some are pending in the courts dragging as sluggishly as is characteristic of the Nigerian justice system. Those who made representations at the various panels of inquiries thinking government was going to decisively and concretely tackle the enumerated issues have been soundly disappointed. Government has not been able to summon the political will to implement the recommendations of the various panels. Even the 1994 Justice Fiberisima Panel report was only released in 2010. Most of those indicted have not been successfully prosecuted by government.

Presently, the Human Rights Watch, an international nongovernmental organisation and the League for Human Rights, a Jos based nongovernmental organisation are the bodies trying through advocacy to sustain the struggle for justice for bruised and hurting people in Jos. It was only in October 2014 that the National Human Rights Commission announced it was visiting the 17 local governments in Plateau state to ascertain the human rights issues in the aftermath of the conflicts. However, with governments continued lack of interest in the human right issues, and with the wheel of justice grinding abysmally slow, respondents say those who are suffering in silence may eventually ventilate their frustration on the system.

4.9 Prospects at managing the social cost of conflict in Jos and Toto

Participants and respondents differed on the best approach to managing the social cost of the violent conflicts in Jos and Toto, but aggregate opinion suggests a collaborative but decisive effort of government, nongovernmental organisations and group leaders, but the process should be driven and coordinated by government. This is because constitutionally, government has the authority and powers to effect fundamental societal changes. Secondly, for any post conflict peace building to endure the rigors of social dynamics and time, to be able to achieve its set goals, government must institutionalize it under a policy frame work, instead of the normal bureaucratic approach, where conflict induced dislocations are either handled statutorily by the ministries or ignored as one of those things time should correct/heal. In fact, Albert (2001) argues that the time that heals conflict wounds must be filled with a lot of medicaments. Managing the social cost of violent conflict involves cost, and government having been reposed with collective resources is more suitable and capable to shoulder these costs on the long haul. Government cannot drive this process alone without the active engagement and participation of the other tracks (in line with the human security concept as popularised by UNDP), especially track two as developed by the Institute of multi-track Diplomacy (IMTD).

Income infrastructure

Data collected did not support entirely the idea of only financial compensation/donations giving to affected communities/individuals without a corresponding effort to rebuild the destroyed structures. They felt the destruction of structures of livelihood should be seen as a social problem and not that of the individual. Many of the respondents feel the rebuilding of social economic structures of income would accelerate development and stability; and this in turn would fast-track the healing process. They believed also that when these responsibilities are shouldered by government, it would make it to be committed towards the maintenance of law and order which is its primary responsibility. The example of the Jos main market that was burnt in 2002 was given. It was established that the market is the commercial hub of Jos sustaining the livelihood of over a million persons in and around Jos directly and indirectly, cutting across group cleavages; and accruing billions in revenue for government. But since its destruction, government has not been disposed towards rebuilding it because it does not have any legal obligation compelling it to do so. Ironically too, the affected residents are too tired to claw themselves back to stability without government assistance. According to the secretary of the Petty Traders Association in Jos, Suleiman Yusuf Abubakar, most of the

traders you see on the road are victims of the 2002 fire incident and do not have money to relocate even if the government allocate new sites to them because every relocation involves cost.

To the question of how government intervention should be, participants and respondents acknowledged the role of the state emergence management agencies during conflict periods in terms of distribution of relief materials like blankets, mattresses, mosquito insecticides, and food items, but noted that government should have a plan to aggregate the costs of conflicts especially as it affects the individuals livelihood and deal with it fundamentally from the root as part of its institutional intervention policy. A law should be in place compelling government to rebuild all structures of livelihood destroyed in conflict because refusing to do so is a breach on the human rights to livelihood of the involved households.

Basic Education

Many groups/respondents noted that many organisations including government agencies had met them severally to take note of the damages but had not administered any help. They observe NEMA and SEMA are not properly equipped statutorily and funding-wise to fill this gap but can be strengthened. They advocated for a conflict cost management body that would work with impacted communities on need areas. Such a body would not only repair broken down school blocks but would seek to repair broken hearts, unstable emotions and discouragement through counselling and talk shops. It would aggregate the percentage of out of school children in each locality as a result of the devastations and dislocations and take steps towards rectifying what would translate to a huge social capital deficit in the nearest future. With the corporation of the schools, government and interventionist nongovernmental bodies can track the kids who are out of school or who may have given up on school to rehabilitate them. Many of such kids are on the streets hawking to argument family income. There is a sectoral entrenched apathy towards basic education in the north, though this is not rampant in the north central but the intensity and volume of violent conflicts in the north central is disillusioning children out of school (Alubo, 2006). This study is not unmindful of bodies like NAPTIP. In operational evolution, NAPTIP seems to have channelled its attention to child trafficking but the issues threatening child education consequent on conflict are beyond trafficking.

