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<title>THE POLITICS OF FERTILISER PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION IN BENUE STATE, NIGERIA, 1999-2020</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/2257" rel="alternate"/>
<subtitle/>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/2257</id>
<updated>2026-04-04T14:46:11Z</updated>
<dc:date>2026-04-04T14:46:11Z</dc:date>
<entry>
<title>THE POLITICS OF FERTILISER PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION IN BENUE STATE, NIGERIA, 1999-2020</title>
<link href="http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/2258" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>UGANDEN, Iveren Adoo</name>
</author>
<id>http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/2258</id>
<updated>2024-05-23T07:42:21Z</updated>
<published>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">THE POLITICS OF FERTILISER PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION IN BENUE STATE, NIGERIA, 1999-2020
UGANDEN, Iveren Adoo
Fertiliser procurement and distribution in Benue State has become synonymous with politics&#13;
due to the prolonged involvement of government in the sector. While previous studies&#13;
acknowledge the political elements of fertiliser policies, the effects of official intervention on&#13;
fertiliser procurement and distribution in Benue State have not been sufficiently examined. This&#13;
study was, therefore, designed to examine the effects of official intervention, the determinants&#13;
of the choice of fertiliser policies and the social relations between the political elite and&#13;
smallholder farmers on fertiliser procurement and distribution in Benue State, Nigeria.&#13;
The political economy theories of Structural Violence and Primitive Accumulation provided&#13;
the framework while the descriptive survey design was employed. Purposive sampling&#13;
technique was used to select nine Local Government Areas (LGAs) with the largest farming&#13;
populations. A sample size of 400 participants comprising farmers, traders, artisans, farm&#13;
labourers and wage/salary earners was determined from the nine LGAs using the Taro Yamane&#13;
formula. This sample was proportionally drawn from each LGA and administered with&#13;
structured questionnaire: Katsina-ala (64), Ukum (63), Vandeikya (51), Gboko (68), Gwer-East&#13;
(44), Gwer-West (30), Agatu (18), Oju (32) and Otukpo (30). Structured questionnaire was also&#13;
administered to 34 staff of the Agricultural Department of the state Ministry of Agriculture and&#13;
Natural Resources. In-depth interviews were conducted with two past commissioners of&#13;
agriculture and one fertiliser dealer. The quantitative data were analysed with descriptive&#13;
statistics, t-test, Pearson Correlation Coefficient and ANOVA at 0.05 level of probability while&#13;
content analysis was utilized for qualitative data.&#13;
From the data, 243 respondents (64.5%) were farmers, 197 (56%) earned below ₦200, 000&#13;
yearly, 257 (68.2) were aged 40 and below, 372 (98.7%) cultivated between 1-4 hectares, and&#13;
375 (99.47) used simple tools in cultivation. Official intervention in the form of universal&#13;
subsidy (1999-2011) was characterised by direct participation of government in procurement&#13;
and distribution. Under the targeted subsidy (2012-2015), government withdrew from&#13;
procurement and distribution of fertilisers but retained subsidies. For the zero-subsidy method&#13;
(2016 to 2020), government participation and subsidies were eliminated and private fertiliser&#13;
markets were expanded. There was no significant difference in the effectiveness of forms of&#13;
intervention (t-0.398), a positive correlation was found between quantity of fertilisers&#13;
distributed and quantity obtained by farmers (r-0.834), a significant difference in the quantity&#13;
of subsidized fertiliser desired and quantity obtained by farmers (t-12.59). ANOVA showed a&#13;
significant difference in access to fertilisers between associated and non-associated farmers.&#13;
The objective determinants of fertiliser policies such as market failures and the need to increase&#13;
fertiliser consumption produced policies with inherent potentials for efficient distribution of the&#13;
product. However, subjective factors such as political and pecuniary aims of securing and&#13;
legitimising elective office, rent-seeking and arbitrage circumscribed the efficiency of fertiliser&#13;
distribution.&#13;
The involvement of government in the fertiliser sector created networks for rent-seeking and&#13;
arbitrage which led to uneven distribution of fertilisers. Efficiency in the distribution of&#13;
fertiliser could increase with the government keeping to its policy defined role of regulation&#13;
and a further expansion of private fertiliser markets.
</summary>
<dc:date>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
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