Insecurity

In tackling the security issues, data gathered favoured a holistic out-of-the-box approach. Security is not a standalone social issue in a post conflict environment as findings in Jos and Toto has shown. In tackling it, the interventionist body should consider the underlying issues of arms proliferation, increased rate of poverty consequent on destruction of income infrastructures, the activities of recalcitrant security agents, porous borders cum unregulated influx of migrants, herdsmen and disgruntled mercenaries from Niger/Chad. The north central has emerged as the undisputed battleground of herdsmen and crop farmers conflict. It is conflicts like this that sustains the gun running in the region. In Jos and Toto, there should be total house to house disarmament as part of government intervention to halt the insecurity and the still brewing anarchy. Many subscribed to a neutral body outside of the alleged “compromised” security agents in Jos to handle this. This body should comprise of the nongovernmental agencies, group leaders and the intervening government agency.

Food security

As it involves food insecurity, the conclusions suggest that tackling the security and conflict issues between the warring groups would indirectly address this in Jos. What does tackling the conflict issue mean for the Jos Fulani? They are not involved in the indigeneity contention in Jos, all they want is justice and accommodation that protects their livelihood referring to the cows and the grazing fields. What about the Hausa? A peaceful Jos that guarantees food security must be inclusive and must be built on respect for each of the congregating groups in Jos. A further expatiation of inclusiveness would mean being accepted as indigenes of Jos north local government with all the accruing benefits. This position is diametrical to those of the indigenous groups which only leaves the resolution hanging. Many other respondents agree that whenever government both at the state and centre summons the political will to decisively address the citizenship issue without bias and hypocrisy, ethnically conflictised localities like Jos would be peaceful. That peace, they argue would cascade to the farms and the markets. In Toto, the conclusions are not farfetched, the Bassa farmers wants safe farms—which would entail a quick resolution of the lingering security challenges and the contestation with the herding Fulani. They want their own chieftdom and chief who would judge their cases and represent them before government in traditional matters. They want the status of the marble at Ugya to be defined and their lands returned to them.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary

The study investigated the social cost of group conflicts in Jos metropolis, Plateau state and Toto local government area of Nasarawa state between 1994 and 2011, with a view to unveiling not just the social costs of the protracted conflicts in the study areas but also its management and implication within the analytical context of conflict transformation. Adopting the systemic theory and the human need theory as analytical tools, and leveraging on a case study research design, the study established that group violent conflicts which seem endemic in the north central zone has a consequential social cost on the society in terms of dwindling income of households, food insecurity, social insecurity, violation of human rights and disruption of basic education, and these impacts directly on development and well being of people. This is compounded by the Nigerian state's weak attempts at addressing conflicts cost especially without a policy framework at the centre. No society develops while being lethargic to the challenges of conflict cost.

Data for the study were gathered from both primary and secondary sources through focus group discussions (FGDs), In-depth Interviews (IDIs), panel reports, submissions by groups at the panels of inquiry, published books, newspapers, journals and internal memos sourced from nongovernmental organisations and palace chronicles. These were content analyzed and the findings were as follows:

- There is a high level conflict-induced economic incapacitation of households in Jos and Toto, consequent on the persistent destruction of income generating infrastructures such as public markets (Jos ultra modern market in 1994 and 2002, Katoko market in 2008, Bassa market in 2010, Farin gada 2001, 2008 and 2010, Dilimi in 2008, Filing ball 2008, Gada Biyu 1994, Bukuru and Kwarafa in 2010 in Jos and Ugya Toto 1997 and 1998), farms in villages (Andafwo/Ugya, 1997-1998) in Toto and (Riyom, Barkin ladi, Bassa, Bukuru and Dogo na Hauwa, 2003-2011) in Jos Other conflict issues causing dwindling family income include loss of jobs and real estates.
- Field data showed that the conflict in Jos and Toto induced food insecurity through a combination of factors like the fightings at the farm communities around Jos between

Berom crop farmers and Fulani herders in Bukuru, Dogo na Hauwa, Barkin Ladi and Riyom; and in Andafwo Toto between Bassa crop farmers and Fulani herders. Other conflict factors inducing the food insecurity and high cost include the desertion of ancestral lands by groups like the Afizere who abandoned their ancestral lands in Dutse Uku, Tina Junction, Jos east and south; cattle rustling which has become endemic in Jos and plateau in general as a conflict tool of engagement and an economic survival strategy for the teeming restive and economically incapacitated youths, insecurity of lives and property in Jos and Toto gingered by the conflict induced proliferation of arms, the conversion of the various security check points that litter the roads into cash collection points by security agents, devastation of farming lands in Ugya due to illegal and unregulated mining.

- Further, the study unveiled human rights abuses as a cost of the conflicts. The right abuses noted here include extrajudicial killings, interference in strictly domestic affairs; dereliction of duty, harassment, sexual exploitation and extortion in Jos. This is in addition to a disturbing rise of insecurity in the metropolis and in Toto despite heavy militarisation of the communities lending credence to the call for the rejigging of the “traditional security” approach to the resolution of conflict issues in Nigeria.
- The work examined the impact of the conflict on basic education and discovered a direct connection between it and the alarmingly increasing rate of out-of –school children in both Jos and Toto. Other effects of conflict discovered in education includes a further fostering of ethnic/religious cleavages, destruction of learning infrastructures, interruptions in academic calendars, low performance, deaths and delays occasioned by persistent closures.

The study interrogated the Nigerian state’s approach towards containing and managing the various social costs of the conflicts and discovered that though, there were responses but they were not coordinated or systematic. At the state-level, plateau state initiated programs like Operation Rainbow which if well implemented could go a long way in not only containing the violence as is the practice in Nigeria but could as well deal with human need/security issues. The conceptual idea of Operation Rainbow is ideal as a conflict transformation apparatus but it is still young in operation and thus cannot be assessed now. However, in a defective federal system as we have in Nigeria, a state is highly limited in addressing conflict cost issues. At the federal level, institutionally, there is at present no framework to address conflict cost beside bureaucratic ministries and parastatas. The IPCR and NEMA are

constrained by capacity. Although, foreign development agencies, funders and civil society groups are having a field day each trying to lend its hand in the resolution of the issues in Jos and Toto but the lack of a state coordinating body is hampering their efforts. Thus, we have societies that are out of conflict way but still suffers the negative effects created by conflicts years after termination of surface conflict. This lacuna keeps societies permanently tensed, impoverished and backward as is observable in Jos and Toto. And as a respondent alluded, “Violent conflict took Toto 40 years backwards socially and economically”. Unfortunately, the study did not find cogent measures to bridge the 40 years gap on the part of the central government. This is in line with Albert’s (2012) observation that when conflict effects are not tackled, it could return society to conflict cycles and dynamics. The untackled effects of the Jos conflicts gave birth to the crop farmers versus Fulani herdsmen conflicts in Jos metropolis outskirts like Bukuru, Barkin Ladi, Riyom, Dogo na Hauwa and beyond. This is also the same issue in Toto as the Bassa/Egbura conflict has now snowballed into the Fulani herdsmen versus Bassa crop farmers conflict in the Toto hinterlands.

The work encouraged the Nigerian state to redefine the concept of conflict transformation from a holistic perspective, which may start with conflict termination but should not end until conflict-torn societies are returned to their pre-conflict status or at least, to a functional state. At present, what seems obtainable inferring from the study is a conflict management approach that starts from forceful termination of violent conflict using security agents and a track one and two approach to the resolution of the conflict issues and parties, oblivious of the effects and their impact on society. At most, when attempts are made, they are often weak. In essence, until social structures are restored to normalcy, until new and emerging problems are taken care of, conflict transformation is not yet functionally in place.

5.2 Conclusion

According to Albert (2001), post conflict peace building as part of conflict transformation has to do with “repairing” relationships, institutions and social facilities and putting in place schemes that can help the disputing communities to be united once again. Without these, he posits, societies would relapse into destructive conflict.

In Nigeria, the institute for peace and conflict resolution (IPCR) as the state’s peace and conflict think tank is saddled with the responsibility of mapping conflicts in the country, dissecting its causes and resolution. In the course of its work it has evolved a national peace


policy which is centred on an institutional framework to drive national peace (IPCR 2009). The national emergency management agency (NEMA) and the various states' emergency management agencies (SEMAS), intervenes in crises emergencies with relief materials to bring immediate succour to communities and individual in conflict cum crises emergencies. Unfortunately, at the cessation of hostilities, government has no structure or strategic framework to address conflict induced devastations like loss of income, insecurity, school dropout, arms proliferation, resettlement and reintegration of devastated societies, de-radicalising of those whose innocence has been compromised by a culture of violence and hatred despite the peace policy. Even the much hyped herdsmen and crop farmers conflict which has gained prominence through some of the pockets of group conflict as noted here has not received any concrete attention by way of institutional resolution or framework for management. Bottom-line is, conflicts are being resolved in Nigeria almost on a daily basis but it is not backed with corresponding healing of either the people or their ravaged social communities. Payment of compensations as is often recommended by the panels of Inquiry is not a sufficient policy to address conflict cost.

5.3 Recommendations

Subsequent on the findings herein, it has become germane to revisit the Nigerian national peace policy as proposed by the IPCR. The document suggested the setting up of a National Peace Commission (NaPCOM), to be saddled with the responsibility of designing an inclusive action plan for intervention in violent conflicts across the country.

Below is a diagrammatic representation of its functions.

Daigram 5.1: Objectives of the NPP under the proposed National Peace Commission (NaPCOM)



Source: The proposed operational template of the national peace plan as developed by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja. IPCR (2009:56)

Sadly, a closer look at the operational template of the proposed peace plan shows that conflict cost or even human rights breaches in conflict was not considered an area worthy of the state's intervention. Nevertheless, since 2009, the state is yet to implement this inadequately proposed peace plan thus still leaving a disheartening gap in the conflict transformation mix, which is to institutionally address the costs of conflicts. Consequently, the following should be considered by the Nigerian state:

- ✓ For Federal Government: The Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) may consider revising the "Peace Policy" being the operational framework for conflict intervention in Nigeria to reflect policy direction in conflict cost management and government commitment to it. So many development partners and donors are working in different directions on this but no one is coordinating and harmonising their activities.
- ✓ A national body should be considered specifically to address conflict costs country wide. In doing this, the state may look at the IPCR or NEMA with a view to strengthening any of the two for this task. The body when constituted should be able to build enough capacity to understudy comprehensively the cost of each conflict in the country, not just human lives and properties as is presently the norm. To ease its work, it should bridge the communication gap between research institutions and policy implementers because there is an existing gap between research, government and industries ("Voyage of Discovery" on NTA, 12th October, 2014). The costs of so many conflicts in Nigeria have been researched but they are abandoned in the university libraries.
- ✓ Income infrastructures as we have seen is the nucleus of family livelihood and social stability, thus the body should address it as a social developmental problem by working with the involved residents in line with the concept of human security. To this end, the state can work with commercial banks to raise non-collateralized start-up loans for them as a way of nurturing their livelihoods back.
- ✓ Other issues that should also be addressed include disarmament as a compulsory accompaniment in every post conflict peace building.
- ✓ As it concerns food security, the state presently has a lot of agricultural programs aimed at ensuring food sustenance. The farmers in Jos and Toto should as a matter of urgency and necessity be engrafted in these programs

with special considerations. This would ensure an enabling peace to allow for active unhindered farming. Secondly, the state through the intervening body can also schedule the farmers for high yield crops and mechanised farming to bridge the gap of lost ground. The intervening peace body must also through advocacy prevail on the national assembly to address the issues around the grazing reserve bill. The grazing reserve bill as it stands now seem to hold the key to both food security and a sustainable peace in communities currently embroiled in crop farmers and herders conflict. Most of these communities are in the north central and this includes Jos and Toto. The body must network and liaise with nongovernmental organisations and foreign donor agencies to be able to do all these.

- ✓ Funding is crucial in the implementation and sustainability of any post conflict peace building thus as noted in the peace policy, the state should evolve a National Peace Fund (IPCR 2009:48), with contributions from both the public and private sectors and this should be managed by the board of the intervening body.
- ✓ For the National Assembly: The 6th and 7th assembly prevaricated on the grazing bill and eventually didn't pass it until their time elapsed. Now there is an opportunity for the 8th assembly to pass the grazing bill so that the conflicts between herders and crop farmers which as we have seen is also a factor in the Jos and Toto conflicts can also subside. It is true the grazing bill as was originally conceived may be problematic in implementation but this can be amended to take care of cultural issues.
- ✓ The national assemble should also as a matter of national emergency deliberate on the issue of indigeneity as against citizenship. It is mere hypocrisy to have a constitution that guarantees citizens right all over Nigeria and then limits it under the guise of protecting indigenes of a particular locality. Indigeneity should be expunged from the constitution and citizenship be emphasised. A nation should not be comfortable tagging her citizen's settlers within her territory. A Residency Rights Bill has been with the national assembly since 2004 sponsored by Senator Jonathan Silas Zwingina. The bill seeks to grant full residency rights to every Nigerian citizen who had lived in a place for at least five years. This should replace the indigeneity clause in the constitution.

- ✓ The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) indicated interest in addressing the cases of rights violations in Plateau state resulting from the conflicts. Presently, this has not started happening. The Commission is advised to speed up their actions in this regard as it concerns the Jos conflict in Plateau and the Toto Conflict in Nasarawa states. This would go a long way to douse the subtle but piling frustrating in the hearts of the residents against the perceived aggressors.
- ✓ For Plateau state: Operation Rainbow is an ideal conflict transformation program if its ideals and intents are followed to conclusion. But it should be made more responsive in terms of spread and efficacy. Instead of its centralized nature, it can be decentralized to the communities where its impact can be felt straight on. It is also hoped that state bureaucracy will not strangle its life before it starts existing. At present, Operation Rainbow is still at its infancy and its performance cannot thus be assessed.
- ✓ The non-implementation of the various recommendations of the commissions of inquiry into the Jos conflict remains a major cause of the recurrence of the conflicts. It is advised that the state government should be bold enough to harmonise these reports and implement them. Those who have been fingered should be punished. This would however require collaboration between the state and the federal government. The commissions included
 - Justice Aribon Fibresima Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the April 1994 Crisis
 - Justice Niki Tobi Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the September 2001 Crisis
 - Presidential Peace Initiative Committee on Plateau State headed by Shehu Idris, Emir of Zazzau, May 2004
 - Plateau Peace Conference (“Plateau Resolves”), 18 August-21 September 2004;
 - Justice Bola Ajibola Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the November 2008 Crisis
 - Presidential Advisory Committee on the Jos Crisis, March-April 2010.
- ✓ For Nasarawa state: It should design a similar program like operation rainbow in Plateau state to address the human security issues of the Bassa/Egbura

conflict. Included also are the Fulani/Bassa farmland tussles in Andafwo, the marble mining at Ugya that is devastating the lands.

- ✓ The Nasarawa state government should also create a separate chiefdom for the Bassa who are numerically superior to other groups in Toto but has had to endure the traditional authority of the Egbura over them since the 80s. This will create a sense of equity and justice that are necessary ingredients for lasting peace in the area.
- ✓ Since time immemorial the Egbura and the Bassa do not inter marry due to no cogent reason other than cultural pride, Nasarawa state government should peacefully find a creative way of letting the two communities see the need to let their children inter marry for the sake of long term peace.

Just as government has a readymade response to crisis, it should also have a readymade response to post conflict developments in form of a policy framework. The framework should capture all aspects of conflict cost and make provisions to adequately address them as is global standard. Margarita Flores (2004:1) corroborates this when she said, “In post conflict situations, priority should be given to investments in education, technology, the protection of vulnerable groups alongside essential infrastructure, as well as policies of income redistribution...strategies designed to assist in post-war rehabilitation needs to address three key dimensions of food security: availability, access and stability”. In Liberia for instance, after the conflict, the government in 1999 launched a “back to farming” campaign in an attempt to make Liberia self-sufficient in food production and to enable agriculture to form the backbone of economic recovery. This was a government policy response to the destructions recorded in agriculture in Liberia. Nigeria should also design similar policies in agrarian communities like Jos and Toto where conflict had led to challenges in agriculture and food shortages, and let it be people-driven in accordance with the spirit of human security or need.

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APPENDICES

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE

SECTION A: violent conflict and means of livelihood

1. In what ways has this conflict affected family income/means of livelihood amongst your group?
2. How has the impacted families been coping?
3. Is it correct to say this conflict induced poverty in the area?
4. Did government assist in this regard?
5. What has been the effects of this?
6. Has any other group or organization apart from government offered any form of assistance in this regard?
7. Has there been any financial compensation since?
8. How do you think government should address this?

SECTION B: violent conflict and food insecurity?

1. The farming communities have become war zones and the metropolis depend on them for food stuff, how has this affected agricultural products in the city?
2. What about the chains of supply (transport, security checkpoints and insecurity)?
3. Any assistance from government on this?
4. Any assistance from any group towards tackling this?
5. What kind of assistance would you recommend for government to address this?

SECTION C: violent conflict and abuse of human rights/insecurity?

1. How has the conflict affected the issue of human rights amongst your group?
2. There are issues of sexual and financial exploitation levied against the security agents how true is this?
3. Is there any connection between this conflict and the noticeable state of insecurity in the city?
4. Have these issues been tabled before any appropriate authorities?
5. Has there been any response?
6. What have your group done on its own to address these issues?
7. Has any group worked with you in respect of human right abuse and insecurity?

8. What is the best way for government to respond to the issues of insecurity and human right abuse?

SECTION D: violent conflict and basic education?

1. How did the conflict affect your children in the primary and secondary schools?
2. Some schools complain of death and school dropout—can your group confirm this?
3. Can we list these effects as they concern the group?
4. Has there been any assistance from government towards this?
5. Has any organization intervened to help?
6. How are your group dealing with these issues?
7. How should this be handled by government?

IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. How long has this conflict been on?
2. Who and who are involved in it?
3. What is its cause?
4. What is your groups interest in it?
5. Have you achieved it yet?
6. What has been the effect of this conflict on your group and on the city?
7. Specifically, how has this conflict affected the income of families?
8. Many of the dispersed traders from the various markets are now on the street hawking—has there been any attempt to rebuild the burnt markets?
9. What of destruction of crops and poisoning of animals, is it also part of the war?
10. Do you think the conflict has increased the poverty level of your group?
11. There are reported cases of midnight raids, ambush, killings and rape. How true is this and how does it affect your group?
12. Has the rate of crime increased because of this conflict?
13. This heightened insecurity around—is it attributable to the proliferation of arms made possible by the conflict?
14. What other factors are breeding the insecurity?
15. What of the security agents almost at every joint—are they not tackling the insecurity?
16. What has it been like having soldiers live on the streets together with civilians for years?
17. Is their activities affecting social life in any way?
18. Are there human right breeches—if yes, please mention them?
19. In what ways did this conflict affect the primary and secondary schools?
20. Did government or any NGO assist in rebuilding the destroyed schools?
21. Any assistance for the loss of income either from government or non-governmental organizations?
22. Has there been any policy to assist the children?
23. Do you have an estimated idea of how many children dropped from your school?
24. What is the impact on absenteeism, enrolment and exam performance?
25. What about punctuations in academic calendar ?

26. Who has been responsible for the burning of the markets?
27. Was there any compensation for the families that lost their means of livelihood in the markets?
28. What is the effect of this conflict on agriculture and agricultural products in the city?
29. Cow rustling was not a problem in the state before the conflict—but now it is a very big issue. Is there a connection between it and the conflict?
30. Were there any kind of assistance for the loss of means of livelihood beyond compensation?
31. Has government rebuilt any of the markets?
32. What is the state of the human right cases?
33. Has there been any intervention on the farms?

SCHEDULE OF IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS AND DATES

| S/N | NAME | DATE | LOCATION |
|-----|---|------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1 | Ohimege of Opanda | 25/4/2013 | Umuaisa, Toto |
| 2 | Berom Community leader | 11/11/2013 | Rayfield, Jos |
| 3 | Afizere Community leader | 12/11/2013 | Plateau Polytechnic, Barikin ladi |
| 4 | The Yoruba leader, Jos | 12/11/2013 | Nasarawa, Jos |
| 5 | Miyetti Allah, Jos | 13/11/2013 | |
| 6 | President and Secretary Traders Association | 26/4/2013 | Tafawa Balewa street |
| 7 | President (BCDU) | 14/4/2013 | Rayfield |
| 8 | Ezeigbo of Jos | 8/11/2013 | New Haven |
| 9 | Nassarawa Comprehensive Model School | 5/4/2013 | Nassarawa Junction, Jos |
| 10 | Premier Comprehensive College | 5/4/2013 | Sarki Arab ward, Jos |
| 11 | Government Secondary School, Tudun Wada | 6/4/2013 | Tudun Wada, Jos |
| 12 | Metropolitan College, Farin Gada | 7/4/2013 | Farin Gada, Jos |
| 13 | Federal Government College | 8/4/2013 | Zaria Road, Jos |
| 14 | Baptist Science Grammer School | 10/4/2013 | Bauchi Ring Road, Jos |
| 15 | LGEA Primary School | 6/4/2013 | Tudun Wada Jos |
| 16 | Command Secondary School | 8/4/2013 | Zaria Road, Jos |
| 17 | Dadinkowa Public Primary School | 14/4/2013 | Dadinkowa Jos |
| 18 | St Luke's Catheral primary | 16/4/2013 | Beside Standard Newspapers, Jos |

| | | | |
|----|--------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| 19 | Toto West Primary School | 3/3/2013 | Toto Town |
| 20 | Government Junior Sec School, Toto | 3/3/2013 | Toto Town |
| 21 | Government Secondary School, Bassa | 15/3/2013 | Ugya |
| 22 | Government Secondary School, Umuaisa | 13/3/2013 | Umuaisa |

| | | | |
|----|-----------------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| 23 | Umuaiasha West Primary School | 13/3/2013 | Umuaiasha |
| 24 | LGEA Primary School, Gadabuke | 12/3/2013 | Gadabuka |
| 25 | LGEA Primary School, Garagwe | 11/3/2013 | Garagwe |
| 26 | Adadu Government Secondary School | 10/3/2013 | Adadu |
| 27 | Auda Primary School | 6/3/2013 | Auda |
| 28 | Andafwo Primary School | 7/3/2013 | Andafwo |

Note: the interviews conducted in the schools were with the school heads

SCHEDULE OF FGDs CONDUCTED AND DATES

| S/N | GROUP | LEVEL | DATE | LOCATION |
|-----|-------------|-------------|-----------|--|
| 1 | Afizere | Adult Male | 30/9/2013 | Plateau Polytechnic Barikin Ladi |
| 2 | ✓ | Adult Women | 1/10/2013 | ✓ |
| 3 | ✓ | Youth | 4/10/2013 | ✓ |
| 4 | Igbo/Yoruba | Adult Male | 19/8/2013 | New Haven |
| 5 | ✓ | Adult Women | 21/8/2013 | Nassarawa, Jos |
| 6 | ✓ | Youth | 23/8/2013 | New Haven |
| 7 | Bassa | Adult Male | 25/3/2013 | Andafwo |
| 8 | ✓ | Adult Women | 26/3/2013 | ✓ |
| 9 | ✓ | Youth | 2/4/2014 | ✓ |

**BEING A POSITION PAPER OF THE AFIZERE NATION ON THE JOS CRISES
SUBMITTED TO CENTRE FOR HUMANI-TARIAN DIALOGUE (HD CENTRE) ON
13TH MAY 2013**

PREAMBLE

Indeed, the Afizere people highly appreciate the concern and desire of HD Centre in finding lasting solution to the lingering crises that have bedeviled Jos and Plateau State for quite sometimes.

The Afizere people of Jos North in particular are among the worst hit by the round of crises that took place in Jos North. We incurred a lot of losses in terms of human and material resources, which, up till now are yet to recover from the traumatic experiences we went through.

We the Afizere nation are aborigines of Jos North, and we recognize that there exist other aboriginal communities in Jos and its environs. Together with these other groups we believe we constitute the indigenes of Jos. That this identity as indigenes qualifies us as individual communities and as a group to certain rights and privileges. This notwithstanding we recognize other groups of Nigerians resident in Jos and its environs as citizens of Nigeria, who equally have under the Constitution their rights and privileges.

Recently the history of Jos and Plateau as a whole has since 1994 been characterized by violent crises. The effects on all of us have been lost of lives and property. We feel that the effect on the Afizere have been even more devastating. Our youth, women, children's means of livelihood, among other things, have been threatened or destroyed. The Afizere have reached a point where, we as a people no longer endorse violence as a means for the resolution of disputes.

While we renounce and denounce violence against all, we wish to embrace collective dialogue as the best way for settling all forms of dispute.

BRIEF HISTORY OF JOS CRISES

Ordinarily, most people believe that the Jos Crises only started in the nineties. But an examination of historical antecedents suggest that the root causes are traceable to the cold war that existed between the indigenes and non-indigenes on the ownership


IMAGES

EMBLEM APPEAL WEEK LAUNCH, 26-GANG MEMBER PARADED IN PIX

The annual Armed Forces Emblem Appeal Week was launched in Jos, on Monday. Also members of a 26-man gang of suspects arrested by men of the Nigerian Army at the UTC Junction were recently paraded before the press.



Plateau State Governor, Jonah Jang (centre) putting heads together with Speaker-PLHA, Hon. Emmanuel Go'ar and Deputy Governor, Mrs. Pauline Talien at the occasion.



Weapons, charms, uniforms and amulets seized from gang members.



Air Commodore I. Shomade, NAF Station Commander 330 Jos (left) with Brig-Gen. Nandu who stood in for the Third Armoured Division, General Officer Commanding (GOC), Major-Gen. Olakunle Akinyemi witnessing the ceremony.



A cross-section of the 26 suspects paraded before the press.



Plateau State, Chief Judge, Justice La'azarus Dakyen, Mrs. Sarah Yusuf, Commissioner of Women Affairs and Social Development, and the representative of the Chairman, Nigerian Legion, Garba Bello Kurgwi, at the launching.



The Chairman Dist Force, Colonel Macaulay showing arms seized from members of the gang arrested at UTC Junction to Plateau State Commissioner of Police, Mr. Gregory Anyateing, at Police Headquarters, during a handing over ceremony.





**AFIZERE CULTURAL & COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION (ACCDA)**

JOS JARAWA DISTRICT BRANCH

MOTTO: KADIDING NKARAK

P.O. BOX 2313, JOS, TEL: 08036077773

Ref.

Your Ref.

Date

5th January 2011.

The Commandant,
Special Joint Task Force,
Plateau State,
Hill Station Junction,
Jos.

Dear Sir,

**SPECIAL JOINT TASK FORCE (SJTF) COMPLICITY IN THE MAIMING AND KILLINGS AT
SJTF SECTOR 2 IN JOS JARAWA (DUTSE- UKU/ ATA ATAAR) PLATEAU STATE NIGERIA.**

Since the establishment of the Special Joint Task Force (SJTF) by the military in January, 2010 with a view to providing security to helpless civilians following out breaks of violence, cases of security lapses which led to the maiming and killings of defenseless and innocent citizens have been confirmed. These have persistently been occurring in the sector area. A few examples will suffice here:

1. As a prelude to the bombings of 24th December, 2010, in the morning of 13th December 2010, hoodlums from Nassarawa, Yanshanu and Rikkos were allowed free passage to execute their nebulous plans with SJTF soldiers on guard. These hoodlums had a primary aim of stopping the erection of a fence at

1. MILITARY IDENTITY CARDS



Umar Hussaini

Army No: 2009NA/64/4307

I.D No. 2009644307

Expires - 2014

Task Force ID Hussaini Umar

Rank: PTE

P/No. 09NA/64/4307

Unit-sector 7



2. Task Force

I.D No. 7122

Name: A. Shehu

Rank: LCPL

P/No. 96NA/41/1501

Unit-sector 7



3. **Staff TAG**
 312 Artillery Regiment
 Kalapanzi barracks
 Kaduna State Kaduna
Mazwoje Tanko
 09NA/62/0835



4. **STF (OP Safe haven)**
 ID No. 7183
 Name: **D. Salisu**
 Rank: PTE
 09NA/64/4246
 Sector 7



5. **Agbo Jonas**
 09NA/64/4797
 09644797

came with us to see the bodies. They made no comment but said they will go back.

Names of deceased

1. Nnamdi John
2. Ekeoma John
3. Ebere John
4. Mrs. Elechi John (Mother)
5. Joseph Davou
6. Gift Amechi - 12yrs
7. Ighechi Amechi - 10yrs
8. Amarachi John - 8yrs
9. Obed Amechi - 5yrs
10. Uchena Amechi (Missing) - 8yrs



The Injured

In an attempt to quell the protest, members of the Nigerian Police Force shot at the protesters, killing one and injuring some. They are now being treated at Bege

HEIPANG VIGILANTE GROUP

17th August, 2011

The Commissioner of Police,
Plateau State Command,
Police Headquarters Jos

Sir,

REPORT OF ATTACK ON HEIPANG COMMUNITY BY SOLDIERS

It is very necessary for us to make a formal report to you to put the records straight so as to know who actually attacked and killed innocent civilians in Heipang at about 12:15am of Monday, 15th August, 2011.

First and foremost, the particular spot where the attack/killings took place is an enclosure located between the Heipang railway round about and the fence of the Jos Airport, a distance of about half a kilometre.

Prior to the time of the attack, there was an unusually large presence of soldiers at the Heipang railway roundabout with three (3) Army Hilux vehicles belonging to the JTF.

At about the said 12:15am gun shots were heard, the entire community was alerted, some members of our vigilante group who were already keeping the watch also made frantic efforts to go to rescue the families under attack but, the routes leading to the houses under attack were blocked by the soldiers with one of their Hilux vehicles parked on the street leading to the Houses under attack.

However, some members of our vigilante group were able to run to the railway station which is the only possible escape route for the attackers with a view to blocking any escaping attackers. But up till day break when our members left the Railway Station and its surroundings, no one attacker was seen, even neighbouring settlements at Kuru, Kwi, Wereng and around the airport area were alerted, yet no sign of any escaping attackers was sighted.

A member of our vigilante group (Mr Pate) who insisted on going into the Houses under attack to rescue/help the victims who were being attacked was stopped and shot severally by the Military Men who later took his body away.

FRESH TRENDS OF ATTACKS ON JOS NORTH, RIYOM AND BARAKIN-LADI LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREAS OF PLATEAU STATE

Plateau State is again engaged in a series of attack. Since 11th August 2011 the Berom Community of Forom Barakin Ladi LGC of Plateau State has been attacked twice.

Resident of Forom reported to Stefanos Foundation that around 12 midnight of Thursday the 11th of August 2011, Mr. Pam John, his son Elijah and his uncle, Gwom Gyang were killed in their house and their daughter was also injured. The Foron community suspected the Bisichi hausa's as the attackers.

Sources said tension mounted in Bisichi on the 10th of August against animal theft that took place at the Fulani settlement close to Bisichi. A Fulani herdsman who was injured in this attack said the attackers were not native Berom people.

Despite this information, the Bisichi hausa in their protest, vowed on carrying out a reprisal attack. The attackers of Pam John's family left behind a military helmet and a blood stained military belt.

This morning the 15th August 2011, Foron again reported another attack which left three people dead, they are, Deme Dung Tsok, Samuel Gwom and Adamu Gwom.

CHWELNYAP 14TH AUGUST UPRISING

On Sunday the 14th August 2011, Muslim rioters took to the street at Chwelnyp junction, Nassarawa Gwom of Jos North around 10am. Three Christians were macheted, one dead and another said to be missing while a woman amongst them was left injured.

Information reaching Stefanos Foundation says the body of one Kamilu Yahaya was found in a stream at Eto-Baba area in Jos North, which caused the uprising which kept so many worshippers in church beyond closing hours.

Clinic and Trauma Care Center, the medical outreach of Stefanos Foundation based at Heipang.



Bulus Choji Nding Tim

Umar Hussaini

Army No. 2009RA/54/4307

ID No. 2009RA4307

Evidence of suspected attackers

The villagers presented Stefanos Foundation with bullet shells collected from the scene and some identity cards and bank documents which they said were also collected from the scene. These, they said were evidences that soldiers were responsible for the attack. While preparing this report, Stefanos Foundation has received several telephone calls from the community, refuting the media reporting that now seeks to distort the facts of this incident.

Callers have expressed frustration over the Army Special Task Force Public Relations Officer's reporting on Nigerian Television Authority. They insist that the military carried out the attack and killed 9 members of their community.

Earlier on, when the Police Commissioner visited the area, the people told him of the involvement of the military. While sympathizing with the community, the Commissioner vowed to do everything possible to expose the truth. The people, while resigning to fate, staggered with trust as they all applauded in affirmation.



**CABINET REPORT ON THE VISIT OF A THREE MAN
DELEGATION FROM THE DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS,
ABUJA ON 28/02/2011.**


At about 3:00pm Monday, 28 day of February, 2011, a three man delegation led by Col.Dan Kochia visited the cabinet on a fact finding mission on the recent Jos Crisis.

The visitors were presented with kola nuts to welcome them into the cabinet. Igwe further prayed with kola for long life and prosperity of cabinet members, the entire Ibos on the Plateau and the visitors. The cabinet Vice-chairman, Chief Tony Moka called for a formal introduction of all the cabinet members present along with the I.C.A exco representative after which the floor was opened for the visitors to address the cabinet on their mission.

Col. Dan introduced his other colleagues as Jerry Davidson and Corp. Uzo Emerogwu. He told the cabinet members that their visit emanated from the reports received at the defense headquarters that Ibos were killed in the recent Jos Crisis before the soldiers. That JTF deployment were biase, soldiers were deployed more to Muslim dominated areas leaving behind Christian dominated areas leading to the killings of our kinsmen. That a Luxurious bus belonging to Ekwos Transport Company was burnt and Christians killed and that Christians were killed in their houses. He said that a press release was made to this effect by Engr. Richard Wayes (Igbo President General) on the 10th of January, 2011.


After introducing their mission, Igwe went down memory lane told the visitors that the killings started on the Christmas eve, 24

TOTO LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA IN NASARAWA STATE



Source: Google.com.ng. Accessed on 5th January 2016

JOS METROPOLIS PLATEAU STATE




Source: Google. Com.ng. Accessed on 5th January, 2016.



Source: Google. Com. ng. Accessed on 5th January, 2016.

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Source: [Http://nigeriawatch.org/index.php?urlaction=evtMap&type=map](http://nigeriawatch.org/index.php?urlaction=evtMap&type=map)
Accessed on 5th January, 2016